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The quantity of documentary information on the 
subject of Nadir Shah is, at first sight, quite bewildering 
in its immensity; it is, moreover, all the more formidable 
by reason of its polyglot character. When one analyses 
this huge mass of material, however, one can whittle it down 
very considerably, by discarding such works as are mere para­
phrases of those of earlier writers.
Special notes on the sources of outstanding 
importance are given in this introduction; those of lesser 
interest and value are mentioned in the bibliography at the 
end of the book.
For the sake of convenience, the authorities have 
been divided into two groups, namely, Oriental and European.
A* ORIENTAL SOURCES.
I. MIRZA MAHDI KHAN.
MIrzS Muhammad Mahdl Kaukabi Astarnbadl was, as his 
name implies, a native of the northern Iranian province of 
AstarabM.^* The dates of Mirza Mahdi1s birth and death are 
not recorded. He was probably born towards the close of the 
XVIIth or in the beginning of the XVTIIth century A.D.; there 
is evidence to show that he was still living in 1172 or 1175 A.H. 
(1758/59 or 1759/60).2
In consequence of* his northern origin and upbringing, 
MIrza Mahdl acquired a profound knowledge of Turki or Eastern 
Turkish. He stated, in the preface to his Turki-Iranian 
dictionary, the Sangllkh, that he greatly enjoyed reading 
Turki poetry.^
It is not recorded when Mirza Mahdi first met Nadir 
or on what date he entered the latter!s service. As he 
belonged to Astarabad, he may, originally, have been employed 
by FatheA H Khan, the well-known chief Of the local Ashaqbash
1 C. Schefer, in his fChrestomathie Persane*, Paris, 1885, Vol.II 
page 2359 states that Mirza Mahdl was born in MSzandaran, 
apparently because Jones substitutes nMazandaranin for 
^Astarabadi” in his preface.
^ See the two chronograms at the end of MlrzS Mahdlfs Turki- 
Iranian dictionary, the fSanglSkhf, which purport^ -to give 
the date of the completion of that work; it is'Known which 
of these dates is the correct one. See C. Rieu»s Catalogue 
of the Turkish Manuscripts* in the British Museum, London, 
1888, page 265.
 ^Rieu, o£. cit.. p.265*
2.
Qajars,'** and may have accompanied Fath^ll Khan when the 
latter joined fihala Tahmasp at Sari, in M&zandar'&n, in the 
spring of 1726; in that case, he would have first come into 
contact with Nftdir in the following autumn, at Khabtlshan 
(Quchan); all this is, however, merely conjectural* It 
seems evident, from the intimate knowledge which Mirza Mahdl 
displays of affairs of state in those times, that he obtained 
some post at TahmHsp's court in 1726, or shortly afterwards.
Mirza Mahdi was, perhaps from the very beginning of 
his royal service, in the office of raqam (royal order) writers 
and calligraphists or royal secretariat, of which he later 
became chief, with the title of Munshi Al-Mamalik. It was 
he who, in January 1751* composed the preamble to the contract 
of marriage between NadirTs eldest son, Rida Qull, and Fatima 
Begum, one of the daughters of ShSh SultSn Husain.5
It was not until the day of Nadirfs coronation (8th 
March 175&) that Mirza Mahdl was appointed official historio­
grapher. The Armenian Catholicos, Abraham of Crete (on whose
 ^The Qajars of Astarabad were divided into two branches or 
clans, known as the Yokharibash and the Ashaqbash; these 
branches were so called because they had at one ftime occupied, 
respectively, the upper and lower parts of Shah‘Abbas's 
fortress^  of Mubarakabad there. See C. Huartfs article on 
the Qajars in E.I., Vol.II, page 61J. FatheAlI Khan Qajar 
was the grandfather of Agha Muhammad, the first Qajar Shlh, 
and great-grandfather of FathiAli Shah.
 ^This title, meaning literally "Secretary of the Kingdoms”, 
may be translated as 'Secretary of State'.
* _
J This preamble is given in Mirza Mahdl's ’Durra-yi-Nadira', (a 
history of Nadir of which details will be given below) Bombay 
lithographed edition, 1295 A.H. (1876/77), pages 93 and 94.
In thi^ <£onng^ion, see Schefer's nChrestomathie Per sane"
authority the last statement is made)^, describes MlrzS. MahdX 
as ”un homme sage et modeste, intelligent, de moeurs douce, 
et portS h la condescendancew, The representatives in Iran 
of the East India Company, who had many dealings with Mirza 
Mahdl in connection with the Company’s endeavours to secure 
the renewal of its privileges, found him, on the whole, 
reasonable and honest.
MIrzS Mahdl was well qualified for his new post. In 
his previous capacity, he had made himself familiar with every­
thing of importance that occurred at the court, and he must 
have had almost unique opportunities of ascertaining the facts 
of Nadir’s early life; he was, moreover, an accomplished 
linguist, being well versed in Iranian, Arabic, Turki and 
Ottoman Turkish.
It is unfortunate, however, that Mirza MahdT, when 
compiling Nadir’s biography, should have had to write his book 
in such a form and in such a manner as to please his royal 
master.5 The natural result is that the Ta’rTkh-i-Nadiri4
contains, in certain instances, exaggerated and distorted
 ^See M. F. Brosset’s French translation of the Catholicos’s 
interesting work, entitled ”Mon Histoire et Celle de Nadir, 
Chah de Perse”, in Brosset’s ^Collection d’Ristoriens 
Armeniens”, St. Petersburg, 1876, Vol.II, page 3^ 2*
* ibidem, page 505.
5 This statement, as will be seen below, does not apply to the 
last few pages of the Ta’rlkh-i-Nadirl, which were written 
after Nadir’s death.
^ No title is mentioned in the work itself, but this is the one 
by which it is usually known; it is sometimes called the 
Ta ’ rTkh-i-J ahangushai-yi-Nadir!.
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versions of what actually occurred; also, several important 
incidents are omitted altogether*
Owing, no doubt, to the circumstances under which it 
was written, the Ta’rlkh-i-Nadirl gives but little information 
as to NSdir’s personal appearance and characteristics; fortu­
nately, this deficiency can be largely made good by drawing 
upon other sources. Another matter on which Mirza Mahdl might,
hbXfc
had conditions been different,/thrown more light, is the
veritable nature of NSdir’s religious beliefs.
Fear of Nadir’s displeasure can hardly, however, have
been the reason why MTrzS Mahdr scarcely mentions the subject
of Nadir’s naval policy; the cause of his failure to deal
adequately with this important question is a mystery. Nadir’s
efforts to create and maintain fleets on the Persian Gulf and
the Caspian Sea were truly remarkable.
Notwithstanding these defects, the Ta’rTkh-i-NadirT
is an invaluable record of Nadir’s life, and, as such, it affords
the only sound foundation upon which a critical account of his
whole career can be based.^
The Ta'rikh-i-NadirT gives, with a wealth of detail,
particulars of Nadir’s wars and punitive expeditions, but the
2author fails sometimes to give accurate geographical data.
The difficulties to which this defect has given rise are
 ^See, however, the remarks on Muhammad Kazim’s KitSb-i-NadirT 
on pages9&3Cbelow. The portions of this work which are extant 
only relate to the years 1756-1747*
2 For example, Mirza Mahdl’s account of the routes followed by 
Nadir on his Mesopotamian campaign in 1/53 is extremely 
difficult to follow.
aggravated by the large number of mistakes in place names, 
owing, doubtless, to careless copying. It is to be regretted 
that no carefully edited and well printed text of the Ta’rlkh- 
i-Nadirl exists; some of the earlier MSS. are comparatively 
free from mistakes, but the Bombay and Tabriz lithographed 
editions teem with errors.
Despite an occasional over-indulgence in hyperbolic 
expressions (notably, on the occasion of the festival of Nau 
RHz) and a somewhat wearisome repetition of flowery epithets 
when describing Nldir and his troops, MTr£a MahdT’s style, in 
the Tar’ikh-i-Nadirl, is not unpleasing. His vocabulary is 
vast, and it is interesting to note, from his use of a number 
of Mongol and Turco-Mongol military expressions, that these 
were still, in his time, in use in Iran.
Mirza Mahdl completed the Ta’rTkh-i-Nadirr after he 
had returned from Constantinople in 1747*^ During his absence, 
Nadir Shah had been assassinated, and he could therefore write 
at last without restraint. In the concluding portion of his 
book, Mirza Mahdl describes graphically the terrible change that 
took place in Nadir1s character after the attempt upon the Shah’s 
life in 1741, the blinding of Rida QulX Mirza (which he had 
previously omitted to mention), and the horrors of the last few 
years of Nadir’s reign. It is a matter for profound regret 
that Mirza Mahdl did not completely revise or re-write his work,
 ^Particulars will be given in due course of the diplomatic
mission to the Porte on which Mirza Mahdl was sent after the 
signature of the peace with Turkey in 1746.
6.
Instead, he seems to have given himself up to the completion
of the Sanglfikh.
Before leaving the subject of the Xafi^kh-i-Nadirr,
it is necessary to make some mention of Sir William Jones *s
1
French translation of it. One is apt, at first, to criticise 
Jones severely for the vast number of mutilated names which 
disfigure his translation, as well as for his incorrect con­
version of the majority of the Muhammadan dates. It must, 
however, be borne in mind that, apart from the fact that the
task of translating the Ta’rikh-i-NadirX was forced upon Jones
2and that it was distasteful to him, he had no personal 
knowledge of Iran* Moreover, there were not, at that time, 
any really accurate maps of that country, and books of 
reference were but few in number. Even to-day, with all the 
facilities which now exist, it would be impossible to make a 
translation of the Tarikh-i-Nadiri that would be free from 
error, the main reason being that a number of the names 
mentioned cannot now be identified. As to the dates, there 
was no conversion table like that of Wustenfeld in existence 
in Sir William Jonesfs times.
Sir W. Jones published, in 1773? an abridged English 
version of his translation: in the same year, T. S. Gadebusch’s
1 This translation, entitled ”Histoire de Nader Chah, traduite 
du Persan par ordre de sa Majeste le Roi de Dannemark^, was 
first published in London in 1770* Tbe Iranian MS. from 
which Jones made his translation is now in the Kongelige 
gLbJ^ gJjek aj C o ^ e n h ^ g ^ n * c h a s e d  this MS. in Shiraz
 ^See p a g e s o f  Sir William Joneses preface to his wIntro­
duction to the History of the Life of Nadir Shah”, in Volume 
XII of his works, London, 1807.
 __________________________________________
German translation of Jones’s French text was published at 
Greifswald, and, at a later date, the Tsarevich David (the son 
of Giorgi XII, the last Georgian king) made a Georgian transla­
tion of it (see B. Dorn’s ’Catalogue des Manuscrits et 
Xylographs Orientaux de la Bibliotheque Imperiale Publique de 
St. Petersbourg’, 1852, page 295)*
Mirza Mahdils second work on Nadir Shah* the Durra- 
yi-Nadira, although a monument to his erudition, is also a 
manifestation of his bad taste* It is written throughout in 
the objectionable artificial style which Wassaf originated in 
the 4th century A.H* The text is so overloaded with recondite 
Arabic words as to be almost unintelligible, even to well- 
educated Iranians; how the work could have made any appeal to 
an illiterate man like Nadir is a mystery. If one may imitate 
one of Mirza Mahdl’s metaphors, he gave, in this book, free 
rein to the high-mettled steed (tausan) of his verbosity and 
pedantry; in the Ta’rikh-i-NadirT the author mercifully kept 
his steed in check, except for an annual Nau Ruz gallop.
The Durra-yi-Nadira contains but little that is not 
to be found in the Ta’rlkh-i-Nadirl; it is, however, of some 
use for the purpose of checking the place-names and dates given 
in the latter work. Itseems in the highest degree unlikely 
that the Durra-yi-Nadira will ever be translated into any 
European language; to do so would be a singular waste of effort 
and time.
 ^The preamble to Rida Qull Mirza’s contract of marriage which, 
as stated on page 3 above, is in the Durra-yi-Nadira, is not 
contained in his official biography.
In his concluding words in the Ti^rikh-i-Nadirl, 
Mirza Mahdl expressed his intention of writing a history of 
the period following Nadir *s death. Whether he ever carried 
out this intention is not known; in all probability, his 
preoccupation with the Sanglakh prevented him from doing so.
Some other specimens of Mirza MahdTfs writings exist. 
There is the letter from Nadir to Rida Qull Mirza which he 
composed, informing the Prince of the victory at Karhal;^ 
other letters of Mirza Mahdifs are included in a collection of 
documents published in Tehran in 1285 (1868/69)*^
II. MUHAMMAD KAZIM. OF MERY.
For many years Mirza Mahdl! »s Ta*rikh-i-NadirT, the 
official biography of Nadir Shah, was looked upon as the most 
important source of information respecting that monarch. The 
late Professor Barthold expressed the opinion, however, that 
Muhammad Kazim!s biography, which is known as the Nadir-Nama 
and the Kitah— i-Nadirl, is of even greater importance.
The text of this letter is given by the contemporary Indian 
historian Muhammad Bakhsh in his Tafrl.kh-i-Shahadat-i- 
Farrukh Siyar va JalTIs-i-Muhammad Shah (India Office 
Iranian MS.No.422), foil. 509(b) “ 515(b); _Mubammad Bakhsh 
states that this letter was written by Mirza MahdT. An 
English translation of the letter, by Sir John Malcolm, is 
in "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, pages 559“547 • It is pro­
bable that Mfrza Mahdr drafted NSdir!s letter to Muhammad 
‘All Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, which Sir J. Malcolm also 
translated (see "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, pages 555-559), 
and there can be but little doubt that his pen was responsi­
ble for the treaty of cession which Nadir compelled Muhammad 
Shah to sign at Delhi in 1759-
o
This volume, according to Schefer, is called the Munsha»at-i- 
Mahdi; I have had no opportunity of examining it, so I am 
unable to say whether its contents throw any further light
uoon Nadir. 9.
Muhammad £azimfs work was originally in three volumes, of which 
the first is, unfortunately, missing; the remaining volumes 
cover the period from 1756 to 1747* Only one copy of this 
work is known to exist; it is in the Institut Yostokovedenia, 
at Leningrad*
As I have never seen Muhammad Nazim’s MSL,^* it is• $ 9
useless for me to attempt to add to the notice of it which 
Professor Minorsky gives in his excellent ”Esquisse d,une 
Histoire de Nader-Chah.”^
III. MUHAMMAD MUHSIN.
Muhammad Muhsin, fAmil-i-Divan, of Isfahan, was a 
mustaufi or treasury official in the service of Nadir Shah. In 
the preface to his general history, entitled the ZubdatuH- 
Tawarlkh (”Cream of the Histories”), he states that Nadir 
ordered him to compile the work for the use of his eldest son 
RidS Qull Mirza. The work was composed in 1154 A.H. (1741/1742), 
after Nadirfs return from Bukhara and KhWSrazm and not long 
before the unfortunate Prince was blinded.
1
Realising the extreme importance of studying this unique MS., I 
endeavoured to obtain the loan of it from the Institut 
Vostokovedenia, but the authorities of the Institut were un­
able to accede to my request because the MS. was then in use.
I then tried to get a photostat copy made of the MS., but the 
figure which the Institut quoted for carrying out this work 
was beyond my limited means. Thanks to the kindness of 
M. Litvinov, I have been assured that, if I ever visit 
Leningrad, the Institut will give me every facility for study­
ing this and any other MS. of interest to me.
Publication de la Soci6t6 des Etudes Iraniennes et de l!Art 
Persan, No.10, Paris, 1954, page 46.
The Zubdatu1t-Tawarikh begins with Adam, but it is 
not until the era of the later Safavis is reached that it be­
comes really detailed. Rieu is certainly justified in saying 
that the latter part of the chapter on the Safavis is ”of 
special importance as being a contemporary record of the decline
of the Safavl dynasty and of the rise of NSdir ShSh down to the
1
time of his assumption of the royal title.n
Although not so complete as the Tlfrlkh-i-Nadiri, the
Zubdatu1t-Tawarikh nevertheless contains certain particulars
which are not to be found in the former work, and the portion
respecting the relations between Shah Tahmasp II and Nadir merits
close attention.
The chronology, owing, perhaps, to careless copyists,
2is frequently faulty , and the haphazard arrangement of some of 
the chapters or sections is confusing.^ The author makes a 
surprising blunder when he states that Baghdad surrendered to 
Nadir when he besieged it for the second time, after the defeat 
and death of Topal Osman Pasha. Notwithstanding these defects,
1 See Rieu’s 15Supplementary Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts
in the British Museum,” London, 1898, pages 24 and 2 5.
2 Several of the dates relating to the Afghan wars are two or even
three years out, and in some places, in the late Professor 
Browne’s manuscript (N0.G.I5 in ”A Descriptive Catalogue of 
the Oriental MSS. belonging to the late E. G. Browne ...”, 
Cambridge, 1952), blanks have been left where dates should 
have been inserted. This MS. is far more legible than the 
one in the British Museum (0 R.3498).
 ^For example, a detailed account of the revolt of Mir Wais and
the Afghan wars follows the chapter devoted to the assembly on
the Mughan plain and Nadir’s accession.
4 See Fol.217(b).
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this work is one of the most important contemporary sources 
for Nadir's early career, and it is to be regretted that it 
stops short with his accession to the throne in 1736. It has 
the appearance of having been written quite independently of 
the Ta'rlkh-i-NsTdirl.
IV. SHAIKH MUHAMMAD ALI HAZIN.
The Tadhkiratu' 1-Ahwal^ * of Shaikh Hazln is an important 
contribution to the history of the era of Nadir Shah. It re­
presents the view point of one of the few men of culture and 
literary taste who lived in, and survived, those troubled times, 
when, in Iran at any rate, the pen was much less mighty than the 
sword.
The Shaikh has much to say of the devastation and 
ruin vrtiich Nadir brought upon the country of which he had been, 
at first, the saviour. It was, in fact, the Shaikh's distress 
at seeing the manner in which the Iranian people were oppressed 
that made him decide to leave Iran for India in 1734.^ Shaikh
T------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
x The Iranian text was edited by F. C. Belfour and published in 
London in 1831*
 ^Lutf cAli Beg Adhar, the author of the Atash-Kada", in the 
portion of that work entitled "Ahw£l-i-Muc Asirin" ("Condi­
tions of Contemporaries"), remarks upon the lack of literary 
men and poets during this epoch: he sajs "The suspicion of
the soul and the disordered state (of affairs) are such that 
no one is in the mood to read poetry or to write it."
 ^See F.C.Belfour's English translation of the Ahwal, entitled 
"The Life of Shaikh Mohammed Ali Hazin", page 251* Belfour, 
in the preface to his translation, quotes (on pages v and vi) 
some lines from'Abdu'l-Karlm's Bayan-i-Waqi*, which he trans­
lates as follows: "An illustrious person has observed, that 
the language of the Sheikh_on this subject is not worthy of 
attention, because they (Nadir Shah and he) were enemies to 
each other, and the venerable Sheikh from fear of him (NSdir 
Shah), honoured India as the place of his retirement." The 
identity of this 'illustrious person1 is not disclosed.
12.
Hazin, though a partisan of the legitimate Safavi line, praises 
at times Nadir's prowess as a military leader, and his version 
of the Indian invasion is not unfair to the conqueror. The 
Shaikh's descriptions of Nadir's battles are not of the slightest 
value. He did not witness any of the battles of which he 
writes; being anything but a fighting man, he always found 
some excuse to absent himself whenever a clash of arms seemed 
Imminent. He says that only two Iranian troops were wounded 
at MihmandHst and that no more than three were killed and a 
score slightly wounded at KamaU^-
No biographical details of the Shaikh are given here, 
because they can be found in F. C. Belfour's English translation 
of the Ahw&l. cAbdu' 1-Karlm Kashmir? (see pagesljd^ below) and 
Sayyid Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai2 have utilised the Ahwal to 
some extent in the preparation of their respective works.
V. KHWAJA ABDU'L-KARIM KASHMIRI.
'Abdu'1-Karim, the son of Aqibat Mahmud, of Kashmir^, 
the author of the Bayan-i-Waqif, before recounting, in that work, 
his personal experiences when in the service of Nadir Shah, 
devotes a number of pages to the conqueror's origin, and exploits 
up to the time of the Indian invasion.3 Whilst this portion of 
the Bayan is not based on first-hand observation and knowledge,
See F. C. Belfour's English translation of the Ahwal, entitled 
"The Life of Sheikh Mohammed Ali Hazin", pages 193 and 299*
2 The author of the Siyaru'l-Muta'akhkhirTn.
 ^See foll.4(a)-15(a) of the Iranian MS. Add.8909 at the British 
Museum.
13.
it Is, nevertheless, of very considerable value* The author, 
having no reason to fear Nadir's resentment, writes freely 
and without exaggeration of his humble start in life; he 
gives, moreover, some anecdotes and interesting personal 
details regarding Nadir which are not to be found in Mirza 
Mahdl's official biography. * Abdu* 1-KarTm states that he ob­
tained his information from old companions of the Shah; if, 
he says, there are any errors in his narrative, it is their 
fault, and not his own; some of his information is derived 
from the Ahwal and other writings of Shaikh Hazin.
The portion of the Bayan which is based on the 
author's personal observation and experiences begins with an • 
account of Nadir's stay in Delhi, where rAbdu*l-KarIm was at 
that time* Being desirous of performing the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, he entered the Shah’s service, and accompanied the 
Iranian army on its return march to Iran and on the Turkistan 
campaign; on reaching Qazvln he obtained permission from the 
Shah to resign and to proceed to Mecca.
‘Abdu'l-Karlm furnishes a number of particulars of 
the return of the army to Iran and of the conquest of Bukhara 
and Khwarazm which are omitted by Mirza Mahdl, while his des­
cription of the hardships of the troops when passing through 
the Kurram valley in December 1739 and their similar 
experiences in that of the Gurgan some fifteen months later,
1 Pol. 101(b).
does much to amplify the official account*'1' Through his
close association with the capable Indian physician Alavi Khan
.(whom Nadir had taken into his service at Delhi), *Abdu11-KarTm
learnt much of Nadir’s physical and mental condition, and his
2remarks on this subject are of decided interest.
No complete English translation of the Bayan-i-Waqic
has yet appeared. In 1798 Francis Gladwin published, in
Calcutta, his ”Memoirs of Khojeh Abdulkureem1*, but Gladwin
omitted all the earlier portion of the work; his translation
(in which there is room for improvement) begins with Nadir’s
departure from Delhi. Lieutenant H. G. Pritchard translated
this early part, together with much that Gladwin had already
3
done, for Sir H. M. Elliot, but only a comparatively small
4portion of Pritchard’s translation has been published.
VI. MIRZA MUHAMMAD SHIRAZI.
Mirza Muhammad, the son of Abu’l-Qasim, of ShTraz 
wrote his Ruznama or autobiography in 1200 A.H. (1785/1786) 
when he was an old man. Professor Sa‘id Naficy, of Tehran, 
possesses a MS. of this autobiography, of which he has been
 ^Foil.52(a) and 6l(b) respectively.
2 See foil.66(b) and 99(b).
5 Pritchard’s translation (in manuscript) is contained in the 
British Museum MS. Add.50782, foil.64-112.
^ Extracts from this translation are given in Elliot and
Dowson’s ”The History of India as told by its own Historians” 
London, 1877# Vol.VIII; those relating to Nadir are on 
pages 126-152.
15.
kind enough to send me a typewritten copy.***
The first 21 pages of this typewritten copy are con­
cerned with the trials and adventures of the author and his 
family during the Afghan period and that of1 the supremacy of 
Nadir. Mirza Muhammad gives much prominence in his autobio­
graphy to events in-Fars and, above all, in Shiraz, and the 
particulars which he gives of Nadir’s expulsion of the Afghans 
from that city are of interest. He relates that, with the 
return of security at the beginning of Nadir’s reign, the 
havoc wrought by the Afghans in and around Shiraz was in due 
course repaired, and the gardens and fertile land in the 
vicinity were cultivated afresh; in this taskthe inhabitants 
were, he says, aided by extraordinarily abundant rain, which 
led to the saying: "Shiraz has become Mazandaran. ” 2
As is natural, Mirza Muhammad has much to say regard­
ing the revolt of Muhammad TaqI Khan Shirazi, the Beglarbeg*of 
Fars, in 1744. Fasa’i, the author of the Farsnama-yi-Nasiri,^ 
cites Mirza Muhammad as one of his authorities for his des­
cription of this uprising. Mirza Muhammad deplores the 
terrible fate of Shiraz and its gardens in consequence of TaqI 
Khan's revolt, but he regards as excessive the punishment which 
Nadir meted out to TaqI Khan. He speaks of the vow which 
Nadir had taken never to injure TaqI Khan, and states that the
 ^It consists of 115 pages.
2 Page 9 of the autobiography.
5 See page 195 of the Tehran lithographed edition, published in 
Dhu’l-Qa’da 1512 A.H. (April/May 1895)*
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Shah tried to conciliate the rebel Governor before taking 
extreme measures.**"
VII. LUTF *ALI BEG ADHAR.
Only a brief notice need be accorded to Lutf 'All 
Beg Adhar, the author of the well-known work, the Atash-Kada. 
In the section of his book entitled ,Ahwal-i-Muiasirinl or 
Conditions of Contemporaries"^ Lutf 'All Beg gives a brief 
historical outline from the time of the Afghan invasion up 
to the advent of Karim Khan half a century later* In this 
outline the author makes a number of references to Nadir and 
his campaigns and to events that occurred during his reign.
He states, in concluding his remarks on Nadir, that the 
numerous revolts towards the end of his reign so maddened him 
that he determined to ruin Iran. As stated in the notice re­
garding Shaikh Hazin, Lutf ‘All Beg remarks upon the great 
scarcity of poets and men of letters during the half century 
covered by his outline of events.5
Pages 16-21 of the autobiography.
^ Only the first 189 pages of the Bombay lithographed edition 
of 1277 A.H. (1860/61) have been numbered; as this section 
comes later in the book, no exact reference can be given. 
Some of the dates given in the above edition are incorrect.
 ^The late Professor E. C. Browne has drawn attention to this 
remark in his nPersian Literature in Modern Times11 (the 
final volume of his "Literary History of Persia"), page 282.
VIII. TAHIR BEG.
Tahir Beg, who appears to have been a native of the 
Darragaz district of Khurasan, wrote a history of Nadir 
entitled the Tafrikh-i-Nadir, a MS. copy of which is preserved 
at Tehran. Tahir Beg served in N2dir!s army, but remained 
in India when Efadir returned to Iran; he afterwards entered 
the service of Shuja hi'd-Daula. In the Bibliotheque Nationale 
at Paris there is an anonymous and incomplete history of Nadir 
Shah extending up to the year 1155 A.H. (1759/40) which may, 
it is thought, be by Tahir Beg.^ In 1798 Colonel Gentil, the 
Author of the ^Abr^g^ Historique des Souverains de lilndoustan”, 
1772, (Bibliotheque Nationale MS. Fr.24219)^ presented the 
Bibliothfeque Nationale with this anonymous MS. Colonel Gentil 
stated that he obtained his data regarding Nadirfs origin from 
a certain?Taerbegui*, evidently Tahir Beg. Jean Otter (see 
notice No.IV of the European authorities) says, in the preface 
to his V^oyages en Turquie et en Perse1, that he deposited in 
the Bibliotheque du Roi nune Relation en Langue Persanne, 
ecrite a Dilli l*an 1155 lfhegiren, from which he had ob­
tained some of his information regarding Nadir. The mention 
of the date 1155 A.H. led me to think that Otter?s MS. might 
possibly be the anonymous one referred to above. I made
 ^Professor Sa*!d Naficy informed me of the existence of this
MS.
 ^See the description of this MS. is M. Blochet’s Catalogue des 
Manuscrits Persans” in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, 
1905, Vol.I., pages 502 and 5^ 5*
5
I have not been able to consult Colonel Gentil^ work.
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enquiries of M. Blochet, who, besides being good enough to 
inform me that the anonymous MS. was presented to the 
Bibliotheque by Colonel Gentil fifty years after Otter’s death, 
stated that no trace can now be found of the MS. which Otter 
claims to have deposited. Blochet says that Otter’s state­
ment may have been incorrect or that, if Otter was right, the 
MS. in question has since been lost.
I have sent photostat copies of the first and last 
pages of the Paris MS. to Professor Naficy at Tehran, so that
they may be compared with the authentic Tahir Beg MS. there.
«
I am now awaiting Professor Naficy’s reply.
As I have had no opportunity of studying either the 
Tehran copy of Tahir Beg or the anonymous Paris MS., I am not 
in a position to express any opinion on their merits or demerits.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS.
Sir John Malcolm, in his ’History of Persia’, gives 
translations of passages from a number of Iranian MSS, some 
apparently contemporary or nearly so, that relate to Nadir; 
unfortunately, he does not in all cases give the names of the 
authors; it would be of interest to know whether these MSS. are 
still in existence, and if so, where they are.
Space does not permit me to give separate notices here 
of the numerous Indian authors (except rAbdu’l-Karim Kashmiri) who 
have written on the subject of Nadir. The majority of these
writers confine their attention to Nadirfs invasion of India; 
references will be made in the footnotes to a number of these 
writers, who will, moreover, be mentioned in the Bibliography.
B. EUROPEAN SOURCES
I. THE STATE PAPERS AT THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.
The correspondence exchanged between Whitehall and 
the British diplomatic representatives at Constantinople and 
St. Petersburg during the years 1729-1747^, although concerned 
for the most part with affairs in Turkey and Russia respective­
ly and with the policy of the British Government in regard there
- — 2to, nevertheless contains many references to Nadir Shah . The 
despatches from Constantinople frequently had, as enclosures, 
official communiques (in Italian) from the Porte to the foreign 
diplomatic corps at that city respecting the wars with Iran, 
while those from St. Petersburg were sometimes accompanied by 
translations of reports from Kalushkin, the Russian Minister at 
the court of Nadir Shah, and of letters from Russian commanders
A complete list of these representatives, with the dates of 
their appointments to and transfers from the Russian and 
Turkish capitals will be found in D.B.HornTs nBritish Diploma­
tic Representatives* 1689-I789n, published by the Camden 
Society, London, 1952, pages 111-115 for Russia and 152-155 
for Turkey.
2 The St. Petersburg despatches (and many of the replies from
London) are contained in the series S.P.91, Volumes X to XLVI 
(1728-1748), while the Constantinople despatches are in the 
series S.P.97, Volumes XXV^o XXXIII.
on the frontiers of Iran and Turkey. Also, the despatches 
themselves, by describing the reactions of the Turkish and 
Russian Courts to ther- reports which they received of the 
ebb and flow of Nadir*s fortunes, supplement the valuable 
accounts to be found in the pages of von Hammer-Purgstall and 
Soloviev.^ *
In the correspondence between the Northern Department 
and the representatives at St. Petersburg much space is devoted 
to the British trade with Iran via Russia, and a large propor­
tion of this space is taken up with the Elton controversy and 
the difficulties of the Russia Company. There are, for 
example, memoranda by Elton himself, copies (in defective 
German) of the accusations against him by Bakunin, the Russian 
Consul at Resht> a hitherto unpublished letter on the subject 
written by Jonas Hanway at Astrakhan in November 1744* and 
many other documents of interest. The material regarding this 
question of the British transit trade with Iran is, in fact, so 
abundant that only a relatively small proportion of it can be 
utilised in a work dealing primarily with Nadir Shah. This 
subject of the British trade connection with Iran via Russia 
Is one which merits separate treatment.
II. THE RECORDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.
The archives of the East India Company at the India 
Office are a rich mine of information respecting the period of
See the separate notes regarding these two historians.
21.
■i am
Nadir Shah* Not only is much of this information not to be 
found elsewhere, but the bulk of it has never been utilised 
before* The most important of these records, in so far as 
the subject of Nadir Shah is concerned, is the Gombroon Diary, 
wherein the Agent in Council at Gombroon (BandarcAbbas), re­
corded the day-to-day activities and transactions of the Company 
at that place, besides mentioning many events that occurred 
elsewhere. Volumes IV (1728-1737), V (1737-1746) and VI 
(1746-1752) of the "Persia - Persian Gulf" series of the India 
Office Records contain the portions of the Diary that deal with 
the period under review* Volume XV of the same series (cover­
ing the period 1729-1752) contains a large number of letters 
from the Agent in Council at Gombroon and from the representa­
tives of the Company at Isfahan, Basra, etc*, which supplement 
the data contained in the Diary and to some extent bridge the 
occasional gaps in that record. These gaps were caused through 
certain portions of the Diary being lost when pirates captured 
the vessels that were conveying these portions from Gombroon to 
Bombay*^
Further data are to be found in the Bombay records of 
the Company, but, as these are very voluminous and naturally 
relate mainly to India, it is no easy matter to extract the 
relevant material* J* A. Saldanha, in his Selections from 
State Bapersn (Calcutta 1908), has drawn upon the Bombay records
1 The periods so affected are 27th July 1758-l6th August 1759 
and 51st July 1744-I7th August 1745*
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to some extent, but his work, besides being very incomplete, is 
marred by an extraordinary number of misprints. Some addi­
tional information is to be found in the Surat Commercial 
Diary and Consultations.
The Gombroon Diary and the letters contained in 
Volume XV throw much light upon the relations of the Company 
with the Iranian Government, the naval policy of Nadir Shah, 
and the course of events in the Persian Gulf, as well as 
happenings at Isfahan, Kirman, Shiraz and Basra, where the 
Company had representatives. There are, for example, most 
graphic descriptions of the Iranian attempts to capture Basra 
in 1755 and 1745> and much valuable data respecting the 
relations between the Iranian Government and the Gulf Arabs, 
the Iranian campaigns infDman and Nadirfs great bid to establish 
Iranian naval supremacy in the Gulf. These records make at 
times pathetic reading: the staff often had to undergo severe
hardships, and to run terrible risks. A number lost their 
lives from illness and one employee Y/as murdered during a dis­
turbance.
Although these records contain so much that is of 
value in respect to affairs that came within the orbit of the 
Company’s representatives, they have, nevertheless, to be used 
with some caution in so far as they deal with events in other 
parts of Iran or Turkey.
There is doubtless a vast amount to be gleaned from
the archives of the Dutch East India Company; I much regret 
that I have been unable to examine these Dutch records.
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III. JAMES FRASER, of REELIG.
W. Irvine, in his brief article entitled !TSome Notes
1 -  —  2 on James Fraser” 7 describes Fraser’s nNadir Shah” as ”a first­
hand contribution to the history of the period, important not 
only by reason of its early date, but because of the number 
of original documents it has preserved, documents not to be 
found elsewhere.® The only word to which one might take some 
exception in the above passage is "first-hand”, because Fraser 
was never in Iran and, although he was in India during Nadir’s 
invasion of that country, he did not come into personal contact 
with the conqueror.
So far as can be ascertained, James Fraser was
employed as a Writer in the Surat, Cambay and Ahmadabad factories
3
of the East India Company from 175° to 1740.
Fraser states, in his preface (page iv), that during 
the last three years of his (first) stay in India (i.e. from
 ^Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1899* pages 214-220.
2
It appears, from the ’’Gentleman’s Magazine” for January 1742 
(page 5w, that the first edition appeared in that month) 
the price was 4/-. The second edition was published in 
March 1742.
 ^Dictionary of National Biography. I have been unable to dis­
cover, in the Surat records, any reference either to Fraser’s 
arrival there in 1750 or to his departure ten years later (he 
returned to England in 1740 in order to arrange for the pub­
lication of his book); it is known, however, that he was at 
Surat during muchj. If not ■th^ "wholo^ of that period. Fraser 
did not become a member of the Council of Surat until after 
his return there in October 1745) his appointment thereto is 
mentioned in a letter from Surat to London dated the 31st 
October of that year (see the India Office Volume No.l^ entit­
led ’Bombay letters received - 20th January 1755 - 8th April 
1758”). Fraser returned from India in 1750 or 1751, and resid­
ed at Reelig, Inverness-shire, of which place he became laird 
on his. father’s death; he died in 1754.
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1757 to 1740), he nheld a Correspondence with some Persians 
and Moghols there (at Patna), and that frequently on the
subject of Nadir Shales Expedition* ** He goes on to say:-
wThe Account‘d of NSdir Shah*s first Exploits I have 
been favoured with from a Gentleman now in England, who 
resided several years in Persia, speaks that Language, 
and has been frequently in Company with that Conqueror.
2
The Journal of his Transactions in India, with 
the Letters and Cession of the Provinces, were transmit­
ted from Dehli, by the Secretary of Sirbullind (Sarbuland) 
Khan, whom Nadir SliSh had appointed to be one of the 
Commissioners for levying the Contributions to Mirza 
Moghol, Son to' Ali Mahommed Khan at Ahmedabad, who being 
my intimate Friend gave it to me.n
Fraser omits to give the name of the author of the 
^Account*1 referred to above, but he states (page 128) that this 
individual left Iran for India in February 1757* It being 
obvious that the person in question must have been in the 
service of the East India Company, I consulted the Gombroon 
Diary, where I discovered that William Cockell, the Agent at 
Gombroon, left that Place for Bombay on the 9th/20th February 
1757$^ no other employee of the Company left Iran for India 
in February 1757 • Having regard to these facts, as well as
to Cockell*s position and qualifications, there can be no
** See pages 71 to 128 of Fraser *s work.
2 u n 152 11 223 1* n 11 1 have been unable to
ascertain what has become of the original MS. from which 
Fraser made his translation. It is not amongst the Fraser 
MSS. which are now in the Bodleian Library, and it is 
possible that he may have given it to his friend Dr. Mead.
5 Gombroon Diary, 9th/20th February, 1757> in Volume IV of the 
ffPersia and the Persian Gulf” records of the East India 
Company, at the India Office.
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doubt that he was FraserTs informant. Cockell was Representa­
tive of the Company at Isfahan during the latter part of 
Ashraf*s reign and throughout that of Shah Tahmasp II. He 
was in Isfahan when Nad^ .r entered the city in triumph in 
November 1729> after Ashraf had fled. Cockell came into
personal eontact with N&dir, as well as with Shah Tahmasp on
0
several occasions. In May 1733 Cockell was appointed Agent at 
Gombroon (Bandar ‘Abbas), where he remained until his transfer 
to Bombay in February 1737* After reaching India, Cockell was 
given a seat on the Council of the Bombay Presidency, and it 
was doubtless during his stay in Bombay that he met, or at any 
rate entered into correspondence with, Fraser.
Although it might be supposed that Cockellfs n Account11 
would be a really reliable source of information regarding 
Nadirfs early career, one finds, on examining it closely, that 
it is by no means free from errors. In fact, one discovers 
repeatedly, when carefully analysing such records of Nadir Shah, 
that their authors are very liable to make incorrect statements 
or to omit important facts unless they are describing incidents 
of which they themselves had first-hand knowledge or are quoting 
the iosissima verba of some reliable eye-witness. It must be 
borne in mind that Iran is a country where high mountains or 
vast expanses of desert separate many of the principal centres, 
such as Isfahan and Mashhad; in the days of Nadir, communica­
tion between such centres was often slow and uncertain, particu­
larly in times of crisis. It was consequently extremely
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difficult for anyone in, say, Isfahan, to obtain accurate
information of the course of events in Mashhad, or viee
versa.^ Wild rumours were often current, and these were
not infrequently accepted as statements of fact.
Since Nadir spent but little time in Isfahan
between 1729 and 1733 > it is probable that Cockell had to
compile his "Account", in part at any rate, from statements
by persons who were, in fact, but ill-qualified to give him
information. It is unlikely that Cockell derived much, if
indeed any, data from Nadir himself; during Cockell*s tenure
of office at Isfahan, the relations between him and Nadir
were, except at the outset, not of a cordial nature.
Whereas one is bound to comment adversely upon
Cockell1s "Account", one can accept as absolutely reliable
and of great interest and value the "Personal Description and
Character of Nadir Shah*1 which is also included in Fraser fs 
2book. Cockell-was likewise the author of this "Personal 
Description". It is of interest to compare this delineation 
of NadirTs personal appearance and character with that furnish­
ed by the Chevalier de Gardane, who was French Consul at 
Isfahan from 1727 to 1750.^ Both these descriptions of Nadir
** Cf. the comment of the Agent at Gombroon on some astonishing 
rumour that was current in that town in October 1739s nIt 
is certainly impossible to allow of the Truth of any Report 
in this Country without Visible Proof." (Gombroon Diary, 
20th/31st October 1739)*
^ See pages 227-234.
3
See the remarks on La Mamye-Clairac and his authorities.
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are obviously based upon personal observation and knowledge* 
Of Fraser’s translations^*? the various letters in 
Iranian and of the Journal of Mfrza Zaman Khan it is unnec­
essary to say more here than that they afford some additional 
information of the Indian campaign and of the events at Delhi 
during Nadir’s stay there in 1759*
IV. JEAN OTTER*
Otter’s ”Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, avec une
Relation des expedition de Tahmas Koulikhan”, was published
in Paris in 1748, the year in which he died; it is not,
apparently, known whether the book appeared before or after
2his death, which occurred on the 26th September.
Otter states in his preface that he derived his in­
formation for the historical part of his work from MS* memoirs 
and from conversations which he had had withnwell-informed 
persons.” From‘Abdu’1-HaqT Khan, the Iranian Ambassador to 
the Porte and members of his suite (in whose company Otter 
travelled from Constantinople to Iran in 1736/7), as well as
As regards Fraser’s knowledge of Iranian, the following ex­
tract from the Surat Diary & Consultations, Vol.XXIV, page 
69 (dated Jlst December 1739)> is of ihterests ^The Chief 
having requested of Mr. Fraser who is well versed_in the 
Persian Language to translate our Phirmaund (farman) as very 
often in transacting Business at the Durbar we are at a loss 
for a just Explanation of some things, the Translates of 
which were before in the Office not being so exact as this 
which Mr. Fraser has now translated*..” ([the text of his 
translation is then given).
 ^Nouvelle Bibliographie Generale, Paris, 1862, Vol*XXXVIII, 
page 953• *»a Mamye Clairac likewise died in the same year
that his book was published.
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from persons in Isfahan and elsewhere, he obtained a number 
of details regarding the life of Nadir Shah. He claims that 
his account of Nadirfs expeditions, particularly that to 
India, was based upon the statements of actual eye-witnesses 
and was, moreover, confirmed by ’une Relation en Langue 
Persane ecrite k Dilli 1’an 1155 de l’h6gire’ (of which men- • 
tion has already been made in the notice regarding Tahir Beg.)'*' 
Otterfs description of Nadir’s origin, his being dispossessed 
of Kalat by his uncle, his first military success and subse­
quent disappointment, etc. follows Cockell1s account in 
Fraser’s ’Nadir Shah’ so closely that, although Otter does
not acknowledge it, he must have taken much of it from that 
2work.
This part of Otter’s work, like his description of 
the Indian expedition, is neither very accurate nor of much 
interest. The most valuable portion of his book is that 
wherein he describes what he actually saw and heard himself.
He relates in a graphic way his experiences on the journey 
from Constantinople to Isfahan, his stay for QYer a year and 
a half in that city, his journey to Basra and his return to 
France through Mesopotamia. Being an accomplished linguist, 
he could talk freely to all the people with whom he came into 
contact; his conversations with the peasants in Iran reveal 
the terrible state of misery to which, even at that time (1759)>
 ^See page 18 above.
 ^See Fraser, pages 7!“88, and Otter, Vol.I, pages 298-J02.
29.
Nadir’s ceaseless exactions had reduced them. Otter has much 
to say in regard to Ahmad Plsha of Baghdad, his methods of 
keeping the Arab tribes in check, and his relations with 
Nadir Shah.
Although Otter spent nearly four years at Basra, he 
cannot be looked upon as an important authority upon the 
state of affairs in the Persian Gulf during that period; the 
Gombroon Diary and letters of the representatives of the East 
India Company are of far greater interest, besides being more 
accurate.
On Otter’s returnjrrom the East, he was given the 
post of Interpreter at the Bibliotheque du Roi and that of 
Professor of Arabic at the Academie des Inscriptions. J. P. 
de Bougainville, the author of the ’Parallele” between 
Alexander and'Nadir Shah (see the bibliography) had a high 
opinion of Otter, whose work he utilised largely in the pre­
paration of his own.
V. LA MAMYE-CLAIRAC.
The HHistoire de Perse, depuis le Commercement de 
ce Siecle” by Louis Andre de la Mamye-Clairac (Paris, 175^ ) 
is a remarkably v/ell-arranged and carefully prepared work. 
Although the author was never nearer Iran than Constantinople 
(where he was from 1724 to 1727) 9 he obtained through the 
friends whom he made there and through French diplomatic and
consular officials^ of his acquaintance a large amount of 
data relating to Iran, The greater part of his book is 
concerned with the Afghan revolt and invasion and other 
occurrences previous to Nadirfs rise into prominence; the 
author’s actual narrative comes to an end with the year 1750* 
so that there is but little therein respecting Nadir. In 
the latter part of his third volume, entitled ”Memoires pour 
la Continuation de cette Histoire”, La Mamye-Clairac publishes, 
however, a number of letters and reports which he obtained 
through the good offices of his diplomatic and other friends; 
these documents bring his record of events (with some gaps) 
up to the year 1739* of the most interesting of these
documents is the ”Extrait de la Relation de M. le Chevalier 
de Gardane”. The Chevalier de Gardane succeeded his brother 
as French Consul at Isfahan In 1727 and remained there until 
1730* He, like Cockell, came into contact with Nadir after 
the last-named had driven out the Afghans from Isfahan and 
had occupied the city for Shah TahmlTsp. The Chevalier gives, 
in this ’Extrait1, a most favourable account of Nadir’s 
character and attainments, which should be read in conjunction
 ^Ea Mamye-Clairac knew, amongst others, that astute diplomatist 
the Marquis de Bonnac, M. d’Andrezel, the Marquis de Ville- 
neuve and the brother of the last-named.
 ^La Ma&ye-Clairac also utilised a number of works such as du 
Cerceau’s version of Krusinski’s Memoirs, the ’Relation’ of 
Pere Reynal (which I have been unable to trace), the 
’Relazione della Rivoluzioni di Persia”, (which I have also 
not seen), by the ’Sieur Joseph”, a Georgian who was inter­
preter at the French Consulate at Isfahan, etc*
5 See Vol. Ill, pages 105-109.
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with that given by Cockell.^ *
Amongst the other documents, may be mentioned2-
(i) Lettre sur Tahmas-Kouli-Kan, £erite de Constantinople 
le 8 Septembre 173&- This letter gives a brief 
and not inaccurate outline of NadirTs humble origin 
and of his rise to prominence, besides mentioning 
his friendly attitude towards some French Capucin 
monks; the information in this letter was, it is 
stated, obtained from an Armenian merchant who 
knew Nadir personally.2
(ii) Sundry reports and letters relating to the campaign
in Mesopotamia in 1733* including translations of
reports by Ahmad Pash'S and TopSl'Osman (tJthmSn) 
Pasha.3
(iii) An account of the conquest of India, based upon
what appears to have been a French translation of
the nVerdadeira Noticia11,^  by a French adventurer 
named de Voulton,5 as well as on some letters from 
that individual.
La Mamye-Clairac took great pains to indicate his 
sources, prefacing every section of his work with bibliograph­
ical details.
 ^See Fraser, pages 227-2J4.
2 Vol.Ill, pages 339-347.
5 n " 500-311.
* I contributed to the Bulletin of the School, of Oriental 
Studies, Vol.IV, Part II, pages 22J-245, an annotated 
translation of the Portuguese text (published in Lisbon 
in 1740) of de Voulton’s ’Noticia’: according to that
text, the original was in Iranian. I did not know at 
the time when I made that translation that La Mamye- 
Clairac had utilised the ,Noticia».
5 Cultru, in his nDupleix: ses Plans, Politiques: sa Dis­
grace: Etude d!Histoire Coloniale", Paris, 1901, page
173> gives some details of de Voulton!s interesting 
career; and further information on the subject is to be 
found in a letter from Robert Orme to Lord Holderness 
dated the 11th March 1755 (see page 274 of the Orme MSS. 
in the India Office Library)•
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La Mamye-Clairac died on the 6th May 1750, the year 
in which his !Histoire de Perse* was published. Despite his 
interest in Iran, he wrote no other book regarding it, his 
time being, it seems, fully occupied with his duties as a 
military engineer and with the preparation of works on that 
subject.^ -
VI. JONAS HANWAY.
Hanway has long been regarded as the principal
— 2English authority on the subject of Nadir Shah, and his 
T,Travels**3 has been quoted ver^extensively by subsequent 
writers, both British and foreign.
When one subjects Hanway*s "Travels** to careful 
analysis, one finds, however, that it is unequal in quality. 
While all that he writes of his own personal experiences and
^ Only the first part of one of these works appears to have 
been published. It appeared 7 years after the author*s 
death, and was entitled **L* Ingenieur de Campagne, ou 
Traite de la Fortification Passagere** (Paris, 1757)$ 
death supervened before La Mamye-Clairac could complete 
the second part. An English translation of the completed 
portion of **L* Ingenieur de Campagne1* was subsequently pub­
lished in London.
o
Dr. Samuel Johnson, however, had no great opinion of Hanway. 
After the appearance of Hanway*s somewhat ponderous book 
"An Eight Days* Journey from London to Portsmouth**, the 
Doctor remarks: 9Jonas acquired some reputation by tra­
velling abroad, but lost it all by travelling at home.** 
(Boswell*s **Johnson”, Vol.II, 122) Johnson*s animosity 
had really been aroused by Hanway*s nEssay on Tea” (the 
Doctor was not altogether consistent, for he had a great 
admiration for the well-known Scottish physician and wit, 
Dr. John Arbuthnot, who had held the same views as Hanway*? 
as to the perniciousness of tea drinking).
5 First published in London in 1753 in four volumes. The 
references that folio?/ are to the first edition.
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his citations from the journals and statements of others 
recording what they themselves underwent or witnessed, are 
most worthy of attention, the same cannot in every case he 
said of those of his statements which were founded on pre­
vious works-
Hanway writes most graphically of his adventures
-  -  1during the Astarabad rebellion, and his description of
Nadir’s camp, which he afterwards visited in order to seek
redress for his losses, is most interesting. Hanway never,
however, held converse with Nadir, of whom he only caught a
2fleeting glimpse on one occasion.
It is most fortunate that Hanway thought fit to 
give extracts in his work from the journals of Elton, 
Woodroofe, Thompson and van Mierop, as it is highly probable 
that, had he not done so, little or none of their contents 
would have been preserved; much will be said hereafter res­
pecting these journals, particularly that of Elton.
Before giving his account of Nadir’s life, H&nway 
devotes nearly the whole of one of his four volumes to the 
history of the preceding twenty years. It will be found, 
on examination, that this history of the Afghan wars and the 
Turkish and Russian invasions is merely an abridged transla-
"Travels”, Vol.I, pages 192-219»
tion of La Mamye-Clairac1 s work.**" Hanway, however, has
sacrificed much of the usefulness of the French original by
suppressing most of the bibliographical notes. Considering
the extent to which he made use of La Mamye-Clairac1 s
nHistoiren, Hanway1s acknowledgment to that writer seems most 
2inadequate.
Hanway1s principal sources for Nadir’s career up to 
and including the Indian campaign are Fraser and Otter. For 
the subsequent portion of Nadirfs reign up to 1744 Hanway 
obtained much valuable data, when in Iran himself, from Elton, 
Pere Bazin^ and other Europeans whom he met there; he like­
wise acquired some information from Iranians, but his depend- 
ance on interpreters and the comparative shortness of his 
visit prevented him from learning much through this channel.
It is not easy to trace Hanway1s sources for Nadir’s 
concluding years and death; he probably obtained most of his 
material from those of his associates in the Russia Company 
who remained on in Iran until the collapse of the Anglo- 
Iranian trading enterprise via Russia occurred. Some of his
^ In Hanway1 s third volume (’The Revolutions of Persia: Con­
taining the Reign of Shah Sultan Hussein, with the Inva­
sion of the Afghans, and the Reigns of Sultan Mir Maghmud 
and his Successor Sultan Ashreff”), Parts II to V corres­
pond to La Mamye-Clairac’s first volume, while Parts VI 
to VIII correspond to the latter’s second one.
2 See page XII of Hanway’s introduction, in Volume I.
5 See Hanway’s reference, in Vol.I, page 225, to his meeting 
at Resht with Bazin (whose name he omits) and two other 
French missionaries, one of whom was a Father le Garde. 
Hamay met Bazin and his companions on several occasions.
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information was derived from Dr. John Cook, of Edinburgh,1
who was attached to the embassy under Prince Golitzin which
2the Empress Elizabeth sent to Nadir in 1746.
Despite the fact that Hanway’s book contains many 
mistakes and is not founded on any reliable Oriental source 
like the Ta’rlkh-i-Nadirl, it must be regarded as a remark­
able piece of work. Hanway, although he relies so much on 
other authorities, not all of whom are very reliable, punc­
tuates his narrative with many shrewd remarks, and gives, on 
the whole, a very just appreciation of Nadir’s character. As 
to the British trade with Iran via Russia, Hanway is, of 
course, a most important authority, but his bias against 
Elton must be taken into account.5 Hanway’s chronology, 
though not perfect, is far superior to that of Jones.
1 Dr. Cook lent Hanway his journal, extracts from which Hanway
published in his first Volume (see pages 360 to 378 and 385 
to 393X Cook, in his subsequent work nVoyages and Travels 
through the Russian Empire, Tar tar y and part of the Kingdom 
of Persia” (Edinburgh 1770)> Volume II, pages 299-301, 
severely criticises Hanway, particularly the latter’s atti­
tude towards Elton. Though some of Cook’s criticisms are 
justified, he goes, on the whole, too far; the chief reason 
for his rancour was, it seems, the fact that Hanway, though 
he had included his (Cook’s) journal, had added 1 Jesuitical 
fables” (i.e. statements by. Bazin)♦ Hanway, in Cook’s 
words, ”ought to have considered the difference there is 
between a man of honour, who hates a lie, and a Jesuit, a 
man whose principles are subversive of society.”I
2 Nadir’s assassination prevented this embassy from fulfilling 
its task. Particulars of the embassy are also given by 
another member of it, namely Dr. J. J. Lerch, in his 
’’Nachricht von der Zweite Reise hach Persien....” in Volume 
X of A. F. Busching’s ”Magazln”.
3
To judge from a letter which Hanway wrote to London from 
Astrakhan on the 7th November 1744, when on his way home, 
he was not at that time unfavourable to Elton; his bias 
appears to have developed after his return (the letter in 
question is not included or even referred to in his ’’Travels”: 
a copy of it is in the Public Record Office, series S.P.91 
Volume XXXVI.)
VII. PERE BAZIN, S.J.
Louis Bazin was born at Avranches on the 24th May
1712. In January 1751 he entered upon his noviciate, and,
four years later, having completed his theological studies
and obtained some knowledge of medicine, he left France for
Iran.^ From 1741 Bazin accompanied Nadir on his expeditions.
Bazin was not invariably at the court, for Hanway met him at
Resht in February 1744^ and again at Lahijan in the following
August; on the latter occasion Bazin gave Hanway some
3
medical treatment. In December 1746 Bazin was appointed 
chief physician to Nadir, and remained with him until his 
assassination. In the terrible turmoil that followed Nadirfs 
murder, Bazin narrowly escaped with his life. In February 
1751 Bazin was at Bandar 'Abbas, possibly waiting for a ship 
to take him to France. In 1767 Bazin went to China; he 
died at Peking on the 15th March 1774.
4
In the nLettres Edifiantes et Curieuses" and also 
in the "Missions du Levant" two of Bazin’s letters to P&re 
Roger, the Procureur-G£n§ral des Missions du Levant, have 
been printed; Bazin wrote them on the 2nd February 1751* at 
Bandar ^ Abbas•
These scanty details are taken from Volume I of the 
"Catalogue de la Compagnie de Jesus" by the Fathers 
Augustin and Aloys de Backer.
 ^Hanway, Vol.I, page 225•
5 it " n 325.
4 Published in Paris, 1780; Vol.IV, pages 277-555.
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In the first of these letters Bazin mentioned 
rather briefly Nadir!s origin and rise to power; his 
narrative gets progressively more detailed after reaching 
the point where his personal knowledge of Nadir begins.
Bazin*s description of the Shah*s physical and mental con­
dition and of the treatment which he gave him is most 
interesting, and affords, in conjunction with the data 
given by4Abdu*1-Karim Kashmiri (see page 15 above) some 
clue as to the reason for his sudden outbursts of rage.
As Bazin was in close attendance upon Nadir during 
the last few months of his life, his testimony as to what 
occurred during that dreadful period is of the utmost value. 
Bazin was in the adjoining tent to the Shah when the latter 
was assassinated, and so was able to give as accurate a
version as anyone of what occurred. A sketch-plan by Bazin
1
of Nadir*s camp is reproduced in the **Lettres Edifiantes.**
It is unfortunate that no earlier letters of Bazin*s 
seem to have been preserved.
VIII. SERGEI SOLOVIEV.
Although Soloviev belongs to a much later age than 
that of Nadir, his inclusion in this chapter is amply justi­
fied by the large amount of contemporary material which he 
found in the Russian official archives and utilised in the
 ^This sketch-plan was reproduced again in Sir Mortimer 
Durand*s !INadir Shah**, London, 1908, opposite page 95*
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compilation of those portions of his Istoriya Rosii that re­
late to Russo-Iranian relations during the period under 
review.
Soloviev carefully studied the mass of reports 
which had been received from the Russian diplomatic, consular 
and military representatives stationed in or on the borders 
of Iran. Of especial interest are the numerous reports from 
Kalushkin, who succeeded Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin 
as Russian Resident at ifadir!s court in 1736*
SolovievTs history is also of importance in regard 
to the British trade with Iran via Russia and the Elton con­
troversy.
IX. MARIE-FELICITE BROSSET.
Brosset, like Soloviev, belonged to a later genera­
tion, but he also worked in the official archives at Moscow 
and made use of contemporary material. His chief claim to 
fame, of course, is his great nHistoire de la G6orgietf, in 
which the translations of the histories of Sekhnia Chkheidze, 
the Tsarevich Vakhusht, and Papouna Orbelian are, inter alia, 
given. These histories contain a great deal of information 
respecting the Iranian connection with Georgia during the 
period of Nadir. Brosset also Includes a translation of the 
interesting letter regarding lfadir*s invasion of India which 
Irakli of Georgia v;rote to his sister Anne when on his way 
back from Delhi in 1739;^ and there are some details of
 ^See H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 354-361.
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Nadirfs relations with King Taimuraz and Irakli in Brosset!s 
translation of the fLifef of Irakli by Oman Kherkheoulidze,^ 
and in his ”Mat6riaux pour servir a l’histoire de la Georgie.”^  
Lastly, reference must be made to Brossetfs 
translation of the most valuable first-hand account by the 
Armenian Catholicos, Abraham of Crete, of the events Imme­
diately preceding Nadir’s coronation and of the coronation 
ceremony itself.5
X. VON HAMMER-PURGSTALL.
The excellence of von Hammer’s GesahLchte des 
Osmanischen Reiches is so well known that it needs no 
emphasising in these pages. Thanks to von Hammer, the 
accounts by the official Turkish historiographers and 
other writers of Nadir’s campaigns against Turkey and his 
diplomatic relations with that country, have been made 
easily accessible to European readers. Von Hammer’s ex­
haustive researches have resulted in the assembling of a 
fairly complete mosaic of the history of the period, as 
seen, for the most part, from the Turkish angle. It is 
natural that, not having access to many Iranian and other 
non-Turkish sources which are now available, von Hammer
 ^See- H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages
A  y
 ^Published at St. Petersburg in 1841, in ’’Memoires,
Sciences et Politiques,” Vlth series, Vol.V, pages 165-315*
 ^See Brosset’s ’Collection d’Historiens Armeniens-”, St. 
Petersburg, 1876, Vol.II, pages 259-338.
1
should fall into some errors, hut these are, comparatively 
speaking, very few and far between.
XI. BASIL BATATZES.
Mention is made here of the Greek traveller
Basil Batatzes more because of his early contact with
Nadir than because of the importance of the information
2
which he gives (which is very slight).
Batatzes was one of the first Europeans to meet 
Nadir, with whom he claims to have had several 1 secret 
conversations* at Mashhad, apparently in 17283* Nadir, 
he says, gave him a farman, as well as a sum of money to 
cover his travelling expenses. On reaching Resht,
Batatzes delivered to General Levashev some message from 
Nadir. Batatzes abstains from giving any detailed 
description of NlTdir, and his exploits, because, he says, 
he has already done so in a detailed biography. This 
work has now, however, disappeared; it was read by 
D. D. Philippides in 1809, who, seven years later, pub­
lished his recollections of it in his ,
with the sub-title:
-* E.g. his confusion between the expedition of the Qalgha 
Fath Girai to Daghistlfn in 1/33 and that of the KbSn 
of the Crimea to the same country two years later.
2 His account of Mat, which he visited before proceeding
to Mashhad, is, however, of interest (see Curzon*s 
remarks in the first volume of his tlPersiaM, page 136).
3 See page 225 of Emile Legrand*s French translation of
Batatzes, entitled ^Voyages de Basile Vatace en Europe 
et en Asie", Paris 1886.
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It is a mystery why Philippines waited 
seven years before committing his recollections to paper, 
and why, when he did do so, he included them in a history 
of Roumania.
I have not been able to examine Philippides1 
recollections, ^ but Mr. Minor sky, who has done so at the 
Bibliotheque Nationale, assures me that they are of little 
value•
XII. MISCELLANEOUS.
In addition to the contemporary European sources 
mentioned above, a considerable number of articles and 
books respecting Nadir appeared in Europe during his life­
time, some of which were based upon a very flimsy founda­
tion of fact, while others were sheer fantasy. The 
German writer, who called himself npithander von der Quelle11, 
states that stories were current between 1734 and 1736 that 
Nadir was, variously, French, German, English and Brabancon 
by origin, 3 while others made out that he was Scottish or
 ^Published at Leipzig in 1816. See Vol.I, 2nd Part, 2nd 
Supplement, page 22.
2 There is no copy of his in the
British Museum Library.
3 »Herkunfft, Leben und Thaten des Persianischen Monarchens,
Sqhach Nadyr Vormals Kouli-Chan Genannt1, Leipzig, 1738*
This is the earliest complete work of any size on the
subject of Nadir that I have been able to trace. As it
is of no real importance as a source, I have not given 
its author a separate notice. 42.
Irish (his then title of Tahmasp Qull Khan leading one 
ingenious person to suppose that he was originally an 
Irishman named Thomas 01 Kelly who had, on going to Iran, 
changed his name to fTahmas Kuli,).'*‘
Mention is made in the Bibliography of the books 
on Nadir by Claustre, du Cerceau, Le Margne and others.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
A vast amount of work yet remains to be done 
before it can be claimed that our knowledge of Nadir Shah 
and his times is reasonably complete.
First and foremost, the MS. of Muhammad Kazim 
will have to be carefully compared with the Ta*rikh-i-Nadiri 
and other authorities of the first importance that have al­
ready been studied, and notes made of all the important new 
matter, as well as of such differences as may exist.
In the second place, there is doubtless a large 
amount of material in the archives at Moscow, Constantinople, 
Vienna and Paris that would well repay examination, but 
this would be a lengthy and arduous task. So far as I can 
gather, there is not a great deal to be found in Tehran, 
except certain MSS. such as that of Tahir Beg*s fTa!rikh-i- 
Nadir».
■* See nNadir Shah11, the Stanhope Essay for 1885, by H. J. 
(now Sir Herbert J.) Maynard, Oxford, 1885, page 11.
Thirdly, there are the records of the representa­
tives in Iran of the Dutch East India Company; these 
records would enable one to supplement the valuable data 
contained in those of the East India Company, to which 
reference has already been made. So far as I am aware, 
these Dutch records have not, up to the present, been 
utilised as a source for Nadir’s history.'*'
Lastly, there may be much to be gleaned in the 
contemporary press of various European countries. I have
discovered a number of interesting references to Nadir in
2
the London papers from 1731 onwards, and there are, no 
doubt, similar discoveries to be made in the foreign press 
of the time. I have come across, but have not been able 
.to follow up, references to articles in the ’Gazette de 
Hollande. 1
 ^H. Dunlop, in his ’Perzie’ (Haarlem, 1912) gives the texts 
of accounts by the Dutch East India Company’s representa­
tives at Isfahan of the siege of that city in 1722 (see 
pages 242-257)> but these, of course, contain no 
reference to Nadir.
2 *The Daily Post’, ’The General Advertiser’, ’The Daily
Courant’, ’The Daily Journal’, etc. I have had insuffi­
cient time to explore thoroughly the copies of these 
papers that are preserved in the British Museum.
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CHAPTER II
The Origin and Early History of Nadir*
In the late autumn of 1688 A.D. Imam Qull Beg, of 
the Qiriqlu branch of the Afshar tribe'*", went with other 
members of the Qiriqlu from Kubkan^, in their yailaq or summer 
grazing grounds, to spend the winter (qishlamlshi). as was their 
wont, in the Darragaz district.
After Imam QulX and his wife had crossed the Allahu 
Akbar range to the north of Kubian and had camped near the 
village of Dastgird, the wife gave birth to a son; the parents 
named this son fiB Nadr Quli Beg, after Imam Quli*s father.^ 
Mirza Mahdi gives the date of Nadir*s birth as the 28th 
Muharram 1100 A.H.^ (22nd November 1688), cAbdu*l-KarTm 
Kashmiri, the author of the Bayah-i-Waqi* states that some 
(unspecified) persons gave the year of Nadir*s birth as 1099> 
and others as 1102 A.H.-* Mirza Mahdi*s date, though it may 
not be absolutely correct, is doubtless less inexact than the 
others mentioned, but his statement that Nadir was born 11 in the
For particulars of the Afshar tribe and its branches or clans, 
see Appendix I,
2 Kubkan_is_80 miles N*W. of Mashhad and 30 miles E.N.E. of 
Khabushan. It has been visited‘by Sir P. Sykes, who has 
described it in his "Seventh Journey in Persia®, Geographi­
cal Journal, May 1915> page 3&4.
 ^There is some doubt as to the correct form of this name* See 
Appendix II. For the sake of simplicity, I have decided to 
use the name Nadir throughoutinstead of, successively,
Nadr QulT Beg, Tahmasp Qull Khan, WakTlu1 -d-Daula (and 
Na*ibu*s-Saltana) and, lastly, Nadir Sliah.
4 T.H., page 17 '
5 Bayan, fol.lOl(b). 4*
castle of Dastgird" is certainly a fabrication designed to 
flatter and exalt his patron and sovereign. In all probabili­
ty, Nadir was born in a tent. Nadir afterwards erected a 
maulud-khana or "birthplace-house1* on the site, which was 
situated Just outside Dastgird.
But little is known of InTam Qull Beg, beyond the 
fact that he was, poor and did not occupy any position bf
importance. He is variously described as having been a
1
shepherd, skinner, agriculturalist or camel-driver. The 
humble position of Nadir's parents is, moreover, obvious from 
Mirza MahdT's tactfully worded statements that a sharp sword 
owes its excellence to its temper rather than to the iron mine 
whence its material was taken, and that a royal jewel derives 
its beauty from its water and colour rather than from the ore
ry «
(sulb) in which it was found. Nadir himself, though he 
always took pride in his Turkish or Turcoman blood and thereby 
claimed affinity with the descendants of Timm*, never sought 
to magnify the status of his parents and ancestors. He was 
wont to say that he was nthe son of the sword."3
 ^See, respectively Bazin (Lettres Edifiantes, page 279), 
Fasa'is Farsrfama-yi-MsirT, page 164, RidS QulT Khan's 
continuation of the Raudatu's-Safa, Vol.VIII, page 220(a), 
Bayan, fol.lOl(b).
2 T.N., p.16.
* Cf. Naclir's famous remark at Delhi when questioned as to the 
lineage of his son NasriiLlah. (Mention will be made in 
due course as to the circumstances which gave rise to this 
remark).
Iranian and European sources alike contain but 
little information regarding Nadir’s early years. It is to 
be presumed that Nadir accompanied his parents on their annual 
movements between Kubkan and the district of Darragaz, and that, 
as soon as he grev*r old enough, he assisted his father to earn 
his scanty livelihood. Mirza Mahdl passes over this period 
in silence, merely saying that he ’placed his foot upon the 
ladder of manhood,f^* when he reached the age of 15. Hanway
o _ _
relates that the Ozbegs made a raid into Khurasan in 1704, •
killed many persons and carried, a number of others off as
salves. Amongst the latter were, he says, Nadir and his 
mother; while Nadir escaped in 1708, his mother died in 
captivity. This incident is not mentioned by any Iranian 
authority, and its authenticity is extremely dubious.^
Cockell’s statement^ that Nadir’s father was not only chief
of a clan of the Afshars, but was also in command of the
fortress of Kalat is, like his story of Nadir’s dispossession 
of his heritage by his uncle, devoid of fact. It can be 
regarded as certain that, had any relative of Nadir’s occupied
a position of importance, the fact would have been stressed by
Mirza MahdT.
1 T.N., p.17.
2 Vol.IV, page 4.
5 See Dr. Cook, oo.clt.. Vol.II, page 447.
See Fraser, page
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When Nadir was still a youth, he took the step that
was destined to lead him to higher things. Being, apparently,
unwilling to adopt permanently the humble vocation of his
father, Nadir entered the service of Saba cAlI Beg Kusa Ahmadlu,
who was chief of the Afshars of the town of AbTvard and was
Dabit or Governor of that place. By dint of his ability and 
*
bravery, Nadir speedily attracted the favourable notice of his 
master, and rose in time to be not only the commander of his
guards, but also his son-in-law.^
On the 25th Jhmacfl I, 11J1 (15th April 1719) Bida 
QulT, Nadirfs eldest son, was born. A few years later, Nadirfs
wife died; soon afterwards, he married another daughter of
BabacAli Beg’s, Gauhar SHad by name, 2 who bore him two sons, 
Nasrullah and Imam QulT.
What occurred during the next few years is very 
obscure. It appears that BabacAli Beg died in 1725> and left 
his property to Nadir.^ Owing to tribal opposition, Nadir,
1 — —Raudatu*s-Safa, Vol.VIII, page 220(a). cAbdu’l Karim states.,
possibly'correctly, in the Bayan (f01.5 (a)) that BSbarAli 
Beg, after the death of Imam QulT Beg, married the latter’s 
widow, who was Nadir’s step-mother. Being^struck with the 
intelligence of the youthful N^ dir, Baba'Ali Beg gave him 
one of his daughters in marriage; by this means, says 
cAbdu* 1-KarTm, Nadir obtained his real start in life.
^ MTrza Mahdi mentions towards the end of the T.N-^page 246) 
that Gauhar Stfad was the mother of Nasru’llab/lmam QulT.
 ^Raudatu’s-Safa, Vol.VIII, page 220(a) and FarsriSma, page 164. 
Malcolm^s statement (Vol.II, page 47) that Nadir murdered 
3abacAli Beg seems most improbable. For one thing, such an 
act would hajre occasioned a family feud. It is well known 
that Bab-atAli Beg’s sons afterwards entered Nadir’s service 
in which they attained eminent positions; had there been a 
feud, this could hardly have happened.
48
however, was unable to succeed to his late father-in-law1s 
position as chief of the local branch of the Afsliars. Nadir, 
after occupying himself for a time with the management of his 
possessions, went to Mashhad and entered the service of Malik 
Mahmud Sistani, who had taken advantage of the chaotic state 
of Iran following upon the Afghan overthrow of £he Safavl 
poorer, to seize Mashhad and much of the surrounding country.'*' 
Nadirfs actual motives in taking'this step are open 
to doubt, and the account which Mfrza Mahdi gives of his 
relations with Malik Mahmud does not, for the most part, read 
at all convincingly. It seems most probable that Nadir, 
instead of being inspired with purely patriotic motives, as 
his official biographer asserts, really wished to seek 
advancement in another sphere, his further progress in the 
Abivard district being checked by local jealousy and opposition.
Nadir found two Afshar chiefs at Mashhad who, at 
first, were hostile to him. He won them over and, it is 
said, plotted with them to expel Malik Mahmud.^ It was 
agreed that the Afshar and Jalayir^ tribesmen who were friendly 
to Nadir should be in readiness for action "on the day of the
1 Malik Mahmud belonged to the KaySni family of £>Istan, which 
claimed descent, through the !fahirid Maliks, from the 
Saffarids. Buchner, in the 6.1., Vol.IV, page 459> 
doubts whether this claim could be substantiated.
 ^T.N., page 20.
^  -  — —It may have been at this time that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and
a number of the Jalayir tribe joined Nadir.
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JarTdn\  when Nadir would, while competing in the sport with
Malik Mahmud, seize the bridle of the latter’s horse. This 
*
action was to be the signal for the Afshars and Jalayir to
rush up and kill Malik Mahmud and his followers. The plan
miscarried, however, because Nadir, at the critical moment,
failed to grasp the bridle of Malik Mahmud’s horse. Malik
Mahmud appeared to suspect nothing, and he and Nadir and the
others with them returned to Mashhad together. Naciir,
having reason to suspect that the two Afshar chiefs were not
being faithful to him, murdered them both when on a hunting
expedition. Fearing retribution from Malik Mahmud, NeTdir
fled to AbTvard and Darragaz and endeavoured to raise a force
2of tribesmen to oppose him.
— — ^Some horsemen, amongst them a certain Nasir Aqa,-' 
responded to Naciir1 s appeal, and formed a band under his 
leadership which proceeded to pillage and raid in Khurasan.^
The only determined opposition that Nadir met with in those 
anarchical times was from Malik Mahmud and from certain tribes- 
men who were partisans of the latter.
■* For a description of the game of the JarTd, see M. von
Oppenheim’s !?Das Djerid und das Djerid-Spiel” in’Islamica’, 
1927> pages 590-617$ h^e reference to the nGiuochi di 
Canne11 in Thomas Herbert’s ’Travels in Persia’ (London,
1928, page 50) is likewise of interest. See also Sir H. 
Pottinger’s description of the game as played in Baluchistar 
(’Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde’, London, 1816, page 190]
 ^T.N., page 20. (I have not followed Mlrza Mahdi’s account 
very closely, as much of what he says seems to be most 
improbable.)
 ^See Hanway (Vol.I., page 170)*
 ^Mirza Mahdi naturally makes no mention of these activities of
Nadir’s, but, from whatlAbdu’1-KarTm, Bazin and other^author- ities nave stated, there, seems-to he no doubt that Nadir was for a time, leaner or a band of robbers. pO» ______
Malik Mahmud, having summoned in vain the 
Chamishgazak Kurds of Khabushan to cooperate with him against 
Nadir, attacked them. Nadir marched to their assistance and 
forced Malik Mahmud to retire. Having no artillery, Nadir 
and his allies were unable to follow up this success by pur­
suing the enemy and laying siege to Mashhad. Nadir then 
adopted the less onerous task of reducing several hostile 
tribal fastnesses in the neighbourhood of AbTvard.
It was at this Juncture that Tahmasp, the third son
of Shah Sultan Husain,^ * although quite unable to oust the
Ghilza’i usurper Mahmud from Isfahan, sent his general Rida 
-  2Quli Khan to attack Malik Mahmud. According to MTrza Mahdl, 
Rida Quli Khan, having heard of Nadir’s prowess as a military 
leader, wished to cooperate with him, but was dissuaded from 
doing so by some of the Kurds of Khabushan, who alleged that 
if he did so, and the operations were successful, Nadir would 
reap all the advantage and discredit him.^ Rida QulT Khan
1 Muhammad Muhsin, in his Zubdatu’t-Tawarikh (foil.210 (a) and 
(b)) describes how Tahmasp, after escaping from Isfihan, had 
tried to gather together the loyalist elements in northern 
Iran, but had failed to make head against the Afghans, owing 
to his-love of pleasure and weakness of character. After a 
brief stay in QazvTn (where he had himself proclaimed_Shah 
on the 14th Safar (Muhammad Muhsin, fol.210(b)), Tahmasp was 
forced by the Afghans'to fly to Adharbaijan. He'remained 
there until, in 1725 > the advance of the Turks caused him to 
seek refuge in Tehran. On the Afghans threatening Tehran, 
Tahmasp fled to Mazandaran.o _ _ _ _
Rida Quli Khan Shamlu had been eshik-aghasi or ’master of the 
threshold’ at the court of Shah Sultan Husain (see Muhammad
Muhsin, fol.209(a)); he was a maternal'uncle of Lutf'^ll 
Beg, author of the Atash-Kada.
5 T.N., page 25.
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then twice attacked Malik Mahmud, hut was unsuccessful on each 
occasion.^  In consequence of his failure, he was replaced 
later by another Safavi general, Muhammad Khan Turcoman.
Encouraged by his defeat of Rida Quli Khan, Malik 
Mahmud determined to add NIshUpur to his domains; after an 
unsuccessful attempt by his nephew, he seized the place, des-
— - 9pite efforts by Nadir and his brother Ibraham to prevent him. 
Subsequently, Malik Mahmud severely defeated Nadir, who is 
said to have reached Kalat accompanied by only two men.^
Muhammad Khan Turcoman, Rida Quli Khanfs successor,
reached Khurasan at this stage, and, acting in conjunction
with Nadir, defeated Malik Mahmud outside Mashhad. Nadir
was unable to follow up this victory, because of a Turcoman
rising at Baghbad, to the north-east of Ablvard. Having
punished the Turcomans of Baghbad, Nadir went to Merv, and
later to Sarakhs, where he defeated the adherents of Malik
Mahmud.
%
Nadir was next engaged in hostilities was a kinsman 
of his named ^ .shur Beg Babalu, who was allied with some of the 
Chamishgazak Kurds. Whilst Nadir was besieging cAshur Beg in 
his fortress, he received an addition to his forces of 500 
Ozbeg youths, whom ShlrGbazT of KhTva had sent to his assist-
 ^T.N., page 25.
2
ibidem, page 2 8. 
 ^ibidem, page 2 9*
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1
ance. Much about the same time (i.e. the winter of 1725/6)
an envoy from Tahmasp, named Hasan cAli Beg Mu'ayyiru11-Mamalik,
reached Nadir*s camp. It appears that Tajimasp, who was then
in Mazandaran,, had sent this envoy to report upon Nadir.
Nadir is said to have sent Hasan jALi Beg back with a message
 2
to Tahmasp urging him to march with his army to Khurasan.
After another expedition to Merv, where more
troubles had broken out between the local Qajairs and the
Turcomans, Nadir once more set out against Malik Mahmud.
However, when Nadir was close to Mashhad, Hasan cAli Beg
arrived with the news that Tahmasp was on his way from
3
Mazandaran and that he desired his presence. Nadir accord­
ingly abandoned his march on Mashhad and went instead to 
Khabushan, where he met Tahmasp for the first time.
1
T.N., page 33* Shir Ghazl had formerly been hostile to 
Nadir, but he decided to join forces with the latter 
through fear of Malik Mahmud.
2
T.N., page 35* It appears from Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(a), 





Early Relations between Nadir and Tahmasp: 
The Capture of Mashhad and Tribal Campaigns,
1726-1729.
The fugitive Tahmasp had received a most welcome 
reinforcement when Fath cAli Khan, the chief of the Ashaqbash 
Qajars of Astarabad, joined him at SSri, in Mazandaran, in 
the spring of 1726. Until Fath cAli Khan joined him, Tahmasp 
had seemed in a hopeless position. In Isfahan and most of 
central, southern and eastern Iran the Ghilza!is were supreme. 
The Turks were in possession of the north-western provinces 
and part of the west as well, and in the north the Russians 
had seized the coastal portions of Daghistan, Shirvan and 
Gilan. Over Mashhad and the surrounding country Malik 
Mahmud ruled.^ Lastly, sundry pretenders, claiming to be sons 
of Shah Sultan Husain,^ from time to time appeared and made 
a bid for power.
On receiving Nadir1s message through Hasan cAli Beg, 
Tahmasp and Fath cAli Khan proceeded from Mazandaran to 
Khurasan via Jajarm. On hearing this news, Malik Mahmud set 
out to attack Tahmasp, but withdrew to Mashhad again on learn­
■* The history of Tahmaspfs wanderings in northern Iran during 
the period 1722-1726 is very complicated, and only a very 
brief outline is given here.
 ^On the 7th- February 1725 Mahmud Shah, in a terrible fit of 
frenzy, put to death all the surviving members of the 
Safavi royal family who were in his power, with the excep­
tion of the ex-Shah himself and two infant princes. Pre­
tenders afterwards appeared, claiming to have escaped the 
mansaere: MIrza Mahdi gives^particulars of six of these,!see 
faifep&jg§ II M v XI H 3?a Hazm says (page 155JtHat
ing of Nadir !s march on that place from Merv.^ *
After Tahmasp and Fath ‘All Khan reached Khabushan,
Nadir marched into the town at the head of 2,000 men, mostly
2Afshars and Kurds.
Tahmasp then found himself with two powerful 
supporters. Both were not only ambitious, but also fully 
aware of his weakness of character. As was inevitable, 
acute rivalry speedily developed between Fath CA1± Khan and 
Nadir. It has been alleged that Fath cAli Khan, being 
piqued at Nadir’s advancement, began to intrigue against him 
and even entered into treasonable correspondence with Malik 
Mahmud.^
Meanwhile, Tahmasp, Fath cAli Khan and NSdir had left 
Khabushan (on the 22nd Muharram 1159 = 19th September 1726) , 
and camped, ten days later, by the shrine of Khwaja Rabic, 3 
miles north of Mashhad.
Nadir proceeded to launchattack after attack upon 
the city, but was unable to force his way in.
During the siege of Mashhad, the tension between 
Nadir and his rival reached such a pitch that Nadir persuaded 
Tahm£sp i to arrest Fath ^ li Khan and then to put him to
1 T.N., page 35.
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(a).
5 n It it 212(b).
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death.'*' The latter event took place on the 11th October.
All that can be urged in extenuation of Nadir’s conduct on 
this occasion is that Fath 'All Khan would, in all probability, 
have summarily disposed of him, had he been in a position to 
do so.
His rival being removed from his path, Nadir took
over the control of affairs from the supine Tahmasp, and made,
2or rather caused to be made, a number of appointments. He 
himself became Qurchi-BashT ("Master of the Ordnance"), and 
received the title of Tahmasp Quli ("Slave of Tahmasp") Khan, 
while Kalb CA1I Beg, one of his brothers-in-law, was appointed 
Eshlk-AghasI.
Nadir now gave his whole attention to the siege of 
Mashhad, but he was no more successful than before. Malik 
Mahmud, emboldened by the dissensions which broke out in 
Tahmasp1 s camp after Fath *Al! Khan had been put to death, 
made a sortie.^ A severe engagement was fought near Khwaja 
Rabi, which resulted in the defeat of Malik Mahmud and his
 ^It is of interest to read the extremely conflicting accounts 
of this incident which are given by Mlrza MahdT and Muhammad 
Muhsin on the one hand, and cAbdu’r-Razzaq, the Qajar his­
torian on the other. Mlrza Mahdl’s explanation of Nadir’s 
conduct is not at all convincing. Hanway regarded as 
baseless the charge of treason brought against Fath *Ali 
Khan, and said that Nadir instigated the murder (Vol.IV,L 
page 17)* It is to be noted, however, that Fath CA11 Khan 
had, previous to joining Tahmasp in Mazandaran, been in 
revolt.
o
For particulars of these appointments, see Mohammad Muhsin, 
fol.212(b).
 ^T.N., page 58.
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retreat to the city.
Although Malik Mahmud did not venture outside his 
defences again, Nadir could not carry the city by assault, 
and it was only through treachery, on the part of Plr 
Muhammad,Malik Mahmud’s commander-in-chief, that enabled him 
to enter the city on the night of the 16th Rab^ II (lOth/llth 
December 1726).'*’ Malik Mahmud, after vainly attempting to 
repel Nadir’s forces, surrendered; having laid aside his 
crown, he retired to a cell in the shrine of the Imam Rida.
In fulfilment of a vow which he had made before the 
occupation of Mashhad, Nadir gave orders for the holy shrine 
to be repaired, for the dome to be gilt and for the erection 
of a second minaret. 2 As Nadir was born and. bred a SunrfI, 
this action of his in restoring and embellishing a Shi* a 
shrine is of interest. Nadir’s object was probably mainly, 
if not entirely, political; the Shf a priesthood being at that 
time very influential, he doubtless wished, to enlist their 
support.
Nadir had not been long in Mashhad before he realised 
that his newly-won position Y/as by no means assured. He 
found that he could only place implicit reliance upon certain 
of the Afshars and upon the Jalayirs under Tahmasp Khan; over 
the majority of the wild tribesmen of Abxvard, Darragaz, Kalat
 ^T.N., page 38 and Muhammad Muhsin, fol.212(b).
2 T.N., page 39. Streck, in his article on Mashhad in the 
E.l. (Vol.Ill, page 471) states that this minaret was 
erected in 1730; this was, no doubt, the year in which it
was completed.
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and Khabushan his hold was very precarious* Secondly,
Tahmasp’s ministers started to poison their master’s mind 
against Nadir; in the words of Muhammad Muhsin: tTthe SITah,
by reason of his youth-*- and his reliance upon them, believed 
their baseless statements.11^ It is not surprising that 
Tahmasp1 s ministers should hate and fear Nadir. They were 
self-seeking, unpatriotic and indolenty they strongly 
resented the intrusion of a strong man like Nadir, and feared, 
not without reason, that he would establish an ascendancy 
over Tahmasp and then use his influence to their detriment.
On learning that the Kurds of Khabushan were in­
triguing with the hostile ministers and that Tahmasp had gone 
to Khabushan, Nadir left is haste for that place. Tahmasp, 
it appears, had been induced to sign orders for his governors 
in Mazandaran, Astarabad and the Giraili district to come to 
his assistance against the traitor NSdir* It is even 
alleged that Tahmasp sought to win over Malik Mahmud to his 
side.^
 ^Tahmasp was then 27* I have refrained from giving him the
title of Shah at this stage, because it seems that his 
claim to be regarded as the successor to his father was 
weak. Shah Sultan Husain, on the fall of Isfahan, had 
abdicated_and had with his own hands invested the victor­
ious Mahmud with the crown. Mahmud, moreover, had 
established his rule over a large part of Iran.
 ^Zubdatu’t-Tawarikh, fol.212(b)
5 No authority, not even Shaikh Hazln, has a good word to say 
for these ministers.
4 T.N., page 40. Mlrza Mahdi states that Malik Mahmud inform­
ed Nadir of this action of Tahmasp’s. It is unfortunate 
that no unbiased account of these happenings is extant.
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Nadir laid vigorous siege to Khabushan, where 
Tahmasp was supported by the Chamishgazak and Qaraehorlu Kurds. 
After defeating these Kurds, Nadir came to terms with Tahmasp, 
who agreed to follow him to Mashhad. Nadir then returned 
to Mashhad where, with much ceremony, he received IJahmSsp on 
the day of Nau Ruz 11J9 (21st March, 1727); festivities and 
rejoicings continued for a week.***
Scarcely had these celebrations come to an end when 
fresh risings of the Kurds took place. The forces of the 
insurgents were augmented by the TStars of Merv and the 
Yamrili Turcomans. Sweeping across Darragaz, the rebel 
forces surrounded Nadir*s brother, Ibrahim Khan.
Nadir, in company with Tahmasp, relieved Ibrahim 
Khan, afterwards besjsging and taking Khabushan. NcTdir there­
upon crushed the rebels in Darragaz, but had to return to 
Khabushan to quell a fresh disturbance there. He then went 
back to Mashhad.
No sooner had Nadir reached Mashhad than fresh 
troubles broke out at Khabushan, fomented, it is alleged, by 
Tahmasp. This time, the Chamishgazak and Qaraehorlu were 
joined by the Shadillu Kurds. Nadir, however, speedily broke 
up the confederacy, and proceeded to Nishapur, whither Tahmasp 
had gone. Meanwhile, the Tatars of Merv revolted again, at 
the instigation of Malik Mahmud. Nadir, having arranged for
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.21j(b).
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the quelling of this revolt, had Malik Mahmud and his
nephew Malik IshSq put to death.
Disturbances had also broken out in QafXn where a
SXstarfi chief named Husain Sultan, an ally of Malik Mahmud1 s,
had expelled the governor whom Nadir had appointed.^ On the
17th Dhu!l-Hijja 1159 (5th August 1727) Nadir and TahmSsp
left Mashhad for Qa’In with 8000 men, and soon forced Husain
Sultan to submits a son and nephew of Malik Mahmud, who had 
• — %
2been with him, fled to Isfahan, where they joined Ashraf *
From QafIn Nadir marched via IsfidXn, in the ZXrkuh
district, and Madhiri&bad against the Afghans of Bihdadin.^
It was a trying march in the height of summer, water being
very scarce; also, the cannon kept sinking into the sand
near Madhiriabad. Nadir took Bihdadfn by assault, and then
4besieged Sangan which had also refused to submit. Here 
Nadir narrowly escaped death when one of his cannon burst,^
On the 1st October Nadir took Sangan by assault and put all 
the inhabitants to the sword because of their having feigned
 ^T.N., page 46. The text of the Bombay edition is very 
corrupt here,
^ Ashraf, the son of ‘Abdu11-kzlz (or, according to the Hayat-i- 
Afghanl, of cAbdufl-Qadir, another brother of Mir Wais), 
had put his cousin Mahmud to death and seized the throne 
of Iran on the 22nd April 1725*
 ^This place is now known as Behdavln,
 ^ n n tt t t ft Sangun-i-Pa^Tn.
5 T,N., page 47*
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submission some days before and had then reopened hostilities. 
News was then received that 7,000 to 8,000 Abdali Afghans 
from Herat had reached Niazabad, in order to assist the 
inhabitants of Sangan. Nadir at once marched off to meet 
these Afghans, whom he encountered near Sangan. Knowing 
that his troops were inexperienced and that the many defeats 
which the Afghans had inflicted upon the Iranians had caused 
the latter greatly to fear them, Nadir did not risk an open 
battle. Instead, he placed the bulk of his men in trenches 
while he, at the head of 500 trained cavalry, made a series 
of attacks upon the Afghans. Although the troops in the 
trenches wished to take part in the fighting, Nadir refused 
them permission. After four days of fighting and skirmish­
ing, the Afghans nexchanged fight for flight”,^  and retired 
towards Herat. Nadir, still feeling the need of caution 
because of the inexperience of his troops, refrained from 
pursuit, and returned to Mashhad. The time had not yet coije 
for the trial of strength with the formidable Abdalls.
Relations between Tahmasp and Nadir continued to be 
strained, the formerTs ministers seeking every opportunity to 
discredit the successful newcomer. Tahmasp is said to have 
urged Nadir repeatedly to march direct on Isfahan, but Nadir
always replied that it would be most imprudent to do so until
—  2the Abdalis of Herat, who were so near at hand, were subdued.
1 T.N., page 48.
2 T.N., page 49.
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It was at length agreed that Nadir and Tahmasp, 
starting respectively from Mashhad and NTshapur, should meet 
at Sultariabad (Turshlz), and- march on Herat with their 
combined forces. Tahmasp, however, having been persuaded 
by his advisers not to cooperate, informed Nadir that he 
would go to Mazandaran, while Nadir should proceed alone 
against the Abdalls. Nadir started on his march, but dis­
covered at Bakharz that the nobles were endeavouring to 
cause disaffection in his army. He therefore abandoned the 
advance on Herat and returned to Mashhad.^ *
An AbdalT raid on the Biarjunand district (E.S.E. 
of Sh&hrud) caused Nadir to hasten from Mashhad, in the hope 
of intercepting the Afghans. On reaching Qadamgah he heard 
that Tahmasp was attacking the Bughairi Turks, who were 
friendly to him. Nadir appealed to Tahmasp to desist and to 
cooperate with him against the Afghans; Tahmasp replied by 
summoning Nadir to Sabzavar. Nadir, realising that a crisis 
was developing, gave up his project of intercepting the 
raiders, and went to Sabzavar. On arrival, he found the 
gates shut in his face; just previous to this, he had dis­
covered that Tahmasp had sent messages to all parts of 
'his
Khurasan that/(Nadir1 s) orders and those of his subordinates
2were to be disregarded.




Nadir, after waiting in vain for the gates of 
Sabzavar to be opened, began to bombard the town, which soon 
surrendered. TahnfSsp, having no alternative, then joined 
Nadir and swore to be friendly to him. That same night a 
number of tTah&aspfs guards and retinue went to Mazandaran, 
with the object of fomenting trouble. Two days later, N&dir 
sent Tahmasp to Mashhad under virtual arrest. After vainly 
trying to cut off the Afghan raiders, Nadir returned to 
Mashhad himself.
Almost immediately afterwards Nadir was informed 
that the Turcomans inhabiting the plain between Durun and 
AstarSbad, were raiding the country round the former place. 
Calling upon the Chamishgazak and Qaraehorlu Kurds to accompany 
him, Nadir set out on a punitive expedition. The Kurds, 
however, refused to obey and attacked and defeated Ibrahim 
Khan. In the meanwhile, Nadir had reached the mountain known 
as the Balkhan Dagh,^ near which he met with and defeated the 
Turcomans. On his return march N^dir learnt of the Kurds1 
defeat of his brother, so he advanced into their country and 
killed a large number of them.
Whilst these operations were in progress, one of 
Tahmaspfs followers, Muhammad %li Khan ibn Aslan by name, had 
proceeded successively to Bistam, and the provinces of 
Astarabad and Mazandaran, where he placed nominees of Tahmasp
1 This name is incorrectly given as Pul-i-Khan Daghl in the 
Bombay edition of the T.N., page 55; Jones omits the 
name altogether.
in positions of authority. Serious disturbances then broke 
out in.the two provinces. Nadir immediately set out for 
Astar’hbad, but turned northwards at Kafshgari, crossed the 
Atrak, and crushed some rebellious Yamut Turcomans. He then 
went to Astarabad, where TahmSsp joined him. Nadir marched 
into MSzandaran with !Jahmasp, and soon reduced the province 
to order, Dhufl-Fiqar, the leader of the party hostile to him 
being killed. After taking measures to guard the passes 
leading from Mazandaran to the Tehran and Khar districts, 
which were in the hands of the Ghilza!i Afghans, Nadir sent an 
envoy, in Tahmasp*s name, to the court of Russia, to demand 
the restitution of Gflan."^
Leaving Tahmasp at Sari, Nadir returned to Mashhad
2
in February or early March, 1729\ after Nau Ruz he began 
to prepare for his campaign against the Abdalis.
T.N., page 55* Butkov, in his fMateriali alia ifovoy
Istorii Kavkaza, 1722-1805S St. Petersburg, 1869’, Vol.I, 
page 100, states that Tahmasp wrote to General Levashev, 
in December 1728, that he would shortly be entering GTlan 
in company with Avramov (the Russian Consul at Resht). 
Regarding Tahmasp!s emissaries to Russia and Constantinople 
in l727/o,*see StanyanTs despatches from Constantinople 
in S.P.97, Vol.XXV.
2
Muhammad Muhsin says (fol.214(a)) that Nadir returned to 
Mashhad in the depth of winter.
CHAPTER IV
Nadirrs First Campaign Against 
The Ahdalis.
N£dirfs determination to crush the Ahdalis and to 
win hack Herat before attempting to recover Isfahan from the 
Ghilza!is is proof of his sound understanding of the 
situation. Though the Ahdalis, owing to internal 
dissensions, had not made any attack on Khurasan on a hig 
scale for several years, they were always a potential danger. 
In virtue of their position and their well-known fighting 
qualities, Nadir feared that, if he and Tahmasp and their 
forces were to absent themselves from Khurasan for any length 
of time, the Ahdalis would compose their differences, and make 
a hold hid to take Mashdad, thus striking at the basis of his 
power. It could he regarded as practically certain that the 
majority of the fickle and unstable Kurds and other tribesmen 
of North-East Khurasan would, in that event, forget their vows, 
and ally themselves with the invaders or, at any rate, take 
advantage of their advent to throw off their allegiance.
The history of the Ahdalis during the preceding 
decade is, in places, obscure. After defeating the armies 
which Shah Sultan Husain repeatedly sent against them, and 
holding their own against the Ghilza’is^ the Abdall chiefs of
^Muhammad Muhsin gives a detailed account of these campaigns, 
foil. 205(h) - 205(a).
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Herat were completely independent. It seems that the 
Abdali chief, Muhammad Zaman Khan SadozaTi, who had seized 
power in 1718 by poisoning a rival chief, was himself sup­
planted later on by a certain Muhammad Khan Afghan,
Muhammad Khan Afghan besieged Mashhad for some months in the 
winter of 1722/25, but failed to take it. On Muhammad Khan 
returning empty-handed to Herat, the Abdalls rose against
him, and chose as their chief Dhu*l-Fiqar, the elder son of
— 2Muhammad Zaman Khan. Civil war broke out in 1157 A.H. 
(1725/6) between Dhu*l-Fiqar and Rahman, the son of the chief 
whom his father had murdered. This war was only terminated 
by the Abd*alls sending DhuTl-Fiqar to Bakharz and Rahman to 
Qandahar. Allah Yar Khan, a brother of Muhammad KhSh Afghan, 
was then elected chief, but was shortly afterwards attacked 
by Dhufl-Fiqar.
On the Abdalis hearing of Nadirfs impending attack 
on them, the rival factions patched up their differences and 
combined forces, Allah Yar Khan becoming Governor of Herat 
and DhuTl-Fiqar that of Farah.
Nadir, having finished his preparations, left 
Mashhad in company with Tahmasp on the 4th Shawwal 1141 (5rd 
May 1729^ and marched southwards, via Jam, Farmandabad^ and
 ^They do not seem, however, to have taken any title beyond 
that of Governor#
2 -  -  -Ahmad Khan, the younger son of Muhammad Zaman Khan, after-
* wards became famous as Ahmad Shah Durrani.*
 ^T.N., page 5 6•
4 - -Now known as FarmSnabad.
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Kariz. At the sameftime, the AbdalTs, under Allah Yar Khan,
i
advanced north-westwards from Herat*
Battle was joined between the Iranian forces and the 
Abdalis at KSTfir Qal^ a^ , where the AbdalTs had signally de­
feated the SafavT general SafT QulT Khan, ten years before* 
Nadir pursued the same cautious policy as before; 
restraining the ardour of his troops, he surrounded his 
infantry with his artillery, and posted a body of cavalry on 
the flank* The AbdalTs were the first to attack and a 
desperate struggle took place. The Iranian infantry were 
thrown into confusion by an AbdalT charge, but Nadir retrieved 
the fortunes of the day and himself cut down one of the enemy
2leaders. He then received a lance-thrust in the right foot. 
Night fell soon after, and both sides withdrew to their 
respective lines.
On the following day the AbdSlTs retired tc the 
HarT Hud, with Nadir’s army in pursuit.
Another battle was fought at Kusuya where, after a 
severe struggle, the AbdalTs suffered a heavy defeat, and fell 
back precipitately on Herat, leaving their artillery, tents 
and baggage behind.
1 - cNow knov,rn as Islam Qal a.
2 T.N.,'page‘57* According to Abdu’l-Karim Bukharl’s
”Ta?rTkh-i-Ahmad” (Lucknow, 1850), page 4, Nadir was 
wounded by HTj jT'MishkTn AbdalT, who had sworn to kill 
him or die in the attempt. See also Muhammd cAbdu’r- 
Rahman’s "Ta’rTkh-i-Ahmad Shah Durrani.” ’
Nadir and his troops advanced rapidly on Herat via 
Tlrpul. Allah Yar Khan, having reorganised his forces, 
marched from Herat to oppose the Iranians. The two armies 
met near Ribat-i-Parian, a village a few miles west of Herat. 
The battle lasted from early morning until midday, when the 
AbdalTs retired, leaving over one thousand dead on the field.
A dust storm, lasting for 48 hours, effectively prevented 
any further fighting. On the third day, a messenger from 
Allah Yar Khan reached the Iranian camp with proposals for 
peace, but Nadir refused to listen to such proposals unless 
and until Allah Yar Klian and his fellow-chiefs came in person 
to make them. Allah Yar Khan was about to comply, v/hen he 
received word that his erstwhile rival, Dhu’l-Fiqar, was 
marching to his assistance. Instead of submitting, Allah 
Yar K3aan prepared to reopen hostilities.
Nadir detached a body of men to repel Dhu’l-Fiqar 
and encamped with the bulk of his forces at Shakiban. Dhu’l- 
Fiqa’r, having evaded the troops sent against him, hid in 
ambush near Shakiban; when Allah YSr Khan launched an attack 
on Nadir from the east, Dhu’l-Fiqai* and his men fell upon the 
Iranian camp and began to plunder it. NcTdir managed to 
detach sufficient men to drive off Dhu’l-Fiqar and to with­
stand Allah Yar Khan. On the following day, Nadir advanced 
and fought another obstinate battle with Allah Yar Khan and 
his men, in which he was victorious. Once more Allah Yar Khan
sent a messenger with peace proposals, to which Nadir 
returned the same answer as before. Some of the Abdall 
chiefs then came in person to Nadir, and submitted to him.
After offering excuses for their conduct, the chiefs offered 
not only to obey, but also to assist the Iranians against the 
Ghilza’is. Although Tahmasp and his ministers were opposed 
to accepting the Abdalis’ offer, Nadir decided to do so. On 
the following day a large number of Abdall chiefs came to the 
camp bearing presents, and were rewarded with robes of honour. 
Several of the more notable chiefs entered Tahmasp1s service, 
and Allah Yar Khan was officially appointed Governor of Herat.^ 
Nadir and TahmSsp started on their homeward march 
soon after, and reached Mashhad on the 4th Dhu’l-Hijja (1st 
July), having been absent for two months.
 ^T.N., page 60.
CHAPTER V.
The Expulsion of the Ghilza’is.
Ashraf had been at war with both Turkey and Russia.
So far as tactics and diplomacy were concerned, Ashraf had 
acquitted himself very well in the war with Turkey, but he 
had had, in the end, to acquiesce in a serious loss of 
territory to the Turks, and the war had revealed that his 
military strength was distinctly limited. The fighting 
qualities of his Ghilza’i warriors remained unimpaired, but 
no reinforcements could be obtained from Qandahar, because 
of the feud that subsisted between Ashraf and his cousin 
Husain Sultan, the brother of the late Mahmud.
In May and June 1729 rumours were current in 
Isfahan as to an impending attack by Husain Sultan of Qandahar. 
These rumours were succeeded by reports that Tahmasp, having 
been victorious over the Abdalls of Herat, had begun to 
advance on Isfahan, in order to dispossess Ashraf of the 
throne. Ashraf, in alarm, sent reinforcements to the Afghan 
garrison in QazvTn, and then, on the 13th August, himself 
marched to Tehran with a train of artillery and all the troops 
that he could muster.^ *
On hearing of Ashraf*s northward march, Nadir, who 
had just returned to Mashhad from Herat, hurriedly marched
 ^Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th July and 13th/24th October (based 
on letters from Cockell and Geekie, from Isfahan)•
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against the Afghans. Muhammad Muhsin states that, before 
the army left Mashhad, Tahmasp. and Nadir entered into an 
agreement whereby the former undertook, in return for Mdir’s 
services, to grant to him in fief the provinces of Khurasan, 
Kirman and Mazandaran, after. Isfahan,had been retaken and the 
Afghans driven out from Iran.'*' MTrza MahdT does not mention 
this agreement, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the 
accuracy of Muhammad Muhsin’s statement.
On the 18th Safar (12th September) Nadir and Tahmasp 
left Mashhad and marched via NTshapur and Sabzavar to relieve 
Samnan, which Ashraf was besieging. 2 Ashraf, for his part, 
after detaching some of his force to.continue the siege of 
Samnan, advanced eastwards to meet Nadir.
The Afghan advance guard, under Muhammad Saidal Khan, 
made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Nadir’s artillery at 
Bistarn. Saidal then fell back as far as Mihmandust, 11^
miles E.N.E. of Damghan, where Ashraf joined him with the main 
part of the army.^
Nadir continued to advance until reaching the small 
river of Mihmandust, just to the east of the village of that 
name. At this spot, on the morning of the 6th Rablc I (29th 
September), the battle opened.^ Nadir had formed his men
1 Fol.215(a)., It seems evident, from Tahmasp’s promise of |
Mazandaran to Nadir, that he now regarded as a dead letter 
the treaty which he had concluded with Russia in September 
1723, under the terms of which he had undertaken, inter alis 
to cede Mazandaran to that country; this treaty was never 
ratified.
2 T.N., page 61, HazTn, page 192.
3 T.N., page 61.
4 " « 62.
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into one body, encircled by his musketeers and artillery, 
and had given strict orders that no one was to move or to 
fire until he gave the command. The Afghans, following 
their: usual practice, were in three divisions. They 
impetuously charged the Iranian centre and then attacked the 
flanks. As soon as the Afghans came within musket shot,
Nadir gave the order to fire. Though many Afghans fell, 
the rest pressed on, but found, to their surprise, that the 
Iranians were able, not only to withstand the shock of 
their attack, but to take the offensive. Much havoc was . 
caused by the Iranian artillery which destroyed the Afghan 
zanburaks (swivel-guns mounted on camels) and inflicted 
heavy casualties. *^ On Ashraffs standard-bearer being killed 
by a cannon shot, the Afghans broke and fled. The Iranians, 
it is said, wished to pursue the enemy, but Nadir, feeling 
that they were as yet insufficiently experienced, held them 
back.^
Neither MTrza MahdT, nor Muhammad Muhsin gives the 
numbers of the opposing forces or the extent of their losses. 
Otter gives the strength of the Afghans as 5 0,0 0 0 ,^ which
“  F R A N  K 1 9 H  C C U H O  P IS  A T > 0
1 MTrza MahdT speaks of the nartilfery-men of foreigr^race11
but, as it is most unlikely that 
Nadir could have had any foreign artillery-men at this 
early stage, MTrza MahdT must have merely used the term to 
imply that the Iranian artillery-men were skilful (European 
artillery-men being then generally reputed to be the most 
skilled).
2 T.N., page 62.
 ^Vol. I, page 507*
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seems on the high side, and Hanway estimates the Iranian
strength at 25,000.^ Fraser (Cockell) puts the Afghan
2losses at 12,000 and those of the Iranians at 4,000*
Unstinted praise must he accorded to Nadir not 
only for his generalship and bravery during the battle, but 
also (and, indeed, more particularly) for his careful train­
ing of the troops beforehand and his strict enforcement of 
discipline.
Until the Qizilbash troops had felt his iron hand 
and acquired confidence in his leadership, they had, on many 
occasions, fled almost at the mere sight of an Afghan. Now, 
however, the Iranians not only stood their ground without 
flinching, but proved more than a match for their redoubtable 
adversaries. Like Cromwell and other great commanders,
Nadir, besides having supreme faith in himself, had the gift 
of inspiring in others implicit confidence in his leadership, 
After some interval had elapsed, Nadir and Tahmasp
advanced to Daraghan, whence an envoy was sent to
Constantinople to demand the return of the provinces which the 
Turks had conquered; the envoy, however, died at Tabriz.^
From Damghan the army continued on itswestward march; en 
route, Nadir had, it is said, occasion to tell some unpleasing 
truths to Tahmasp, who, in a rage, refused for a time to
1 Vol.IV, page 27.
2 'Nadir Shah», page 96. Shaikh Ha^Th (page 195) states that
the only Iranian casualties were two men who were slightly
woundedI
J T.N., page 6$.
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proceed.^ In the meantime, Ashraf had fallen hack towards 
VaramTn and had sent for reinforcements from Tehran; he then 
prepared an elaborate ambush for the Iranians in a narrow 
defile in the Khar valley. Nadir, having received warning of 
this ambush from his scouts, sent out strong bodies of 
musketeers to attack the enemy on both flanks, while he march­
ed straight against them. These tactics were completely
successful; once more he routed the Afghans, who fled to
2Isfahan leaving their cannon and baggage behind.
Before advancing any further, Nadir persuaded 
Tahmasp to go to Tehran (which the Afghans had evacuated), in 
order, as MTrza MahdT put it, nto settle important affairs of 
the kingdom there.tTV
When Ashraf reached Isfahan after his series of 
defeats, he had no less than 3,000 of the culama and other 
prominent inhabitants put to death, while his men plundered 
and set fire to the bazaars. Fearing lest the employees of 
the English and Dutch East India Companies should escape to 
Nadir, Ashraf had them stripped and thrown into prison, where
they remained for 17 days; they then escaped with the conni-
4 'vance of their guards.
 ^T.N., page 6 3. Stanyan reported, in a despatch to London
dated the 24th November/5th December 1729 (S.P.97* Vol.XXV) 
that another Iranian envoy, who must have been sent previous 




4 See the letter from John Horne, the Agent at Gombroon, to
London dated the 31st December 1729/H£h January 1730 (Vol. 
XV of "Persia & the Persian Gulf" records), and the Gombroor 
Diary of the 9th/20th December.
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Ahmad. Pasha, of Baghdad, in response to an appeal 
for help from Ashraf, sent him some troops and, it is said, 
some cannon.*’ Ashraf then marched N.N.W. to the village of
Murchakhur, near which he encamped.
Nadir, after being relieved of the presence of
— 9Tahmasp, marched towards Isfahan via Natanz , and was only a
few miles west of Murchakhur at the time of Ashraf *s arrival 
there. Nadir did not venture to attack the Afghans, but 
made a feint towards Isfahan in the hope of luring the enemy
from their position. The ruse was successful, as Ashraf
advanced to the attack. Ashraf, in imitation of Nadir1s 
tactics at Mihmandust, had formed his troops into one body 
and placed his artillery on the flanks. The Iranians wheeled 
round to face the oncoming Afghans, and attacked, their 
musketeers being in the van. The Iranian attack was so sudcess 
ful that the Afghan cannon we re seized; severe hand-to-hand 
fighting ensued in which the Iranians were victorious, despite 
furious flank and rear attacks by the enemy. The Iranians 
pressed home their advantage and captured all the Afghan 
artillery and many prisoners, amongst whom were a number of
*■ Mlrza Mahdl (page 65) states that Ahmad PasHa sent "several 
Pashas and a fitting number of men", and Shaikh Hazln adds 
that Ahmad Pasha also despatched a brigade of artillerymen. 
Longrigg, in his "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq" page 155, 
note 3; says: "The statement in Jihan Gusha and Jones that 
a formidable army of Turks, under the Governor of Hamadan, 
were with the Afghans is impossible to accept." The truth 
probably is that only a small contingent of Turks was 
actually sent.
 ^The Natanz route, though longer than the road via Quhrud, was 
practicable for artillery, Y/hereas the other was not.
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Turks. Nadir is said to have treated these Turks kindly and 
to have set them free.
Ashraf reached Isfahan in the evening, and immediate­
ly made preparations for flight. Every available animal was 
collected for the conveyance of the women, children and 
treasures, and a start was made for Shiraz three days later 
(15th November) •*"
On Nadir learning of the Afghans1 evacuation of 
Isfahan, he marched from Murchakhur and entered the city on 
the 16th November. One of Nadir!s first acts was to send 
word to Tahmasp of his success and to urge him to come to 
Isfahan.
Tahmasp accordingly left Tehran, and entered Isfahan 
on the 8th JumadT I (29th November), nearly 7s years after his 
escape from it during the siege.
Isfahan, however, was merely the shadow of Its 
*2
former self; it had suffered terribly during the siege of 
1722, and many of the inhabitants who survived that ordeal, 
perished in subsequent massacres. Shaikh Hazin, who arrived 
in Isfahan soon after its recapture, said: "I.....  beheld
“«
Gombroon Diary, 24th December/4th January (on the authority 
of letters from Cockell and Geekie from Igfahan dated the 
4th/15th and 9th/20th December.) Mlrza Mahdi, however, 
states, in the T.N. (page 67) and the iDurra-yi-Nadira* 
(pages 75 and 76), that Ashraf lef t^Isf ahan on the same 
night that he arrived from Murchakhur*. As CockeH and 
Geekie were on the spot, their testimony is to be preferred.
See the translation in La Mamye-Clairac (Vol.Ill, pages 9^  
and 92) of a Turkish officials report; this official had 
been sent to Isfahan after its recapture, in order to report 
on conditions there.
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that great city, notwithstanding the presence of the King, in
utter ruin and desertion. Of all that population and of my
friends scarcely anyone remained^
On Tahmasp!s arrival, Nadir informed him that he
wished to leave Isfahan for Khurasan with his men as soon as
the coronation ceremony had taken place. It is very doubtful
whether ifedir really intended to act as he had stated. He
well knew that, though Tahmasp both disliked and feared him,
he would not be able to dispense with his services until the
Ghilza1is were finally expelled from Ir.an. Tahmasp, as Nadir
doubtless foresaw, pressed him to remain, and did so again on
the following day, in the presence of all the army leaders.
2After long discussions, Nadir at length agreed to stay.
Tahmasp was now able to mount the throne of his
ancestors,^ but he was Shah only in name. For some time he
could not even appoint his own ministers and functionaries,
as Nadir prevented him from doing so, on the grounds that the
money that would have to be paid to them as salaries would be
better employed as pay for his troops. Even at this time,
it was generally feared in Isfahan and at the court that Nadir
wished to rise still higher; it was clear to all that the only




5 When Ahmad Pasha, in the autumn of 1726, was advancing on 
Isfahan in order to reinstate the ex-Shah SultSn Husain, 
Ashraf had the latter beheaded.
4 See the most interesting contemporary account of Nadir by the 
Chevalier de Gardane, who was French Consul at Isfahan until 
ffiJrcr'voiumi pafesl8^ri89included this account* In his
Nadir treated Cockell and Geekie with great 
civility, and sent, through them, a letter to the Agent at 
Gombroon asking him to act as Governor and Shah-bandar (port 
officer) there until an Iranian could be appointed. Nadir 
later requested the Company to lend its vessels for the 
purpose of intercepting any Afghans endeavouring to escape by 
sea; he desired the Agent to inform the Arab shaikhs on the 
Gulf coast that nif any of them permilt'any Ophgoons to Escape 
at their respective Ports, they with their Wives and Familys 
shall be sold for Slaves.1*^*
Nadir spent nearly six weeks in Ipfahan nomiraLly 
assisting, but really directing the Shah in the settlement of 
affairs of state.
The Joy of the populace at the expulsion of the 
Afghans and the restoration of the SafavT monarchy was soon 
ngreatly Eclipsed by the money that was ordered to be 
Collected from all sorts of People to pay the naked and hungry 
Soldiery which has been raised in so violent and despotick a 
Manner that severall have been Drub’d to death and others 
quite ruin’d . N a d i r  forcedthe English and Dutch East India 
Companies to make considerable payments.
Nadir’s troops behaved in a most cruel manner to 
the people of Isfahan, plundering their houses, and seizing man^  
from persons whom they sold as slaves.^
 ^Gombroon Diary, lst/12th February 1730.
2 « 14th/25th ” "
5 n 5th/16th July.
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As vd.ll be related in more detail in the next 
Chapter, the Shah sent a letter to the Sultan of Turkey in­
forming him of the reconquest of Isfahan, and requesting the 
return of the Iranian provinces which were still held by the 
Turks. Tahmasp followed up this letter by sending Rida QulT
Khan Shamlu, the former general of Shah Sultan Husain, as
» *
Ambassador to Constantinople.
The Afghans at Kirman, hearing of the disasters 
suffered by Ashraf, abandoned the town on the 19th December, 
after blowing up the citadel.-*'
On the 24th December Nadir, despite the severity of 
the weather, began the march from Isfahan to Shiraz. Travel­
ling by Abarquh and Mashhad-1-Madar-i-Sulaiman (Pasargadae), 
he reached Zarqan, 21 miles N.E. of Shir*az, where he found 
Ashraf awaiting him with 20,000 men. An obstinate battle 
took place, in which Ashraf displayed considerable tactical 
skill. In the end, Nadir’s determined leadership and the 
steadfastness of his men won the day, and the Afghans fled in
,  o
some confusion to Shiraz.
On the following morning Ashraf sent Muhammad Saidal 
Khan and two other Afghan notables to Nadir’s camp to ask for
1 Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th January 1730 (on the authority of 
a letter from the Company’s Armenian agent at Kirman)•
 ^MTrza Muhammad Shiraz! (page 6) states that 10,000 Afghans 
were taken prisoners. See also the Farsnama, page 167*
quarter. Nadir replied that he would grant quarter and 
receive Ashraffs submission if he would first deliver up the 
few remaining members of the family of SK3h Sultan Husain, who
were still prisoners in the Afghans1 hands. These person-
1 _ages were duly handed over, but Ashraf, acting on Saidalfs
advice, left Shiraz with such of his troops as were left, in
the hope of escaping to Qandahar.
Nadir, seeing the dust raised by the Afghans,
realised that he had been deceived, and started in pursuit.
Nadir1s advance guard, consisting of 500 Afshars and
Qarachorlu Kurds, came up with the Afghan rearguard at the
Pul-i-Fasa, ten miles S.E. of Shiraz. A fight took place,
and many Afghans were captured, while numbers were drowned 
2in the river. Ashraf, hoYrever, made good his escape, and 
fled to Lar. Nadir himself pursued the fugitives for 
several farsakhs. but, being unable to overtake them, he re­
turned to Shiraz, whence he issued orders for every route to 
be closed to them.
Ashraf, after leaving Lar, continued his flight in 
a westerly direction. Some of the Ghilza»is, including 
Ashraffs brother and nephew, left him and made for the coast, 
where Shaikh Ahmad Madanl, of Maragh, being desirous of 
assisting fellow-SunnTs^ against the hated Sh£ a£, enabled
1 They were, apparently, all females.
 ^T.N., page 71*
5 Shaikh HazTn states (page 228) tha£ the Sunni Arabs of the 
Gulf coast belonged to the Shafl i sect.
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them to take ship from Charak to Julfar (Rasutl-Khaima), on 
the Arabian side of the Gulf.^ These Afghans, on reaching 
cUman, were attacked by the Arabs, who killed many of the 
fugitives and enslaved the survivors* When Shaikh HazTn 
visited Muscat ^  few years later, he saw and conversed with 
AshrafTs nephew and another GhilzaTi of rank who were then
2acting as Saqqa/s or Y/ater carriers.
The authorities differ as to where End in what 
manner Ashraf met his end; according to the most probable 
account, Ashraf, whose following had been reduced to only two 
or three persons, was killed in Baluchistan or just within the 
borders of Sis tan by one of the sons of the Brahoi chieftain,
c - 3AbduTllah Khan. Husain Sultan, of Qandahar, later informed 
NSdir that Ashraf had been put to death near Zard Kuh by a 
force acting on his instructions. 4
Nadir remained in Shiraz until just before the Nau 
Ruz. During his stay, he gave orders for the town to be re­
paired and the gardens to be replanted.^ Shiraz had suffered
 ^Gombroon Diary, 25th February/8th March, 1730*
2 Shaikh HazTn, page 202.
 ^Shaikh Hazln (page 203), who adds that <Abdurllah Khan sent 
Ashraf*s head to Tahmasp, together with a valuable diamond 
which was found upon his person. See also M. Longworth 
Dames in E.I., Vol.I, page 637*
4 T.N., page 78; H. G. Raverty, !!Notes on Afghanistan and Part
of Baluchistan, Geographical, Ethnographical & Historical11, 
London, 1888, page 609-
5 MTrza Muhammad Shiraz! states, in his autobiography (page 7)*
that NSdir contributed 1500 tomans for repairing the ShSh
esented a,quantity.of gold.from e (,this statement is reproducedChiragh mosque and also which a lamb was to oen m, in the F&rsnama, page lt><
terribly during the last few years, and, in the course of the 
final struggle with the Afghans, a large part of the town and 
practically all the gardens had been destroyed* All the*
Indian banians and many of the inhabitants had been killed by 
the Afghans in reprisal for an attack on them by the roughs of 
the town when the news of Ashraf fs defeat at MurchakhNr became 
known*'*’ Several days of continuous snowfall and -rain had com- 
pleted the devastation and destruction wrought by the Afghans.
While at SlTlraz Nadir caused *Ali Mar dan Khan S h a m l u ^  
to be sent on a mission to Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, 
to announce the recapture of Isfahan and the projected recon­
quest of Qandahar* This envoy was ordered to request the 
Emperor, in the common interests of his realm and of that of
Iran, to close his frontiers to all Afghan fugitives when the
- 4Qandahar campaign was undertaken.
It is said that Nadir, at this juncture, once more 
expressed his intention of returning to Khurasan, but, at 
length he decided instead to endeavour to wrest from Turkey 
the territories which she had seized*
1 Gombroon Diary, Jrd/14th December 1729* The ShTraz repre­
sentatives of the English and Dutch East India Companies 
were seized, stripped and driven out of the town, and the 
establishments of the Companies were plundered; the losses . 
of the English Company were assessed at nearly £17*000.
Many particulars of these troubles are given by Mirza 
Muhammad ShlrazI, pages 4-6.
 ^Mirza Muhammad ShTrazi, page 5*
3 ‘A H MardSn Khan was described by the Agent at Gombroon as
being a 1Creature1 of Nadirfs and as depending wholly upon 
him. The Company therefore thought it politic to convey 
him to Sind in one of its vessels.
4 T.N., page 72.
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CHAPTER VI.
Nadirfs first Turkish Campaign, 1730*
The Russian invasion of Iran in 1722 nearly led to
war between Russia and Turkey, Turkey decided, in the spring
of 1723> that it would be easier to prevent a further Russian
advance in Iran by invading that country herself than to declare
war upon Russia. Turkish forces accordingly entered Georgia
and seized Tiflis. Further south, the aged Hasan Pastia accom-
-  1plished his final success in life by taking Kirmanshah .
The conclusion of the treaty between Russia and
Tahmasp in September 1723^  once more occasioned a critical
situation between Russia and Turkey, and war was only averted
by the able diplomacy of the Marquis de Bonnac, the French
Ambassador at Constantinople, who induced the two powers to
agree, in June 1724, to a partition of north-western and 
*
western Iran.^
 ^Hasan Pasha, the Governor of Baghdad, died early in 1724, and 
was succeeded by his son Ahmad Pasha.
 ^By this treaty Tahmasp agreed to cede the districts of Darband 
and Baku, and’the provinces of Galan, Mazandaran and 
Astarabad to Russia, in return for assistance against the 
Afghans.
 ^The partition treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 24th 
June 1724; for its terms, see Butkov, Vol.I, pages 58-6 2. 
France at that time wished to prevent war between Russia and 
Turkey, because she felt that a strong Turkey was a deterrent 
against Austrian aggression in the west. Great Britain, on i 
the other hand, endeavoured, through her representative at 
Constantinople, to embroil Turkey and Russia, hoping thereby 
to weaken the northern power. Later, France and Great 
Britain were to exchange r3les.
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While Russia, subsequently to this partition treaty, 
made but little further progress in Iran,1 Turkey steadily 
advanced, taking Erivan, Tabriz, Ganja and Ardabil, as well as 
Hamadan.
Tahmasp, in his desire to oust the Afghans, made 
several requests for aid to Russia and Turkey* An Iranian 
envoy reached Constantinople in October 1729 > hut the Turks 
received him somewhat coolly, for fear of giving umbrage to
Ashraf. Early in the following year an Iranian pretender who
- - 2 -claimed to be Safi Mirza, the second son of Shah Sultan Husain,
• ' » % *
arrived in the Turkish capital where, although denounced as an 
imposter by the Iranian minister, he was well received by tl?.e 
Porte. In April 1730 rumours reached Constantinople of the 
defeat and capture of Ashraf, and in the same.month the Sultan 
received Tahmaspfs letter officially informing him of the re­
capture of Isfahan and demanding back the provinces captured by 
Turkey. In June Rida Qull Khan Shamlu reached Constantinople 
and repeated this demand, threatening war if the Porte refused 
to comply.^ Negotiations were, however, entered into, and a
The death of Peter the Great in January 1725 was one cause of 
the lack of vigour shown by Russia; also, the heavy mortality 
of the Russian troops in Gllan discouraged further penetration 
in the southern portion of the Caspian littoral.
o g _
 ^This pretender, whose real name was Muhammad All Rafsinjani, was 
the second to pose as Safi Mirza (the real prince of that name 
having been killed by Mahmud). He reached Shushtar, in 
darvish garb, in August 1729 and gave himself out to be the 
Safavi prince, thereby claiming the throne. Though nSafl 
MirzafT collected some followers from among the townspeople, 
the Governor of Shushtar forced him to fly to Turkish terri­
tory. On his crossing the frontier, the authorities sent him 
to Constantinople, thinking that his presence there might be 
of use. c
3 See page 79 above. See also §^tf All Beg’s fAtash~Kada»*
treaty was signed whereby, as far as can be gathered, Turkey was
to cede the occupied territory and Iran was to pay an annual
sum to the Turks to reimburse them for the expense to which they 
1
had been put*
Nadir decided not to wait until an answer could be 
received from Turkey to the above-mentioned letter and the 
message sent through Rida Qull Khan* Leaving Shiraz, Nadir 
marched via Basht and Behbehan to Ram Hormuz whence he despatched 
Rida Qull to Tahmasp1 s court,, as the betrothal of hies soho. to 
Fatima Sultan Begun, a sister of the Shah, had been arranged.
Nadir went on to SEushtar and Dizful; at the latter place he 
received Muhammad Khan Baluch, whom Ashraf had sent as 
Ambassador to Constantinople in 1727* Muhammad■KHan Baluch 
had started on his return journey in September 1729* learning
en route of Ashraffs overthrow and flight, he decided, after
2 —some hesitation, to hand over to Nadir the letters which the
Sultail had entrusted to him for delivery to Ashraf* Nadir 
rewarded Muhammad Khan Baluch by making him Governor of Kuhgilu.
From Burujird Nadir made a night march to Nihavand 
where he surprised and defeated the Turkish garrison; he 
followed up this success by putting to flight a strong Turkish 
force at Malayir.^
1 See Stanyan!s despatch of 2nd/ljth July 1750 (S.P*97* Vol.XXVI).
 ^See the despatch of the 29th June/lOth July 1750 from Lord
Kinnoull (who had just succeeded Abraham Stanyan as
Ambassador at.Constantinople,)S.P.97* Vol.XXVI.
5 T.N., pages 75 and 76.
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On or about the l8th June Nadir occupied HamadSn^ 
without meeting with any opposition, the Turkish commander and 
the garrison having hurriedly retreated to Sinandij and thence 
to Baghdad. Nadir remained for a month at Hamadan, during 
which time detachments of his army reoccupied the province of 
Ardalan and regained Kirmanshah.
On the 1st Muharram 1145 (17th July) Nadir left
— 2Eamadan with the object of driving the Turks out of Adharbaijan.
Meanwhile, news of Nadirfs aggressive movements had 
reached Constantinople, and on the 24th July the Porte formally 
declared war on Iran. Notwithstanding this declaration of war 
and the extensive preparations that were being made, Ibrahim 
Pasha, the pacific Grand Vizier, sent an envoy to the SKah to 
urge the latter to accept the treaty signed on his behalf by 
Rida Qull Khan. Simultaneously, Ibrahim Pasha sent orders to 
Ahmad PasKa of Baghdad to make every effort to arrive at an 
understanding with Iran. These attempts to achieve a peaceful 
settlement were frustrated by Nadirfs vigorous offensive measures
 ^T.N., page 78.
2 ibidem. Before leaving Hamadan, Nadir took a fal or augury 
from Hafiz; this fal turned out to be very apt, for it reads-
&J-
0 3  5 ^
"Thou hast taken Iraq and Pars with thy fine" poetry,
Hafiz; come, for it is (now) the turn of Baghdad 
and of Tabriz.”
 ^See Lord KinnoullTs despatch of the 24th July/4th August,
S.P.97, Vol.XXVI. (Lord Kinnoull had succeeded Abraham 
Stanyan as British Ambassador at Constantinople a few days 
before this despatch was written.)
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Marching via Sinandij (where he received word of 
Ashraffs death), Nadir sought to attack a strong Turkish concen­
tration of troops^ at Miyanduab, between Dimdim and Maragha.
The Turks, according to Mirza Mahdi, set out from Miyanduab to 
oppose NSdir, but, on sighting his forces, fled towards Maragha 
before a shot had been fired. Nadir pursued the Turks for 
over 20 miles, killing and capturing large numbers and seizing 
all their artillery and baggage.2 In consequence of this 
success, the districts of Dimdim, Saujbulagh, Mukri and Maragha 
were restored to Iran.
After spending two days at Maragha, Nadir marched 
north-westwards towards Deh Khariqan, a village near the shore 
of Lake Urumiya, where some Turks were reported to be. These 
Turks retreated to TabrTz, where a serious mutiny broke out 
almost immediately after their arrival. Many Turkish officers 
were killed by the mutineers who then expelled the loyalists, 
under Mustafa Pasha, the commander-in-chief. On the morning 
after the disturbance, the Turkish mutineers marched out of the 
city, and both they and the loyal Turks were attacked by Nadir*s 
forces. VThile the mutineers escaped to Erzeroum, Mustafa Pasha 
and his men were routed near Suhailan, between Tabriz and Sufian.^ 
On the following day (12th August) Nadir entered Tabriz. 
Another Turkish army, under Rustam Pasha, of Hashtarud, not
 ^The local garrison had been reinforced by the arrival of strong 
contingents under Timur Pasha, the Governor of Van and CA11 
Rida Pasha, the Governor of Mukri.
2 T.N., page 79«
5 " " 80. a*
knowing of the defeat of Mustafa PSsha, now approached Tabriz 
with the object of reinforcing him* Rustam PSsha did not dis­
cover his mistake until it was too late, for Nadir hastened 
from Tabriz and inflicted a crushing defeat upon his force, 
capturing him and many of his officers. NSdir, it is said, 
treated Rustam Pasha kindly, set him and the other Turkish 
officers free and sent, through their intermediary, proposals of 
peace to the Grand Vizier.'*'
In August reports of further Iranian successes were 
received at Constantinople. A tense situation began to develop 
between Turkey and Russia, since the former suspected that the 
latter was secretly lending assistance to Iran. As a matter of 
fact, there v/ere definite grounds for these suspicions, because 
General Levashev, having received authorisation from St. 
Petersburg, sent several of his artillery and engineer officers, 
disguised as Iranians, to assist an Iranian force which was
o
besieging Ardabll. Levashev himself acted as intermediary for 
the surrender of the town which, after the Turkish evacuation, 
was held by Russia for a time.^
t
 ^T.N., page 8l. MTrza MShdl here states incorrectly that it was 
at this time (I2th-I6th August) that Nadir heard of the de­
position of Sultan Ahmad, the accession of Sultan MahnfGd his 
brother (sic), and the killing of Ibrahim PSsha. the Grand 
Vizier; these events did not occur until the end of 
September 1730.
o
Manstein, TMemoires Historiques, Politiques et Militaires sur 
La RussieT, Lyons, 1772, Vol.I, page Friction had already
developed between the two powers because of incidents in 
Shirvan, where Cholaq Surkhai Khan (whom the Turks had made 
Khan of Shamakhi in 1728) had been pursuing an aggressive 
policy tov/ards Russia.
5 Levashev obtained_safe-conduct for, the Turkish garrison which was thus enabled to reach ShamakhT.
The Grand Vizier, who was under orders to take the 
field against Iran, lingered at Scutari, hoping that the 
diplomatic measures which he had taken would render it unneces­
sary for him to leave with the army for the front# September, 
however, brought the news of the Iranian reconquest of Hamadan, 
Kirmanshah and Tabriz, and of the mutiny that had preceded the 
evacuation of the last-named city. News also reached the 
capital that the Tabriz mutineers were approaching and that 
another mutiny had taken place at Erzeroum.
The enemies of Ibrahim Pasha alleged that the fall of 
Tabriz was due to instructions which he had issued, and pressed 
for his immediate despatch to the front, hoping that he would 
fail ignominiously and be disgraced.
The gathering discontent in Constantinople suddenly 
found expression in the rising led by the Albanian Patrona 
Khalil on the 28th September; owing to the ?reakness and irre­
solution of the Sultan and his ministers, the rising rapidly 
attained dangerous proportions, and resulted in the death of 
the Grand Vizier, the deposition of Ahmad III, and the elevation 
to the throne of the latter*s nephew Mahmud, the son of Mustafa 
II. The Turkish Government, being thrown into a state of great 
confusion by this upheaval, abandoned all thought of continuing 
the war against Iran.
As for Nadir, he had intended, after retaking Tabriz, 
to extend his conquests further, notwithstanding the fact that
8 9 .
he had sent peace proposals to the Porte. The arrival of a 
courier from his son Rida Qull, with the nev/s that civil war 
had broken out amongst the Abdalls, that the loyal element had 
been driven out of Herat, and that the rebels were marchihg on 
Mashhad, caused him to suspend operations against the Turks 
and to hasten off to Khurasan. No peace with Turkey was con­
cluded, but a state of truce prevailed.
CHAPTER VII
Nadir's Second Campaign against the Abdalis
The instigatjon of the Abdali revolt was Husain Sultan
of Qandahar. As he had reason to fear that Nadir would in due
course attack him, he despatched emissaries to Herat early in
1750 in the hope of inciting the Abdalis to rise and so
distract Nadir1s attention^
Allah Yar Khan, the Governor of Herat, rejected
Husain Sultan's proposal, but many of the Abdalis revolted,
and sent for Dhu'l-Fiqar Khlua, Allah Yar Khan's old rival.
Dhu'l-Fiqar, aided by the rebels in Herat, drove out Allah Yar
KhSn, and soon after marched on Mashhad, where Ibrahim Khan was
in command. Allah Yar Khto, hearing of Dhu'l-Fiqar* s advance on
Mashhad, hastened from Maruchaq (whither he had gone from Herat)
to the assistance of Ibrahim KKSn, and reached the city just
before his rival camped at Khwaja Rabic.
Although Nadir had given his brother strict orders
not to take the offensive under such circumstances, Ibrahim
Khan, after some days of inaction, yielded to the bolder spirits
amongst his men. He sallied out, but was driven back with 
2
heavy loss; through shame at this reverse, Ibrahim did nothing 
further. It was at this juncture that Rid5 Qull sent the courier 
to his father with the news of what had occurred.
T.N., page 82.
2 T.N., page 84: see also the history of RadT'u1d-Biii TafrishX,
BM. IS. Add 6787, fol. 187 (b).
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Before leaving Adharbaijan, Nadir ordered between
50.000 and 60,000 families of tribespeople to be transferred 
from that province and from Iranian 'Iraq and Fars to Khurasan; 
amongst these were 12,000 families of Afshars (including
2.000 of the Qiriqlu branch); these Qiriqlu were sent to the 
district round KGbkan and the other Afshars to Kalat.
Nadir left Tabriz for Mashhad on the 16th August; 
on reaching the Qizil Uzan, he received a further message from 
Rida QulT that the Abdalfs, after spending a month in the 
neighbourhood of Mashhad, had returned to Herat. There being no 
such pressing need for haste, Nadir turned aside from Tehran, 
marched through MSzandarln and Astarabad, crossed the Atrak 
and attempted in vain to overtake and punish some Yamut 
rebels. He thereupon returned to AstarSibad, whence he marched 
up the Gurgan valley and through Simalqah to Khurhs'an. En 
route Nadir received the submission of some Gokl’an tribesmen 
who had also been in revolt^
On the 11th November Nadir reached Mashhad. Great 
celebrations were held in the city in the following January when 
N^dir1 s eldest son, Rida Qull, was married to Fatima Sultan 
Begum to whom, as already stated^ , he had been betrothed. A 
great hunting party was then organised in the neighbourhood of
Kalat and Ablvard.______ __________________________________
 ^T.N. page 86.
2
See page 85 above. Nadir, at some unspecified date, himself ( 
married another daughter of the late ShSh Sultan Husain, named I 
Radiyya Begum. Butkov states (Vol. I. page 114) that Radiyya 
Begum had formerly been the wife of a Georgian prince. See 
also Professor Minorsky's "Esquisse0, pag-e 8, note 2.
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When Dhu'l-Fiqar Abdall heard of Nadir's arrival at
Mashhad and of the preparations that were being made for the forth
coming campaign, he appealed to Husain Sultan, of Qandahar, for
aid* Husain SultSh came in person to IsfarUz, where he met % « *
Dhu'l-Fiq&r, but, for some unrecorded reason, they failed to 
agree. Husain SultSn then entered into negotiations with 
Nadir, and handed over two Safari princesses in exchange for the 
widows and children of Mahmud and some other persons. Soon 
afterwards Husain Sultan patched up his differences with 
Dhu'l-Fiqar, to whom he sent his well-known gieneral, Muhammad 
Saidal Khan, with 2,000 to 3,000 men.
In order to render it difficult, if not impossible, 
for Husain Sultan to assist the Abdalis, NSdir sent word to 
'Abdullah Khan Brahdi, the Governor of BaluchisfSn, to attack 
Qandahar from the south. cAbdullah Khan, however, could not 
obey these instructions, as he was engaged in a struggle with 
Miyan Nur Muhammad Khudayar Khan, the Kalhora chief of Sind!
In a battle' between the two at Gandava, 'Abdullah Khsin was 
killed.
1 ! : 
MiySn Nur Muhammad, the son of Nasir Muhammad, the chief of 
Sind, succeeded his father in 1708; in 1717, having sworn 
fealty to the Mughal Emperor, he was given the title of 
Khudclyar Kh3n. See T. Postans, nPersonal Observation on 
Sind”, London, 1843, page 168. Sir H. Pottinger states, 
in his ^Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde”, London 1876, 
page 278, that 'Abdiillah Khan was the aggressor, having 
seized part of Khudayar KhSh's territory. See also Leech 
in J.R.A.S., Vol. XII, pages 483 and 484.
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Leaving Mashhad Immediately after the Nau Ruz 
festivities, Nadir marched towards Herat via Turuq, Turbat-i- 
Shaikh Jam, Ribat-i-Tumai]?* to Nuqra, a small place seven miles 
west of Herat. A few days later, the Abdalis emerged from the . ■ 
city, and an indecisive battle was fought. That night Muhammad 
Saidal Khan, the Ghilza’i general, made a surprise attack on 
the Iranians and placed Nadir himself in great jeopardy. NSdir, 
with only 8 men, was surrounded in a small tower for some time.
Eventually, the Afghans were repelled, and Nadir was relieved?
On the following day Nadir made an unsuccessful attack on 
the Afghans who were holding the Takht-i-Safar, a garden on the 
lower slopes of the Kuh-i-Mulla Khwaja, miles N.N.W. of
Herat. Nadir was more successful a few days later when he met 
and heavily defeated Dhufl-Fiqar outside the city. At this 
stage, Allah Yar Khan arrived from Maruchaq with reinforcements.
On the 4th May Nadir decided to invest Herat on
every side; leaving a strong force at Nuqra, he crossed to
the south side of the HarX Rud and marched via the villages of 
Zandij an and Kabutar Khan towards the bridge of Mai an, 5 miles 
south of Herat. The Afghans attempted to stem his progress, but
were hurled back with severe loss, and on the following day
Nadir seized the bridge.
Whilst Nadir was at Malan the AbdalX artillerymen,
1 ~
This place was probably near the Pul-i-Khatun, which was built 




having noticed his magnificent tent, opened fire on it. A. 
cannon destroyed the roof of the tent and struck the ground 
by the side of his couch, but fortunately left him unscathed!
Whilst Nadir1s forces were completing the circle round 
Herat, Saidal Khan, with a force of Ghilza!is and AbdhXls, 
made a sortie, but was driven back with heavy loss? The 
encircling line was then drawn tighter round the city.
An Iranian detachment carried out a successful raid 
on Maimana and Chachaktu, but a larger force, vhieh had been 
sent against Farah, met with disaster?
On the 17th Muharram 1144 (22nd July) Dhufl-Fiqar 
emerged from Herat with a large body of men and crossed the 
Hari Had. Nldir at once sent troops to cut off the Afghans, 
while he delivered a frontal attack. The Afghans were 
completely defeated, and Dhufl-Fiqar narrowly escaped being 
drowned in the Hari Rud. Saidal, the Ghilzafi general, being 
discouraged at this defeat and at the heavy casualties sustained 
by his Ghilzafis during the siege, secretly fled from Herat 
one night. This reverse and the defection of Saidal caused 
the Abdall chiefs to make peace overtures through Allah Yar 
Khan, which Nadir agreed to accept. Ihe Abdalis, however, broke 
faith, thinking that the dust raised by an approaching Iranian
1-------
T.N., page 94.




force under IbraKlm Kiian was that of a relieving army from 
QandahcTr. NSdir, in anger, ordered a renewal of hostilities, 
but the AbdSlis, realising their error, humbly begged for 
forgiveness and asked for Allah YSr Khan to be made Governor 
of Herat. Nadir once more acceded to their request.
DhuTl-Fiqar who, with his brother Ahmad, had been 
exiled to Farah, joined forces with Saidal at Isfarltz. On the 
strength of this news and of the rumoured approach of 40,000 
Ghil za!is, Allah Yar Khan, in September, renounced his 
allegiance to Nadir, sent out raiding parties to Badghls and 
elsewhere, and made an unsuccessful attack on Nadir1s force. 
Nadir, in retaliation, seized Allah Yar*s family at Maruchaq.
At the end of December the Abdalis made fresh proposals of 
peace, but withdrew them again immediately after these had 
been accepted by Nadir; the latter, in great anger, vigorously 
renewed the siege operations, with the result that, on 
1st Ramadan (27th February 1752) Allah Yar Khan finally 
surrendered, and the Iranian army at last occupied Herat.
Allah Yar Khan and his companions were exiled to Multan,
and 60,000 Abdalis were transferred to the districts of Mashhad,
Nishapurand Damghan!
During the latter part of the siege of Herat, Ibrahim
Khan had been investing Farah, which, despite the arrival of
Saidal with 2,000 Ghilza!is, he eventually took. Nadir set out 
—
Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 215(b). Another instance of Nadir* s 
great concentration of tribespeople of good fighting qualities 
in Khurasan; mention has already been made of his transference 
to that province of 60,000 families of Afshars and other tribes.
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from Herat on the 19th Ramadan with the intention of going to 
FarSh, but returned almost at once on receipt of the news of 
Tahmaspfs defeat by the Turks at Kurijan and of his conclusion 
of peace with them!
The siege of Herat had occupied, in all,, some 10 
months. The most remarkable feature of the siege was NITdirfs 
clemency, despite the repeated tergiversation of the Abdalls.
It seems that Nadir was determined, by a display of moderation, 
to win over the Abdalls and that, in so doing, he was already 
endeavouring to put into practice his policy of recruiting his 
army as far as possible from non-Iranian stock. He doubtless 
felt that, being himself a Turk and an upstart, he could not 
depend upon his Iranian troops in the event of a final rupture 
between himself and the Shah.
1 T.N., page 104
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CHAPTER VIII.
Tahmaspfs Turkish Campaign: His Defeat and
subsequent Deposition*
When, in August 1730* N£dirfs departure for Khurasan 
freed Tahmasp from the restraint imposed by his presence, he 
and his ministers gave themselves up to their pleasures, as in 
former times.^ After spending several months in this fashion, 
Tahmasp, in a fit of military ardour, left Isfahan in January 
1731 with the object of driving the Turks out of the Iranian 
territory in the north-west which they still occupied. Tahmasp 
doubtless wished to acquire some military glory himself and, 
at the same time, deprive Nadir of the opportunity of expelling 
the Turks.
From Hamadan Tahmasp sent an envoy to congratulate 
Sultan Mahmud on his accession and also despatched an emissary 
to Surkhai Khan at ShamakhT. Surkhai, in order to show his 
loyalty to the Porte, beheaded the unfortunate emissary and his 
suite and sent their heads to Constantinople.*
Tahmasp proceeded from Hamadlahto Tabriz where he re­
placed the Governor whom Nadir had appointed by his own nominee,
- 2and then marched against Nakhichevan and Erivan.
Meanwhile Turkey had somewhat recovered from the revo­
lution in the previous September; as Rida Qull Khan had received 
no answer from Iran to the communications which he had sent to
■* Muhammad Muhsin, fol.215(a)# 
2 T.N., page 105*
his court regarding the conclusion of peace, the Porte, instruct­
ed its commanders on the frontiers to be on their guard, and 
granted Ahmad FashU full powers to make peace or war. In March 
1751 Rid5 Quli Khan left Constantinople for Baghdad, but was 
imprisoned at Mardin when news was received of Tahmasp1s advance 
on Erivan.
Evacuating Nakhichevan, the Turks fell back on Erivan.
Near Echmiadzin Tahmasp met with and defeated the Turkish 
1
forces; his subsequent attempt to take Erivan ending In 
failure, he retired to Tabriz. Learning that Sill Pasha was 
advancing from ErivSn and that Ahmad.Pasha of Baghdad was march­
ing on Iranian cIraq, Tahmasp left Tabriz and proceeded to Abhar.
Ahmad Pasha, having retaken Kirmanshah and overrun the 
whole of Ardalan, threatened Hamadan. Tahmasp hastening south­
wards with 18,000 men, halted near the village of Kurijan, 20 
miles N.E. of Hamadan. Ahmad Pasha, having deluded Tahmasp 
and his advisers with peace proposals, suddenly attacked the 
Iranians at Kurijan on the 15th September, and totally defeated 
them; several thousand of Tahmasp^ men perished, and all his 
baggage and artillery were captured. The survivors of the 
Iranian army dispersed to their homes, while Tahm&sp, accompanied 
by only a few guards, returned to Isfahan.
Ahmad FasKa proceeded to take HamadKn and Abhar, while 
j^ ll Pasha, although repulsed at Dimdim, recaptured Maragha and
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.2o5(a); Durra-yi-Nadira, page 110.
2
T.N., page 106. See also von Hammer, ¥ol.XIV, page 254.
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Tabriz; in the south, Huwaiza was seized by a Turkish force * 
Peace negotiations were opened, and a treaty was con­
cluded between Tahmasp and the Turks on the 10th January 1752 on 
the basis that all the provinces which N£dir had recaptured 
south and east of the Aras, together with Tabriz, were to be re­
tained by Iran, while Ganja, Tiflis, Erivan, Nakhichevan, the 
Georgian kingdoms of Kakheti and Kartli, Shamakhi and Daghistan 
were to be held by Turkey. The retrocession of Tabriz v/as very 
unpopular in Turkey, but the Government felt that it was better 
to conclude a speedy peace, at the price of Tabriz, than to 
protract negotiations by insisting on its retention. The Turks 
feared that, if they adopted the latter course, they would doubt­
less soon be confronted by Nadir in place of the feeble Tahmasp. 
Although the treaty was confirmed by the Porte, the Sultan him­
self, like many of his subjects, disapproved of its terms; in 
order to allay popular feeling, he dismissed the Grand Vizier, 
Topal^sman Pasha,^ and the Mufti.
Almost simultaneously with the conclusion of the peace 
with Turkey, the treaty of Resht was signed by Iran and Russia.
In April 1751 Baron Shafirov had arrived at Resht in order to 
negotiate, in company with General Levashev, a treaty with the
Topal c0sman Pasha believed that war with Iran was contrary to 
the true interests of Turkey; his fall was precipitated by 
a curious incident at Constantinople in which the captain of 
a British vessel was involved. See Lord Kinnoull’s despatch 
of the 25th January/5th February 1752. Topal <bsman was 
succeeded as Grand Vizier by ‘All Pasha paklmoghlu. (Von 
Hammer’s account.(Vol.XIV, pages 270 and 271) of this 
incident is inaccurate).
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Shah respecting the evacuation of GTlan.^ In consequence of 
Tahmaspfs campaign against the Turks, much delay occurred in 
the negotiations, and the treaty was not signed until the 1st 
February 1732*^ Russia agreed to return to Iran, within the 
space of 5 months, all the territories occupied by her save 
those to the north of the Kura; these territories were to be 
held until the Turks were expelled from Armenia, Georgia and 
the other Iranian provinces which they held. Freedom of trade 
was accorded to Russian merchants in Iran and to Iranian 
merchants in Russia, and each power was to have a diplomatic 
representative at the court of the other.^
Tahmasp, on his return to Isfahan,, gave himself up to
pleasures and festivities to such an extent that none woul^say
/
4that no defeat had occurred.”
At this time a person claiming to be Isma<l.l Mfrza, 
a younger brother of Tahmasp, reached Isfahan. He had, he 
said, escaped from Mahmild’s clutches through the devotion of a 
servant, but had afterwards been captured and mutilated by the 
first pretender to take the name of Safi Mlrza.5 The manfs 
claims were investigated by the court and Tahmasp accepted him
In October 1730 the Empress had, in a letter to Tahmasp, laid 
down the principles on which the evacuation was to proceed; 
see Butkov, Vol.I, page 106.
 ^Butkov, page 110. See also the despatch of the 7th/l8th
October 1732 from Claudius Rondeau, the British Minister at 
St. Petersburg, S.P.91, Vol.XIII.
5 Butkov, Vol.I, page 113 •
4 Muhammad Muhsin, fol.215(b).
5 This 1 SafT Mlrzlt' had appeared in the Bakhtiari country in
1724*and had been killed three years later by a force which 
NSdir sent against him.
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as his brother. Soon after, some of the ministers and eunuchs,
and, it is said, even several of Tahmasp!s women, plotted to
depose the Shah and to replace him by IsmacIl. The plot was
discovered by Tahmasp, who immediately put Ismacll and his
fellow-conspirators to death.^
N5dir, on returning to Herat, sent word to the Sultan
of Turkey that he must either relinquish all the Iranian
2occupied territory or prepare for war; he simultaneously in­
formed Ahmad Pasha, by courier, that he would shortly be 
advancing on Baghdad, and bade him prepare for his reception.
Having thus notified the Turks of his intentions,
Nadir made his attitude plain to his own countrymen. After 
sending a strongly-worded message to the Shahfs ministers, up­
braiding them for their conduct in the matter of the peace treaty, 
Nadir issued a remarkable manifesto to the "headmen, peoples 
and nobles of the kingdom", "calling upon them all to know that, 
with divine aid, his sword had conquered cities and provinces, 
the Iranian armies had been victorious, the Abdalls, having been 
defeated, were now well-disposed, and the Ghilzafis had been
 ^T.N., page 107* Cockell, in reporting this, plot and its out­
come to Gombroon, referred to Ismacll as a pretender (Gombroon 
Diary, 9th/20th May), but MIrza Mahdl regarded his claim as 
genuine.
 ^T.N., page 108, von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 283, Asiatick Re­
searches, Vol.X., page 536.
 ^T.N., page 108. Lord Kinnoull on the 3rd/14th June, announced 
the receipt at Constantinople of "very surprising nev/s” from 
Ahmad Pasha, who had received a letter full of threats from 
Ntdir. S.P.97* Vol.XXVI.
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subdued. Nadir then referred to the peace treaty, saying
"Verily this peace is, in the eyes of wisdom, nought 
but a picture upon water and a mere mirage (sarab); 
its fundamental object, namely, the deliverance of 
the Persian prisoners was not accomplished, this 
important matter not being included in the Treaty
...............  We wish to remove the evilness
of transgressors from among Moslems and to cleanse
the kingdom of all sources of evil......  The
bearing of such a matter is far from honour and is 
repugnant to a proud nature. Since the frontiers 
(as laid down in the treaty) are contrary to the 
pleasure of the Divine Being and are opposed’ to what 
is expedient for the kingdom: we therefore did not
sign (i.e. accept) it ............."
Nadir went on to say that, after the cIdu!l-Fitr (end of March
1752) he would at once make war and would attain his object
stage by stage, and concluded by stating that whoever did not
join him would be
"deprived of the attributes of honour and of the share 
of the bliss of the religious; his recompense shall 
be the curse of Allah and he shall be cast out from 
tne community of Islam and numbered with the hosts of 
the Kharijites."1
It was evidently at this time that Nadir sent the
letter to Muhammad *Ali KEm, the Beglarbegi of Fars, which Sir
2John Malcolm has translated in "Asiatick Researches".
In this letter Nadir denounces the treaty, and in 
referring to his victories, speaks of "the happy auspices of 
the House of Haidar (jU.1) and the twelve holy Imams." He goes 
on to say: "This day is big with ruin to their enemies and
with joy to the sect of the Shiah, the discomfiture of the evil-
-*■ The full text of the manifesto is given in the T.N., pages 
108-110. A verse from Hafiz is incorrectly quoted by 
Mlrza Mahdl.
2 Vol.X, pages 533-539* Fasa1! quotes a few lines of this 
letter in the Farsnama, page 170.
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minded is the glory  of the followers of CA11". Nadir
concluded by announcing his intention of resuming the Turkish 
war after the cIdu’1-Fitr, and requesting the Beglarbegi to 
proceed to Isfahan and point out to the Sh&h why the treaty 
could not be respected.
In all probability, it was Mlrz& Mahdl who drafted 
the manifesto and the above letter.
Although Nadir stigmatised the treaty to such an 
extent, it was not, however, so unfavourable to Iran as it might,
.under the circumstances, have been; in fact, as stated above,
\
the provisions of the treaty were regarded in Turkey as being
/
definitely derogatory to that country.
Although it may have been galling to Nadir to see some 
of the fruits of his victories sacrificed by reason of the folly 
and incompetence of Tahmasp, there can be but little doubt that 
any annoyance which he may have felt on this score was far more 
than outweighed by his satisfaction at being given such an 
opportunity for arraigning the Shah. Nadir, in fact, could 
not have hoped for a better opening. The terms of Nadir’s 
manifesto and of his letter to Muhammad CA1I Khan show that he4
was expecting some opposition to the renewal of the Turkish war, 
and that he was determined to brook no interference or opposi­
tion from anyone. In fact, it is not going too far to say that 
his words were intended more as a challenge to Tahmasp and his 
supporters than as a threat to the Turks.^ Nadir’s references
 ^See Sir J. Malcolm’s remarks in "Asiatick Researches", Vol.X, 
page 527.
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to the twelve InfSms and his apparent championing of the Shica 
cause are of especial interest; he clearly wished to excite 
and utilise Shifa fanaticism for his own ends; so long as the 
Shica ladder was of use to him in his upward progress, he would 
not kick it away. By wording his manifesto and letter as he 
did, Nadir aimed at not only rallying the majority of the Shi'a 
to his side against the Sunni enemy, hut also at discrediting 
Tahmasp* If TahmSspTs followers refused to go to war against 
Turkey, they would he branded as heretics; if they acquiesced 
in Nadir!s policy, they v/ould he acting against the wishes of 
their sovereign, and lowering his prestige.
After spending Nau Ruz at Herat, Nadir went to Mashhad 
whence he sent HasanfAll Beg to Isfahan to explain to Tahmasp his 
reasons for not accepting the treaty, and to request the Shah to
meet him at Qum or Tehran in order to march jointly against the
1 _Turks. With the object of strengthening his position, Nadir
dismissed many provincial governors and replaced them with his
own nominees.
While at Mashhad NUdir appointed ^ bdu’l-Ghanl ^ JLi 
Kuza!i Governor of the AhdSIXs and rewarded many other AbdalT 
chiefs. He ordered these chiefs to he ready with horses, arms 
and provisions for the march to cIraq. Having given orders for 
the shrine of the Imam Rida to he circumambulated and for the 
Imam!s intercession to he besought, Nadir marched via Khahushan
T.N., page 111.
1 0 5 .
to Jajarm, whence, with a small force, he made a swift, but
unsuccessful, dash northwards to the BalkhHn D3gh against the
Turcomans, Whilst on this expedition NSdir learnt that the
Russians had completed their evacuation of Gllan. Rejoining
his main army at Qusha (25 miles S.W. of DSmghan), Nadir went
to Tehran, where he distributed the large sum of tomans
(£110,000) to his followers for the repair and renewal of their
equipment He had intended marching through Farahan to the
Turkish frontier, but he set out instead for Isfahan, the reason
for this change being (according to MlrZS Mahdl) that Tahmasp had
not only refused to join him at Qum or Tehran, but was acting in
2collusion with Ahmad Pasha,
Nadir arrived at the capital on the 25th August. There 
are several versions of what subsequently occurred, which, al­
though identical in their essentials, differ in points of detail.
 ^T.N., page 114.
2
n ” This statement is an^exaggeration, but it is
true that Tahmasp wrote to Ahmad Pasha, regarding the 
threatened "renewal of the war, excusing himself by saying 
that nhe cannot govern Tamas Kuli Khan who with his victor­
ious Army has power to do what he pleases, and will do what 
he pleases; but this is only a political excuse in tlje 
Schah for breaking his last Treaty of peace with the Grand 
Sigr.*1 (Lord Kinnoull, 5ra/14th June, 1752, S.P.97* Vol.
XXVI). W. Cockell reported to Gombroon on the 8th/19th
July that Nadir intended "to break the peace with the Turks 
which his Majesty is entirely averse to, but to no purpose, 
having no Power to Prevent his arbitrary Proceeding*1 
(Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th August, 1752).
After ceremonial visits had been exchanged, Nadir 
invited the Shah to the HazarjarTb garden. After receiving the 
Shah with great respect, Nadir took him to his private apartment. 
Thereupon Tahmasp,
^having summoned, as was customary, the lords and nobles 
of the state, expressed a desire for wine and musicians 
and called for the instruments of pleasure and the 
makers of joy (arbab-i-tarab). The Highness-with-the 
rank-of-Alexander (.Nadir), out of politeness, respect,
and hospitality, obeyed, and prepared everything....
and for three days and three nights His Majesty, in 
company v/ith the worthless nobles, was occupied with 
drinking and pleasure. All the chiefs, cavalry 
leaders and commanders of the armies ofcIraq and 
Khurasan obtained complete information as to what 
occurred.......  His Majesty became intoxicated.1
Nadir convened a great conference (kingash) of the 
QizilbSsh and leaders, where the unsuitability of Tahmasp for 
his exalted position was emphasised. The people of Isfahan
were then called upon to witness the condition of the Shah.
2 - Thereupon, it is said, all agreed to the deposition of Tahmasp
and the elevation of his infant son cAbbas to the throne.
Tahmasp, together with his haram and attendants, was then sent
under strong guard to Mashhad.
Cockell reported to Gombroon^ on the 19th/30th 
September that Nadir had proclaimed fAbbas MIrza as SK&h nunder
Muhammad Muhsin, foil. 215(b) and 216(a). MTrzl Mahdl does not 
mention the Shah’s drunkenness; there seems, nevertheless, 
to be no doubt not only that Tahmasp took too much to drink 
on this occasion, but that Nadir encouraged him to do so.
The whole episode has the appearance of having been carefully 
planned beforehand. (See Shaikh HazTn, page 221).
^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216 (b)
5
Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th October.
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pretence of his Father having forfeited the Crown by his Lazy 
Indolent Management and his being a Sott^ and a Sodomite.
That this struck such a Terrour into the Nobility and Inhabi­
tants that none had courage to oppose him   Since which
there has not been the least trouble and this unexpected 
Revolution has been brought to pass without any bloodshed."
According to Muhammad Muhsin^ version, the deposition
of Tahmasp occurred six days after N5dir*s arrival in Isfahan,
that is, on the 31st August 1732 j Cockell, however, states that
Nadir seized and imprisoned Tahmasp on the 22nd August (2nd
September N.S.), and had ^ bbas proclaimed Shah on the following 
2day.
It may well be asked why Nadir did not go one step 
further, and mount the throne himself. Caution rather than
modesty was doubtless the reason. Nadir probably realised that 
there was still a strong feeling of loyalty throughout the 
country to the Safavi dynasty, and felt that, strong though he 
was, it would be wiser to wait until he had still further in­
creased the non-Iranian element in his army before actually 
supplanting the ancient royal line.^
 ^The Carmelite monk, Leandro di Santa Cecilia, in his "Persia
Ovvero Secondo Viaggio" ... dell!oriente (Rome 1757)> Vol.II, 
page 1559 said that Tahmasp was "molto dedito al vino", a 
statement which is abundantly confirmed by other writers, such 
as Lutf CA1T Beg, and later authorities like Fas!*!, MTrzli 
MuhammadcAlI (the author of the Daura-yi-Mukhtasar-i-Ta*rlkh- 
i-iran), etc.
 ^Gombroon Diary, Jrd/14th October.
 ^In this connection, see Hanway, Vol.IV, page 75*
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On the 17th RabTcI (7th September) the investiture of
A^bbas III took place at the Talar-i-TawTla palace. On the
Infant?s cradle being brought forward, NSTdir laid the .jiga by
his head and placed a sword and shield by his side.^ Homage
was then rendered to the new monarch; for seven days.and nights
the drums sounded.
Nadir, in taking on the of fir ctgr of regent, adopted
the titles of WakTluTd-Daula and Nafibu?s-Saltana in place of
that of Tahmasp Quli Khan.
The news of the coup d!etat was received at St.
Petersburg with satisfaction, where Nadir was looked upon as
2having always been f!a declarM friend to Russia1. Many at
St. Petersburg believed that Nadir would, as soon as he was
firmly established, "find means to despatch this young Sophy."5
Ambassadors were sent to Turkey, Russia and India
to convey the tidingscfficially to the rulers of those countries.
Muhammad ^ li Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, who was appointed
Ambassador to India,was instructed to repeat to the Emperor the
request made through CA1T Mardan Khan in 1730 for the Indian
4frontier to be closed to Afghan fugitives.
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216. See also T.N., page 116; Fraser 
(Cockell), pages 108 and 109, and Rondeau 2nd/13th December 
1732 (S.P.91, Vol.X).
 ^Rondeau, JOth December 1732/lOth January 1733^  (S.P.91* Vol.X),
■k ■
5 ibidem.
4 T.N., page 116.
In Constantinople the tidings of Nadirfs deposition
of Tahmasp caused anxiety for the future.'*' The Porte, besides
preparing for a clash of arms in western Iran, determined to
strengthen its influence in Daghistan and ShTrvan and so to
threaten Nadir with attack from that quarter. Instructions
were accordingly sent to Qaplan Girai, the Khan of the Crimea,
to take action in the desired sense. Qaplan Girai therefore
gave the titles of Vizier and Beglarbegi respectively to
9Surkhai Khan and his son Muhammad. On being pressed to take
more active steps, Qaplan Girai, early in 1733* despatched his 
-^ Fath Girai,
Qalgha,vwith 20,000 Tatars, to DSghistan, with orders to raise
4the tribes there against Iran and to invade that country. As 
Fath Girai, marching by the nearest route, crossed into Russian 
territory, great alarm was caused in St. Petersburg, and NepluieVj 
the Russian Minister at Constantinople lodged a vehement protest. 
A critical situation arose between Turkey and Russia when it 
became known that a battle had been fought in the Chechen terri­
tory between Fath Giraifs army and 4,000 Russians under General
■*■ Lord Kinnoull, ljth/24th December 1732 (S.P.97> Vol.XXVl).
 ^Howorth, nHistory of the Mongols11, Part II, Division I, 
page 577.
 ^The Qalgha or deputy of the Khan, was the highest dignitary in 
the Crimea, after the Khan himself. For further details, 
see Howorth, op.cit., page 610.
 ^Butkov, Vol.I, page 118. Von Hammer’s chronology is at fault 
in regard to the Khan of the Crimea; in this instance, he 
states that the Porte decided to create this diversion after 1 
Topalc0sman!s defeat and death in November 1733 (Bee Vol.XIV, 
page 511).
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Yeropkin, whom Count von Hesse-Homburg, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the forces on the Iranian and Turkish frontier districts, 
had sent to oppose the Tatars. The Russians forced the Tatars 
to retreat; ultimately, Fath Girai and his men left Russian 
territory and joined the Turkish forces in AdharbaijSn and 
Georgia.
CHAPTER IX.
The Resumption of the War with Turkey; Nadir’s 
Mesopotamian Campaign.
Although NSdir. now had the supreme control of the
affairs of the kingdom, he v^ as unable immediately to carry out
his intention of taking the offensive against Turkey, the reason
being that a revolt broke out in the Bakhtiari country.
The revolt was occasioned by the Governor, a BakhtiarT
chief whom Nadir had just appointed, putting a man to death for
insubordination. The tribesmen rose to avenge the man’s death
and killed the Governor, some of them afterwards flying to the
garmsTr or hot country.^ * The Sunni Arabs of the coastal dis-
— 2tricts, led by Shaikh Ahmad Madani, of Maragh, also rebelled, 
and for many months carried out raids in the neighbourhood of 
Bandar cAbbas, Cong, Basidu and elsewhere.
Nadir, having given orders for the BakhtlSrls who had 
fled to the garmslr to be pursued and caught, left Isfahan for 
the BakhtiarT highlands on the 19th October. Marching via the 
sources of the Zayanda Rud and the Karun river, he traversed the 
heart of the Bakhtiari country; as Nadir and his army advanced,
 ^T.N., page 116., Tadhkira-yi-Shushtariyya, page 67*
 ^Gombroon Diary, 28th November/9th December 1732. Shaikh
Ahmad Madani (who, as stated on page 80-1 above, aided some 
of the Ghilza’i fugitives to escape to Arabia) was always 
ready, on the slightest provocation, to flout the authority 
of the Government.
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the BakhtiarTs fell hack before them and took refuge in their 
stronghold at Banavar. After enduring a siege lasting 21 days, 
the Bakhtiari defenders, in despair, made a sortie and met their 
end fighting to the last.*** Nadir, in pursuance of his usual 
policy, sent off 5,000 Haft Lang BakhtiSrT families to Khurasan. 
Nadir then proceeded through FailT Luristan to
2Kirmanshah vrtiich town the Turks evacuated after a brief siege. 
During his halt at Kirmanshah Nadir gave orders for the Zand 
tribe in the districts of MaX&yir and Qalamrau *A1T Shakar to be 
severely punished for their continual depredations since the^time 
of the Afghan invasion.^
Having been joined by his main forces, Nadir left 
Kirmanshah for the Turkish frontier on the 10th December* Hearing 
that Ahmad Pasha had fortified the frontier passes at Darna, 
Mandali and Badra and had posted strong forces at Zuhab and on 
the Taq-i-Girra, NSdir resolved to surprise the Turks by attack­
ing them from an unexpected direction. Striking north or north­
east from the main road near Karind, he crossed the lofty 
Biv/anij table-land into the Zimkan valley near Gahvarra, and, 
turning N.W. up the valley, went over the Gardana-yi-Yanakiz.
He then, during the night, skirted the south and south-west flanks 
of the mountain immediately to the east of Zuhab and fell upon
 ^T.N., page 116.
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216(b)., Hanway, Vol.IV, page 76.
5 See Muhammad Sadiqfs t7Tarikh-i-Giti-Gushafin (sometimes called 
the ^Ta^ikh-i-ZandTyya17) ,BM., MS., Add. 25524, fol. 4 (a).
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the Turks while it was still dark. Many of the Turks were
_ 2
killed and their commander, Ahmad P£sha Bajilan, was captured.
Having sent detachments to collect provisions from 1 
the neighbourhood of Buhriz and ordered his brother-in-law,
Lutf \ll Beg Kusa Ahmadfti, the commander of the contingents from 
AdharbaijSn, ArdalSn and Hamadan, to cross the Turkish frontier 
further north and to join him on the Mesopotamian plain, NSdir, 
instead of marching direct on Baghdad, made a feint towards
Kirkuk, in the hope of drawing Ahmad Pasha out of Baghdad. When
a few miles beyond Tuz Khurmatu Nahir halted; after detaching
7,000 men to invest Kirkuk,^ he marched south to Qara Tappa where 
Lutf fAlT Khan and his army, having proceeded via Qara Chwolan, 
joined him. The combined forces then went via Tash Kopru 
tov/ards Shahraban, probably crossing the Jabal Hamrin by the 
Saqal-Tutan pass. Having defeated 10,000 to 12,000 Turks near 
Shahraban, Nadir marched to Yangija, whence he endeavoured, during
the night, to seize the bridge at Buhriz; in the darkness, how­
ever, he and his men went astray. The advance on Baghdad was 
then resumed, and a reconnoitring Turkish force, under Muhammad 
Pasha, was intercepted, many of the enemy being killed and 
wounded and the remainder captured.
-*• This route is based largely on conjecture, some of the geograph­
ical details given by MTrzS Mahdl (T.N., pages 117 and 118) 
being incomprehensible.
2 T.N., page 118. There seems to be no evidence in support of von 
Hammer!s statement (Vol.XIV, page 284) that the Beg of Darna 
assisted Nadir on this occasion.
5 T.N., page 119• Sulaiman Sa!igh, in his nTafrlkhuf 1-Mausil1 
(Cairo, 192J), page 275**is incorrect in saying that KirkUk 
v;as taken on this occasion. Von Hammer, following the Turkish
Longngg, "Four Centuries o^goaern Tra^ ", page Ip8, note 1.
On the 51st December 10,000 Iranians crossed over to 
the west side of the Tigris at Samarra, in order to threaten 
Baghdad from that side. The main Iranian force camped opposite 
the shrine of Kazimain, above Baghdad, on the 17th January 1755 > 
and three days later Nadir sent a body of .jazavirchis to guard 
the shrine of Abu Hariifa at Mucazzam; meanwhile, the Iranians 
had seized the bridge at Buhriz.
The Turks having previously'denuded the whole district 
of supplies and taken them to Baghdad, Nadir arranged for provi­
sions for his forces to be brought from Tuz Khurmatu, Zuhab and 
Mandali.^
As the Turks had fortified the right bank of the Tigris 
opposite the Iranian camp, Nadir determined to cross the river
2and turn their position. With the aid of a foreign engineer, 
a floating bridge, consisting of palm-trunks laid upon inflated 
skins, was constructed and placed in position, apparently some 
distance up-stream from Baghdad. On the 1st Hamadan (15th 
February) NSdir crossed over with 2,500 men and was followed the 
next day by another 1,500; the bridge then broke asunder. With­
out waiting for these 1,50° men, Nadir set out in the direction
1 T.N., page 121.
r\
According to the Bombay edition of the T.N., (page 121) this 
man had been sent on a mission to Nadir by?,the Austrian (or 
German) King" (the adjective used is Namsa- which has either 
meaning)• There is no record in the Haus-, Hof-und Staats- 
Archiv at Vienna of any diplomatic mission having been sent 
to Iran at that time; it is most unlikely that any German 
mission r .would have been sent. .
of Baghdad. Hearing of the Iranian advance on the. western 
side of the river, Ahmad Pasha despatched a strong body of 
Janissaries, with cavalry and artillery in support, to meet the 
enemy. When the two armies met, the Turkish infantry proved 
more than a match for the QarachorlCf Kurds and Goklan Turcomans 
whom Nadir had with him, but the Afghan troops stood firm.
The position had become extremely critical when the 1,500 troops 
mentioned above most opportunely made their appearance, and 
enabled Nadir to rout the Turks. This victory gave NSTdir the 
mastery of the west bank of the Tigris and enabled him to draw 
his cordon tightly round Baghdad. The Turks opposite the
Iranian camp retired within the walls of the city, leaving the
1 ^cannon and equipment there and at Old Baghdad to the Iranians.
At Nadir?s orders, Iranian detachments occupied Samarra, Hilla 
Karbala, Najaf and other places, to all of which Iranian 
Governors were appointed.^
The fragments of the broken bridge were then collected, 
and floated down to Kazimain; there they were joined together 
and strengthened by means of boats which had been captured from 
the Turks.4
 ^Mirza Mahdi*s "Kuhna Baghdad" is evidently the same as the
area marked by Niebuhr as "Ruinen von Alt Baghdad" just north 
of the portion of the city situated on the west bank of the 
Tigris; it is obviously distinct from the ruins of the 
Sasanian town of Daskara and the later Arab town of Dastajird 
which are now known as Eski Baghdad. (See NiebuhrTs 
"Reisebeschreibung", Copenhagen, 1778, Vol.II, Table XLIV)»
2 T.N., page 125*
5 " w u Muhammad Muhsin, fol.216(b).
4 " " 124.
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The city was now completely blockaded* The Iranians, 
like the Ghilzafis surrounding Isfahan in 1722, had no proper 
siege artillery, and although the city was bombarded with some 
vigour, the walls could not be breached sufficiently to enable 
an assault to be launched.Nadir therefore had to rely upon 
famine within the city rather than upon his cannon to make Ahmad 
Pasha to yield.
Extraordinarily elaborate fortifications were con­
structed by the Iranians. Strong forts were built on each side 
of the Tigris nine miles above Baghdad, and no less than 2,700
towers, each a musket shot from the other, were constructed
2round the city.
cAbduf 1-^ V1I, the Shaikh of the Bani Lam Arabs, having
joined Nadir, the latter arranged for him to cooperate with the
Governor of Huwaiza in an attack on Basra. A siege of the • %
town was threatened for a time, but the troops designed for the 
purpose soon dispersed,^ the Arabs, it is said, going back on 
their word, while the Iranian troops were called away to suppress 
a rebellion in the Province of Lar
Nadirfs manner of conducting this siege was in marked contrast 
to that of Sultan Mur^d IV in 16j8. Otter (Vol.I, page 321) 
rightly describes N5dir?s operations as a blockade rather 
than a siege.
2 Fuller particulars of these fortifications are given in the
letter which Jean Nicodeme, the French physician who accompan­
ied Topalc0sman Pasha, wrote to the Marquis de Villeneuve on 
the 10th August 1733> after Topalc0smants victory over Nadir
and his relief of Baghdad (see von Hammer, Vol.XIV, pages 5^ 5 
and 526)•
5 Letter from Martin French, the Basra representative of the East 
India Co., to the London office of the latter, 19th/30th March 
1833 (Vol.XV of the 1.0. records). Muhammad Muhsin is incor­
rect in saying that Basra was captured•
4 T.N., page 124.
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According to the Gombroon Diary, Nadir, besides wish­
ing to capture Basra, also intended for a time to send an 
expeditionary force against Muscat,^ but nothing came of this 
project*
The descriptions of the sufferings of the inhabitants
of Baghdad recall those of the people of Isfahan in 1722; large
2numbers died from famine and disease. Hanway describes how 
Nadir derisively sent several cart-loads of water-melons into 
the city and how Ahmad Pasha, in return, presented Nadir with 
a quantity of the best bread.>
Nadir, in order to discourage the defenders, caused, 
every fortnight or so, bodies of 10,000 to 12,000 of his troops 
to leave the Iranian lines quietly by night, make a short march 
Into the desert, and rejoin the camp the next morning with 
colours flying, as though they had just arrived to reinforce the 
besiegers.^ By the end of Muh&rram 1146 (13th July) the plight 
of Baghdad was such that Ahmad Pasha sent envoys to Nadir to 
arrange the terms for its surrender.
 ^See the entry on the 22nd April/3rd May 1733 stating that the 
Agent had received a letter from Nadir requesting him to have 
shipping in readiness to transport a force to Muscat.
o
The Armenian Joseph Emin, who went through the siege when a 
child of 7> gives an account of his experiences in his nLife 
& Adventures11, London, 1792, page 20.
5 Hanway, Vol.IV, pages 82 and 83* See also the story recounted 
by Longrigg in "Four Centuries of Modern Iraq11, page 140.
4 -See the French translation of Al?mad Pasha!s despatch to the
Porte, in La Mamye-Clairacrs Vol.Ill, page 301*
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Deli/verance for the besieged was, however, near at 
hand, for the Turkish relieving force, under the Sarcaskar Topal
c ^ — 1Osman Pasha was approaching from the north. The Porte, on
realising that Baghdad was in great jeopardy, placed Topal cOsmln
Pasha in command of an army of some 80,000 combatants, drawn
largely from the European portion of Turkey, Marching via
Diarbakr and Mosul, Topal c0smanls progress became slower after
he had passed the latter place, owing to the number of rivers 
be
to/crossed; when he approached Kirku£, the devastated state of 
the country rendered the question of supplies a difficult one,
A day or so after Ahmad Pasha had opened the negotia­
tions for the surrender of Baghdad, he received a message from 
Topalc0sman to the effect that he was marching to his relief as 
quickly as he could. It was doubtless the receipt of this 
message which caused Ahmad Pasha to prevaricate, and stipulate 
that the city should not be handed over to Nadir until the end 
of Safar (llth August)• Ahmad Pasha read out in public the 
letter from Topal°0sman, but the.people refused to believe that 
it wras genuine until they had been shown the seal and signature 
upon it,^
On leaving Kirkuk (which had managed to resist the 
Iranian force that Nadir had sent against it when he was about
 ^For the previous history of Topal*0sman, see in particular
A. de Claustrefs nHistoire"de Thamas-Koulikan1 (Paris, 1745), 
pages 225-247* (Hanway appears to have derived his informa­
tion from this source.)
2 See La Mamye-Clairacfs translation of Ahmad PEsfta^ s despatch to 
the Porte, Vol.Ill, pages 500-307*
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to march on Baghdad), TopalcOsman marched to the Tigris and kept 
to its banks, so as to protect the boats carrying his provisions, 
as well as to have water for his men. Nadir sent word to Topal 
cOsman that he would be ready to give him battle whenever he 
pleased; the Turkish Sarcaskar retained the messenger and sent 
no answer.
In order to meet the coming attack, Nffdir despatched 
all his army northwards, except for a skeleton force of 12,000 
men. Nadir ordered the withdrawal to be done in such manner 
that the besieged should not know that tTone drop of that bound­
less ocean” had ebbed away,"**
Nadir did not leave the Iranian lines outside Baghdad 
until the evening of the 6th Safar (l8th July), and joined his 
army on the following morning just before the battle began. The 
exact site of this battle is difficult to determine, as the 
names given by von Hammer and other authorities have undergone 
such mutilation; von Hammer states that the battle was fought 
at Douldjeilik, by the banks of the Tigris, thirty leagues from 
Baghdad.^
Topalc0sman had stationed his men by the river, where 
they were strongly entrenched, with their cannon in position;
 ^T.N., page .125•
 ^Vol.XIV., page 290. ’Douldjeilik1 suggests some place on the 
Tigris close to Dujail (the latter place, though at more or 
less the distance from Baghdad indicated by von Hammer, is 
some miles west of the river). French, in his letter from 
Basra to London dated the 6th/l7th August 1733* states that 
the battle was fought at JadTda. There is a village named 
KMn JadTda on the left bank of the Tigris 20 miles N. of 
Baghdad.
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in numbers they were slightly superior to the Iranians.
The battle began at 8 a.m., when the opposing advance- 
guards encountered each other; soon after, the cannon of the 
Turkish rear-guard opened fire on a large body of Iranians who 
had marched round and attacked from the north-east. The main 
attack was launched an hour later by Nadir, at the head of
50,000 men; the Iranian and Afghan infantry who were in three 
divisions forced the Turkish centre back, and captured some of 
their cannon; the position of the Turks seemed highly critical 
when 2,000 of their Kurdish auxiliaries fled. Tophic0sman, 
however, did his utmost to rally his troops and sent forward his 
reserve force, consisting of 20,000 men, with the result that 
the Iranian attack was stemmed and the lost cannon recaptured. 
Nadir himself was in the thick of the fighting; while leading 
the attack on the Turkish artillery, his horse was wounded and 
fell. He promptly mounted another horse and rode again into 
the fray.^
The wind being from the north, the dust and smoke 
raised by the combat were blown in the faces of the Iranians, 
and the July sun blazed down upon them. After several hours 
of fierce fighting all ranks were suffering terribly from thirst; 
no water was obtainable, as the Turks 7/ere in possession of the 
river bank.
1 T.N., page 126.
2 ^Both MTrza Mahdi and Muhammad Muhsin speak of the agonies of
thirst of the Iranians'. (See'T.N., page 126, Durra-yi- 
Nadira, pages 12J-5, and Zubdatu*t-Tawarikh, folio 216(b)).
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On NadirTs second horse being wounded, it fell on 
its head and-threw Nadir to the ground. Though he was at once 
provided with another steed, many of his-troops, on seeing him 
fall, imagined that he had been wounded or killed, and a panic 
ensued which the Iranian officers were unable to check.^  See­
ing that further efforts were useless, Nadir retreated from the 
field with such of the survivors of his army who had not fled.
The casualties on the two sides are variously estimated; the 
Iranians appear to have lost over 30>000 killed, while 3*000 
vrere taken prisoner.^ All NSdir’s artillery,5 baggage and pro­
visions were left in the hands of the Turks; altogether, it was
a signal triumph for pop'llc0smS.n, for Nadir’s army vtras shattered,
and the way to Baghdad now lay open; the victory, however, was 
not quite complete, for Nadir himself had escaped.
The Turks had by no means escaped scatheless, as they 
lost some 20,000 men.
It is difficult to understand Nadir’s generalship in 
this campaign. He would surely have been better advised either 
to wait within his fortified lines outside Baghdad, and make
1 T.N., page 127.
Nicodfeme, at one end of the scale, puts the Iranian losses in 
killed at 40,000, while Mirza Mahdl, at the other, says that 
only 2,000 fell! There can be no doubt that the Iranian losses
were very heavy, epid 30,000 seems to be a reasonable figure.
Many Iranians were killed after the battle as they were quench­
ing their thirst by the side of the Tigris.
 ^Nicod£me (von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 5^ 3) says that the Iranians 
left all their cannon on the field, including 4 30-pounders,
6 15-pounders and 8 9-pounders. There were also 500 camels 
navec des ambares’1 (i.e. zanburaks). Almost all the Iranians’ 
horses and beasts of burden were taken.
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Topal cOsman advance that much further and attack him there, or 
else to have left Baghdad at an earlier date and attacked Topal 
c0sman when he was crossing the Greater or the Lesser Zab.
Instead of following either of these courses, NSdirgave battle
i
at a spot that was very disadvantageous for himself and his men. 
One can only assume that Nadir's lack of judgment on this occa­
sion was due to over-confidence.
As soon as the news of Top^l cbsmanl s victory reached 
Baghdad, Ahmad Pasha ordered a sortie, and overvdielmed the
12,000 Iranian troops who were manning NaTdir's fortifications. 
The bridge of boats was cut, and all the Iranians' supplies fell 
into Ahmad FashU's hands. Many of the Iranian troops were 
killed; a number of survivors on the west side of the Tigris 
escaped by devious ways to Iran, their flight being facilitated 
by the Bani Lam.'*'
Topal c0sman, having spent the evening of the 19th July 
and the following two days resting his troops and attending to 
the wounded, resumed his march, and on the 23rd July he and his 
army camped within sight of the forts and towers erected by the 
Iranians round Baghdad. Soon afterwards Ahmad Pasha arrived at 
the Turkish camp. On the following day, the 24th July, Topal 
c0sman entered Baghdad. At the SarcaskarTs request, no special 
honours were accorded him, since, as he said, nto God only is 
victory to be attributed.,T In the words of Nicod§me, it seemed
 ^T.N., page 127.
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that TopTH cOsman and those with him vj-ere entering a tomb rather
than a town; the dead lay piled up in heaps, and thousands of
people were suffering from hunger or disease. It was said that
110,000 persons had perished during the siege.'*’
Such was the devastation wrought by the Iranians in
the country around Baghdad that Topalc0sman, after a halt of 8
days some 7 miles from Baghdad, had to withdraw the bulk of his 
# —troops* to Kirkuk in order to prevent them from dying of starva­
tion.
Nadir and the remnants of his army made their way via 
Buhriz to Mandali, and were Joined en route by some of the 
survivors of the skeleton besieging force which Ahmad Pasfta had 
routed.5 The Iranian soldiers were in a sorry plight, many
being on foot and almost naked.^ What happened to thewounded
tf
is not recorded.
Although Nadir’s conduct of the siege of Baghdad and 
of his operations against Topalc0sman is open to criticism, his 
behaviour after his defeat deserves the highest praise. The 
disasterj he said, had been ordained by Fate, and it was useless 
to revile at its decrees.5 In this spirit Nadir set about the
stupendous task of reconstituting his army.
Nicod^ me, (Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 5^ 7)*
o
As will-be ocon»in the ■ ouboeffiaont -ehaptorj Topal -Qeflian-aenfr 
Fnlad PaohQj with eome- 6jQ0Q monj to Jam-'ghafo*-
5 Durra-yi-Nadira, page 127*
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.217(a).
5 T.N., page 128.
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Nadir held a conference with his principal officers at 
MandalT, and. gave his men leave to return to their homes to 
r e f i t H e  issued urgent orders to all parts of Iran for arms 
and equipment of all kinds, together with baggage animals, to be 
collected. The artillery and munitions were to be of better
o
quality and greater in quantity than before. Instructions were 
issued to the provincial authorities to see to the refitting of 
their troops, who were to be at Hamadan in two months’ time, 
and to enrol recruits.
On the 4th August Nadir arrived at Hamadan, and 
attended in person to his great task. He ordered 200,000 
tomans (approximately £440,000) to be distributed to the troops 
to compensate them for their losses and to enable them to pur­
chase new equipment; every man who had lost a horse worth ten 
tomans, was given one worth double that amount, and the same 
principal was followed in regard to camels, tents and arms.^
In the relatively short space of two months, the 
gigantic work was accomplished, and, on the 22nd RabxcII (2nd 
October) Nadir left Hamadan for the Turkish frontier with his
A 1*  —
reconstituted army. On reaching Kirmanshah, Nadir heard that 
Fulad Pasha, of Adana, was stationed on the Diyala river a few 
miles beyond Zuhab, in order to guard against an advance on
 ^Tadhkira-yi-Shushtariyya, page 68.
 ^Muhammad Muhsin, fol.2l7(a).
 ^T.N., pages 128 and 129*
4 _
T.N., page 1^ 0, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page 129*
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Kirkuk. As on his previous march, Nadir left his baggage and 
artillery behind and, marching by mountain tracks, aimed at 
surprising the enemy. The attempt was less successful than on 
the previous occasion, but the Turks, after a skirmish had 
taken place, beat a retreat.
It was at this juncture that the news first reached 
Nadir1 that Muhammad Khan Baluch had revolted. This rising 
was really more a royalist movement than a rebellion. Nadir’s 
exactions had made him unpopular and his treatment of Tahm&sp 
had outraged the feelings of many Iranians who had not, however, 
dared to show their sentiments openly. It was reported in 
Isfahan in April 1733^ that Nadir had sent for Tahmasp with the 
object of reinstating him, but Nadir, after his defeat, changed 
his mind and ordered Tahmasp to be retained in Mashhad, because, 
under the altered circumstances, TahmSsp’s rule would have been 
’inexpedient and a hindrance.”  ^ It was, no doubt, Nadir’s change 
of mind that caused numbers of the SafavT faction^ to join 
Muhammad Khan Baluch.5
1 T.N., pages 151 and 152. It is stated in the Gombroon Diary, 
under the date 25th October/5th November 1733> that reports 
had been current for some little time that Muhammad Khan 
Baluch had rebelled and had declared in favour of Tahmasp.
 ^See the Gombroon Diary, 26th June/7th July 1733*
 ^T.N., page 1J0.
 ^The direct descent of the SafavT monarchs from CA11, through 
Husain and the Imam Musa al-Kazim, caused them to be much 
venerated by their Shica subjects. See Shaikh HazTn, page 
241.
5 —  — ^Muhammad Khan was also joined by numbers of Baluch, Arabs .and
KhuzistSn tribesmen. See MIrza Muhammad ShTrazT’s autobio­
graphy, page 11.
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Nsidir felt that this revolt was not of sufficient 
gravity to cause him to postpone his Turkish campaign and re­
solved to deal with it after he had finished with the Turks*
It is impossible to recount with any pretence to\ 
accuracy the course of events between the skirmish by the Diyala 
and the battle of Lailan, because the geographical data given by 
Mirza Mahdx and Hanway are vague and fanciful in the extreme.^ *
It seems that Nadir advanced tov/ards Kirkuk much as he had done 
previously, but his object on this second occasion was entirely
different* He was aiming not at luring Ahmad PashA away from
Baghdad, but at meeting with and crushing Topal cOsman PSsha* If 
he could defeat Top^l‘Osnian, his lost prestige would be regained, 
and Baghdad in the south and Tabriz in the north would both be 
at his mercy*
TopSl cOsman was under no illusions as to his position. 
His losses in the battle of the 19th July had not been made good, 
despite repeated requests to Constantinople not only for rein­
forcements, but also.for a younger man to take his place* Nadir,
on the other hand, now had an army even more numerous and better
equipped than before.
By the 24th October Nadir had reached the plain of 
Lailan, a few miles S.E* of Kirkuk, and an engagement took place 
between detachments of his force and of Jopal cOsmanTs army; 
both sides claimed the victory, but the advantage rested, appar-
■* See Longrigg, 00*cit*. page 145*
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ently, with the Turks. Topal Osman, however, kept his main 
force within its defences. HSTdir thereupon marched off to 
the north-east and captured the fortress of Surdash, in the 
hope that Topll^sman would emerge from Kirkuk and march to 
its relief. Part of the Turkish forces fell into Nadir’s 
trap, for scouts brought him word, when he was at a place 
called Qara T a p p a ,  ^that Mamish PSsha, with 12,000 men, had 
entered the Aq Darband defile.^
Taking a route which was thought to be impracticable, 
Nadir inarched his men over the hills and into the defile at a 
point above the Turkish position. On the following day (9th 
November), Nadir, after sending some .lazSvirchis to make a 
detour and to get across the Turks1 line of retreat, advanced to 
the attack.
Soon after the battle was joined with Mamish Pasha 
and his men, the main Turkish force under Top'alcOsman arrived, 
and engaged the Iranians. For two hours a tremendous fire was 
kept up by both sidesthen the Iranian troops, being anxious 
to wipe out the memory of their previous defeat, made a furious
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, pages 291 and 292, Hanway, Vol.IV, page 97*
 ^Qara Tappa is not marked on existing maps;, it is obviously 
distinct from the QarS Tappa just to the north ofthe Jabal 
Hamrin.
 ^There is a description of this defile in C.J.Rich’s ’Narrative 
of a Residence in Koordistan”, London, l8j6, Vol.I, pages 58 
and 5 9.
4 See the interesting letter which Nadir wrote to the Count of
Hesse-Homburg regarding this battle; a French translation of
this letter was sent by Lord Forbes and C.Rondeau from St.
Petersburg to London on the 2nd/15th February 1754 (S.P.91*
Vol.XVI). In this letter, which appears to have been written 
towards the,end of Nov.l/pd* the„names and.dates have sufferedgome.distortion in the process of,_ translation from Iranian to ussian ana from Russian to French. 128.
charge and drove in the Turkish centre. Topal^Dsman left his 
litter, and, having mounted a horse, endeavoured to rally his 
men,'*' but a fierce flank attack by the Abdalls caused the Turks 
to give way again. The day was irretrievably lost when the 
brave Topal c0sman was shot down. The unfortunate Sarcaskar?s 
head was then cut off, stuck on the point of a lance and taken 
in triumph to NSdir. The whole Turkish army was in flight by 
this time, and heavy casualties were inflicted upon the fugitives 
by the .iazavirchis whom Nadir had previously detached for this 
purpose. At a conservative estimate, the Turks lost some 20,000 
men killed and prisoners.^
Nadir caused Topal^sman1 s body to be recovered and 
sent it, together with the head, to Baghdad for burial, in charge 
of a Turkish qadi namedcAbdu!1-KarTm Efendi who was one of the 
prisoners taken in the battle.
After the battle, Nadir despatched a force under Baba 
Khan CKaushlu, the Beglarbegi of Luristan, who was then near 
Samarra, to cross the Tigris, and reoccupy Hilla, Najaf and 
Karbala and prevent supplies from reaching Baghdad. As there was, 
apparently, no hope of relief for Ahmad Paslia, Nadir left enough 
troops to blockade Baghdad while he himself marched northwards to 
recover Tabriz. On reaching the town of B"ana, he learnt' that
1 Hanway, Vol.IV, page 98. Mlrza Mahdl alleges that Topal<bsman
only mounted a horse in order to escape, but this does not seem 
in accordance with the Sarraskar!s character.
2 No reliance can be placed upon MIrza Mahdl’s figures; while, in
the T.N. (page 155) he states that 10,000 Turks were killed and
5,000 captured, he raises the number of killed to 20,000 in the 
Durra-yi-Nadira (page 157)* Hanway1s figure of 40,000 killed 
seems far too high.
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TTrrfur Pasha, on hearing of the Turkish defeat at Aq Darband, 
had evacuated Tabriz and that an Iranian force had reoccupied
I
it. There being no longer any necessity to proceed to 
Adharbaijan, Nadir marched southward again in order to join his 
forces that were blockading Baghdad. He-was confident that 
the city would speedily fall into his hands.
On reaching Tuz Khurmatu, Nadir received disquieting
_ _ o __
news of Muhammad Khan Baluch1s rebellion. Nevertheless, Nadir 
did not deem the situation in Khuzistan and Fars sufficiently 
critical for him to proceed there in person; instead, he sent 
orders to Tahmasp Khan Jalayir (who was then at I^ hhan) and to 
the new Governor of Kuhgilu.3 and other provincial authorities 
and leaders to cooperate in crushing the revolt.
From Tuz Khurmatu Nldir marched to Samarra and thence 
to the Iranian investment lines round Baghdad. On the Jth 
December Ahmad Pasha sent a confidential messenger to Nadir, 
who, after showing Ahmad1s authority to conclude a treaty of 
peace, delivered his offer to restore to Iran the conquered 
territories.
After negotiations extending over several days, Nadir 
and Ahmad PSsha reached agreement and signed the treaty on the
 ^T.N., page 136 and Nadir*s letter to Count von Hesse-Homburg.
2 For particulars of the progress of this revolt and its suppres­
sion, see the ensuing Chapter.
5 Nadir, as soon as he heard of Muhammad Khanfs revolt, had de­
creed his dismissal from this post,, and had appointed in his 
place a certain Ismacil Khan KhazTtaa.
1 3 0 .
19th December. The provisions of this treaty were, briefly, 
as follows:-
(i) Turkey agreed to relinquish all the Iranian territory 
conquered during the last ten years and to revert 
to the frontier as laid down by the Turco-Iranian 
treaty of 1639*
(ii) The prisoners taken by both nations were to be re­
leased, and the captured cannon restored.
(iii) Iranian pilgrims visiting the holy places in Turkish 
territory in the vicinity of the frontier were to 
be accorded certain privileges.
It can be regarded as certain that, had it not been 
for the rebellion of Muhammad Khan Baluch, Nadir would have re­
fused to agree to any terms that did not include the surrender 
of Baghdad.
In accordance with the provisions of this treaty, Ahmad
Pasha forthwith sent orders to the Pashas of Ganja, ShTrvan,
_ set
Erivan and Tiflis to evacuate their respective territories and to/
at liberty all their Iranian prisoners. Nadir, in return,
liberated all the Turkish prisoners in his hands.
Costly presents were exchanged between Nadir and Ahmad 
Pasha, and arrangements were made for the former to visit the 
shrines at Kagimain, Najaf and Karbala.-*-
Before leaving the vicinity of Baghdad, Nadir gave two 
letters for the Grand Vizier to the Qadi cAbdu!1-KarTm Efendi, who
1 T.N., pages 137 and 138.
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was to take the treaty to Constantinople for ratification; in 
these letters HUdir drew attention to the common origin of the 
Ottoman Turks and the Turcomans, and pointed out that this was 
a reason for concluding peace.^
Martin French reported to London from Basra that 90 
days were allowed for the ratification of the treaty to be re­
ceived from the Porte.
According to Lord Kinnoull, Ahmad. Pasha did not expect 
the Porte to ratify the treaty. In an explanation of the cir­
cumstances under which he had been compelled to sign the
document, Ahmad said that he only agreed to its terms as a means * %
of gaining time, since he could not possibly have held out for
another month.
The QadI ‘Abdu*1-Karim Efendi reached Constantinople in
the middle of February 175^. After several councils had been
held to consider the question of the treaty, the Porte rejected
it on the grounds that it was dishonourable. Although the
Sultan and his ministers approved of Ahmad PashaTs conduct under
such difficult circumstances, they nevertheless dismissed him
from his post as Governor of Baghdad, doubtless because of the
machinations of his arch-enemy CA H  Pasha., the Grand Vizier.^
In accordance with the decision taken, the orders which Ahmad
*
^ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 555 •
^ Despatch dated the l8th February /1st March 1759 (S.P.97*
Vol.XXVII).
^ Ahmad Pasha was appointed Governor of Aleppo, but he was, at 
his own request, appointed to Urfa instead. See Longrigg, 
op.cit.. page 147*
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Pasha had sent to the Pashas of Ganja, ShTrvSn, ErivSn and 
Tiflis were disregarded, and more troops were sent to reinforce 
the Sarcaskar Abdu!llah Koprulu (who had been raised to that 
rank on the death of TopalcOsman) at Diarbakr. The Porte never­
theless sent no message to Nadir expressly denouncing the treaty; 
instead, it endeavoured for a time to make Nadir believe that the 
question was still under consideration and that a lasting settle­
ment would shortly be made.
The Russian Court had followed with interest, and, at 
times, with anxiety the course of the Turco-Iranian campaign.
The news of Nadirfs defeat by Topal^sman caused considerable
perturbation, it being feared that Iran would be forced to come
at Constantinople 
to terms with Turkey and that the French Ambassador/(the Marquis
de Villeneuve) would then succeed in inducing the Porte to go to
war with Russia.^ Russia was already deeply involved in the war
of the Polish succession and would have been faced with a critical
situation had Turkey been able to yield to.the importunities of
France, and attack her; it was only the continuance of the war
French policy in relation to Turkey and Russia had undergone a 
complete change: whereas in 1723 and 1724, France had played
the part of mediator (see page 83 above), in 1735 she was just 
as actively engaged in endeavouring to fan into flame the in­
creasing animosity between the two powers, because of the inter­
vention of Russia in the war of the Polish succession on the 
side of Augustus of Saxony. France had espoused the cause of 
Stanislas Le^czinski, the father-in-law of Louis XV. (see F. 
Martens* T?Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus par la 
la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangeres”, Vol.I, page 70 and 
Vol.XIII, pages 42 and 45)* Great Britain, which in 1723 and 
1724 had tried to embroil Russia and Turkey in war, now, on the 
other hand, played the role of peace-maker.
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with larstin which compelled Turkey to keep the peace with Russia. 
The march of Path Girai to Daghistan, the resulting submission 
of many of the northern Caucasian tribes to Turkey, and the 
action with the Russian forces at the Chechen territory were 
additional sources of anxiety and tension. The situation was 
greatly eased as far as Russia was concerned when Nadir decisive­
ly defeated the Turks, in the great battle in which Topal‘bsman 
lost his life. The Porte was thrown into the utmost consterna­
tion on receiving the news of this battle, and the hopes of the 
Marquis de Villeneuve for an early termination of the Turco- 
Iraniani v/ar were completely dashed; the French Ambassador had 
been hoping, once peace v/ith Terrain was concluded, to bring about 
the re-appointment of TopalcOsman Pasha as Grand Vizier, and then 
to engage Turkey and Russia in war.-*- The Russian court was, as 
was natural, proportionately relieved when it received the news 
of NadirTs great victory.
1 Lord Kinnoull, lst/12th December 1733 (S.P.97, Vol.26). The 
strongly Francophile sentiments of Topal‘Osman were common 
knowledge, and he was, moreover, extremely hostile to the 
Austrians and Russians.
Lord Forbes’ despatch from St. Petersburg of 8th/19th December 
1733 (S.P.91, Vol.15).
CHAPTER X.
The Suppression of Muhammad Khan Baluch1s revolt: 
Prince S. D. Golitzin!’s Embassy: NadirTs Lazgl
Campaign.
After Nadir had visited the shrines at Kazimain, Najaf
and KarbalS, he sent off his artillery to Isfahan via Khurramabad.
Taking the desert route via Huwaiza to ShTLshtar, he seized and
put to death the Governor and imprisoned many of the inhabitants
1because they had aided Muhammad Khan Baluch. Nadir then pro­
ceeded to Ram Hormuz; leaving his baggage there, he marched 
light towards Behbehan. Hearing that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and 
the Beglarbegi of Kuhgilu had joined forces and were marching on 
Muhammad Khan Baluch,Nadir effected a junction with these 
commanders at Du Gunbadan, and pressed on towards the Shulistan 
defile, where Muhammad Khan, with 15,000 men, was reported to be. 
When the Iranian advance guard appeared, Muhammad Khan,.who had 
had no news of Nadirfs coming, imagined that it was merely an 
isolated body of troops, and hastened to attack it. He was dis­
illusioned when he saw the main Iranian force arrive, and heard 
Nadir, in his voice of thunder, issuing orders to his men.
Muhammad Khan Baluch was entirely defeated, and fled 
from the field, leaving 5,000 dead. Though pursued by Tahmasp 
Khan Jalayir, he escaped to Shiraz and thence to Jahrum and Lar.
 ^T.N., page 158, Durra-yi-Nadira, pages 159 and 140, Tadhkira-yi- 
Shushtariyya, page 69-
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He was refused admittance into Lar, and hastened on to the 
garmsir*
When NSdir found that his quarry had slipped through 
his fingers, he sent messages to both the English and Dutch 
Agents at Gombroon to send vessels without delay to patrol the 
coast and prevent Muhammad Khan and his followers from escaping. 
The Agents replied that the ports were so numerous that they 
could not keep watch over all with the scanty shipping available, 
but promised to send vessels to any specified port.^
Meanwhile Tahmasp Khan Jalayir had pursued Muhammad 
Khan to Shaikh Ahmad MadanT*s stronghold of Maragh, and had 
begun the siege of that fortress. At the beginning of May the 
place was taken by assault and Shaikh Ahmad was captured, but
2
Muhammad Kh&n and a few others escaped to the island of Qais.
It was at this juncture that a certain Latif Khan 
reached Gombroon and. gave the English and Dutch Agents letters 
from Tahmasp Khan Jalayir stating that Nadir had appointed 
Latif Khant
nHis Admiral of the Gulph, with Orders to Purchase 
Shipping of the Europeans of Gombroon. He therefore 
required our Compliance with the Caunfs Desires in 
sparing Two Ships for their service which they should 
be paid for ”5
This was NadirTs first attempt to acquire a navy.
Gombroon Diary, 3rd/14th February, 1734.
2 « n 8th/19th May, 1734, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page lfflti
3 it " 7th/l8th " »
1J6.
The escape of some of the Afghans to Arabia, and the difficulty 
of preventing fugitives like Muhammad Khan from following suite 
had evidently brought home to Nadir the great importance of 
sea power.
As the English and the Dutch almost invariably pre­
varicated when asked to lend their ships or to cooperate with 
the Iranian land forces, and as the Arabs who possessed vessels
were usually in sympathy with those against whom the Government
were
wished to take action, or/in revolt themselves, Nadir certainly
had a sound reason for wishing to have a fleet of his own.
At Tahmasp Khanfs request, the Dutch and English each
sent a vessel to Qais, and Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and the
powerful Huwala chief, Shaikh Jabbara of Tahlri and Bahrain also
provided vessels. Muhammad Khan was eventually captured and
sent in chains to Isfahan. Nadir ordered Muhammad Khan to be% %
blinded; three days later he died, but it is uncertain whether 
he did so by his own hand or as a result of the treatment which 
he received.^
Shaikh Ahmad Madantt was put to death, and many of the 
refractory tribesmen of the Gulf ports (Banadir) and of the 
Huwaiza district were transported to Khurasan and Astarabad. 
Further, their fortresses were rased to the ground, and Shaikh 
Jabbara was made to collect an indemnity of 10,000 tomans from 
Shaikh Rashid of Basidu and other Arab chiefs. The. power of’
T.N., pages 143 and 144. See also Fraser, page 113> Hanway, 
Vol.IV, page 111, Farsnlma, page 176, Shaikh Hazin, page 266, 
and Whu-KarTa,fol.l2(bJ. *
2 Gombroon Diarv, 28th June/lOth July, 1934*
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the Arabs was thus entirely broken.
In the meantime Nadir had gone to ShTraz, where he 
remained for over two and a half months. During his stay in 
Shiraz* he appointed MIrza-Muhammad Taql Khan Shiraz*! Beglarbegi 
of FSrs.1
On the 14th Dhu!i-Qacda (l8th April) Nadir left Shiraz
for Isfahan; whilst he was en route news was brought to him of
the birth of Shahrukh, the son of Rida QulT and Fatima Sultan
2  __Begum on the 21st March. Nadir was accorded a great reception 
when he entered Isfahan* "the streets being covered at his Entry 
in the same Manner as for the King and the Illuminations and fire 
Works on this Occasion lqsted there for some days.’1^
During Nadir’s stay in Isfahan the Qadi 5.bdu’1-Karim 
Efendi arrived from Constantinople* bearing a letter for Nadir 
which stated that *AbdufHah Pasha Koprulu, the Sarcaskar, had 
been empowered to conclude peace with Iran. Despite the 
assurances of cAbdu* 1-Karim, Nadir was convinced that the Porte 
was merely endeavouring to gain time; he nevertheless treated 
cAbdu’1-Karim courteously, and sent him back with a message to 
cAbdu’llah Pasha that all would be well if the occupied Iranian 
territory were returned; if this were not done* the war would 
recommence. Nadir’s belief was, as it turned out* only too
■* Farsriama* page 178.
 ^T.N., page 141.
 ^Gombroon Diary* 5rd/14th and 15th/26th June, 1734 (on the 
authority of letters from Geekie, Cockell’s successor at
Isfahan).
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well-founded, for the Turkish jolama, on being consulted by the 
Grand Vizier in April 173^ , recommended that the war with Iran 
should be continued and that none of the conquered provinces 
should be given back so long as Russia retained any Iranian 
territory.
Almost immediately after Nadir had given the Turkish 
envoy his conge. Prince Sergei Dimitrievich Golitzin and his
o
suite arrived from St. Petersburg. After an interview with 
Nadir, Golitzin conducted his negotiations with Mirza Kafi 
Nasiri Khulafa; his instructions were to report ufion the 
situation in Iran and to use every endeavour to induce Nadir to 
terminate the truce with Turkey. Golitzin reported to his 
court that Nadir*s attitude was difficult, as he was very proud 
and much resented being asked to take any action; much tact 
was therefore essential.^
Although Nadir at first agreed to Golitzin*s request 
that, if Turkey made war on Russia Iran would attack Turkey, he 
afterwards procrastinated and clouded the issue by making in­
quiries respecting other matters. When Golitzin said that
1 Lord Kinnoull, 27th April/8th May 17J4 (S.P.97, Vol.XXVIl).
2 see Schnese's account of the journey in Dr. J. J. Lerch's
ITNachricht von der Zw.eiten Reise nach Persien von 1745**, in 
Biisching*s **Magazin fur die neue Historie und Geographie**, 
Vol.X, pages 461 and 462. See also the T.N., page 154,
(Mirza Mahdi always refers to Prince Golitzin as *Kannas*,
this being, presumably, his rendering of the Russian word 
KHfl3= f prince*).
 ^Soloviev, Vol.XX, page 1332.
Russia was prepared to assist Iran, Nadir thanked him, hut said 
that he did not see how he could avail himself of this offer 
if the Russians would not go to Shamakhl or Baghdad. If cir­
cumstances arose that involved a rupture with Turkey, he hoped 
to deal with the Turks without help from abroad; if he succeed­
ed, he would advance through Anatolia to Constantinople, when 
Russia could attack Turkey from the other side.***
As nothing further had been heard from Turkey respect­
ing the ratification of the treaty and the restoration of the 
occupied territory, NSdir set out for the Turkish frontier on 
the 12th Muharram 1147 (l4th June 1754) . Accompanied by Prince 
Golitzin and his suite, Nadir marched via Gulpayagan to Hamadan.
It seems that, up to his arrival at Hamadan, Nadir had intended
- 2 —advancing on Baghdad via Kirmanshah. On leaving Hamadan, howr-
ever, Nadir marched to Sinandij and Maragha. The main, if not 
the only reason for this change of plan was that Nadir received 
word from an Iranian agent in Russia that the Russian court had 
ordered the Georgian ex-king Vakhtang and his son Bakar to go 
to Darband whence they were to capture Shamakhl and conquer 
Kartli for R u s s i a * ^
Soloviev, Vol.XX, page 1355.
 ^Vakhusht's "Histoire de Kartli", H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I,
page 130 and Schnese, op.cit.. page 462.
 ^Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 129. Brosset 
states, in a footnote, that the actual text of the instruc­
tions to Vakhtang and his son was reproduced in the TToJWlce 
Co8>f:iAA/('e_ 3AkoHoBi> Vol.IX, page 317*
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At Maragha a Turkish envoy came to Nadir, but it
seems that he brought no message of importance. Nadir then
/■
despatched his (paternal) uncle Baktash Khan Qiriqlu and the 
soldiers under him to Tabriz, and ordered a number of tribal 
Governors to concentrate at Dimdim, where they were to wait 
until it was knovm whether there was to be peace or war with 
Turkey.^
2
Nadir reached Ardabfl on the 10th August where he 
received a message from ^ Abdu’llah Pasha requesting him to post­
pone for two years his demand for the return of the occupied 
territory; if an envoy v.rere then sent to the Ottoman court, 
the provinces would be handed over.^ This message showed Nadir 
conclusively that the Turks had no intention of concluding peace 
on the terms agreed upon between him and Ahmad PS'sha.
Nadir decided to strike the first blow, not at the 
Turks themselves but at their vassal Surkhai, the Khan of ShTrvSn. 
In taking this decision, Nadir had a fourfold object. First, 
he wished to capture Shamakhl before Vakhtang could seize it 
for Russia. Secondly, he felt that the presence of Iranian 
troops so close to Baku and Darband would induce the Russians 
to expedite the conclusion of the treaty which Golitzin had for
T.N., page 144.
2
Schnese, oo.cit.. page 464. According to the T.N., Na“dir did 
not reach ArdabTl until the 19th Rabi*I (19th August).
" T.N., page 144. -
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so long been negotiating. Thirdly, Nadir certainly had 
grounds for wishing to humble Surkhai. In the last place, by 
taking ShamakhT, he would be recovering part of Iranfs lost 
territories
Surkhai, as Khan or Governor of ShTrvan, had received 
orders from Ahmad Pasha to evacuate that province (see page 1J1 
above), but, when the Governor of Astara, at NadirTs request, 
wrote to remind Surkhai of these instructions, he replied: nWith
the swords of the Lazgi lions we have conquered ShTrvan; what 
right has Ahmad of Baghdad or anyone else to interfere in this 
way?TT^
Yoien Nadir, on the 21st August, reached the Kura,v
—  — ASurkhai became alarmed and fled to the Daghistan mountains.
Nadir thereupon crossed the Kura and occupied ShamakhT, apparent­
ly without meeting with any resistance.5 After appointing a 
Governor, Nadir levied a heavy tax upon the inhabitants.^
Whilst at.ShamakhT, Nadir, through Golitzin, threaten­
ed Russia with war unless Baku and Darband were returned, his
 ^The Grand Vizier believed that Russia had prompted Nadir to 
take ShamakhT. See Lord Kinnoull!s despatch of the 12th/
25rd September, 1734. (S.P.97, Vol.XXVII).
2 T.N., page 145.
5 Lerch in his "Auszug aus dem Tagebuch" in Busching’s T,Magazin!T, 
Vol.Ill, page 21, gives the (O.S.) date as August 10th. 
According to the T.N. (page 148), NSdir reached the Kura on 
the 29th RabTcI (29th August).
" Durra-yi-Nadira, page 143*
S «*■J Butkov is incorrect in saying that Shamakhl was besieged for two 
months, and makes a further mistake in stating that Surkhai 
was killed on this occasion. (Vol.I, page 126)
^ Schnese, oncit., page 464,
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argument being that Turkey would not restore the provinces in 
her occupation so long as Russia retained any Iranian territory. 
The Russian court then sent word to Nadir that, notwithstanding 
the treaty of Resht, Russia would evacuate all Iranian territory, 
provided that Iran ratified the Resht treaty and bound herself 
to regard Russia1s enemies as her own. In October 1734 General 
Levashev (who had succeeded the Count von Hesse-Homburg in the 
command of the Russian forces in Daghistan) received orders to 
evacuate all territory south of the Darband district, including 
the town of Baku, and to prepare for the handing over of Derband.^ 
As will be seen below, Baku was not, however, given up until the 
spring of 1735*
On the 15th September Nadir left ShamakhT with half his 
army, numbering 12,000 men, and penetrated into the heart of the 
GhazT Oumuq country, with the object of destroying Qumuq itself. 
Three days later Tahmasp Khan Jalayir set out writh the remaining
12,000 men for the Qabala district, where Surkhai was reported 
to be. Tahmasp Khan encountered Surkhai at Deve Batan, on the 
road from ShamakhT to Qabala. Surkhai had some 20,000 men in 
all, including 8,000 Turks and Tatars from Ganja under the 
command of Mustafa Pasha and the Qalgha Fath Girai (another 
Turkish force had been sent to assist Surkhai, but had been 
heavily defeated and. forced back to Tiflis by King Taimuraz of 
Kakheti). Despite his inferior numbers, Tahmasp Khan routed
 ^Butkov, Vol.I, page 127*
Surkhai1s composite force; Surkhai fled towards Qumuq, and the
Turks and Tatars retired to Ganja. Tahmasp Khan followed up
this success by capturing and destroying Surkhai*s fortress of 
1
Khachmaz.
Meanwhile, Nadir was advancing with some difficulty in
the Ghazl Qumuq country, Surkhai, after offering to submit,
attempted resistance, but he suffered defeat again near Qumuq,
and fled to Avaria. Nadir then destroyed Qumuq and seized
Surkhai*s treasures,
Khass Fulad Khan, the son of cAdil Girai, the former
Shamkhal of Tarkhu, who was a personage of some importance in
DSghistan, submitted to Nadir. Nadir revived the post of
-  -  2Shamkhal, and conferred it on Khass Fulad.
The lateness of the season rendered any further pur­
suit of Surkhai out of the question. Nahir, after spending a 
week at Qumuq, went to Akhti where he attacked and put to flight 
and number of hostile LazgTs. From Akhti Nadir went via 
Khachmaz to QutqashTn, over a most difficult road. From 
QutqashTn Nadir went to Qabala, where a messenger from King 
Taimuraz brought him news of his victory over the Turks. The 
Turks had received a further set-back shortly after Taimuraz*s 
triumph, for Giv Amilakhor, of Ksan, captured the citadel of
 ^T.N., page 146.
 ^ n T 148. Nadir apparently wished to review the
Shamkhalate as it had been originally, i.e. before the split 
occurred between the mountain Ghazl Qumuqs and those of 
Tarkhu.
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Gori.^ Leaving Qabala on the 22nd October, Nadir crossed the
2Kura south of Aresh, and marched to Ganja, under the walls of 
which he camped on the 5rd November. From this camp Nadir 
sent word to Vakhtang at Darband to come to his camp, but 
Vakhtang deemed it wiser not to obey. Being unable to carry . 
out his instructions from the Russian court, Vakhtang returned 
to Astrakhan.^
 ^Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 47 & 48.
2 The T.N. has fArasT for TAresh*, which, of course, makes non­
sense.
 ^Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 1^ 0.
CHAPTER XI.
Siege of Ganja. Treaty of Ganja between Russia 
and Iran. Iranian military successes.
Nadir took elaborate measures for the prosecution of 
the siege of Ganja. The town having been evacuated by cAlI 
Pasha (who had retired to the citadel), Nadir mounted cannon 
on top of a mosque, but the Turkish artillery soon silenced 
this battery. Attempts were then made to scale the walls of 
the citadel by means of lofty wooden stagings, but these stagings 
were destroyed by the fire of the defenders. Active mining and 
counter-mining went on, and on one occasion six Iranian mines, 
which were exploded simultaneously, did great damage to the 
walls and killed 700 Turksl In the course of the siege Nadir 
thrice narrowly escaped death; on one occasion a soldier
by his side was decapitated by a cannon ball, and Nadir1 s face
and clothing were spattered with the unfortunate manfs 
brains and blood?
The usual Iranian weakness in artillery and the 
difficulty of compaigning actively in winter combined to render 
the siege long and arduous. The Turks defended themselves with 
spirit and inflicted severe loss on the Iranians.
Golitzin realised at an early date that the siege was
likely to be a lengthy one owing to the inexperience of the 
Iranians in siege warfare and their lack of heavy cannon. Feelirg
T.N., page 150.
2
T.N., page 151* 146
that the delay in the capture of Ganja would be harmful to 
Russian interests as well as to those of Iran, Golitzin 
offered to assist Nadir* The offer was gladly accepted, with 
the result that Levashev, in November, sent an engineer 
officer and four bombardiers, all clad in Iranian clothes, to 
Nadirfs camp; some heavy artillery was also sent} Nadir is 
said to have been inclined at first to under-estimate the 
prowess of these Russians, but he was soon convinced of their 
ability?
Feeling it to be impossible to carry Ganja by 
assault, Nadir decided merely to blockade the place and to 
employ part of his army for the reconquest of Tiflis and 
other places. NSdir accordingly detached some troops who, 
in conjunction with their Georgian allies, laid siege to • 
Tiflis.
On the l6th/27th December Golitzin, acting on 
instructions from St. Petersburg, informed Nadir that the 
Empress, feeling assured that he was able to expel the Turks, 
had agreed to return the territory still in Russian hands on 
condition that Nadir undertook never to give up the territory 
in question to Turkey, but treat as his foes the enemies 
of Russia, and to confirm in writing his promise to Golitzin 
to do all in his power to withstand Turkey. NStdir was 
delighted at this message and promised to accede to these
 ^Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1333* Lerch, Biisching^ fMagazinf, 
Vol. Ill, page 37*
o
Dr. J. Cook, o p .  cit.. Vol. II, page 465.
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requests!
The result of this development was the signature 
of the treaty of Ganja on the 10th/21st March 1735* Russia 
undertook to evacuate Baku within a fortnight and Darband within 
two months from the date of signature of this treaty; Iran 
promised, in return, to be the perpetual ally of Russia, and 
never to surrender Baku and Darband to any other power? The 
Sulaq was agreed upon as the frontier between Russia and Iran, 
and each power bound itself not to negotiate a peace with 
Turkey without the knowledge and consent of the other?
Russia surrendered Baku and Darband within the 
stipulated periods, and although not obliged to do so by the 
terms of the treaty dismantled and evacuated the fortress of 
the Holy Cross. Thus ended the Russian occupation of Northern 
Iran which Peter the Great had begun 13 years before. The 
only real advantage which Russia had derived from this 
occupation was that Turkey had thereby been prevented from 
establishing herself on the shores of the Caspian Sea, but 
this advantage, important ithough it was, had been dearly bought. 
It had cost the lives of no less than 130,000 Russian soldiers, 
the majority of whom had perished from sickness in the unhealthy 
province of Gilan£
As ^ Abdullah .Pasha, who was then at Qars, made no move
Soloviev. Vol. XX, page 1333.
2
Butkov. Vol. I, pages 130 and 131-
 ^T.N., page 154.
4
Mansteinfs !M6moiresf, page 95.
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to relieve Ganja, Nadir, a few days after the Nau EQz 
celebrations, sent a body of troops towards Qars in the hope 
of making him ”raise his head from the collar of obscurity” 
and so enable the Iranians to attack himl N£dir also 
despatched troops to keep watch upon the warlike Jar and 
Tala LazgTs.
It was probably at this time that Nadir gave orders 
for the inhabitants of Shamakhl to move en masse to Aq Su, 15 
miles to the W.S.W. Shamakhl was destroyed, and a new town arose 
at Aq Su, to which place Turkish prisoners of war were sent to 
provide the necessary labour. Aq Su was then re-named New 
Shamakh\.^ Nadir1 s pretext for this action was that the site 
of Shamakhl. was too open to attack^ - but Hanway Is probably 
correct in saying that Nadir rased the town to the ground 
and slaughtered many of its inhabitants because of ”the 
countenance which this city had given to the Lesgees”?
Nadir, after arranging for the blockade of Ganja 
to be carried on, left for Q*Srs at the head of a considerable 
forcef After making an unsuccessful attempt to intercept 
Timur Pasha, the Governor of Van, who was marching to the relief
T.N., page 155.
2
T.N., page 154, Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b), Butkov, Vol. I, 
page 126, Dorn, Geschichte Schirwanx, page 4lj.
5 Vol. IV, page 115.
4
Durra-yi-Nadira, pages 145 311(1 147.
of Tiflis, Nadir tried to reach the fortress of Qazanchai by 
an extremely difficult mountain route, hoping that the threat 
to the fortress would rouse !&bdufllah Pasha from his lethargy• 
Thick snow on the mountains rendered the tracks impassable^ 
so Nadir had to abandon his project and advance.on Qars via 
Lori. On the 24th May he camped three miles from Qars. As 
<Abdu. !llah PashS. still remained inactive behind his walls, 
and as provisions were scarce in the neighbourhood of QUrs, 
Naidir retired to Abaran, where he very graciously received the 
Armenian Catholicos Abraham. He then proceeded to Erivan, 
which he besieged; an Iranian force which was sent against 
Bayazld succeeded in capturing that fortress?
Nadir left enough troops to continue the siege of 
Erivan, and marched to Echmiadzin with his main force, so as to 
be ready to attack cAbdullah Pasha, should the latter leave Qars. 
After returning to Erivan to repel a sortie by the garrison, 
Nadir went to Parakar where he received the welcome news that 
Abdiillah had crossed the Akhurian river (Arpa Chai) with an 
immense army and was advancing towards him5
The Turkish army consisted of 30,000 Janissaries and
—
"T.N., page 156. See also the Catholicos Abraham1 s M^on 
Histoire et celle de Nadir, Chah de Persen, in Brossetfs 
"Collection d1Historians Armeniens", St. Petersburg, 1876, 
Vol. II, page 267.
2 T.N., page 157-
T.N., page 157* also the Catholicos Abraham, op. cit., 
page 270.
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50.000 cavalry} the numbers of the Iranians are given as only
15.000 by MIrza Mahdi and as 18,000 by the Catholicos} but 
it seems that these numbers only relate to Nadir1s advance 
guard and that his main force, which (as will be seen below) 
came into action later in the battle, consisted of some 40,000 
men, making the Iranian strength 55,000 in all^
Leaving his baggage behind, Nadir hastened to meet 
the Turks. On the evening of the 25th Muharram (l7th June)
N^ adir and his men reached the village of Akhikandi, close to 
the Zanga Chai, and camped bn a hill called Aqjfappa. 
Simultaneously, rAbdufllah Pasha1 s army arrived at Baghavard, 
two farsakhs away, on the further side of a plaint
On the following morning the Turks, confident in 
the superiority of their numbers, took the offensive. Nadir, 
having first posted a large number of his men in ambush, 
charged down the hill with only three regiments and fell 
upon the Turks. What his men lacked in numbers, they more 
than made up for in courage. Nldir, with a number of jazayirchis, 
1
See the translation of a letter which Nadir sent to Prince 
Golitzin at Darband after the battle: this translation was
enclosed in Rondeau1 s despatch of the 6th/17th September. 
(Golitzin, in company with MTrza Kafi Nasiri ffhu^ afa. who 
was being sent as Ambassador to St. P eter sburg, 1 ert 
Nadirfs camp for Darband just before the battle of 
Baghavard.) MIrzS Mahdl1 s figures, namely, 70*000 cavalry 
and 50,000 infantry, are much exaggerated.
2
Catholicos Abraham, page 271-
3
This is the total given by Hanway, Vol. IV, page 119*
4
T.N., page 157* Durra-yi-Nadira, page 147*
made for a small hill on the plain on which cAbdu! llah Pasha 
had placed some of his artillery, and captured it, while 
another bpdy of men advanced against the artillery on the 
Turks* left wing. Whilst these attacks were in progress the 
Turkish and Iranian centres became engaged. The Iranian 
heavy artillery and zanburaks or camel-swivels poured a most 
destructive fire upon the Turkish centre, which was soon thrown 
into confusion and began to retreat. At Nadir1 s command, the 
Iranian cavalry, as well as the troops in ambush, then charged 
the Turks as they fell back, and converted the retreat into 
a rout. cAbdu*llah Pasha, the Sarfaskar, Sara Mustafa Pasha, 
a son-in-law of the Sultan, and a number of other Turkish 
officers of note were amongst the slain, and an immense number 
of Turks were taken prisoners^ - The remnant of the defeated army 
fled in various direction. Between 3,000 and 4,000 Turks who 
were going to Ashtarak were cut off by Armenians and then 
killed by the pursuing Iranians. Nadir afterwards informed 
Prince Golitzin that he had never been so fortunate since he 
had begun to wage war?
 ^T.N., page 159. There Is some divergence between the various 
authorities as to the date of this battle. While Mlrz^ .
MahdT gives the date as the 26th Muharram (l8th June), the 
Catholicos gives it as the 8th/19th June, as do General 
Yeropkin (a copy of his report of the battle was given by 
Veshniakov to Lord Kinnoull in the following September - 
see S.P. 97. Vol. XVII) and Nadir himself in his letter to 
Golitzin. There seems no doubt that the 19th June is the 
correct date.
2
See Nadir1s letter to Prince Golitzin.
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After the battle, Nadir had the corpse of ^ A.bdu!llah 
Pasha Koprulu recovered and, as in the case of that of Topal 
cOsman Pasha, sent to the Turks* He then sent some of the 
Turkish prisoners to Ganja, Erivan and Tiflis to inform their 
compatriots there of the victory?-
Mien, on the Jrd July, the news of the Turkish 
disaster reached Constantinople, it caused the utmost dismay* 
The Grand Vizier, *Ali Pasha Haklm-Qghlu, was blamed for the 
defeat and was dismissed, and Ismael PSshS, the Governor 
of Baghdad, took his place as Grand Vizier. Ahmad P^sha 
was made Sarfaskar, in succession to the defunct cAbdu* 11 ah 
PEshE, and was soon afterwards reinstated as Governor of 
Baghdad?
When the Turkish prisoners brought the news of the 
battle of Baghavard to CA1T Pasha, the Governor of Ganja, he at 
once asked for quarter, and surrendered the fortress on the 
9th July 1755: ke kac^ stubbornly defended it for 8^ months*
‘All Pasha and the Qalgha Fath Girai were kindly received by 
Nadir, who allowed CA1T Pasha to go to Qars and Fath Girai to 
Tiflis. Ishaq PashE, the Governor of Tiflis, soon followed 




2 Otter, Vol. I, page 32.
T.N., page 160. The Catholicos Abraham (page 278) and
Sekhnia Chkheidze (H. de la G.,^Vol. II., Part II, page 48) 
both give the same date as MIrza Mahdi.
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For the second time Nadir proceeded to Qars. which• *
he besieged for a month, cutting off the water-supply and 
ravaging the country from the Arp a Chai to Erzerouml
Before describing the concluding phase of the 
Turkish war, some mention must be made not only of the 
Iranian attempt to capture Ba§ra In April 1735* but also of 
the march of the Khan of the Crimea to Daghistan in the 
summer and autumn of that year.
Reference has been made on page 136 above of Nadirrs 
first attempt to found a navy. Under circumstances which 
will be explained elsewhere? Nltdir had procured two English 
vessels in December 1734 and had by degrees collected a small 
fleet. Bushire was made the base of this Inchoate navy, 
and an old Portuguese fort there was put into a state of 
repair.
In April 1735 Latif Khan, the Iranian 1 Admiral in 
the Gulph* as the East India Co.!s representatives termed 
him, entered the Shattufl-)lrab with his fleet, having as 
his object the capture of Basra. On being joined by a 
number of Arabs who were in revolt against the Turks,
Latif Khan proceeded up-stream.
T ~
T.N., page 160 and Catholicos Abraham, page 277* the latter
states that Nadir transferred 6,000 Armenian families from 
the district of Qars to Khurasan.
o
See Appendix No. III.
This naval attack had most unpleasant consequences 
for Martin French at Basra, as well as, later, for the East 
India Co, itself.
The facts, as reported by French} are as follows:- 
When Latif Khan entered the Shattu’l-Arab, with 3 
’grabs1, 50 large trankeys and several smaller vessels, the 
PashE of Basra called upon French to hand over two of the 
Company’s vessels which were then anchored off the town.
French protested that the British and Iranians were friendly 
nations and that the ^ast India Co. had settlements in Iran, 
etc. but the Pasha cut short these arguments by seizing the 
two vessels, placing 200 men in each and sending them off 
downstream against LatXf Khan. The two ships met the Iranian 
fleet at a narrow part of the river five leagues below Basra, 
where the Iranians had g&t two batteries. The crews of the 
British vessels delayed engaging the enemy as long as they 
could, but on the 23rd May/3rd June, the Turks forced them 
to attack. Fighting continued for 3 days and ended in the 
rout of the Iranians. Only two men were killed and one -wounded 
in the British ships, although they
nreceived above fifty shot in their Hulls, besides ye 
damage done their Masts and Yards • • . The Bashaw has 
transmitted an account of this Action with great 
incomiums to the Port, and has likewise wrote to the 
Earl of Kinnoull about it, the action was doubtless 
very brisk, but I could wish it were against some other 
Nation, tho’ I believe they (i.e. the Iranians) will 
do us the justice to think that nothing less than an 
absolute necessity cou’d ingage us to Act against them”.
 ^Letter from French to London, dated the 5th/l6th June 1755* 
See also the Gombroon Diary, l8th/29th June.
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The Agent and Council at Gombroon took a very serious 
view of the matter which, they feared, would aggravate still 
further the bad relations subsisting between the Company and 
Nadirl Nadir was angry when he received the news, but his 
■wrath was not directed solely against the Company* He 
dismissed Latif Khan from his post, saying that he should not 
have attacked until the land force of 8,000 men was ready to 
cooperate with him.
The Company’ s representatives were so apprehensive 
of the punishment that Nadir might inflict upon them that 
they at first contemplated evacuating the factory at Gombroon 
and taking to their vessels. Urgent messages were sent to 
Whittwell, the representative, at Kirman, to settle up the 
Company’s affairs there, and to come to Gombroon. The 
affair, however, was ultimately smoothed over because Nadir 
was extremely anxiotis to obtain more shipping from, or 
through the intermediary of, the Company, and the latter did 
what it could to accommodate him.
In 1734, as in 1732, the Porte requested the Khan
of the Crimea to march to Daghistan. The Khan excused himself
on the grounds that funds were lacking and that his men were
unwilling to go? it appears that, in reality, he was loath to
 ^The question of Nadir’s relations with the Company will be 
dealt with at greater length in Appendix III.
2 Tagebuch des Russisch-Kaiserlichen Generalfeld-Marschall 
Grafen von Mtonich (Leipzig, 1843), page 131*
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quit the vicinity of the Polish frontier, as he wished to inter­
vene in the war of the Polish succession on the side of 
Stanislaus Leszczynskil Early in May 1735 the Porte issued 
firm orders for the KMn to march with 80,000 men to Daghistan 
and thence into Shlrvan and this time it would brook no refusal. 
Waen Nepluiev, the Russian Resident at Constantinople, and 
his assistant Veshniakov heard of these orders, they 
strongly protested to CA1T Pasha, the Grand Vizier, but he 
informed them in reply that many of the leaders, culama and 
others of DSghistan had appealed to the Porte for assistance againsl
N&dir, who had already defeated Surkhai and appointed a new
\
ruler (i.e. Khass Fulad). The Grand Vizier added that the
Porte had considered this petition and that it felt obliged,
under the circumstances, to take the people of Daghistan under
its protection and to send them military assistance; the orders
to the Khah had therefore been issued and could not be rescinded?
The British, Austrian and Dutch representatives at Constantinople
pointed out to the Grand Vizier the great danger of war with
Russia that this march (like that of Fath Girai two years before)
would cause, but CA1T Pasha replied that the orders must stand,
and that the Iranian war could not be brought to an end unless
the Khan marched to Daghistan; he added, however, that the
Khan would be given strict orders not to enter Russian territory?
 ^Butkov, Vol. I, page 123 (Butkov is guilty of an anachronism 
here, as he states that Qaplan Girai started for Daghistan 
in November 1733*)
2
Lord Kinnoull, 24th May/4th June 1735*
ibid. See also Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1328.
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It is beyond the scope of this work to describe the 
further attempts which were made by the British, Austrian 
and other representatives (except the French Ambassador) to 
exert a moderating influence. All was in vain, and in Julyi
1755 Qaplan Girai set out with 53*300 men^ and reached 
D2ghistSi in October. No actual military encounter with 
the Russians occurred during this march, but the Russian Court, 
without declaring war on Turkey, sent General Leontov, with
20,000 regular troops and a force of Cossacks, to ravage 
the Crimea, with the double object of relieving the pressure 
on Nadir and of punishing the Crim Tatars for their frequent 
raids on Russian territory?
Alarmed by the attitude of Russia and by N£dirfs
threat to Anatolia, Turkey decided to offer, peace terms to
*
Iran. Not only had Nadir recovered all the Iranian provinces
and towns (with the exception of Erivan, which was still holding
out), but he had carried the war into Turkish territory.
Ahmad PctshH, who was at Erzeroum at this time and who
had been empowered to negotiate the terms of the peace, sent
an envoy to N3.dir offering to deliver up Erivan and to conclude
peace on the basis of uti possedetis. N&dir, however, was
besieging Qars and demanded the cession of that fortress:
an indemnity for all the losses suffered since the Turkish
^ See Mttnnich, op cit. page 153 ^or details of the composition 
of this force.
2
Butkov, Vol. I., pages 125 124. See also Count 0stermannls
statement to Rondeau which the latter reported in his 
despatch dated the 8th/19th November (S.P. 91* Vol. XVIII)
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occupation of Iranian territory began and the inclusion of 
Russia in the treaty! Nahir soon afterwards dropped his demand 
for Qars, whereupon Ahmad Pasha ordered EriVan to be surrendered.
•  *  ,7
which accordingly opened Its gates to the Iranians on the 3rd
October? Three days later Ngdir raised the siege of Qars and*
marched away to Tiflis. The remaining points of the peace 
treaty were left unsettled, but discussions were resumed after a 
brief interval.
Nadir was given a good reception at Tiflis, the 
streets through which he had to pass being strewn with carpets.
He treated well the Georgians who had submitted to him, but 
banished to Khurasan 6,000 families of the rebels?
Ihen Nadir had spent nearly 5 weeks in Tiflis, he 
heard that Qaplan Girai was marching on Darband with his army. 
Though he knew that CA1I PashS, the former Governor of Ganja, 
was on his way to settle the frontier question on the former 
basis and that the Sultan had sent Instructions to Qaplan Girai 
to return to the Crimea, he insisted upon setting out to 
attack the Khanf Nadir marched through the districts of Jar 
and Tala where he killed many Lazgls and burnt a number of 
villages. He then went via Shaki to Shamakhl with the object 
of encountering the Khhn. On reaching Shamakhl Nadir learnt
that Qaplan Girai, having heard of his advance and having also
 ^Lord Kinnoull, 20th/31st October 1735 (S.P. 97* Vol. XXVII)
2 T.N., page 161, Catholicos Abraham, op. cit. page 278.
5 Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G. Vol. II, Part II, page 49* Just 
previous to Nadir's arrival', Taimuraz and some other Georgian 
notables had fled to Circassia and Russia^  because_Nadir had 
granted Kartli and Kakheti to his nephew %1% Mlrza (who was
a Mohammadan) instead of to Taimuraz.
T.N., page I6g.__________ 1SQ.
received the SultSn's orders to return, had left for the 
Crimea. Before leaving DaghistSn, QaplSn Girai made EldSr, a 
brother of the late kdil Girai^ Shamkhal, and appointed Surkhai 
Governor of ShlrvSn and Ahmad Khan, the Usmi of the Qaraqaitaq, 
Governor of Darband?
Beyond immobilising a relatively small number of 
troops whom Nadir had detailed to watch his movements, Qaplan 
Girai, during his stay in Daghistan, had done nothing, in a 
military sense, to affect the issue of the Turco-Iranian 
war except to give some encouragement to the LazgTs; on the 
other hand, his expedition aggravated the already tense 
situation between Russia and Turkey.
Notwithstanding the beginning of winter, Nadir 
continued his campaign In Shir van and Daghistan. Marching 
from Shamakhl via Alti Agliach and Darrakandi, he punished 
the inhabitants of Buduq and Khaluq (Khinaluq) and took 
measures to intercept the fugitives. He then went via Gilyar 
to the north of Darband where he camped on the 21st November; 
here Nadir learnt that EldSr, the 1 anti-Shamkhalf, Surkhai #nd 
the Usmi Ahmad Khan had joined forces at Ghazanlsh, in order to 
attack Khass Fulad. Nadir thereupon went to Majalis where he
1 I ~
Eldar was thus the uncle of Khass Fulad, whom Nadir had 
made Shamkhal. For the genealogy of this family, see 1. 
Berezin's ' TTv-reid"6 c'rBic t t o  
Kazan, 1848, page 77*
2 T.N., page 164. See also Dorn's 'Geschichte Schirwans1,
pages 413 and 414.
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heavily defeated Khan Muhammad, the son of Ahmad Khan. From 
MajSlis Nadir and his forces proceeded through the mountain 
country to Gubden, in Khass Fulad1 s territory, killing the 
tribespeople and plundering and burning their villages as they 
went.
On the 17th Shac ban (2nd January 173&) NUdir left
Gubden for Qumuq. with Khass ^ul^d^ Surkhai had gathered% %
together all the available tribesmen whom he had stationed 
in a strong position in the valley of the GhazX Qumuq. Qoisu, 
through which the Iranian army would have to pass; in addition, 
he had fortified the mountain tops.
Nadir ordered his .lazllvirchis to attack the enemy 
and sent the Afghans to carry their mountain positions, 
which they did. The operations were successful, and Surkhai had
o
to retreatf Eldar, who was on his way to join Surkhai, was also 
defeated. Nadir then marched on to Qumuq where he received the 
submission of the chiefs. Surkhai, they said, had fled to 
Avaria, whether he had sent his family some time before. As 
nothing further could then be done against Surkhai, Nadir 
marched towards Quraish, a fortress belonging to the Usmi.
Ahmad Khan sent his daughter5 to Nadir, together with a number 





According to Rondeau, she was reputed to be !lthe finest woman 
in the East". ‘Abbas QulT, in his ‘Gulistan Iram»c (page 258), 
states that Nadir handed the girl over to Husain All, the 
Khan of Qubba.
161.
to pardon the Usmi, on condition that the Lazgls of Doqquz-Para 
gave him 1,000 horses and sent their principal families as 
hostages. The headmen of Tabarsaran then submitted to Nadir 
and provided hostages. In this way, the affairs, of Daghistan 
were settled, and Khass Fulad and the other loyal D^ghistani 
leaders were rewarded and given leave to return to their homes. 




Having defeated the Afghans and Turks, subdued the 
Lazgls and other rebels, and recovered, except for QandahSr, all 
the territory which had been lost, Nadir decided that the time 
had come to make himself Shah de jure as well as de facto.
In order to give his action some show of legality, Nadir deter­
mined to have the crown conferred upon him at the declared wish 
of all the leading military, civil and religious personages of 
the Empire. He had already, as far bhck as July or August 
17359 taken the significant step of sending raqams to all parts 
of the kingdom stating that, up till that time, his efforts 
to reconquer the lost territories had prevented him from 
establishing fa certain rule of government1! One of these 
raqams was received at Gombroon early in September. It was 
stated therein that Nadir, after taking Erivln, would go to 
Tabriz or Qazvln, and that the Governors, Deputy Governors, 
Kalantars, Kadkhudas, etc. were to be in readiness to meet him 
at whichever of these two places he afterwards directed 
”when he will establish a Rule of Government to be observed 
over the whole Kingdom, and then retire to Chorazoon (KhurasSn) n? 
It seems obvious that Nadir had, in reality, no intention of
1 See the Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th September 1735*
 ^See the Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th September 1735* It Is
strange that MTrz*5 Mahdi makes no mention of the issue of 
these raqamg, but it by no means follov/s from this omission 
that the raqam quoted in the Diary was not authentic.
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retiring afterwards to Khurasan, but that he merely had this
statement inserted so as to cloak his designs on the throne.
Somewhat later, NSdir followed up this step by
issuing special orders (faramin-i-mutaca ) to all parts of
the country bidding the army commanders, Governors of provinces
and towns, qadls. \ilama and nobles to assemble on the MugKSn 
%
plan where a qurulta’i  ^or national council was to be held for 
the purpose of conferring the crown of Iran upon the person 
whom the council considered to be most worthy to receive it.
The site selected for the qurulta* i was close to 
Javad, on the piece of land bounded on the north by the Kura 
and on the east by the Aras, immediately to the west of the 
point of their confluence. Nadir gave orders for 12,000 
buildings of wood and reeds, together with mosques, rest-houses, 
bazaars and baths, to be erected at this place. Splendid 
apartments for himself, his haram and his suite were also to 
be built?
Marching as rapidly as possible via Hasan-Qal* asi
and Aq Su (or New Shamakhl), Nadir reached the Mughan plain
on the evening of the 22nd January 173&4 Soon after Nadir's
coming, the army leaders, Governors and other persons of
1
T.N., page 167. Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b).
2 Howorth defines this old Turkish word as 11 a general assembly 
of princes of the blood and the military chiefs11 (Wo.-I.. .X,
iu t^) ; it is here used in a wider sense.
 ^T.N., page 167* Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b).
4 T.N., page 167. Catholicos iibraham, page 282 (the Catholicos
states that he had travelled from Echmiadzin at Ncfdir's
express invitation and that he reached the camp on the 12th/
23rd January, the day after NSdir’s arrival).
importance began to arrive in large numbers. At the end of
the month ^ 11 Pasha, viio had become Governor of Mosul, came
in order to conclude the peace negotiations; in company with
him was his mihmandar. !kbdufl-BcLqT Khan Zangana, the Governor
of Kirmanshahi By the 20th Ramadan (3rd February), the whole
of the delegates had arrived, numbering some 20,000? Supplies
of food were brought to the camp from the surrounding country,
and were rationed out daily to all present?
Elaborate measures were taken for guarding the camp,
and the bridge over the Kura at Javad was protected by two
strong towers that were erected on the northern side of the
river. Nadir1s own quarters were protected by 6,000 kasftLkchis
or special guards. Discipline was strictly enforced by the
nasaqchis. much to the admiration of the Catholicos^ The
dignitaries, being far too numerous to be received simultaneously
were divided up into batches, each batch being given a separate
audience? The Catholicos Abraham, CA11 Pasha, and other notables
were received in audience on the first day of the cIdu! 1-Fit r
%
(1st Shawwal = 14th February). The Catholicos, though too 
frightened to count exactly, estimated that 1,000 persons were
1 T.N., page 167.
2
Muhammad Muhsin, fol 217(b). Bazin (op. cit.« page 287) states 
that only 15,000 were present. The number given by MlrzS. 
Mahdi, viz, 100,000, seems much exaggerated, even if he 
included in the total all the servants and camp-followers.
3
Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b).
 ^Catholicos Abraham, page 286. Muhammad Muhsin, fol. 217(b).
5 ibidem page 292.
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seated in the audience hall. Rose-water perfumes and sherbet 
were distributed to everyone, and a band consisting of 22 
musicians played. On the following day Nadir appointed a 
committee consisting of T&hmasp Khan Jalayir and six other 
persons: this committee requested those gathered in the
audience hall to confer together and to recommend whom they 
considered most fitted to govern the country. Nadir, the 
committee stated, was old and was worn out by his campaigns; 
thanks to the divine Providence, he had delivered Iran from her 
enemies and re-established peace in the country. He now, 
they continued, wished to go to Khurasan and rest in his fortress 
(of Kalat).
The gathering then dispersed. Later, they reassembled 
and unanimously recommended that N3dir should be chosen as their 
ruler. The next day, when all were present, Tahanasp Khan 
Jalayir, on behalf of Nadir, laid down three conditions
(1) No one should abandon Nadir and support any son of 
the Shah.
(2) The Sunni faith should be adopted in place of the Shic 
and the obnoxious and heretical practices of Shic a 
must cease. The Shica faith had been adopted by
Shah Isma'il and had occasioned much bloodshed between 
Iran and Turkey. . . if the people of Iran desire 
that we should reign, they must abandon this doctrine ' 
which is opposed to the faith of the noble predecessors
j
and the great family of the Prophet, and (they must) \
i
follow the religion of the Sunnis. Since the Imam I
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Jaffaru^s-SSdiq was descended from the Prophet . . . •
the faith (tarlqa. literally the froadf) of the people
of Iran is clearly this religion. They should make
him the head of their sect.Tt
(5) No act of treason should be committed against Nadir
or his son. All should be submissive to them.
According to the official account of the proceedings,
all those who were present signified their acceptance of these
conditions without demur^ but Fraser (Cockell)^ and Otter? have
recorded that the MullS-bashI rose and objected to the forced
abjuration of the Shica faith. Nadir is said to have dealt
summarily with the objector, whom he ordered to be seized and
strangled. It is quite probable that so revolutionary a move
as the substitution of the Shica faith by that of the Sunni
may have met with strong opposition from the priesthood; it
by no means follows that, because MIrza Mahdi is silent on this
score, no such incident occurred^ in fact, Shaikh Hazln relates
that Nadir, on this occasion, non some pretext having put to deati:
one or twTo of the most celebrated men of the time, he-displayed
before them the dread instruments of execution. . . ■•w Shaikh
Hazin, it is true, does not state who these celebrated men were,
but who was more likely than the mullas to give Nadir a pretext
for such action?___________________________________________
1 T.N., page 168.
 ^Pages 120-122.
 ^Vol. I., pages 5J2-3J4.
4 The Catholicos likewise omits all mention of any incident of 
this nature, but he may, of course, have been too frightened 
to mention it.
Fraser and Otter both state that Nadir1 s execution of 
the Mulla-bashl caused the mullas to become his bitter enemies.
On Nadir learning of their hostile attitude, he confiscated a 
large part of their revenues.
Otter says that this action of Nadir1s gave rise to 
varying comment in Iren, some persons saying that he had always 
been a Sunni at heart, and others that he was a man without 
religion. It was recognised later, Otter continues, that Nadir 
had only pretended to show zeal for the Shic a faith in the earlie] 
stages of his career, in order to serve his own purposes, and 
that, if he declared himself a Sunni when he came to the throne, 
it was merely in order to succeed the more easily in the 
realisation of his schemes of conquest of the neighbouring coun­
tries!
It seems, however, more likely that Nadir substituted 
the Sunni faith for the Shic a because the latter had been so 
closely identified with the Safavls; the Safavl dynasty had 
owed much of its strength to its warm espousal of the Shi* a 
doctrine, and the zeal which it showed for this doctrine had 
naturally made the priesthood Its fervent supporters.
Consequently, it seems highly probable that Natlir felt that the 
Shica culama, if left undistrubed and unweakened by him, might 
at any time use their considerable influence with the people to 
work for the restoration of Tahmasp or his soncAbbas. Secondly,
4
Nadir may have felt that his suppression of the Shi* a faith
1
Otter. Vol. I, page.334.
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might facilitate the conclusion of peace with Turkey and so 
enable him to devote his energies, for a time at least, to the 
east. Whether NSdir acted in the way he did in order to please 
the large numbers of Sunnis in his army may or may not have been 
the case; but it is certain that he would not have dared to 
make so drastic a change if there had not been so many Sunnis 
in his service.
After the assembly had signified their acceptance of 
the three conditions, a fatwa recording what had been agreed 
was drafted and sealed.
The Catholicos states that, even after this fatwa 
had been issued, Nadir, In appearance at least, endeavoured to 
refuse the crown, but that he at length yielded to the entreaties 
of the nobles and other dignitaries!
; In the meantime, discussions had evidently been in 
progress with *A1T Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador.
It appears that Nadir, from the time when he. left
Qars in October 1735 until the arrival of CA1T Pasha at the 
%
Mughan camp, had been negotiating intermittently with Ahmad 
Pasha and %11 Pasha through the intermediary of messengers. 
Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg? in December or January, 
that the Turkish Ambassador was making lavish presents to 
influential persons at the Iranian Court and that the people
 ^Catholicos Abraham, page 302.
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were longing for peace with Turkey!
Before his coronation, Nadir made the deputies agree
to his sending an embassy to the Sultan in order to negotiate
2a peace on the following basis:-
(1) The Iranians having given up their former beliefs 
and chosen the religion of the Sunnis, were to be 
recognised as a fifth sect, to be known as the 
Jacfarl.
(2) Since each of the Imams of the four existing sects had 
a column (rukn) in the Kacba assigned to themy a fifth 
column was to be provided for the Imam Ja far.
(5) An Iranian Amlruil-Hajj (leader of the Pilgrimage),
with a position equivalent to that of the Amirs of 
the Syrian and Egyptian pilgrims, should be appointed, 
and be allowed to conduct the Iranian Pilgrims to 
Mecca.
(4) The prisoners on both sides were to be exchanged, and
none of them was to be allowed to be bought or sold?
(5) Each country was to maintain a representative at
the court of the other.
Although Nadir had now obtained the * consent1 of
everyone to his accession, there was, nevertheless, some delay
_
Soloviev, Vol. XX, page 1334.
2
T.N., pages 168-169*
Jones (Vol. XI, page 362) has mistranslated the last part of 
this clause; instead of saying that the prisoners were not 
to be bought or sold, he stated that trade between the two 
nations was to be free.
1 7 0 .
in arranging for his coronation. The reason for this delay 
was two-fold; in the first place, the engraving of the seal 
for the new Shah had not been completed and the dies for the 
new money were not yet ready. Secondly, the astrologers, 
on being ordered to discover an auspicious date for the 
ceremony, fixed upon the 24th Shawwal 1148 (Sth March 1736)!
Numbers of the Khans and other dignitaries now took 
their departure, without waiting to attend the coronation.
The Catholicos Abraham left on the 23rd February/5th March, 
because of the cold and of the shortage of bread?
On the following day cAli Pasha left for Constantinople, 
to communicate to the Porte Nadir’s peace proposals in the form 
indicated above? cAli Pasha was accompanied by cAbdu’l-Baqi Khan 
whom Nadir had appointed Ambassador to Turkey. cAbdu’l-EaqI Khan 
was instructed to convey to the Sultan the news of Nadir’s 
accession (although Nadir was not actually Shah at the time of 
his departure), and had full powers to conclude peace. With 
cAbdu’l-BaqI were Mirza cAbufl-Qasim KashanI, the Sadr or 
Shaikhu’l-Islam of Iran, and Mulla cAil Akbar, the Chief
T.N., page 169*
2
Catholicos Abraham, page 310* It is probable that many of the 
khans left for the same reason. The Catholicos states that 
there was a great scarcity of bread not only at Mughan, but 
also throughout the Tabriz district, Ganja, EriVan and else­
where. The rest of the Catholicos1 description of the pro­
ceedings at Mughan and of the coronation ceremony is based on 
information which he received from an Armenian priest named 
Ter Thouma, who remained on at Mughan. Ter Thouma was housed 
in Mirza Mahdifs tent and was therefore very close to Nadir1 s . 
place of residence. (Mirza Mahdi at that time was responsible 
for the preparation and issue of Nadir’s orders (raqam).)
3
Catholicos Abraham, page 310.
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Mulla} the purpose of the ecclesiastical members of this
mission was to discuss with the Turkish culamn the religious
points that were likely to arise in connection with Nadir1 s
demand for the recognition of the JacfarT sect and for the
erection of a fifth pillar in the Kacba. The mission bore a
letted from Nadir to the Sultan which set out, at considerable% *
length, the former1 s views on the religious question and his 
reasons for urging the recognition of the Jacfari sect, etc,
A special envoy was also sent to St. Petersburg to notify the 
Empress of Nadir*s accession. This envoy reached St.
Petersburg early in July, VJ56.
On Wednesday, the 7th March, Nadir1 s eldest son,
Rida Qull, whom his father had Just appointed Vali of Khurasan, 
left the Mugh£n camp for Mashhad to take up his new duties?
As the astrologers had recommended, the coronation 
ceremony was held on the 24th Shawwal 1148 (8th March 173&) >
1 at eight hours and 20 minutes after sun-rise1^
1
T.N., page 170. Mirza Mahdl is misleading here, as it appears 
from his account that c^ll Pasha and the Iranian embassy left 
the Mughan plain after the coronation ceremony. The 
Catholicos, however, explicitly states that they left 2 
days before, i.e. on the 24th February/6th March.
2 __
See the ^Maktub-i-Nndiri11 in the TTArmaghanT (Tehran, October
1929)> pages 449-455.
 ^Catholicos Abraham, page 515*
4 ✓ —T.N., page I69 and Durra-yi-Nadira. The 24th Shawwal, which
is the date given by Mirza Mahdl, agrees exactly with that
of the Catholicos Abraham, viz. 26th February O.S. or 8th
March N.S. Hanway is in error in stating that the
coronation took place on the llth/22nd March: he is also
incorrect in saying (Vol. IV. page 127) that 1 the Armenian
patriarch, who was in the camp, performed part of the
ceremony, by buckling on his sabre1.
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Those khans and other persons of consequence who still 
remained at the camp assembled in Nadir's audience-hall at the 
appointed time, all clad in their robes of honour. The golden 
crown, which the Armenian priest Ter Thouma describes as being 
shaped like a helmet and adorned with precious stones and 
magnificent pearls, was placed on Nadir1 s head by MIrzS Zaki.
All those present knelt down and prayed, save the Chief Hulla, 
who intoned the prayer. Miilst this prayer was being uttered, 
all kept their arms above their heads; afterwards, whilst the 
Fatiha or opening chapter of the Qu'ran, was being read, they 
bowed down, with their faces to the ground. When the Fatiha’ 
was finsihed, everyone seated himself in his appointed place, 
according to his ranki Then followed a scene similar to that 
which took place at Nadir's reception on the first day of the 
cIdu'l-Fitr (see page 166 above).
Before taking their leave, all. present bowed down 
before the new Shah?
From the time of his coronation, Nadir ceased to 
be known as the WakTlu'i-Daula, Na'ibu's-Saltana or Vail 
Niemat. Instead, he took the title of Nadir ShShy' thus 
changing his own name Nadr (or Nadhr) into Nadir.
The poet Qawamu'd-Dln made the Arabic chronogram 
I "the best is in what has occurred". Some of the
wits of the time, by transposing the first two letters,
1 Catholicos Abraham, page 511. Mirza MahdT omits these details, 
simply saying that Nadir was crowned "with the splendour of 
FarTduh and the pomp of Solomon".
2 Catholicos Abraham, page 511.
5 Shaikh Hazin, page 270.______ 175* _____________
completely reversed the meaning of the phrase without altering 
its numerical value, -which is 11483" This chronogram was 
reproduced on the coins struck at this time and later?
When Nadir was left alone with his brother and a 
few of his other relatives and some high officials, a number of 
singers and musicians appeared and entertained them for half an 
hour. Two hours after the ceremony had begun, all was over, and 
NSdir, taking off his crown, put on once more his ordinary 
headdress, which, is>. described as being a turban in the shape of 
a cross, covered with a piece of extremely fine white wool, the 
two ends of which were embroidered and came down over Nadir1s 
ears?
On the same day, after the ceremony, Nadir made Mirza 
Mu*min chief of the raqam writers and calligraphists, in place 
of MTrza MahdT. In order to console Mirza MahdT, Nadir 
appointed his his historiographerf
The day closed with more music, this time provided 
by drums, cymbals and trumpets; for three days and nights this
music continued without a pause?____________________________
 ^T.N., page 170. Shaikh Hazin (p. 271) quotes the following 
lines by a poet who preferred to remain anonymous:
y*)? , *  Abo 'A f ,fWe have cut off all desire for
KZY {. <:r' property and life
At the date ”The best is what 
0 ^  • ^  has happened.””
z Catholicos Abraham, page 330. See also R. Stuart Poole, ”The 
Coins of the Shahs of Persia”, (London, 1887)* page 72 and 
Plate VII.
ibidem, page J12.
4 ibidem, page J12.
the 
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As for the youthful *Abbas III, Nadir sent him, 
after his deposition, to join his father Tahmasp in Khurasan} 
where he remained until Rida QulT had him, his father and 
younger brother Sul aim ah put to death in 1740*
Nadir appointed his brother Ibrahim commander-in­
chief of the whole of Adharfeaijah, and ordered all the 
Governors ”from the borders of Qaplah Kuh to the Arp a Chai and 
the limits of Daghistan and Georgia11 to obey him?
After the Nau Ruz, festivities, Nadir had discussions 
with his commanders regarding the projected Qandahar campaign, 
and questioned the Afghans in his service as to the state of 
the country there.
Some days were then devoted to feasting^ and It was 
not until the 14th April that Nadir and his army left the 
Mug hah camp for Qazvih4
Before his departure Nadir sent back the Kartlian 
representatives with orders to raise the sum of 3,300 tomans 
(£7,260) and to provide a garrison of 5°° men at Tiflis. This 
order provoked a revolt in Upper Kartli which was headed by Giv . 
Amilakhor, Vakhusht Abashidze, Shanshi and other Georgian leaders. 
This revolt was stamped out later in the year by Safi Khan BughairS
*1
See Shaikh IJazIn, page 272, and the Bayah, fol. 14(b). Hanway 
is in error in stating (Vol. IV, page 123) that *Abbas died 
early In 1756 and that nsome art was used” to bring about his 
death.
T.N., page 170*
5 Kalushkin reported that, after the coronation, there was much 
drunkenness and, in consequence, considerable disorder in the 
. camp. See Solbviev, Vol. XX, page 1356.
T.N., page 172.
5 For particulars of this revolt, see Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la 
G., Vol. II, Part II, pages 50 and 51.
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CHAPTER XIII.
The Truce between Iran and Turkey: Nadir fs Rela­
tions with Russia: Capture of Bahrain: Bakhtilrl
Operations*
As related in the previous chapter, A^bdu’l-Baql Khan 
and CA1I Pasha left the Mughan camp for Constantinople on the 
4th March. 1756* As yet unaware of this fact and of the 
nature of Nadirfs proposals, the Porte, on the 20th April, 
sent a full power of authority to Ahmad Pasha to conclude the 
peace treaty; satisfaction was expressed at the reports which 
Ahmad Pasha had evidently sent in regard to the abandonment of 
the Shic a doctrine, but it was made perfectly definite that 
consent would never be given to the inclusion of Russia in the 
treaty.^
cAbdu’l-BaqI Khan and CA1I Pasha i'rea£bed Constantinople 
on the 6th August, having been five months on the way, the 
former, on his arrival, ^received Honours which are never paid
o
to the Ministers of any Christian Princes *
At the first meeting between the Iranian and Turkish 
negotiators, the Shah’s letter to the Sultan was read, as were 
also, his letters to the Grand Vizier and the Mufti* In the 
discussions that followed, agreement was reached without diffi-
 ^See Rondeaus despatch of the 22nd June/3rd July 1756 (S.P.91* 
VoILXVIIl), in which a translation of the power of authority 
to Ahmad Pasha was enclosed (Sir E. Fawkener, the new British 
Ambassador at Constantinople had evidently forwarded the 
translation to Rondeau)• .Obviously, the Porte had not yet 
learnt of Nadir’s proposals regarding the Jacfarl sect, etc*
2 Sir E. Fawkener, 7th/l8th August (S.P.97, Vol.JOCVIII).
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culty respecting the exchange of prisoners, the reciprocal 
appointment of ambassadors and the nomination of an Iranian 
Amir u ’ 1-Ha jj.^ * The case was entirely different, however, in 
regard to Nadir’s religious points; these points were discussed, 
on the Iranian side, by the Sadr, Mirza Abu’l-Qasim KashanI and 
the Mulla-Bashi, *A11 Akbar; the Turkish negotiators were Laili 
Ahmad Efendi, the acting Chief QadI of Anatolia, MaSIhzada 
cAbdu’llah Efendi, the nominal occupant of that position, and 
*Abdu’llah Pasha, the head of the fatwa records, and Ahmad Efendi, 
the former Q&dl of Constantinople.^ CA11 Akbar, the very capable 
Mulla-Bashi, Is said to have taken a prominent part in these 
discussions and to have caused the Turkish representatives con­
siderable embarrassment by his dialectical skill.^
The Turks flatly refused to accede to Nadir’s religious 
proposals; as neither side would give way over the two points 
involved, It was decided to draw up a treaty containing the 
first three points only, and to send an embassy to the Shah to 
inform him of the situation. cAbdu’l-BaqI Khan agreed to accept 
the treaty thus truncated, subject to its being confirmed by 
Nadir, and he and the Turkish representatives signed it on the 
28th September. Qn the 17th October cAbdu’l-Baql Khan, Abu’l- 
Qasim KashanI and CA11 Akbar were invited to a meeting of the 
Council where they were officially given the treaty. In the
^ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 344.
2 n « n « 343.
5 Otter, Vol.I, page 134.
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preamble Nsidir was officially recognised as Shah; then followed 
three articles each dealing with one of the three points on 
which agreement had been reached; lastly, it was provided, in 
an annex, that the frontiers between the two powers were to be 
identical with those laid down in the treaty of the 7th May 1639^ *
The state of war between Iran and Turkey was thus 
officially suspended, pending a solution of the religious diffi­
culties and the receipt of Nadirfs views.
When <Abdufl-BaqI Khan returned to Iran, the Porte des­
patched at the same time, as its Ambassador, Mustafa Beg, to­
gether with Maslhzada <AbduTllah Efendi and the QadT of Adrianople 
to assist him on the religious questions. The Turkish embassy 
left Constantinople on the 23rd November 1756, and was followed 
the next day by ‘Abdu11-Baql Khan and his suite The results 
achieved by this Turkish mission will be described in Chapter 
XIV.
Whilst the Turco-Iranian peace negotiations were in 
progress, the Russo-Turkish situation had steadily deteriorated. 
War between the two powers had been practically inevitable ever 
since the march of Qaplan Girai to Daghistan and Leontov’s inva-
^ Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, Page 348. Sir E. Fawkener reported, on 
the 24th September/5th October, that the Porte had ordered 
all persons having Iranian slaves in their possession to de­
liver them up to the courts of justice in the places where 
they resided. In the course of a month between two and 
three thousand Iranian slaves were given up.
Von Hammer, Vol.XIV, page 346.
5 See Otter, (Vol.I, page 37) > who accompanied fAbdu! 1-Baql Khan to 
Iran. The Armenian Tambouri Aroutine was a member of the 
Turkish Ambassadorfs suite (see the Bulletin de l*lnstltut 
Egyptien, Cairo, 1914, Vol.XIII, page 174)•
_______________  178,______ _______ ____________
sion of the Crimea. At Constantinople the situation was 
aggravated by the efforts of the French Ambassador to incite 
Turkey to attack Russia. On the Russian side, the repeated 
urgings of Nepluiev and Veshniakov to their Government to attack 
**the barbarians*1 when they were, apparently, being forced to 
their knees by Nadir, more than counteracted the moderating in­
fluence which the British, Austrian and Saxon Ministers at St. 
Petersburg strove to exert.
When Russia at length decided to go to war, she was no 
doubt influenced by the belief that Nadir would not only make 
no separate peace, but would actively cooperate with her against 
Turkey. Nadir, as has been seen, had made more than one 
attempt to persuade Turkey to include Russia in the projected 
peace treaty, but the terms of the Turks* repeated refusals 
must have made it plain to him that they would never agree to 
do so.
On the 28th May 1736 Russia declared war on Turkey; 
Nalushkin shortly afterwards received orders to inform Nadir of 
this and to notify him of the siege of Azov; he was, further, 
to point out to Nadir that this was the moment for Iran to take 
action against Turkey, when the latter power was being forced to 
use every effort to repel the Russian onslaught. Nadir*s gaze, 
however, was by now directed eastwards instead of westwards.
He replied that, while he would not undertake any hostile opera­
tions against the Turks, he would delude them with proposals of 
peace, and that he would not come to terms with them unless
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Russia were also a party to the settlement.^
Kalushkin informed Nadir, through the medium of Mir2a 
Mahdl, that it was strange that the SKSh, who had by his insist­
ence, embroiled Russia with Turkey, should now abandon his ally 
and seek a new friend in one who really desired nothing more 
than to ruin Iran. Nadir retorted that the Russian military 
operations were all of a minor nature; Iran had no need of 
Azov, just as Russia had no need of BaghdHd. Would Russia 
undertake a campaign against Constantinople? The Empress 
should lead or send her armies thither; there was, however, no 
hurry, as Russia and Iran would first have to settle the plan 
of campaign; Nadir concluded by saying that he would not make 
peace till he received the Empressfs answer. In reporting 
these conversations to St. Petersburg, Kalushkin stated that the 
Iranian nobles became noticeably colder to him every day, when 
he urged Iran to attack Turkey. Iran could not, in fact, re­
sume the Turkish war as she was in a dangerous condition , the 
country and people having become terribly impoverished.*
The Iranian envoy who reached St. Petersburg at the 
beginning of July 1736, after officially notifying the Empress 
of Nadirfs accession, assured her and her ministers that Nadir 
would make no separate peace; he received in return the promise 
that Russia would likewise refuse to make peace with Turkey un­
less Iran were included.^




The news of the signature of the Constantinople treaty 
came therefore as a shock to the Russian court. Nadir, however, 
had not, technically at any rate, broken his word to Russia.
The settlement effected at Constantinople was, in reality, 
little more than an agreement officially to suspend hostilities; 
moreover, this treaty was never ratified by NSdir.
NSdir remained for three months at Qazvln. Whilst
there, he issued an edict to give effect to the religious
changes which he had announced at the Mughan assembly. This
edict forbade the use of the words "CA1T the Friend of God* in
prayer, as being contrary to orthodox usage. He also ordained
the omission, after the Fatiha and TakbTr, of the words "Hay
the King from whom all our fortune flows, live for ever", on
1
the grounds that mortal man could not be perpetuated.
Fraser states2 that Nadir went through another coro­
nation ceremony at Qazvln "where the Ceremony of Inauguration 
of the Iranian Monarchy is performed. Having girt on the 
Royal Scymitar, and put the Imperial Crown on his Head, he took 
the usual Oath ....." etc., etc. Neither Mirza Mahdl nor any 
other contemporary Iranian authority, so far as the writer is 
aware, mentions a second coronation taking place at Qazvln, and
^ See Fraser, pp.123-127, who quotes what purports to be a
translation of this edict. It was issued some time in the 
month of Safar 1149 (12th June-9tk July, 1736).
Fraser, p.127. Otter (Vol.I, p.335) also mentions this
coronation, but he probably copied Fraser. Rida Qull Khan




it therefore seems most improbable that it took place; the 
investiture on the Mughan plain was surely sufficient# It
seems, moreover, unlikely that Nadir would follow a Safavl 
precedent by being crowned at QazvTn.
When Nadir was at Qazvln, the news arrived of the 
recapture of Bahrain. For some little time Latlf Khan (who 
had been recently reinstated by Nadir as 1Admiral of the Gulf») 
had been making preparations at Bushire for an expedition to 
Bahrain.^ * One of his ships was the "Northumberland11, formerly 
an East India Company vessel, which Latlf Khan had forced the 
Captain to sell for 5>000 tomans. Precise details of this 
expedition are lacking, but it appears that it set out from 
Bushire in March or early April 1736, when it was known that 
Shaikh Jabbara had left Bahrain to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.^ 
The Shaikh1 s deputy resisted for a time in the fortressj 
but was forced by superior numbers to yield. On returning to
Relations between the Persians and Shaikh Jabbara had of late 
become very strained.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 17th/28th June 1736. When the Agent u^raided 
the captain of the "Northumberland" for selling his vessel, 
the captain explained that Latlf Khan had taken him at a 
disadvantage, when much of his cargo had been landed and he 
himself was ashore; he said, however, that though he had 
sold the vessel under duress, he had got !a great price1 for 
her.
5 See T.N., p. 172 and At-Tuhfatuin-Nabhaniyyat Fi Ta’rTkhi'l- 
Jazlratifl-Arabiyyati (Cairo, 1929/30* P«ii3)*_ by Shaikh 
Muhammad ibn Shaikh Khalifa ibn IJamaditn-Nabhan. The latter 
writer (whose account contains a 'number of mistakes) states 
that the fort now known as the Qal' atufd-DTw£n, in the south 
of the island of Manama, is believed to have been built at 
NSdirfs command. Bushire was re-named Bandar Nadiriyya at 
or about this time.
Bushire, Latlf Khan sent the keys of this fortress to Muhammad 
Taql Khan^ who, in turn, sent them to Nadir* Nadir thereupon 
rewarded Muhammad Taqi Khan and added Bahrain to the province 
of FSrs* The successful Bahrain expedition led, as will he 
explained in a later chapter, to a more ambitious project, 
namely the conquest of ‘Oman and the establishment of Iranian 
naval supremacy in the Persian Gulf*
As the Chahar Lang section of the Bakhtiarl, under
Q O
their leader AIT Muradf had been in revolt for some considerable 
time and had defeated a body of troops which Nadir had sent to 
subdue them whilst he was besieging Brivan, he determined, now 
that he was no longer occupied with the Turks, to crush these 
rebels before proceeding eastwards.
The account given by MTrza Mahdl of the operations 
in this Bakhtiarl campaign is extremely difficult to follow, 
because very few of the places which he mentions can now be 
traced.^ Though it is impossible, for this reason, to give a 
detailed description of this campaign, the main outline of it 
can be indicated.
^ According to Fasa’T (p.l8o), Muhammad TaqT Khan went in person 
bn this expedition to Bahrain^ but this is incorrect*
^ T.N., p.174. According to the late Sardar Zafar, thisCA1T 
Murad belonged to the Chahar Lang section of the Bakhtiarls* 
The Haft Lang tribesmen remained loyal, and cooperated with 
the royal troops in suppressing the rebellion*
3 Though the writer has been allowed to utilise the excellent
maps prepared by the geologists of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
(which are far in advance of any other existing maps of the
Bakhtiarl country), and has, moreover, consulted Keighobud
Ilkhan, the son of the late Sardar Zafar, he has been only 
able to identify very few of these places. The unidentifiable8laces have either ceased, to exist or are now Known Dy  ifferent names* 185*
Having had previous experience of crushing revolts 
in Daghistan, the Kuhgilu province, and the Bakhtiarl country 
itself, Nadir determined to attack from several different 
points and to advance into the Bakhtiarl country by converging 
routes. He himself, at the head of his Kurdish and Afghan 
troops, entered the mountain country from the north or^ iiorth- 
east in the-middle of August 1756, after leaving his baggage 
and supplies at Charpas, in charge of Nasrullah Mlrza.^
A sharp engagement with the BakhtiSrls resulted in 
their defeat and flight to a fortress called Elruk, which is 
described as one of the most inaccessible of their strongholds; 
it was, apparently, situated in the very mountainous country to 
the E.N.E. of Dizful.^
Meanwhile other bodies of troops were penetrating into 
the Bakhtlhrl country from Isfahan, Kirmanshah, Shushtar and the 
Province of Kuhgilu. Numbers of Bakhtiarls were killed and 
many were captured.
After scouring the country on the borders of LuristUn, 
the Iranian forces pursued the remaining rebels south-eastwards,
T.N., page 175*
2 ibidem. The Ab-i-LIruk, which is mentioned by MTr2a Mahdl, 
seems from the context to be the Ab-i-Diz under another name. 
The difficulty of the terrain which the royal forces had to 
traverse is expressed in the following phrase in the Durra-yi- 
Nadira (p. 158): - ? ^
"From farsang (farsakh) to farsang (there was) nothing but 
stones (sang) and boulders (Kharsang)1*
and crossed the watershed on to the Isfahan side of the moun-
%
tains* ‘All MurSd and a few followers took refuge in a cave 
near a place called Gurkash, not far from the Bakhtiarl fortress 
of Banavar. CA1I Muradfs hiding place was eventually discovered, 
and he, his family and adherents were seized and taken to Nadir* 
At the Shah’s orders, rAlI Murad was blinded and had his hands 
and feet cut off; two days later, the wretched man died*^
With this cruel action, Nadir completed his subjuga­
tion of the Bakhtiarls
In accordance with his usual practice, Nadir enrolled 
a considerable number of Bakhtiarls in his army; as will be 
seen later, these Bakhtiarls rendered signal service during the 
siege of Qandahar.
Having thoroughly crushed the rebel Bakhtiarls, Nadir 
marched through the Karkunah district to Isfahan, where he 
arrived on the 9th JumadI II (15th October).5 He immediately 
busied himself with the preparations for his long-projected 
attack on Husain Sultan, of Qandahar.
^ T.N., page 176, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page 159*
2
Nadir is still remembered in the Bakhtiarl country; the 
Bakhtiarl fortress of Diz-i-ShShI is also known as Sangar-i- 
NSdirT at the present time (195^ )•
 ^T.N., page 176.
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CHAPTER XIV.
The Re-eonquest of Qandahar.
From the time when he ejected the Ghilzafis from 
central and southern Iran in the winter of 1729/1730* NSdir al­
ways had in his mind the desire to reconquer the city and pro­
vince of Qandahar and to remove once and for all the danger of 
attack from that quarter.
Events elsewhere, however, continually interfered 
with his plans. First there was the war with Turkey in 1730; 
then came the AbdSlI campaign. Nadir would probably have 
marched against Husain Sultan in the summer or autum of 1732* 
had not Tahmaspfs disastrous Turkish campaign diverted his 
energies to the west. Thereafter, until the autum of 1736* 
Nadir was occupied successively with the Turkish war, Muhammad 
Khan Baluch’s revolt, the Lazgl campaign, the Turkish campaign 
of 1735* toe Mughan assembly and the coronation and, lastly, 
the Bakhtiarl revolt*
With the conclusion of the truce with Turkey and the 
outbreak of the war between that country and Russia, there was 
no fear of invasion from the west and north-west, at any rate 
for some time to come. The Lazgls had been chastened,^ and 
the Bakhtiarls had been thoroughly subdued. Rida Quli MlrzA 
had been sent in the early spring to punish the Governor of 
Andkhud and to maintain order in the north-east of KhurasSn,
As subsequent events were to prove, the LazgTs were not, 
however, thoroughly quelled.
   126,   _____
while measures were in contemplation for bringing about the 
submission of the Baluchis.
Whilst still engaged on his Bakhtiarl campaign Nadir 
had sent orders to the Governor of Isfahan to make a levy of 
18,000 tomans as a contribution to the cost of the coming expe­
dition to Qandahar. The ShSh’s agents were busy at Gombroon 
at the same time requisitioning provisions for the troops; 
they carried out their duties so rigorously that the inhabitants 
were reduced to the utmost misery. Besides being forced to 
supply provisions, the merchants and other inhabitants were made 
to pay 72,000 rupees, fa sum so extravagant that it has near 
Completed the ruin of Everyonef.^  In the province of Kirman 
Nadir so denuded the people of supplies that there was a famine 
there for seven or eight years afterwards.^ What was done at 
Isfahan, Gombroon and in Kirman was no doubt carried out with 
equal ruthlessness elsewhere.
Nldir decided to march to Qandahar via Kirman and 
STstan. Since much of the country to be traversed was desert, 
he gave orders for large quantities of provisions to be sent on 
in advance to the various halting places. In order to provide 
the necessary transport, the Government authorities commandeered 
large numbers of draught animals, including those that were
i
Gombroon Diary, l8th/29th August, 1736.
 ^N. de Khanikoff, nMemoire sur la Par tie Meridionale de lfAsie 
Centrale”, Paris, 1861, page 192.
conveying a consignment of the East India Co's wool from Kirman 
to Gombroon.’*'
After spending five weeks in Isfahan, Nadir began his 
march on the 17th Rajab 1149 (21st November 1736) the head
of 80,000 men, of whom the majority were cavalry; there were
large numbers of KhurSsanls and Abdalis, and a strong contingent 
of Bakhtiarls.
Nadir took with him, as hostages rather than volun­
teers, several prominent Georgians, amongst whom were King 
Taimuraz, Giv Amilakhor, and Bardzim, the Eristav of the Aragwi.^
After spending a few days at Kirman, 4 the army pro-
 ^The Shah's agents even stopped caravans on the roads, seized
the animals and left the goods which they had been carrying
by the road side. See Gombroon Diary, l8th/29th August and 
2Jrd August/3rd September 1756 and J. A. Saldanha's 
"Selections from State Papers", page 49*
Fraser, page 128 and FarsnAma, page 181. According to the 
former Tahmasp Khan Jalayir joined Nadir shortly afterwards 
with another 40,000 men. Hanway (Vol.IV, page 146) gives 
similar figures, but he is in error in stating that Nadir 
marched via Khurasan.
5 Vakhusht, H. de G., Vol.II, Part I, page 132, and Sekhnia
Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 52.
4 Nidir was at Kirman for a few days late in December 1736.
Henry Savage (who had succeeded Whittwell there) reported 
that he had been forced to make Nadir a present to the value 
of 160 tomans, "the Dutch having led the way with a more 
considerable one". (Gombroon Diary, lst/12th January 1737)♦ 
In February 1737 Savage stated that "the King has sent orders 
to seize all the beasts again to carry Powder and Shott and 
draw Cannon to Candahar"; this, he said, would make it 
impossible for him to forward any wool for some time.
ceeded via Bam, Tum-i-ETg and Gurg to STst^n;^ the Sistan- 
Qandahar border was crossed on the 2nd Shawwal (3rd February 
1737) 9 and the army reached Girishk on the 18th of the month, 
after passing through Far ah, Dalhak and Dilaram. Girishk was
|d)ace
held by a Ghilza’i force, but this/speedily surrendered on a 
bombardment being opened* Whilst at Girishk Nadir detached 
portions of his forces to subdue the district and fortress of
_ o
ZamTndavar and the town of Bust*
After a halt of three days at Girishk, the army 
marched via Shah Maqsud to the Arghandab, on the west bank of 
which it camped. That night Husain Sultan, with a force of 
picked men, crossed the river by a ford and fiercely attacked 
the Iranian camp. The Ghilza’is, however, were repulsed with 
heavy loss.^
From Kokaran, where he crossed the river, Nadir 
marched towards the QaitUl ridge on which the northern and north­
western defences of the fortress were situated. Despite cannon 
fire from the fort on the lofty Kuh-i-Laka, at the western end 
of the ridge, the Iranian army crossed a projecting spur of this
1 T.N., page 176, and Durra-yi-Nadira, page 160. Sir F.Goldsmid,
on page 250 of his "Eastern Persia: an Account of the 
Journey of the Persian Boundary Commission, l870-71-72w, 
(London, 1876), states that he found a ruined gate 29 miles 
from Gurg which was said to be a relic of Nadir’s passage.
N. de Khanikoff, who travelled along this route in 1858, men­
tions that Nadir had to have the pass over the ridge extending 
N.N.W. of Siah Kuh (some 65 miles N.W. of Nusratabad) widened 
by means of the axes carried by his men, so that his artillery 
could pass. This pass consequently became known as the 
Gardana-yi-Tabarkand (see de Khanikoff, op.cit.. page 164)
2 T.N., page 178.
 ^ ibidem.
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mountain, and, skirting the western and southern walls of the
city, encamped on the plain to the east of it.^
On the 8th Dhufl-Hi^ja (9th April) Nadir moved his
o
camp a short distance to Surkh Shir , where he caused a whole
>
city to be built, complete with walls and citadel, bazaars, 
mosques, baths and rest houses; to this place he gave the name 
of Nadirabad.3
Meanwhile NSdir had begun the siege of the city* As 
AurangzTb and, later, his brother Dara Shukuh, had found to 
their cost in the middle of the XVIIth century, QandahSr was so 
strongly fortified as to be impregnable unless the besieging 
force had heavy and efficient artillery. The city was protect­
ed on the north by the Qaitul ridge and on its other sidds by 
enormously strong walls, made of dried mud strengthened with 
chopped straw and stones; in places, these walls were ten yards
in thickness.5
As Nadir was, as usual, deficient in siege artillery, 
he was forced to adopt blockading methods similar to those
 ^T.N., page 178.
2
 ^ v JL79* See also Durra-yi-Nadira, p.160. Surkh Shir 
or NSdirabad was two miles S.E. of QandahSr.
5 According to cAbdufl-KarIm, Nadir ordered each of his men to 
build a house, while he himself caused ca fortress and forti­
fications to be erected. (Bayan-i-Waqi, folio 14 b*)
4 The Emperor SK5h Jahan had given Aurangzlb, in 1649> positive
orders to attempt no assault on the fortress until these wa!3s 
could be breached; Aurangzlb1s artillery, however, could not 
make any appreciable impression upon them*
5 Ferrier!s flCaravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghan­
istan^  Turkistan and Beloochistann {Translated by Captain 
W. Jesse), London, I856, page 317.
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which he had employed during the siege of Baghdad. A ring
of strong forts was built round Qandahar; between these
forts, towers were placed at intervals of 100 yards, and
others were afterwards added.
Since Husain Sultan had had ample warning of
*
Nadirfs intention to besiege Qandahar, he had laid in large 
quantities of provisions, so the siege was likely to prove a 
long one. Nadir, however, had one great advantage over 
Aurangzlb in that his army, which consisted largely of hardy 
mountaineers and men from Khurasan, was far better ~ able to 
withstand; the-rigours of a winter campaign than were 
Aurangzlb^s Indian troops; Nadir was thus able to contemplate 
a siege of several months duration with comparative equanimity.^ 
The only seriousL problem was the provisioning of 
his large army, which required far more food than the country 
surrounding Qandahar could supply. Reference has already 
been made to the privations which the; inhabitants of Kirman 
had to undergo, as a result of the depletion of their resources 
in order to provide supplies for the army; this was not all 
that the unfortunate people had to endure, forf at- the begina- 
ing of 175&* draught animals became so scarce that, in 
February 1758, men and women were compelled to act as porters 
from the Kirman district to Qandahar, the men having to carry 
fifteen, and the women seven, Tabriz maunds (some 97 and
 ^Nadir obtained fresh supplies of powder, etc. by caravan 
from Kirman.
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lbs* respectively) of grain.^
In May news of the capture of Bust was received at 
the camp, and the town of Safa fell soon after. Imam Verdi Beg 
Qiriqlu then advanced against Qalat, which fell after a siege 
lasting over two months, when one of Husain Sultan1 s sons 
named Muhammad, his general Saidal and a number of other 
Ghilzafi leaders were captured and brought to Nadirabad. Nadir 
had Saidal blinded, because he looked upon him as a dangerous 
man.^
On the 11th Muharram 1150 (11 th May 1737) > Nadir
despatched Muhammad Khan Turcoman, the former Safavl general,
on a mission to Muhammad Shah.' The reason for this mission%
was that, when an Iranian detachment had defeated some Ghilza’is
a few farsakhs beyond Qalat, and the survivors had fled over the
Indian frontier, the Mughal authorities made no attempt to stop
them.3 Muhammad Khan Turcoman had orders not to remain for%
more than 40 days at the Mughal Court, but, as will be seen 
later, he was detained there for over a year.
Meanwhile, bodies of Iranian troops were operating 
in Baluchistan, where Plr Muhammad and Asilmas Khan had been 
sent earlier in the year to quell a revolt. Owing to a quarrel 
between Plr Muhammad and Asilmas Khan, the former, on one
 ^Gombroon Diary (Volume V, 1st March 1738.
2 T.N., page l8l.
3 ■ffhe—toxt of Nadir10—letter to the Emperor is quoted in the' 
anonymous' Sahifa yi Iqbal, P.M. ,■ MS. OR.32QI, fall.7l(^
■Tho MSi also quotes the E m p e r o r repxy which 
was draf-ted, but nover> apparently, sentr
3 T.N., page 190. 1Qn
occasion, refused to go to the latterfs assistance, with the 
result that a number of Iranian troops perished. When the 
facts were reported to Nadir, he ordered Plr Muhammad-to be 
beheaded*^
Muhabbat Khan and Imtiyas Khan, two of the sons of 
the late Brahoi chieftain, "Abdullah Khan, reached Nadir fs court 
some time in the summer of 1737* and were well treated by him, 
Muhabbat Khan being made Governor of Baluchistan.^
The operations against the Afghans of Zamlndavar 
were not attended with success at first, partly owing to the 
treachery of some Afghans, and it was-- not until the end of 
January 1738 that the district was completely subdued,5
To return to the siege of Qandahar. Owing to the 
great strength of the defences, Nadir made no attempt to deliver 
an assault until the 30th January 1738 > when his troops captured 
part of the outer fortifications and, what was far more import­
ant, some towers on the Qaitul ridge. One of these tpwers,
which was built of stone, was near the Chihil Zina, at the
4eastern end of the ridge, and overlooked Qandahar. The 
Iranian troops hauled mortars and cannon up to this point, 
whence they bombarded the city.5
1 T.N., page 182.
^ ibidem.





As seme of his Bakhtiarl troops had repeatedly 
asked leave to deliver an attack, Nadir allowed 300 of them, 
together with 300 Chamishgazak Kurds and a like number of 
Abdalls to carry out an assault on the 13th March* IJusain, 
however, had received word of the impending attack and had 
concentrated his troops at the threatened point; the result 
was that the assailants were repelled with the loss of 200 
killed and wounded.^
Ten days later, Nadir decided to launch another 
assault, this time with between 3*000 and 4,000 picked men 
(including many Bakhtiarls, who had volunteered again)• On 
the night of the 2nd Dhufl-Hi33a (22nd/23rd March), whilst his 
troops were taking up their positions wherever they could find 
cover, Nadir ascended to the tower near the Chihil Zina, in 
order to witness the delivery of the assault the next day.
After the midday prayer the signal was given, and 
the Bakhtiarls rushed forward towards a strong tower, which 
they scaled by means of ladders and captured. Another strong 
position then fell to the assailants and this success led, in 
turn, to the capture of the walls, gates and remaining towers 
of the fortress.
Husain Sultan managed to escape with his haram
T.N., page 186. See also the Durra-yi-Nadira, page 162. 
Jones V^ol.XI, page 406) incorrectly states that the 
attackers numbered 300 in all,
^ T.N., page 187* Both Anand Rain Mukhlis and Otter (Vol.I, 
page 356) ascribe the fall of Qandahar to treachery.
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and a few followers to another fort which still held out,*** 
but the rest of his adherents were either killed in the final 
onslaught or taken prisoners.
Nadir brought his cannon to bear upon Husain 
Sultanfs place of refuge, with the result that the Ghilzafi 
leader, on the following day, sent his elder sister Zainab, 
together with a number of Ghilzafi chiefs, to beg Nadir for 
quarter; this action, as Mirza Mahd3f explains, was in accord­
ance with the Afghan custom of nannawat.^  Nadir respected 
this custom, and granted Husain Sultan and his family and 
followers their lives; soon afterwards he despatched them all 
to Mazandaran.
Nadir found imprisoned in Qandahar his former foe 
Dhufl-Fiqar Khan, the Abdall leader, and his younger brother 
Ahmad; the two brothers had fled from Herat to Qandahar> but 
had been seized and thrown into prison by Husain. After 
making Dhu’l-Fiqar and his brother a grant from his treasury 
for their sustenance, Nadir sent them to Mazandaran.5
T.N., page 187* MEza Mahdl falls into error here, for he 
states that Husain Sultan took refuge °at Qaitul which is on 
the top of a mountain on the south side of the fortress0.
Sir J. Sarkar, on the authority of the cAdat-i-<AlamgirI,says 
that QaitHl is the name of the ridge to the north of the 
fortress. (See his °History of Aurangzib0, Vol.I, page 126),
^ T.N., page 188. Mirza Mahdr described this custom as being 
equivalent to^hat^of* the Arabs which is known as dakhll 
(the phrase ^ means °I am under the protection of
so-and-so°).* See'also Elphinstonefs explanation of the 
term in his °Account of the Kingdom of Caubul0, (London 1829 
Vol.I, page 295).
5 T.N., page 188. See also ^ Abdutl-Karlm cAlavi!sgukhapar*^ 
nT^rikh-i-Ahmad0, page 4, where it is stated that Nadir 
treated Dhufi-Fiqar and Ahmad with great kindness.
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Nadir then gave orders for the fortress of 
Qandahar to be rased to the ground*1, and for the surviving 
inhabitants to move to NSdirabad, which he made capital of 
the province of Qandahar* cAbdu* 1-GhanI Khan was made 
Governor of the province and other Abdall chiefs were appoint­
ed Governors of Girishk, Bust and Zamlndavar. The Abdall 
tribesmen who were settled at NTsliapUr and elsewhere in 
Khurasan were brought en masse -to QandaKAr (where they had 
formerly lived) and were given the lands of the Hotiki 
Ghilzafis^ , while the latter were transferred to Khurasan; 
here they were granted the lands which the Abdalis had just 
given up.5 a considerable-number of young Ghilzafis were en­
rolled in Nadir1s bodyguard instead of being transported to 
Khali'S s an.
Rida Qull Mirza had taken up his duties as Governor 
of Khurasan on his arrival in that province from the Mughan 
plain in the spring of 1736* As CA1T MardSn Afshar, the 
Governor of Andkhud, had disobeyed Nadirfs orders, the young 
Prince, having collected a force of some 12,000 men, set out 
for Andkhud via BSkharz in April or May 1737> with the object 
of punishing him.^ When the Prince was nearing Andkhud,
 ^The walls of the fortress were so solidly constructed that 
this order could only be partially carried out. Even in 
1934 moich olpthese wallscooold still be seen, and part of 
the citadel was still standing.
 ^Husain Sultan-belonged to the Ho tiki clan of the Ghilza*is.
 ^T.N., page 188 and TS1rlkh-i-Ahmad, page 4.
4 T.N., pages 170 and 182*
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the Afshars of that town seized *A1T JIardan and surrendered
the place; CA1I Mardan and his associates were then sent to
Qandahar for punishment.
Rida QulT went on from Andkhud to Aghcha, which
surrendered to him on the 29th June. Two days later the
young Prince advanced on Balkh, where the Governor attempted
resistance, but surrendered after a siege lasting three days.
All the Ozbeg and other chiefs in the Balkh district then
submitted to the Prince, as did the people of Qunduz; Rida
QulT then annexed the whole province of Balkh to the empire.^
Although he had received no orders to go beyond
the Oxus, Rida QulT crossed that river and advanced on Bukhara * %
via Qarshi. Abu!l-Faid Khan,^ the Khan of Bukhara, having 
obtained help from Ilbars,^ the ruler of Khwarazm, attempted 
to bar Rida QulPs progress. Although the Prince was very 
considerably outnumbered, he boldly attacked and defeated the 
combined forces of Bukhara and Khwarazm.^
 ^T.N., page l8j. For reasons which will be explained later, 
Balkh was not formally annexed to Iran until Nadir went 
to Bukhara in person, after his Indian campaign.
2 — _ —Abufl-Faid Khan, the son of Subhan QulT Khan, was a descend­
ant of Chingiz Khan. He was*a man of weak character and 
was a mere puppet in the hands of his capable and ambitious 
chief minister, Muhammad Rahim BI, of then family of Manqit. 
See A. Vamberyfs "History of Bokhara", London, 1873* page 
338.
 ^ — — — — y Ilbars Khan Qazaq, the ruler of Khwarazm, also claimed
descent from Chingiz Khan. Unlike Abufl-Faid, he was a
resolute and truculent chief.
4 T.N., page 183.
197
When Nadir received news of his sonfs advance
beyond the Oxus~. and his attack on the forces of Abu*l-Faid, he
despatched orders to him to cease fighting and to return, to
Balkh. NSdir sent word to Abu'l-Faid that he recognised his
sovereign rights, over Bukhara, as a descendant of Chingiz Khan
and as a Turcoman, and that he had ordered his son to cease
making war upon him#*
In-response to a summons from Nadir, the Turkish
Ambassador and his suite,who had reached Isfahan from
Constantinople at the end of July 1737$ left the former city
for Qandahlr at the beginning of February 1738, accompanied by
'Abdufl-Baql Khan. The two Ambassadors arrived at NadirSbad
on the 9th May, 1738.^ The letter from the Sultan which
Mustafa Pasha delivered to Nadir offered excuses for his inabil * ♦
ity to recognise the Jacfari sect or to agree to the erection 
of a fifth pillar in the Ka'ba; it was also stated that the 
sending of the Iranian pilgrims via Syria might prove a cause 
of trouble. The Sultan therefore begged Nadir to excuse his 
acceptance of the first two points; as to the third, he 
suggested that the Iranian pilgrims should proceed to Mecca 
via Najaf, in which case he would arrange for their protection 
and well-being en route.5
Nadir informed the Turkish Ambassador and his 
advisers that the questions of the Jalfari sect and of. the
* T.N., page 184.
2 ■» ® 189.
5 * « 189.
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fifth pillar for the Kacba were, in his view, the most
important part of the treaty* He then appointed CA1I Mar dan
Khan, the Governor of Fail! Luristan, as his Ambassador to
Turkey, who was to travel back with the Turks and discuss the
1 9matter further at Constantinople. According to Otter, 
NSdir, when giving his last audience to Mustafa Khan charged 
him to give a faithful account to his sovereign of all that 
he had seen, and to assure the Sultan that he would have news 
of him as soon as he returned from India. 'All Mardan Khan 
and the members of the’ Turkish mission left Nadirabad for 
Constantinople on the 1st Safar (21st May)^#
It is possible that Nadir deliberately kept the 
religious controversy alive, so as to be able to use it as a 
pretext for again attacking Turkey, whenever it suited his 
purpose to do so.
* T.N., page 189*
2 Otter, Vol.I, page 225* 
 ^T.N., page 189*
CHAPTER XV
The Invasion of India* I* Qandahar to KarnlLl.
As already stated^ Muhammad Khan Turcoman, in May 
1737* was sent post-haste to the Mughal Court with a letter 
from Nadir^ respecting the failure of the Emperor to close 
the Indian frontier to Afghan fugitives; the envoy was under 
orders to limit his stay at Delhi to 40 days. When 
Muhammad Khan delivered this letter, the Bnperor and his 
ministers were perplexed; if they replied to N^dir1s letter, 
by what title should he be addressed?^ Instead of deciding this 
question, they resolved to return no answer until the result 
of the siege of Qandahar became known. Moreover, despite the 
remonstrances of Muhammad Khan, they refused to give him leave 
to depart. A whole year thus passed, and when, after the fall 
of Qandahar, there was still no news of Muhammad Khah, Nadir 
sent emphatic orders to him to return at once and to bring 
whatever reply the Snperor might wish to give^
1
See page 192 above.
2
For the text of this letter, see the anonymous MS. Sahlfa-yi- 
Iqbal (BM. OR. 3281) fol. 7l(a)-73(a): this MS. also gives
what purports to be the Emperor’s reply, but this, if 
authentic, could have been nothing more than a draft, since 
it is known that no answer was sent.
3 —Shaikh Hazln, page 286; Siyar, page 470; Bayan, fol. 15(a).
4 T.N., page 190.
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Without waiting for an answer to this message, NSttir 
set out from Nadirabad for Ghazna on the 21st May 1738j 
and crossed the Indian frontier, apparently at or near MHkur^ 
a few days later. Thus began the invasion of India.
Nadir nevertheless kept up the semblance of friendship 
with the Enperor for some time to come, and excused his 
violation of the frontier on the grounds that he merely wished 
to punish the Afghan fugitives. It is highly probable, however, 
that Nadir1 s expressed desire to punish the Afghans was merely 
a pretext, and that he had for some time harboured the design 
of conquering India. The almost continual campaign of the past 
few years had caused famine in Iran and had brought her to the 
verge of bankruptcy, besides rendering it difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain sufficient recruits to replace casualties 
and wastage. Nadir had doubtless realised that, under such 
circumstances, he could not hope to succeed in his design of 
marching to the Bosphorus. As Iran could not meet his 
requirements, he must look elsewhere; he could recruit the man­
power he wanted from among the warlike Afghans and 'Ozbegs, but 
that ?/ould be impossible without money. India, it must have 
seemed, offered the only solution to the problem. The 
ambassadors whom Nadir had sent on several occasions to that 
country must, on their return, have informed him of the 
enormous wealth, as well as the increasing weakness, of the
The T.N. (page 191) gives the name of the place where the 
frontier was crossed as Chashma-yi-MakhmTir, ?,rhich cannot 
now be identified.
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Mughal Empire} With the spoils of India, he could raise and pay 
his Afghan and Ozbeg levies, and so renew his war with Turkey; 
besides, by invading the Panj"Sb, he would be following the 
example of Alexander the Great, Mahmud of Ghazna and Tiinur, 
and thereby merit the title of ”Wo rid Conqueror”.
Another reason for the invasion, according to a
number of contemporary historians and T/riters, both Indian^
and European^ is that Nadir entered India at the invitation
T ’ '
Anand Ram, in his Tadhkira (vol.165(b)), says that "the train 
had long been laid and from these negotiations (i.e. the 
various missions from Nadir to Muhammad &hah) sprang the 
spark that fired it”. He adds that the above was merely 
the apparent motive for the invasion, and that the true 
reason was the weakness of the Mughal monarchy.
2
See, in particular, the Jauhar-i-Samsak of Muhammad Muhsin 
Siddlqi; the writer was, however, a zealous supporter of 
Sarasamu’d-Daula Khan Dauran, the Amiru’1-Umara or 
Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal army and one of the 
leaders of the ’Hindustani* party. Khan Dauran was very 
hostile to the Nizamu’ l^Mulk who was a prominent member of 
the rival ’Central Asian1 faction at the Court (feeling 
between these two parties was very intense). The accusation 
is also made in Rustam CA11’ s Tarikh-i-Hindi (B.M. MS. OH. 
1628, fol.281(b)), but it is qualified by the words ”it is 
said that” . . . See also the ’Halat-i-Nadir Shah’ by 
Amra Chandirl (i.O. MS.4008), ’NSair Var’ (a ballad on
Nadir’s invasion) by Nijabat, a Haral Rajput (see the paper 
read by R.B. Pandit Hari Kishan Kaul before the Pan jab 
Historical Society on the 26th September 1916), and Tilok 
Das’s Hindi poem (see W. Irvine’s annotated translation in 
the J.R.A.S. 1897, Vol. LXVI).
5 Fraser, pp. 129-153; Otter, Vol. I, page 555* Hanway, Vol.
IV, page 142. Belief in the Nizamu’1-Mulk’ s guilt was
certainly very widespread; that it was by no means confined
to India is evidenced by a remark made to J. Otter in 1743
by the Kiahya of Mosul. Wishing to imply that Ahmad PashS
was in collusion with Nadir, the Kiahya said: ”N’y auroit
il pas parmi nous un second Nizam ul-Mulk, qul trahit le 
Grand Seigneur, et fait venir le Roi (Nadir) contre nous”. 
(See Otter, Vol.’ll, page 3&5) • Dr. Jadunath Prasad, in 
his (unpublished) thesis entitled ”The Life and Career of 
Mir Qamaru’d-DIn, Nizamu’ 1-Mulk Asaf ^ ah I”, is, however, 
convinced of his inno*cence.
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of the Nizamu11-Mulk, the veteran Viceroy of the Deccan;
it has also been asserted that Sa’adat Khan, the Subadar of
Oudh, was jointly responsible with the Nizamu11-Mulk for
inviting Nadir to comei It is by no means impossible that
either or ’both of these nobles may, indeed, have been guilty
of treason. Chin Qilich Khan, the Nizamu11-Mulk, was of
Central Asian extraction, and Safadat Khan was an Iranian 
2by birth; consequently, neither may have had any deep feeling 
of loyalty to the Mughal state. On the other hand, the charge 
against then has never been, and now probably never will be, 
proved; the only way that that could be done would be to 
produce the incriminating letters that are alleged to have been 
exchanged,
Hanway, it appears, is fully justified in remarking? 
fTIt appears to me highly probable that Nadir did not stand In 
need of such instruments (i.e. the Nizamu11-Mulk) for the 
execution of his ambitious designs11.
After crossing the Indian frontier, the Iranian 
Army halted for a few days at Qarabagh, 37 miles south-west
 ^Risala-yi-Muhammad Shah (B.M. MS. OR 180, foil. 106(b)-107(b)) ;
the anonymous author of this work was (like Muhammad Muhsin
Siddiql) a warm supporter of Khan Dauran.
2  _  _  ^ 
For Sa1 adat Khan* s antecedents, see the ^madu* s-Sa*adat, fol.
6(a) > and the recent work by Dr. Srivastava, entitled ”The
First Two Nawabs of 0udhn, Lucknow, 1933* pages 5-3°-
 ^Vol. IV, page 142.
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of Ghazna. Mien the Governor of Ghazna heard of Nadir1 s
arrival at Qarabagh, he abandoned his post and fled to Kabul;
the a adls. culama, and notables of the town, however, came
in a body to Qarabagh, and submitted to NSdir^-
Ghazna was reached on the 22nd Safar (llth June),
and from there the army went on towards Kabul. Soon after
leaving Ghazna, Nadir sent the following message to the
Kotwal of Kabul:
wWe are not concerned with the Kingdom of Muhammad 
Shah, but since these frontiers are like a mine unacdan) 
of Afghans and numbers of fugitives have also Joined them, 
it is (our) intention to extirpate these people. Be not 
anxious for yourselves, but undertake the obligations 
of hospitality. tf2
Nasir Khan, the Subadar of Kabul and Peshawar, when ♦ *
faced with the task of repelling the invaders, appealed to Delhi 
for money to pay his troops?
When Nadir1s army arrived within two stages of Kabul, 
a deputation, consisting of the notables of the city, came out 
and made their submission to him. However, Sharza Khan, the 
commander of the citadel, offered resistance, and held out until 
the end of June^
_  , , . - —  -?
T.N., page 191. 1
2
Shaikh Hazin, page 287-
Ghulam Husain blames Khan Dauran for the relatively defenceless
state*of the province of Kabul. Had Khan Dauran, he says, i
attended to his duties, Nadir would not have wished to come tc
India or he would not, at any rate, have had such facility in
coming. Ghulam Husain describes Nasir Khan as a man who,
when he was not hunting, was engaged in his devotions and in
reading the Qufran. (Siyar^l-Muta1 akhkhirin, page 469)
4 — -T.N., page 192. Nasir Khan was not in Kabul at the time of
NSdir*s approach; * as will be seen below, he was engaged in
collecting a force to defend the Khaibar Pass.
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On the 14th July Nadir sent an envoy to Muhammad 
Khan with a long message complaining of his behaviour and 
stating that he (N^ dir) had come to Kabul with the sole object 
of punishing the Afghans; the people of Kabul having resisted 
him, he had been obliged to punish them. Nadir concluded by 
expressing his friendship for the Emperori The envoy leftfo£ 
Delhi in company with some notables of Kabul; when the party 
reached Jalalabad, they were stopped by the Governor and the 
envoy was slain; the Kabulis were, however, sent on to 
Peshawar?
Since provisions were scarce at Kabul, N3dir took 
his army some forty miles northwards, to the fertile district 
of Charikar, in the Kuhistan, where food and fodder were to 
be had in abundance? After a halt of 22 days in this district, 
the army left for Gandamsk on the 5th September; on reaching 
Gandamak^  NMir stormed the mountain fastnesses of the local 
tribesmen^ A punitive expedition was then sent on in advance, 
to Jalalabad, where it avenged the murder of the Iranian envoy.
1 T.N., page 195.
2 T.N., page 194. Shaikh Hazin states (pp. 288 and 289) that
Nadir sent a trooper accompanied by ten horsemen on this
errand. At JalSlabad they were set upon by a mob and all but
one were killed; the survivor managed to escape to K&bul.
S -T.N., page 194. Thqr town of Charikar stands on the site of
Alexandria, which was founded by Alexander the Great in
the Spring of 529 B.C.
4
The names of these tribes are not given. It is stated by 
Anand Ham (fol. 164(b)) that the Safi Afghans offered much 
resistance to Nadir.
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Nadir and his main force thereupon advanced to BahUr 
Sufla^ * a few miles S.W. of Jalalabad, where Rida Qull, in 
response to a summons from his father, joined the latter on 
the 7til November, having travelled from Balkh via the Qunduz 
(Badakhsh&n) district?
After reviewing the troops from Balkh whom Rida Qull 
Mlrza had brought with him, Nadir made the young prince Viceroy 
of Iran "with power to dismiss and appoint Governors and (other) 
persons of authority"? A few days later, at the beginning of 
Shacban (14th November), Nadir placed the diadem on the head 
of his second son Nasru^lah and gave orders that he and each 
of his other sons should, in the manner of kings, wear the 
-ilaa on the right side, instead of the leftf , On the Jrd Sha** bhn 
Rida Qull took leave of his father and returned to Iran, and on 
the following day Nadir and his army set out for Jalalabad, 
outside which place they camped six days later? On leaving 
Jalalabad, NSdir sent forward 12,000 men to act as an advance 
guard, with orders to keep two stages ahead of the main force.
In the meantime Nasir KhSn, though he had received 
no assistance from Delhi in response to his appeal, had collected 
a considerable force of Afghans of the districts of of Peshawar
and the Khaibar, whom he stationed in the Khaibar Pass£_________
 ^Bahar Sufla is, apparently, identical with Bahar Pa1in. '
 ^T.N., page 
 ^T.N., page 195*
’ ibidem.
2 For the shortage of provisions experienced here, see Brosse^s 
translation of a letter which an Armenian correspondent sent 
to Kalushkin from Jalalabad. H. de la G. Vol.II.Part II,p.569.
This force, according to the T.N., (page 196) was 20,000 strong. 
See also Siyarufl-Muta! akhkhirin, page 4/1.
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apparently close to its eastern end, a few miles west of the 
fort of Jamrud.
On hearing of the presence of this hostile force 
in the Khaibar Pass, NSdir adopted his favourite device of 
making a detour by an unfrequented route and falling upon 
his foe from an unexpected quarter. At the village of Barikab^
20 miles east of Jalalabad, Nadir left his baggage and 
artillery in charge of Nasrurllah Mlrza, and set off himself, 
at the head of 30,000 cavalry, to the village of Siah Chob£
9 miles to the S.S.E.
No further place names on this route are given by any 
of the contemporary authorities consulted, but it seems that 
N&dir and his men went on from Siah Chob in an east-south­
easterly direction towards the Tsatsobi pass. Irakli of 
Kakheti, who, with a number of Georgians accompanied NEdir on his 
Indian expedition, relates that, starting in the morning, they 
covered four aghach? before halting in the evening, probably at 
 ^T.N., page 196. BarikEb is known now as Barikao.
o —
* Mlrza Mahdl makes no mention of a guide, but Tambouri Aroutine, 
(page 188) says that, when Nadir was wondering how he was 
going to traverse the Khaibar Pass in the face of opposition 
from Nasir Khan, a spy offered to guide the army by a 
difficult alternative route, which would bring NSdir and 
his men to a point an hour and a half or two hours1 march 
beyond the place where Nasir KhEn and his force were 
awaiting him. See also Major H.R. James* * Report on the 
Settlement of the Peshawar District1 (Lahore, 1865, page 
36) and the article entitled * Friends and Foes1 in the 
tPioneer Mail* (of Allahabad) of 23rd August 1885* MirzE 
Mahdl gives scarcely any details; all flie says (T.N., page 
196) is that on the route via Seh Chuba?,6 there was a high 
mountain and that the road was very difficult to traverse 
owing to its steepness.
 ^The Turkish aghach is equivalent to the farsakh.
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same point near China, 4^  miles N.^ . of the Tsatsobi pass. On 
Nadir arriving soon after, they went on again by moonlight:
Irakli states that they soon entered a pass (the Tsatsobi) where 
the cold was very severe. Owing to the narrowness of the defile 
and the roughness of the track, there was great confusion, and 
it took 5 hours for the troops to traverse the pass, which was 
half an aghSch in length^
Nadir continued his march into the Bazar valley and 
must have passed through or near the village of Chora, 12 miles 
S.E. of the Tsatsobi pass. From Chora he doubtless followed 
the trend of the valley east and then north-east until within 
a few miles of Jamrud; it appears that he entered the Khaibar 
pass either at its eastern end of else a mile or two further 
west, by scaling the intervening ridge between it and the Chora- 
Jamrud route. Whichever he did, he and his men, though they must 
have been much fatigued by their long march of some 48 miles? 
came up to Nasir KftSn^ s position, and attacked it so fiercely 
that the Indo-Afghan force, after suffering heavy losses, was 
driven back to Jamrud and Peshawar, leaving Nasir Khan and a
See the letter from Irakli II of Kakheti to his sister Anna 
(H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, page 355)* Irakli, who had 
joined Nadir at Qandahar shortly before his father Taimuraz 
had been allowed to return to Georgia, accompanied Nadir on 
his Indian expedition (for further details, see Brosset!s 
translation of Irakliys TLifeT by Oman Kherkh6oulidze, in 
H. de la G., Vol. II, Part II, pages 206 and 207).
 ^Mlrza MahdT (T.N., page 196) gives the length of this march 
as JO farsakhs ?/hich, taking into account the shortness of 
the farsakh in mountainous country, is very much the same.
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number of other officers and men prisoners in the hands of the 
Iranians^
The advance on Peshawar was resumed three days after 
this battle, by which time the main portion of the army and 
the baggage and artillery had had time to come up via the 
Khaibar Pass. Dismayed by the defeat and capture of Nasir Khan, 
the people of Peshawar offered no resistance to Nadir's forces.
Nadir remained for nearly four weeks at Peshawar; 
whilst he was there, the unwelcome news arrived of the death 
of his brother IbrShilm Khan at Kakhf in Shirvan, at the hands of 
the LazgTs?
Before continuing on his way, Nadir despatched a 
strong force to ravage the country between Peshawar and the 
Indus and to construct a bridge of boats over that river at 
Attock. On receiving word that this bridge was completed^
T -----------------------------------------     — c---------
T.N., page 196; Anand Ram, fol. 165(a).
T.N., page 196. In consequence of a succession of Lazgl raids 
into Georgia and Shirvan, Ibrahim, in the late summer of 1738, 
collected a force of Iranian and Karlian troops, and penetrated 
into the Lazgl district of Jar, which he devastated. Whilst 
Ibrahim Khan was on his way back, the Lazgis tallied, and 
fell upon his army, killing him and a large number of others, 
and putting the remainder to flight. Amongst the survivors 
was King Taimuraz, who had but recently returned from 
Qandahar. See Sekhnia Chkheidze, H. de la G., Vol. II,
Part II, page 55.
 ^"Daniel Mogini6" (S.H. Maubert de Gouvest), in his book
'L'lllustre Paisan1, (Lausanne, 1754), page 160, asserts 
that a French engineer named Bonal (who had, he says, joined 
Nadir at Tiflis in 1735) constructed this bridge. Mogini$s 
work, however, is so highly imaginative in places that one 
hesitates to accept as correct any of his statements (such 
as this) which are not corroborated by other authorities.
Sir Alexander Burnes, in his 'Travels to Bukhara1, Vol. I, 
pages 267 and 268, states that these floating bridges over 
the Indus could be completed in from three to six days; such 
bridges could only be thrown across the Indus from November 
to April.
209.
Nadir left Peshawar on the 25th RamadSn (6th January, 1739) 1 
and had reached the further bank of the Indus with all his forces 
by the 4th Shawwal (15th January). From this point the Iranian 
army headed for Wazlrabad, and crossed the Jhelum (which, like 
the other rivers of the Panjab, was low at that season) without 
difficulty?
Near the small fortress of Kunja Mazra^ situated 12 
miles N.W. of Wazlrabad, at a road-junction, the Iranian 
advance was opposed by 5*000 to 6,000 men of the Lahore forces, 
under the command of Qalandar Shan. The Indians were driven 
back to the fortress^which was then taken; Qalandar Shah and 
many of his men were killed.
The Iranian advance was then resumed, and the Chenab 
was crossed in safety. The Iranian army advanced upon, and
Anand Ram, fol. 166(a). According to the Bombay edition of 
the T.N. (page 197)* Nadir left Peshawar on tie 15th 
Ramadan; Anand Ram seems more likely to be correct, because 
55 days appears rather an undue amount of time for his army 




3 > —The text of the Tarlkh-i-Nadirl is obscure here (page 197)*
it gives the name of the fortress as Kachha Mlrza won that
(i.e. the east) side of the river of WazTrabadn (i.e. the
Chenab). No fortress called Kachha Mlrza can be traced;
Sir J. sarkar, in a personal letter to me, expresses the
view that fXachha Mlrzaf is a mistake for Kunja Mazra; as
to the words ( f  > considers either that
(fthatf) should read (!this!) or that the account was
written at Delhi, when jT(*that side*)* would mean
the western side of the Chenab. This explanation seems
better than the one which I had previously had in mind,
namely that Kachha Mlrza was at a point somewhere near
Kachha Sarai (which, according to the Manazil-i-Fufuh
(fol. 8(b)) was 10 coss from YamYnabad, on the road to
WazTrabad.
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sacked, Wazlrabad, and it inflicted the same fate upon 
YamTnabad (Eminabad) and other places on the line of march?"
From YamTnabad Nadir marched to the Degh Nala
which he may have crossed by the ShSh Daula bridge? It was
here that he is said to have heard that Zakariya' Khan, the
Governor of Lahore, had made a strongly fortified position
on the banks of the Ravi to the north of the city, on the
direct line of his approach? Nadir, instead of marching
direct on Lahore, turned due east for a time, in order to
outflank the Indian position on the Ravi. At Mulkpur(or
Mubarakpu^ 4 the Iranians sighted and then engaged a strong
body of Indian troops under the ZamTndar of Adlnanagar5
who were marching to the assistance of Zakariya” Khan. The
 ^Anand Ram, fol. 167(b). The lot of the inhabitants of the 
Panjab was indeed pitiable, for, besides suffering severely 
at the hands of the Iranians, they were preyed upon by 
thousands of highway robbers #10 made their appearance in 
these troubled times (Shaikh HazTn, page 292); moreover, 
those who fled to the hills for safety were there despoiled 
by the Sikhs (see Malcolm1 s "Sketch of the Sikhs" in 
Asiatick Researches, (Calcutta, 1810), Vol. XI, page 258 
and J. Browne1 s "History of the Origin and Progress of the 
Sicks" in his India Tracts (London, 1788), page 13.p
See note 4 below.
 ^Anand Rain fol. 167(b) and Siyaru11-Mutaf akhkhirln, page 472.
4 Mlrza MahdT states that Mulkpur was 6 coss from Lahore.
. Professor Sarkar considers that Mulkpur should read 
Y  tMubarakabawt*, which is a place 9 miles north of Lakodehr.
/ If this is correct, it seems unlikely that Nadir crossed 
the Degh Nala by the Shah Daula bridge; it is probable 
that he crossed that river further upstream.
 ^This hame is given as Adlnagar by Mlrza MahdT (page 197) I but 
it is evidently Adlnanagar (now called Dinanagar. 75 miles 
E . N . E .  of Lahore and 8 miles N.N.E. of Gurdaspur) .
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1
Indians were defeated, but a number succeeded in reaching 
Lahore* The Iranian army crossed the Ravi near Lakodehr}
Soon after, battle was Joined with the forces of Zakariya Khan 
which, according to Shaikh Hazln, consisted of 14,000 to 15,000 
cavalry and a number of militia? Yahya Khah, the Governor1 s 
eldest son, managed to cut his way through the Iranian ranks, and 
hastened to the Emperor1 s camp with the news? On the following
day (22nd January), the battle was resumed, but Zakariya Khan,
*
because of the Inadequacy of his forces and the failure of the
4
Emperorfs generals to afford him any support, soon realised that 
he could not resist any longer, and asked for quarter. Nadir 
returned a favourable answer, and ordered ‘Abdu’l-Baql Khah, on 
the 2Jrd January, to meet Zakariya Khah and to conduct him to his 
presence^ On the Governor1 s arrival, Nadir treated him with great 
honour and respect. Two days later Nadir again received Zakariya 
Khah; on this occasion the latter handed over to the conqueror 20 
lakhs of rupees in gold, several elephants and other gifts?
By making his submission and paying________________________  _
According to Anand Ram, Nadir wheeled to the right, after
crossing the Degh Nala and outflanked the Indians by marching 
to the west of their position. In view of what has been said 
above, this could not have been the case. In this connection, 
see Irakli’s letter to his sister (H. de la G., Vol. II.
Part II, page 53) > Sir Alexander Bumes "Travels to 
9 Bokhara", Vol. II, page 16.
Shaikh Hazln, page 293* Muhammad Muhsin Sidedql,_in the 
Jauhar-i-Samsam, fol. 6(a), states that "Zakariya Khan had
40,000 horsemen. With his usual bias, he adds that Zakariya 
Khah, owing to his understanding with the NizSunu’1-Mulk, made 
no serious attempt to stop Nadir’s progress. (See also Otter 
Vol. I, page 574). Shakir Kh§h, in his "Tadhkira"_fol. 41(a) 
makes a similar allegation, adding that Sa<§dat Khan was 
jointly responsible with the Nizamu’l-Mulk for giving the 
instructions to Zakariya Khah not to oppose Nadir.
5 Anand Ram, fol. 167(b).
4 ibidem, fol. 168(a)
5_ditto. 212.
this ransom, Zakariya Khan was enabled to save Lahore from 
being sackedi
Nadir remained for 12 days in Lahore, where he 
behaved as though he were already master of India. He allowed 
Zakariya Khah to retain his position as Governor of Lahore, 
and he gave orders for the reinstatement of Fakhru1 d-Daula, 
the ex-Governor of Kashmir ,, who, after being driven out of 
his province by a rebellion, had been deprived of office and was 
living in poverty in Lahore. NSdir also confirmed Nasir Khan, 
his former opponent, as Subadar of Kabul and Peshawar?
During Nadir’ s stay in Lahore news was received of 
the Einperor’ s efforts to gather together an army to oppose him. 
Nadir, on receiving this news, addressed a letter to the 
Emperor? Nadir began by mentioning the Turcoman origin of the 
Enperor and himself and stated that he had nothing but friendly
feelings in his mind. He then referred to the Afghans, saying
that, as India had suffered even more than Iran at the hands
1 7“  I
Anand Ham, fol.168(a). Tilok Das, however, asserts that
Lahore was sacked, but his poem cannot be regarded as possess­
ing any real historical value.
2 T.N., page 197.
3
T.N., page 198. This letter is not in Jones1 translation or 
in the present writer’s MS. Shaikh Hazin (page 295) states: j 
!fTwice or thrice from Lahor also, before he came up with :
the Indian army, Nadir Shah sent a message to Muhammad Shah 
to expedite the return to him of his ambassador Mohammed 
Khan. But although they carried his ambassador along with 
than on their march, they would not grant him his conge; 
and at that time it did not appear, what their design could 
be in keeping him.*
215.
of that race, it would seem natural that the Indian ministers 
should wish to punish them. He repeated his statements regarding 
the Emperor1 s treatment of his envoys, and concluded by warning 
Muhammad SfrSh that, if he went to war, the Indian Army would 
feel the strength of his army. If, however, the survivors 
submitted, he would pardon them.
NSdir left Lahore on the 26th ShawwSl (6th February) 
and marched to Sirhind, where he arrived ten days laterl 
At Sirhind NSdir heard that Muhammad Sh&h had reached Karnal 
with an army of 500,000 men, 2,000 elephants and a large number 
of cannon?
It is now necessary to describe what had, in the 
meanwhile, been happening at the Mughal Court. When the news 
of Nadir1 s capture of Kabul reached Delhi, Ttno one listened 
to a word or if he listened, he did not understand.1T^ However, 
on reports being received of Nadir1s continued progress, the 
Emperor summoned the Nizamu11-Mulk from the Deccan to advise him. 
When the Nizamu11-Mulk reached the Court, he found that his 
enemy Khan Dauran, the leader of the Hindustani party, was all- 
powerful, being in command of the army and possessing much 
influence over the feeble Emperor; consequently, any advice 
which the Nizamu11-Mulk offered received but scant attention,
1 \
T.N., page 198. See also Ghulam All Kh&n1 s Muqaddama-yi-SK&h 




Siyaru11-Muta1 akhkhirin, page 471.
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and little or nothing was donel There was much talk of
setting out to repel the invader, but no attempt was made to
send assistance to ZakariyS. Khan. At the beginning of Ramadan
(13th December 1738) Khah Dauran, Qamaru’d-Din Khan, the
Ictimadu1 d-Daula, and the Nizamu* 1-Mulk marched out of Delhi
at the head of the army, but they proceeded no further than
the ShalimUr gardens where they camped for the rest of the
month? Khan Dauran, it is true, wrote to Sawai Jai Singh
and other Rajput leaders^ on whose bravery he set much store,
but, as Sir J. Sarkar points out:
”Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzib's 
time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming 
at political salvation by declaring their independence 
and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the 
Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming.tT^
The Buperor even went so far as to appeal to the Peshwa Baji Rao, 
*
but "reliance on the Mahrattas, even if seriously contemplated,
proved like leaning on a broken reed. ”5 A summons was then
sent to Sac adat Khan Burhanu*1-Mulk, the Subadar of Oudh, who,
in response thereto, set out to join the Eknperor in the third
week of January, 1739^
At the beginning of Shawwal (12th January), when the
 ^Rustam CA1I (fol. 282(a)) states that when Khan Dauran suggested 
any plan, the Nizamu’1-Mulk opposed him, and vice versa.
2
Anand Ram, fol. 168(b).
 ^Siyarmu11-Mu ta1 akhkhirin, page 472.
4 Sir J. Sarkar* s ’Nadir Shah in India”, page 31*
5
ibidem, page 32.
 ^Dr. A.L. Srivastava, op. cit.. page 63.
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news reached Delhi of the arrival at the Indus of the force
which Nadir had sent on in advance, the Mughal army at last
set out, but its progress was so leisurely that it took a
month to cover the four stages from the Shalimar gardens to
Kamal} In response to urgent requests by the Nizamu11-Mulk
*
and Khan DaurSn, the Enperor himself left Delhi on the 18th 
Shawwal (29th January), and reached Panipat, 20 miles south of 
Karnal, on the 27th of that month (7th February) f he arrived 
at Karnal a few days later. It had originally been intended 
to advance beyond Karri&l, but, as the plain just to the north 
of that town was a suitable camping-ground, being plentifully 
provided with water by the CATI Mardan canal and protected by 
thick jungle to the north, and as it was deemed expedient to 
await the arrival of Sac adat Khan and the contingent from OudhJ 
the Indian commanders proceeded no further. A mud wall was 
constructed round the camp, the eastern side of which was bounded 
by the cAl1 Mardah canal. Guns were mounted at Intervals on the 
wall round the camp which is said to have been fourteen miles in 
circumf erencef
The numbers of combatants in the Indian camp are
1 Siyarull-Mutatakhkhirin, page 472.
2
Anand Ham (fol. 168(b)) states that when the news was received 
that Nadir Shah had reached the Indus, the Indian commanders 
urged the Emperor to advance against the invaders.
 ^Siyarufl-Mutafakhkhirin, page 472.
4 Journal of Mlrza Zaman (Fraser, page 152). Hanway (Vol. IV, 
page 159) states that Msome writers mention it as twelve 
miles”.
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variously given, ranging from only 80,000 to the fantastic
figure of 1,200,000} it is probable that the former figure
is close to the truth. If, however, the numbers of non-
combatants are taken into account, the total may, as Sir J.
Sarkar suggests, have been nearly a million all told.
From Sirhind, NSdir sent out a force of 6,000 Kurdish
cavalry, under Hajjl Khan2 to reconnoitre the Indian position.
On the next day the army set out for Ambala via Raja Sarai.
Leaving his baggage and haram at Ambala, Nadir marched to Sh“&haba3,
*
55 miles north of Karnal on the 19th February. That same night 
the Kurdish patrols whom Nadir had sent out from Sirhind came into 
contact with the Indian forces, and a number of Indian troops 
were killed and others captured? Ihe Kurdish patrols then fell 
back to Sarai cAzimabad, a village 25 miles south of Shahabad 
and 12 miles north of Karnal; from this village they sent 
Nadir their report, together with some of the prisoners. The 
Shah thereupon ordered these patrols to reconnoitre both to
the east and to the west of the enemy position^________________
Mlrza Mahdl, as stated on page 2J4 above, gives the strength of 
this Indian host as 500*000 men. Sir J. Sarkar (”NSdir Shah 
in India”, page 54) reduces this figure to 75*000 combatants. 
The French adventurer de Vuulton, in his ”Verdadeira e Exacta 
Noticia” (which the present writer translated from the 
Portuguese and published, together with an introduction and 
notes, in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies,
Vol. IV, Part II, pages 225-245), states that the Mughal army, 
after the battle of Karnal, consisted of 400,000 horsemen and !
800,000 infantry, ^here is no doubt, however, that the number 
of camp-followers was exceptionally large, and that some 
writers, like de Voulton, may have erroneously included their 
numbers in the total of the fighting force.
T.N., page 199; see also Fraser, page 153*
5 T.N., page 199* The Indian commanders are said to have been 
most negligent as regards sending out patrols.
4 T.N., page 199*
On the 12th Dhu,l-Qacda (21st February) NSdir moved 
forward and, marching via Tirawari, arrived at Sarai ^ .zTmabad 
early in the morning of the ljth; here the Governor of Ambala 
put up a show of resistance for a time!
Nadir learnt from his scouts and from Indian prisoners 
of the strength of the Emperor1 s position, as well as of the 
existence, south of Sarai cAzImabad, of a belt of jungle, 
traversed by only one narrow road, extending for eight miles in 
the direction of Karnal. It became clear to him that the only 
practicable course open to him was to make a d£tour to the 
east of Karnal, which would enable him not only to outflank 
the enemy but also to avoid this belt of jungle. If Muhammad 
Shllh issued forth from his lines, he would give him battle on 
the plain, some 7 miles in width, stretching eastward from KarnSl 
to the Jumna; if, on the other hand, the Emperor elected to 
remain inactive behind his fortifications, he would march on to 
Panipat and thence to Delhi?
No further advance was made on the ljth Dhu!l-Qaeda, 
but on the next morning (Monday, the 2Jrd February), Nadir left 
Sarai Azlmabad, led his troops across thecA11 Mardan canal and, 
marching south-east for some miles, camped at a point apparently 
just to the north of the village of Kunjpura, which is situated 
5§ miles E.N.E. of Karnal and a mile and a half west of the 
Jumna. Nadir, at the head of some of his body-guard, rode up close




to the Indian camp; after taking a careful note of the 
disposition of the enemy, he returned to his 011 camp}
Scouts reported to Nadir in the evening that Sacadat 
Khan, the Subadar of Oufih, who was on his way to reinforce the
Emperor with JO,000 men, had reached P&nipat, 20 miles to the
—  o vsouth of Karnalt Nadir immediately despatched a strong force




ibidem. See also Sir J. Malcolm1s translation of Nadir's 
letter to Rida Qull Mlrza in ”Asiatick Researches11, Vol. X, 
page J42 (for reasons which will be given later, this letter 
has to be used with care as an authority.) According to 
this translation, the letter was written at Delhi on the 
29th Dhu'l-Qacda 1115 (sic). The Iranian text of this letter 
is given by Muhammad Bakhsh ('’Ashub”) in his Ta^ rlkhT-I- 
Shahadat-i-Farrukh Siyar va Jalus-i-Muhammad Shah (India 
Office MS. No. 422), foil.509(b)-Jl5(b)\ Ashub says that 
this letter was drafted by Mlrza Mahdl in the camp at 
Karnal (not Delhi, as stated in the translation).
3
ibidem. In the Risala-yi-Muhammad Shah, fol. 106(b), it is 




The Invasion of India* II* KarnTil.
On the morning of the fateful 15th Dhu,l-Qacda 
(24th February)^ , Nadir split up his army into three divisions* 
He ordered Nasrullah Mir2a, who at that time was in command
1
of the left wing, to advance from the Jumna towards Karnal, 
while he himself, with a number of men, marched southwards 
between the Jumna and the *A1T Mardan canal in order to recon­
noitre the enemy position and to inspect the field of battle* 
Whilst Nadir was so engaged, the troops whom he had despatched 
the previous evening to intercept Sa^&dat Khan returned,saying 
that the Subadar had managed to elude them by making a detour 
and that he had reached the Emperonfs camp at midnight;^ they 
had, however, pursued him and captured a number of his men, 
besides taking much booty.
T. N., page 200. M£r23 Mahdl says that Nadir ordered Na^ruHah 
to advance towards Karnal Bfrom the north side of the river 
Jumna*. Sir J. Sarkar (*Nadir Shhh in India*, page 37) 
takes this as meaning that the young Prince had crossed 
the Jumna, which, as he rightly observes, was unlikely. The 
explanation may be that Nasru’llah and his men had been ad­
vancing to, or posted at, some point close to where the 
village of KhirSjpur (l mile E.N.E. of KUnjpUra) now stands; 
for a mile or so to the S.E. and S. of Khir&jpur, the Jumna 
flows from east to west before turning south again; thus, 
Nasru’llah, when at or near Khirajpur, would have been north 
of the Jumna.
2
T.N., page 201. cAbdufl-KarIm (Bayan, fol.16a.) and other 
authorities confirm that Sacadat Khan reached the Emperorfs 
camp at this time. Rustam CA1I (fol.283(a)) gives the 
strength of his force as only 20,000 men. Owing to a wound 
received three months before, Sacadat Khan was unable to 
ride a horse, and had either to be carried in a portable 
chair or to mount an elephant.
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On hearing this news, Nadir halted, his position
then being some three and a half miles to the east of the
1 9Indian camp; here he was joined by Nasru’llah and his troops*
In the meantime, Sacadat Khan had gone to pay his 
respects to Muhammad Sh&h. During his audience word was 
brought to Sacadat Khan that the Qizilbash troops were plunder­
ing his baggage.3 Enfuriated by this news, Sacadat Khan took
a hurried leave of the Emperor; despite all endeavours to 
restrain him, he called his men to arms, and rushed off to try 
and recover his baggage. His troops, who had been continually 
on the march for a whole month and who were unused to forced 
marches, were much fatigued, and but few responded to his call; 
nevertheless Sacadat Khan pressed impetuously on, though
4followed only by 1,000 cavalry and some hundreds of infantry.
^ T.N., page 201.
2 ibidem.
 ^Bayan, fol*l6(b). Harcharan Das, in his ®Chah&r Guldhar
Shujac i® states that Muhammad Shah had doubts as to Sacadat 
Khanfs loyalty, and made him swear on the Qo’ran that he 
would be faithful (see fol.8la.) Harcharan Das, like 
^Abdu’l-Kartm, asserts (fol.82a.) that the news of the 
Qizilbash attack upon Sacadat Khan1s. baggage train reached 
him during his audience.
4
Abdu’l-Karlm states that many of Sa adat Khan’s men believed 
that he was still with the Emperor, while others, putting 
the care of their horses before all else, refused to stir. 
(Bayan, fol.17(a)). Anand Ram (fol.169b.) says that 
Sacadat Khhn *with a headlong impetuosity misplaced in a 
commander, flew to the scene of action accompanied by only 
the few horsemen who were with him, without collecting his 
artillery or waiting to form his men in any kind of order.®
When Sac£dat Khan and his small force emerged 
from the Indian lines, they encountered some Iranian 
patrols who were advancing from the opposite direction*
The Iranians immediately feigned flight in the hope of lur­
ing Sa*adat Kh&n and his men further away from their lines 
Sacadat Khan hastened after the retreating foe, and sent 
urgent appeals to the camp for reinforcements to enable him 
(as he imagined) to follow up his success. The Emperor 
wished to go in person to Sacadat Khanfs assistance, but the
Nizamu11-Mulk and Khan Dauran dissuaded him, saying that It
2would be a mistake to fight that day.
The Emperor„ then asked the Nizamu1 1-Hulk for his
advice, who replied that, as Khan Dauran was in command of
the right wing and therefore nearest to Sacadat Khan, he
*
should go to the assistance of the last named*^ The 
Emperor agreed, and Khan Dauran accordingly set out, at the 
head of between 8,000 and 9*000 cavalry. 4
Nadir, who, as Ittrza Mahdl remarks ^had longed for 
such a day11,5 donned a coat of mail and a helmet, and put
^ Bayan, fol.l7(a).
2 ibidem,f01.17(b).
 ^Bayln, fol.l8(a). According to Anand Bam (foil.169(b) and 
170(a)), Khan Dauran, on receiving this order, said that 
the army had not expected to fight that day and that it 
would be better to wait till the morrow, when the artil­
lery could be placed in the front. JThe Emperor was dis­
pleased at this answer, whereupon Khan Dauran, ^who had 
the good of his master at heart11, mounted his elephant, 
and set out.
4 Bayln, fol.18(a).
 ^T.N., page 201. See also Asiatick Researches, Vol.X,
page 545. ™
himself at the head of 1,000 picked Afshar horsemen, in 
readiness to ride from place to place and direct the opera­
tions.^ When NSdir heard of the advance of Sa<adat KKhn and 
Khan Dauran, he placed 3,000 of his men in ambush, and sent
out two bodies of .iazayirchls. each 500 strong, with orders
2to draw the enemy into the trap. .
Hanway states that NSdir, in order to frighten the 
elephants of the Indians, ordered stagings to be carried by 
pairs of camels; on these stagings he had naphtha and other 
combustible materials placed, which were to be set on fire 
during the battie.5
It was one of clock in the afternoon when the battle 
began. Sacadat Khan and his scanty force, who formed the 
Indian right wing, became heavily engaged with the Iranians 
at Kunjpura. The jazayircbls. who had been posted behind 
the walls and buildings there, poured in a destructive fire. 4 
A little later on, Khan Dauran^ division, which now constitut­
ed the Indian centre, came into action with the Iranian centre 
under Nasr^llah. A wide gap separated Khan Dauran1 s 
division from that of Sacudat Khan and a similar gap existed
 ^Fraser, (quoting MIrza Zamanfs Journal1) page 157*
2 ibidem.
 ^Hanway, Vol.IV, page 166. Cf. Firdausifs description of 
Alexander^ method of Scaring FutTs elephants.
4 Father J. Tieffenthaler^ ^Beschreibung des Feldzuges des
Thamas Kulichan11, in J. Bernoulli^ H^istorisch-Geogiqph-
ische Beschreibung von Hindustan1*, Berlin, 1785-1787*
Vol.II, Part II, page 50.
between the former and the Indian left wing* For this rea­
son, none of the Indian leaders had knowledge of what the 
others were doing, and there was thus a complete lack of co­
hesion and co-ordination on their side.^ Moreover, so 
hurriedly had the Indian commanders advanced to the attack 
that they had little or no artillery with them.
Sac£dat Khanfs men were the first to give ground, 
though they only did so after sustaining heavy casualties*
He himself, surrounded by some of his followers, bravely con­
tinued the fight until his elephant was charged by that of his 
naphew Shir Jang, which had been maddened by a wound.*
Sacadat Khianfs elephant then got out of control, and bore him 
into the Iranian ranks, where he was made prisoner.5
The Indian centre, under Khan Dauran, fought on 
bravely, but they, like SacSdat KKanfs men, were mown down by 
the rapid and accurate fire of the .1azayirc3ils* as well as by 
that from the zanburaks* The swordsmanship, of which the 
Indians were so proud, was of little avail against such
^ Bayan, fol.l8(b).
9 _
Muhammad Bakhsh (f,Ashub1*), nTafrlkh-i-Shahadat-i-Farrukh- 
Siyar va Jaltls-i-Muhammad Shah1*, fol.216(a), Bayan, fol* 
19(b), Ghulam ^ LLT Naqavl*s <Imadu,s-Sa* adat, foil.31(a) 
and-Jl(b) •
3
For the manner in which Sacadat Khan was captured, see the 
Siyar, page 475 and Irakli, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, 
page 559*
methods of fighting; as cAbduf l-Karlm remarked: ®An arrow 
cannot answer a .lazayir.1*^
The end came when Khan DaurUn, who had already been 
wounded, received a mortal wound from a musket shot and fell 
unconscious in his howda: his brother and son and many other
umara were among the slain.^ Bereft of their leader, the few 
survivors of the Indian eentre were speedily overcome, and at 
five o1clock the battle was over. Khan Dauran1s servant, at 
great personal risk, succeeded in bringing his masbertack to 
the Indian camp.^
Though so successful in the field, Nadir was too
R
prudent to attempt an attack on the Emperorfs position;^ as 
will be seen later, he had other expedients in view for bring­
ing about the subjection of Muhammad SKah and his army.
The points that are chiefly remarkable in respect 
to this engagement are, in the first place, the marked con­
trast betyreen Nadir’s generalship and that of the Indian
Bay&n, fol.l8(b). A vivid, but fanciful, account of the 
battle is given by Nijabat in his ballad nNaTdir Var*1, (see 
Kaulfs translation in the Journal of the Panjab Historical 
Society, Vol.VI, lines 659-682); see also Tilok D£sfs poem 
(W. Irvinefs translation in J.R.A.S., Vol.LXVI, Part i). 
Neither of these poetical descriptions can be regarded as 
having any historical value.
^ AshUb, fol.219(a).
3 For lists of the umara killed or wounded, see Ashub, fol.






leaders; in tactics, as in strategy, Nadir was immeasurably 
superior. Secondly, the numbers actually engaged on both 
sides formed but a small proportion of the whole. The 
Indian left wing, after emerging from its lines and taking 
up a position by the side of the*AlI Mardan canal, remained 
passive the whole time,^ and of KhSn Dauran1 s and Sacadat 
Khanfs divisions, many did not advance to the attack.
The casualties sustained by the Indians have been 
much exaggerated by some writers, such as Mirza Mahdl, who 
puts their losses in killed alone as high as 30,000 .^  In 
all probability, the Indians may have lost some 10,000 men;^ 
they could not have lost many more, since the total number 
engaged on the Indian side was not greatly in excess of that 
figure. According to a contemporary letter quoted by 
Fraser,^, the losses on the Iranian side were 2,500 killed
It is^alleged in the Jauhar-i-Samsam (fol.34(a)) that the 
Nizamu*1 Mulk prevented^the Emperor from sending rein­
forcements to KhSn Dauran.
^ T.N., page 202. Badir himself also exaggerates the Indian 
losses; in his letter to Rida QulT, he stated that the 
enemy lost upwards of 2 0,000*in killed, and a much great­
er number captured. (Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 
544); as Nadir concludes his letter with the words cMake 
copies of this our royal mandate and disperse them over 
our-empire, that the well-wishers of our throne may be 
happy and rejoice. ...n, it is obvious that he deliberately 
magnified his success in order to give heart to his sup­
porters. The letter contains some other particulars of 
the battle which cannot (evidently for the above reason) 
be reconciled with accounts by other writers.
5 De Voulton, op.cit.. page 230.
4 Frasei 
la z!
that „ the /Iranians lost only 3, men killed and_a score wounded (c.r. his statement that their casualties at the 
battle of MihmNnaTLst only amounted to a couple of men,
who were slightly wounded 1)
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and 5 9000 wounded, but these figures seem on the high side.
In the evening, the NizSmu* 1-Mulk, the I*tiitf2Ldu*d 
Daula and the eunuchs of the Imperial haram went to see KK&n
9
Dauran. The wounded commander-in-chief, who had recovered
his senses in the meanwhile, said to them, in tones that
were almost inaudible through weakness:
**We have completed our business.....  Do not let
the Emperor meet Nadir Shah or take NNdir to Delhi, 
but remove this calamity (bala) from here by any 
means in your power.***■
That same evening Sacadat Khan was brought before
Nadir. After answering tactfully some questions which
Nadir put to him respecting the resources of the Emperor,
Sacadat Khan recommended the Shah to summon the Nizamu* 1-Mulk
2
and to discuss the terms of peace with him. NSdir followed 
this advice, with the result that the Nizamu* 1-Mulk, having 
been invested by the Emperor with power to negotiate, went 
to the Iranian camp, where he arrived after nightfall on 
the 25th February.^
Siyar, page 473* According_to 0tt£r (Vol.I, page 381), the 
Nizamu* 1-Mulk insulted Khan Dauran as he lay moribund and 
helpless, and so revenged himself for a number of rude 
remarks which the Commander-in^Chief had made in regard 
to him at the Court (Khan Dauran is said by Tilok Das and 
others to have likened the Nizamu* 1-Mulk to a monkey).
2 _
‘Imadu* s-Sacadat, fol.31(b)•
^ Shakir Khan was with the Nizamu* 1-Mulk on this occasion and 
has described the meeting*with Niidir (see the translation 
of the relevant passage in the Tadhkira in Elliot & 
Dowson, Vol.VIII, pages 232-4.)
On being conducted to the Shah, the Nizamu11-Mulk
discussed with him the terms of settlement, and it was agreed
that Nadir should inflict no further injury on India and
return to Iran in consideration for an indemnity of 50 lakhs
of rupees,^ payable in instalments- Having requested the
Nizamu11-Mulk to invite the Emperor to lunch on the following
day, Nadir gave the Indian statesman leave to return*
Notwithstanding the death-bed advice of KKSLn Dauran,
Muhammad SHah accepted Naclirfs invitation* MIrza Mahdi*0
states that the Emperor, on the 17th Dhufl-Qafda (26th February), 
formally abdicated and that, after removing the crown from his 
head, he set out for the Iranian camp. It is curious that, 
while Mlrza MahdT mentions the Emperor fs abdication, he omits 
to say whether Muhammad SHah formally handed his crown over to 
Nadir on this or any subsequent occasion*^ It is obvious
The amount is given as 2 crores by Ghulam eAli (Siyar, page 
473) and Otter, Vol.I, page 384, but Sir J. Sarkar (nH&dir 
ShSh and India11, page 50) puts the amount at only 50 lakhs* 
According to the Bayan (fol.20(b)), the amount of the in­
demnity was left unsettled, but this seems unlikely*
2
T.N., page 203* M. de Bussy, in his BRemarques sur l*HIstoire 
de Nader Cha, Roy de Perse* (see the Orme MSS. in the India 
Office, Vol.XXIII, page 32), says that Nadir had intended to 
seat himself on the throne of India, but that the Nizamu11- 
Mulk dissuaded him from doing so, on the grounds that he 
would not be able to hold so large a country in subjection 
(de Bussy claims to have obtained the above and other infor­
mation relating to Nadir, from Iranians who remained in India 
after the Shahf-s departure*)
3 —^ It is possible that Muhammad Shah surrendered the crown to 
Nadir on the occasion of his second visit to the Iranian 
camp when he, as will be seen below, was virtually a prison­
er, but if this were so, why should MIrza Mahdl mention the 
abdication as having taken place before the first visit?
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from what occurred later that the Emperor did, in fact, 
abdicate, and that Nadir assumed for a time the crown of 
India, but nothing appears to be on record as to any official 
ceremony of investiture having taken place.
Muhammad Shah, on reaching the Iranian lines, was 
received by NasruTllah MIrza whom NSciir had sent to meet him 
and conduct him to the tent of audience. When the Emperor 
drew near, Nadir himself emerged, and greeted his imperial 
giiest in the customary manner,'*’ much stress being laid on the 
fact that they were both of Turcoman origin. Nadir then took 
Muhammad SHah by the hand, led him into the tent and seated 
him on the throne by his side* After some conversation to­
gether (which was conducted in Turkish)^, the Shah and Emperor 
were served with food. Nadir, in order to show his guest 
that the food had not been poisoned, exchanged dishes at the 
beginning of the meal.^ Nadir himself handed a cup of 
coffee to the Emperor. The meeting between the two monarchs 
passed off without the slightest hitch or unpleasantness; 
^nothing that courtesy and friendship required was omitted
4
during the whole conference, which lasted a quarter of the days
Anand Ram, fol. 171 (a) says: ®When they (i.e. Muhammad SHah
and Nasru!llah) drew near, the Shah himself came forward, 
and the usual etiquette between the Iranian and Mughal 
Courts followed.n See also Nadir1s letter to Rids QulT 
Mlrza, in Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 545*
^ The Nizamu11-Mulk had previously informed the Emperor that he 
would have to converse with Nadir in Turkish (Harcharan Das 
fol.87a.)
5 Harcharan Das, fol.87(b).
^ Anand Ram, fol.171(b).
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The Emperor was then escorted back to his own camp; it is 
said that the successful outcome of the meetings between 
Nadir Shah, the Nizamu*1-Mulk and the Emperor restored the 
peace of mind of the Indian troops, who now had hopes of 
being allowed to return to their homes.
Ever since the evening after the battle, however, 
Nadir had kept the Indian camp closely invested; no one was 
suffered to leave, and no provisions were allowed to be 
brought in.^ By this means, Nadir knew that he could ensure 
prompt compliance with his terms.
Khan Dauran having died on the day after the battle, 
the posts of Commander-in-Chief and Paymaster-in-Chief which 
he had held, became v a c a n t I n  circumstances which it is 
unnecessary to describe here,^ the Nizamu11-Mulk obtained the 
post of Mir Bakhshi (Paymaster-in-Chief), a position which 
Sacadat Khan, it is said, had been hoping to obtain himself♦ 
When Sa‘adat Khan found that the Nizamu11-Mulk had1 forestalled
1
T.N., page 203; de Voulton, page 230.
^ There is much disagreement between the authorities as to the 
date of Khan Dauran1 s death. I have selectedJthe 25th 
February, since that is the date given by Mlr^a Mahdl (T.N. 
page 202;, by Anand Ram, fol. 170(b), and by Nadir himself 
Tsee 11 Asiatic^ Researches*1, Vol.X, page 545*) MTrzTT Zaman 
(Fraser, page 161) and Siyar give, respectively, the 27th 
and 28th February.
^ For these particulars, see Harcharan Da's, fol.88(a), also 
Siyar, pages 473“4* _The NizSmu* 1-Mulk also obtained the 
post of AmTru* 1-Umara, and it is known that Bacadat Khan had 
had designs on that as well (see Siyar page 474), and 
Dr. Srivastava, op.cit.. page 69*
him, he became beside himself with rage.^ In this state,
he rushed off to Nadir Shah and sought to undo the work of
his successful rival by inducing the SHah not to rest content
with such a small iindemnity as that provided for in the
treaty made with the Nizamu* 1-Mulk. Sacadat Khan pointed
out that, if the Shah were to march to Delhi, he would be able
to obtain an incalculable amount of gold, jewellery and other
valuables from the Emperor*s treasuries and from the houses
9 —
of the nobles and merchants. Sacadat Khan added: **There
is now no one of note at the Imperial Court except Asaf Jah,
who is a trickster and a philosopher. If this trickster is
snared, everything will happen as your Majesty desires.
NacLir showed pleasure at these words of Sacadat Khan*s, and
determined to follow his advice.
After purposely waiting a few days, Nadir, on the
24th Dhu*l-Qacda (5th March), summoned the Nizamu11-Mulk again,
and ordered him to request the Emperor to revisit his camp.
The Nizamu* 1-Mulk protested that this procedure would not be
in conformity with the treaty, but the SHah, after saying that
his purpose was not to abrogate the treaty or to act to the
detriment of the Emperor, insisted that a further interview
4was necessary.
^ Siyar, page 474; Rustam^Ali, fol.286(a).
2 Siyar, page 474.
^ Harcharan Das, fol*88(b).
4 Siyar, page 474.
The blockade of the Indian camp not having been re­
laxed* the lack of food there had become so acute*** that the 
Nizamu11-Mulk had no option but to comply. He accordingly 
wrote to the Emperor in the sense demanded by Nadir SHah. On
receiving this letter, Muhammad Sliah, despite the remonstrances
2
of some of his nobles, who advised a further appeal to arms, 
proceeded to the Iranian camp on the 26th Dhufl-Qacda (7th 
March), accompanied by a retinue of 2,000 persons.?
Though Nadir outwardly treated the Emperor with 
respect and orderedcAbduTl-Baqi Khan to attend to his wants,4 
Muhammad Shah, was, in reality, a prisoner,? as were also the 
nobles in his entourage. After the Emperorfs arrival, 
Qizilblsh troops were sent to his camp who seized all the 
artillery and arrested such of the leaders and nobles who were 
still there. ^ The Indian rank and file were then informed
that they were at liberty to stay on at Karnal or to proceed 
to Delhi or to their homes.^ Bereft of all their leaders,
^ ifirza Zaman (Fraser, page 167), De Voulton (page 231) states 
that 4000 Indian troops were killed when trying to obtain 
provisions and fodder outside their camp. He adds that the 
scarcity of food was such that ^the measure of wheat and 
rice which used to cost the tenth part of a rupee was sold 
at ten rupees or 100 sous.
Anand Ham, fol.l73(a)*
^ Bayan, fol.22(a).
4 T.N., page 203.
Anand Ham, fol.173(a)*
^ De Voulton, page 236. AsHub (fol.260(a)) states_that Nadir 
ordered the Indian cannon to be sent to Qandahar. See also 
Asiatick Researches, Vol.X, page 5^6.
7
’ Siyar, page 474.
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and weakened by famine, the Indian soldiers endeavoured as 
best they could to escape to their homes, but large numbers 
were killed en route by roving bands of QizilbcTsh cavalry
*i
and by robber bands, as well as by the peasantry.
On the 1st Dhu’l-Hijja (12th March) the Sh&h and 
the Emperor left Karrial for Delhi, Muhammad Shah keeping a 
coss (approximately 2 miles) behind Nadir
Previous to his departure, Nadir had despatched in 
advance Sacadat Khan, whom he had appointed WakTlu1 l-Mutlaq. 
(Deputy of the Absolute) of India, and Tahmasp Khan Jaliyir, 
with an escort of 4,000 cavalry. They bore with them a 
royal order (shlqqa) from the Emperor to the Governor 
Lutfiillah Khan for the handing over to Tahmasp Khan of the 
keys of the city, and also an edict (raqam) from Nadir confirm­
ing Lutfufllah Khan in his position.?
^ Hazin, page 296, and de Voulton, page 231, Asliub, fol.257(a)*
2 T.N., page 203; Fraser, page 177*
3 r - —




The Invasion of India. III. Delhi.
When the nev/s of the battle of Karnal was brought
to Delhi, the capable Kotw'Sl of the city, Hajji Fulad Khan,
took effective measures to prevent any panic or outbreaks of
lawlessness, and steps were taken to put the city into a
1
state of defence.
When Tahmasp Khan Jalayir and Sacadat Khan-reached 
the gates of Delhi, they found them closed against them. They 
thereupon sent to the Governor, Lutfufllah Khan, the shiqqa 
or order from the Emperor and Nadirfs raqam. with the result 
that Lutfu’llah Khan opened the gates and delivered up to 
Tahmasp Khan the keys of the fortress and those of the trea­
suries and store-houses.^
Preparations were then begun for the reception of 
the Emperor and Nadir Shah.
Meanwhile Nadir Shah and Muhammad Shah were on their 
way to the capital. Travelling via Panipat, Sonepat and 
Narela, the two monarchs reached the Shalimar gardens, just
Anand Ram, fol.172(b)* The letter from Surat which was pub­
lished in the London TOaily Post® of 23rd November 1739 
states that *the traitor Saadul-Cawn (sic) was sent with an 
army of 24,000 men to Dilly where they shut the gates against 
him, but he, with his usual Perfidy, telling them that the 
Mogul . • • had beaten Nadir Shah and was in pursuit of him, 
gained admittance.® In the Jauhar-i-Samsam (fol.53b)> 
NasruTllah is said to have been sent to Delhi with 
horsemen, under the guidance of Sacadat Klian who "being a 
fellow-countryman, had become a friend of the enemy and 
increased his dignity.®
2 Siyar, page 474.
outside Delhi, on the 7th Dhu’l-Hijja (l8th March). On the 
following day, NSfdir fgave leave1 to the Emperor to enter 
the city, in order to prepare for his reception.^ Nadir him­
self remained in the Shalimar gardens till the 9th Dhu’l- 
Hijja (20th March), when he made-his entry into Delhi in
o
great state. The streets were lined with troops, and the 
Slaah’s procession was headed by 100 elephants on each of 
which several jazayirchis were mounted. Nadir himself was 
on horseback, and when he reached the fortress and dismounted, 
the cannon thundered forth a salute.^
The Emperor received Nadir with great pomp and 
ceremony-and gave him costly presents. Mirza Mahd"i gives an 
exaggerated and distorted account of what occurred. The 
Emperor, according to him, "spread the table of humility for 
the feast of h ospitality.Nadir, in return, thanked the 
Emperor for his attentions and informed him that he was, in 
virtue of the treaty concluded at Karnal, once more in 
possession of his kingdom.? In recognition of Nadir’s 
magnanimity, Muhammad Shah therjfoffered his guest all the 
royal treasures and jewels. "Although' all the treasures of 
the (other) kings of the earth were not equal to a tenth
^ T.N., page 203, Fraser, page 178.
^ Ashub, fol.263(a).
^ Irakli. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 360).
4
T.N., page 204.
? ibidem. These were (if uttered) but empty words, for Nadir, 
as will be seen below, did not reinstate Muhammad Shah 
until just-before his departure from Delhi.
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part of a tenth part® of these gifts, Nadir refused for a
long while to accept them, and only gave way after the
<
Emperor had repeatedly urged him to do so.^ * Needless to 
say, this reluctance on Nldir’s part was merely feigned.
After his reception and entertainment by the 
Emperor, Nadir took up his quarters in the palace built by
— — o
SKSth Jahan, near the Dlvan-i-Khass, while Muhammad Shah 
occupied a building close to the Asad Burj or Lion Tower*?
As for the Qizilbash troops, some were quartered in and 
around the fortress and others were billeted in the city 
itself.^
On the morning of Saturday the 10th Dhu’l-Hijja 
(21st March), which, besides being the Iranian Nau Ruz, was 
also the Muhammadan festival of thecIdu’d-Duha (feast of 
Sacrifice), the Khutba. in*accordance with instructions 
already given, was read In. Nadir’s name in all the mosques of 
the city; moreover, coins were struck on which he was given 
the title of "King of Kings" and "SultSn over the Sultans of 
the Earth."? Nadir held the usual Nau Ruz reception and 
distributed robes of honour to his principal officers.
That same morning Sa*adat Khan died; some doubt 
exists as to the actual cause of his death. According to
^ T.N., page 204.
^ ibidem.
Tieffenthaler (on the authority of Diogo Mendes), page 56.
4 Ibidem.
^ Ashub, foil.263(a) to 264(a).
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one authority,^ Sacadat Khan had suffered much from his foot 
on the previous day (doubtless from his wound); he had, how­
ever, paid no heed to the matter, and on the morning of the 
10th Dhu!l-Hijja he expired. Another writer states that the 
Khan took poison after Nadir had severely rebuked him in 
public#2
In the afternoon NSdir went to the Emperorfs 
quarters, to return his visit of the day before. Towards the 
close of the day, after the Shah had returned to his own 
palace, wild rumours became current in the city that he had 
met with an untimely end; other reports were that he had been 
seized and imprisoned by order of the Emperor.^ No one took 
the trouble to see whether there was any foundation for these 
rumours,4 which spread with the rapidity of lightning through 
the crowded streets and bazaars. Mobs speedily collected
fAbdu'l-Kaflm, Bayan, fol#22(b). See_also the Siyar (page 475) 
where it is stated that Sacadat Khan died of gangrene 
(literally, saratan = cancer) in the foot.
^ Rustam (fol.289(a)) says that the NizamuT 1-Mulk suggested 
to Sacadat Khan, after Nadir had spoken roughly to him at 
the public Darbar or Court, that they should both take 
poison. Sacadat Khan, "since he was a soldier and had no 
knowledge of the guile of this old man, drank a cup of poi­
son and died, whereas the Nizamu11-Mulk quaffed a glass of 
sharbat and slept peacefully'until the next morning11. Dr. 
Srivastava (oo.cit.. page 75) believes in the theory of 
suicide, and refers, in support of this, to an entry in_the 
Delhi Chronicle of the 10th Dhufl-Hi33a that Safc'adat Khan 
had taken poison and died.
5 It is said in the Siyar (pages 474 and 475) that some Indians
sserted,that Nadir had died, and others stated that he had 
een killed by two of the Emperorfs Qalmuaxwomen guards.
According to ae voulton (op.cit.. page 2J7) "four young
Omhras (i.e. UmarS) of ordinary rank (de nobreze ordinaria),
having become ihtbxicated at eight in the evening, spread
the rumour that the Emperor had .killed Nadir ShSn with-a
blow." See also Anand Rain, 1/4(aJ.
^ Shaikh HazTn, page 2 9 8 .
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and, carried away by excitement, began to attack those of the 
Qizilbash troops who were in the town* These rumours and 
disturbances, which were to have such appalling consequences, 
are said to have arisen in the following way:^* at noon that 
day Tahmasp Khan Jalayir despatched some mounted nasaqchls to 
the PaharganJ granaries, which are situated to the south-west 
of the city, with orders to open them and to settle the price 
at which the corn was to be sold. The nasaqchls duly carried 
out their orders, but the price which they fixed, namely ten 
sirs for one rupee, so exasperated the corn-dealers that they 
caused a mob to assemble* This mob then attacked and killed 
the nasaqchls together with some other Iranian soldiers who 
had come to purchase corn. The instigators of the attack 
then spread a report that Nadir had been cast into prison, and 
others said that he had been poisoned. In their progress 
through the city, these reports became more and more distorted 
and fantastic, and "foolish persons with arms and equipment 
having collected together, created a d i s t u r b a n c e . M a n y  of 
the Qizilbash troops, walking singly or in pairs in the narrow 
streets, were taken entirely by surprise and fell an easy prey 
to their assailants. The Indian writer Muhammad Bakhsh
^ Mirza ZamSh, in Fraser, pages 180 and 181. It is also
stated in the Bayan, fol.24(b), that the disturbance began 
in the Paharganj quarter.
o
Siyar, page 474. According to Ashgf). the disturbance began
when "three or four gharis ( the day remained,"
i.e. between one hour and 12 minutes and one hour and 
minutes before sunset.
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(wAshub11) saw from the roof of a house the Qizilbash soldiers
being set upon and cut down from all sides by bands of men who
were, for the most part, from Kabul and Peshawar, and who ?jere
seeking to revenge the slaughter of their fellow-countrymen at
KarnHl. Muhammad Bakhsh states that some of these men had
belonged to Sacadat Khanfs army.^ When the reports of Na5irfs
death reached the Iranian soldiery, their consternation was so
2
great that their ability to resist was greatly lessened.
Shaikh Hazin asserts that none of the Indian umara 
took any steps to control the mob, and that some Indian nobles 
even murdered the Iranian guards whom Nadir had, at their own 
request, sent to protect their houses.^
The estimates of the numbers of the Iranians who lost 
their lives on this occasion vary from merely a few hundred to
^ Ashub, fol.265(b).
^ Bayan, fol.22(b).
^ Shaikh Hazin, page 299$ see also Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 
182). ' It is noteworthy that no suggestion has ever been 
made that the Emperor or any leading Indian noble was in 
any degree^responsible for fomenting the trouble. In 
fact, Mirza Mahdi himself expressly exonerates Muhammad 
Shah and his nobles (T.N., page 205)* Also, it has never 
been seriously alleged that Nadir or his men deliberately 
provoked the disturbance in order to provide an excuse 
for sacking the city (in this connection, see Bayan, 
fol.22(b)).
as much as 7*000;^  it seems probable that some 3,000 actually
2
perished.
During the disturbance, some Indian nobles, of whom 
the most prominent were Sayyid NiySz KK&n, a son-in-law of 
Qamaru^-din Khan, and Stfah Nawaz Khan, having collected 
together some 500 men, raided the royal elephant stables, 
killed the superintendent and removed the elephants. They 
then left the city and took possession of a fort situated 
just outside it,^
When the first report of the disturbance reached 
Nadir on Saturday night, he refused to believe it, and angrily 
exclaimed that some of his soldiers had falsely accused the 
inhabitants of stirring up trouble, so as to prdvide them­
selves with an excuse to pillage the city.4 Nadir then 
ordered one of his yasauls to go and ascertain the true state 
of affairs and to report to him. This man, on emerging from 
the castle, was killed almost immediately by the mob, and a
1
The estimates given by the principal authorities are as 
follows:- _ _
Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 185) 400
Siyar, page 475 700
Bayan,' fol,. 22(b) 3*000
Rustam feAli, fol.287(b) ) c
De Voulton, loc.cit., page 238)
P&re Saignes (Lettres Edifiantes,
Vol.IV, page 253) 5,000 to 6,000
Shaikh Hazin, page 299 7*000
2 I follow Sir J. Sarkar, who acceptscAbdu,l KarTmfs figure 
of 3*000 as the most probable one.
" T.N., page 206.
4 Bayan, fol.22(b).
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second yasliul. whom Nadir sent after him, suffered the same 
fate. Realising then that the trouble was of a serious 
nature, Nadir despatched a body of 1,000 .1az5yirchTs to iquell 
the rioters, but, owing to the darkness and the smallness of 
their numbers, they failed to restore o r d e r T h e  SJISih then 
ordered his men to remain under arms all night, to defend 
themselves if attacked, but to take no further action without 
sanction from him.
At sunrise the next morning Nadir mounted his horse 
and, with a strong escort, rode through the streets to the 
golden-domed Raushanu*d-Daula mosque, in the middle of the 
Chandni Chok quarter.^ It is said that when Nadir had approach­
ed close to this mosque, someone fired a shot at him from a 
balcony or window. The bullet missed Nadir, but killed an 
officer beside him.4 On reaching the mosque, Nadir, after 
ascertaining in what quarters of the city the attacks on his 
men had been perpetrated, ordered his soldiers to leave no 
person living wherever a Qizilbash had lost his life.5 
At nine a.m. the Qizilbash troops began their dreadful task.




Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 183)*
*5 —
^ T.N., page 205, Hazin, page 300* Siyar, page 475*
After the streets had been cleared of the rabble, the 
soldiers forced their way Into the shops and houses in the 
doomed portions of the city, killing the occupants and laying 
violent hands on anything of value.^ The money-changers1 
bazaars and the shops of the jewellers and merchants were all 
looted, and large numbers of buildings were set on fire and 
destroyed, all within them perishing in the flames.. No dis­
tinction was made between innocent and guilty, male and female, 
or old and young.
Nadir remained in the mosque, his drawn sword by his 
side, whilst the work of destruction went on.^ When the 
massacre had been in progress for some hours, the Emperor sent 
the Nizamu11-Mulk and Qamaru*d-Dih Khln to the Shah, to implore 
him to be merciful.4 After listening to their pleadings,
Nadir commanded the Kotwal, Haj ji Fulad Khan, to go through 
the streets, with a body of Iranian flasaqchTs. and to convey 
to his soldiers the order to refrain from further action.5 
The fact that this order was instantly obeyed is proof of the 
completeness of Nadir*s control over his men.^ He then com-
^ Anand Ram, fol.173(a).
^ Ashub, foil.270(b) and 271(a).
3 Tieffenthaler, page 56•
4 T.N., page 206., See also de Voulton (page 238), who says
that the Nizamu* 1-Mulk went alone to Nadir, whom he found 
eating sweetmeats.
^ Anand Ram, fol.174(b)•
^ tAbdu*l-Karim (f01.24(b)) regards the prompt obedience of the 
Iranian troops on this occasion as **one of the most wonder­
ful things in the world.** The massacre ceased at 3 p*m., 
having lasted for six hours. 242.
manded his troops to restore to their families the prisoners 
whom they had taken.^
How many persons, the vast majority,of whom were 
guiltless of any crime against the Iranians, lost their lives 
on this terrible occasion will never be accurately known; the 
estimated totals range from 8,000 to the fantastic figure of 
400,000.2 sir j. Sarkar considers that, having regard to the 
relatively small area affected and the short duration of the 
havoc, the number of those put to the sword was probably not 
in excess of 20,000;5 to this figure must be added the several 
hundred persons (mostly women) who committed suicide* As Anand
 ^T.N., page 206; MTrza* Zaman (Fraser, page 187) states that 
these prisoners were not released until the next day (12th 
Dhu’l-Hijja * 23rd March).
2 As in the case of the killing of the Iranian troops, there is
much divergence between the authorities regarding the total 
number of victims in this massacre.
‘■'Abdu’l-Karim (according to the MS. belonging
to Sir J. Sarkarfs MS.) 8,000
‘Abdu^l-Karlm (according to B.M. MS. fol.23(b)) 20,000
Mirza Mahdl, T.N.. page 206 30,000
Rustam ‘All, _fol.288(a; ’nearly one laldi
Harcharan Das, fol.91(a) lnn nnn
Tieffenthaler, page 56 >
Hanway, Vol.IV, page 177* (Hanway says 110,000
_that another 10,000 committed suicide)
Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 185) 120,000 to 150,000
Surat letter (in "Daily Post" of 23rd
November 1739) 200,000
Otter, Vol.I, page 393 225,000
Mahratta letters 50>000 bo 400,000
(N.B. Ashub gives no aggregate figure, but states that, in 
addition to the numbers of people burnt alive in their houses, 
the bodies of 14,000 to 15,000 persons were afterwards collect 
ed and burnt.)
3 "Nadir Shah in India", page 66. The limits of the aj?ea destroy- 
^d/pnvthis occasion are given bytAbdu11-KarTm (Bayan, fol., 
-4(b)J and by Anand Ram Tfql.^MaT). „Two Christian churches md the house of a devout Christian lady were destroyed 
PSre Saignes, "Lettres Edifiantes", vol.IV, page 26DJ; two
Portuguese Jesuits named Matthias Rodriguex and Francisco^da
I f 1W c M ? ”  ( l l f  I  i f J g i l i l f 1 , § a f|n e s , ap l f  l ° & 0 )
Ram remarked* Delhi had not experienced such a catastrophe 
since the time of Timur.
Na&irfs next step was to send a force under 
‘Azimu’llah Khan and Fulad Khan to apprehend two Indian nobles 
named Sayyid Niyaz Khan and Shah Naw'az Khan, and their follow­
ers, who, as stated above, had taken up their position in a 
fort outside the city after raiding the elephant stables on the 
previous night. This fort was duly attacked, and the two
Indian leaders and their followers were captured; later in the
2day they were put to death.
According to Mirza Zaman, ^ Nadir also took vigorous 
punitive measures against the people of the Sarai of Ruftufllah 
Ktian and the Tatar Mughals of MughalpQnaa because they had 
killed some Iranian troops whom NSTdir had previously sent to 
the Sarai: to seize the cannon there.
Having re-established order in the city and surround­
ings, Nadir confirmed Hajji Fulad Khan in his position as 
Kotwal.^
For some days after this massacre, the streets re­
mained littered with corpses; at length, in the interests of 
public health, Nadir ordered the Kotwal to collect and burn
^ »Tadhkiran, fol.174(b). (Timur sacked Delhi in December 1J98.)
T.N., page 206. 
v Fraser, page 187.
^ ibidem.
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the bodies. Timber from the wrecked houses provided fuel 
for the funeral pyres, on which the bodies of Muhammadans and 
Hindus were piled and burnt without distinction of creed or 
caste.
Having taken his toll of human lives, NITdir now 
began to exact his tribute of money and jewels. The posses­
sions of IQl&n Dauran and Muzaffar KKan were seized, and a 
strong body of Qizilbash was despatched to Oudh to confiscate 
and bring to Delhi the effects of Sa^ 'Sdat Kban.^ Later,
Nadir appointed a commission, under Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, to 
assess the contributions of the nobles and of the merchants 
and citizens.
All this while a cordon of Iranian troops surrounded 
the city, and forcibly prevented anyone from leaving, though 
they allowed persons to enter.^  Further, the granaries were 
kept under seal and were guarded by Iranian troops; these 
measures were evidently intended to expedite the collection of 
the tribute.
On the 16th Dhu!l-Hijja (27th March) Nadir despatched 
a farman by chapar to Iran exempting all the provinces of that 
country from taxation for three years. At the same time, he 
richly rewarded his officers, and gave his soldiers their 
arrears of pay, together with a gratuity; he also gave
^ Siyar, page 475> Hazin, page 300.
Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 188), and T.N., page 207*
 ^Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 188).
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presents to the camp followers and servants ranging from 60 
to 100 rupees in amount, according to their status.^
While the people of Delhi were still mourning their 
dead, Nadir, having demanded for his son Nasrufllah the hand 
of an Indian princess, a daughter of YazdSn Bakhsh and great- 
grand-daughter of Aurangzlb, ordered displays of fireworks 
and lavish entertainments. For a whole week these festivi­
ties continued, and on the 27th Dhufl-Hij3a (6th April) the
2marriage ceremony took place.
Having heard a report at the end of DhuTl-Hijja that 
certain of his men intended to observe the anniversary of the 
killing of Husain ibn'Ali on the 10th Mul^ arram in the usual 
Shi*a manner, Nadir issued strict orders forbidding, on pain 
of death, any ta1zias (passion plays) or marthias (threnodies), 
saying that these were only for the ignorant and heretical.5 
Some of the Qizilbash, nevertheless, disobeyed these orders, 
and were severely punished in consequence.^
T.N., page 207•_ date, which is omitted by Mirza Mahdi, 
is given by Mirza Zaman; the latter states that Nadir gave 
his troops all their arrears of pay and a gratuity equival­
ent to six months1 pay.
o ' _
T.N., page 206, Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 197)* Sir J. Malco]a 
quoting from some unspecified Iranian MS., relates: ®when 
the pride of the Royal House of Delhi required that his son, 
who was to marry a princess of that family, shouh give an 
account of his male ancestors for seven generations, the 
conqueror exclaimed: *Tell them that he is the son of Nadir 
Shah, the son of the sword, the grandson of the sword; and 
so on, till they have a descent of seventy instead of seven 
generations.n (History of Persia, Vol.II, pages 46 and 47) •
 ^AshTLb, fol.300(b).
^ Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 199)*
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The work of assessing, and then of collecting, the 
levy on the citizens occupied some time# Emissaries of the 
Kotwal, together with Iranian nasaqchis. went from house to 
house enforcing the appearance of the owners and making 
inventories of all that they possessed, in order to calculate
1
their individual contributions in accordance with their means; 
in the case of some rich men, the assessment was as high as 
50$. RSTdir is said to have given orders that the towns­
people should be preserved from violence and treated with 
lenity during the carrying out of this work.
When all the returns were complete, Delhi was 
assessed at two crores, and the Nizamu* 1-Mulk, Sarbuland Khan 
and three other nobles were ordered by Hadir to collect the 
money. For this purpose Delhi was divided into five sections, 
and each of these nobles was made responsible for the collec­
tion of the money in one of these sections.^ While Sarbuland 
Khan, carried out his disagreeable task as humanely as he 
could,^ some of the other nobles acted very harshly, with the 
result that many families were entirely ruined and numbers of 
persons, being driven to desperation, committed suicide.^ In 
some instances torture was employed to enforce payment.
 ^Anand Ram, fol. 175(b)*
^ Bayan, fol.25(b).
 ^Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 201).
^ ibidem, page 217*
 ^Anand Ram, foil.176(b) and 177(b). Anand RSta himself had 
to pay 5 lakhs.
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The aggregate value of all the money, jewels and 
other objects of value which NUTdir obtained from the Emperor, 
his nobles and people must have been at least 70 crores of 
rupees;'** as Anand Ram remarks,^ *the accumulated wealth of 
548 years changed owners in a moment•**
On the Jrd Safar II52 (12th May) Nadir held a great 
darbar or court to which he invited the Emperor and his 
principal nobles* Nadir, with his own hands, placed the 
crown of Hindustan on the head of Muhammad SKah, and handed 
him a belt and a sword set with jewels; he then gave splendid 
coats of honour to the nobles.3
According to Mirza Mahdi,^ Muhammad Shah, in gratitude 
for his reinstatement as Emperor, then pressed Nadir to accept 
all the territories of the Empire situated to the west of the
Indus nfrom the frontier of Tibet and Kashmir to the place
!
where that river flows into the ocean, together with the 
provinces of Thatta and the ports and fortresses belonging to
Mirza Mahdi (T.N., page 207) values the gifts, including the 
Peacock Throne, which Nadir received from the Emperor and { 
nobles at 15 crores* together with jewels ^beyond enumeraticr 
Anand R'Sm (foT7l75Ta)) says that these jewels were worth 50 
crores. Mirza Zaman (Fraser, pages 220 and 221) and Otter 
|Vol.II, page 9 0) both estimate the total value of the 
spoils at 70 crores: Otter adds that the booty taken by the
officers and soldiers was worth 10 crores. ‘Abduil-Karim 
(Bayan, fol.26(a)) gives the figure of 80 crores* while de 
Voultonfs list of the items amounts to the undoubtedly exag­
gerated total of 111 crores (pages 242 and 243)•
2 Tadhkira, fol. 175^ .  ITT was actually 35  ^lunar years from
the time when Timur sacked Delhi in December 1398*
3 T.N., page 208. _
4 ibidem. It is in such euphemistic terms that Mirza Mahdi
refers to what was obviously a forced cession of territory.
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them.*^ Mirza Mahdi goes on to say:
*....since the greater part of the countries to the
north and west of the river Indus had always
been regarded as being within the territory of
Khurasan, His Majesty agreed to their being added
...... and an instrument^ was drawn up by Muhammad
Shah and was delivered to that exalted Government 
(i.e. Nadir), and is preserved in the imperial 
treasury.*
Nadir thereupon, it is said, gave Muhammad Shah some 
advice on the art of government, and exhorted the Indian nobles 
to obey their master;3 he concluded by saying that; if the 
Emperor were ever in need of his assistance, he would send a 
force and that he himself could reach him in 40 days from 
Qandahar. According to MTrza Zaman, 4 Nadir advised Muhammad 
Shah to keep a standing army of 60,000 cavalry, to confiscate 
the jagirs (fiefs or domains) of the nobles, and to forbid 
them to maintain forces of their own.
** T.N., page 208.
2 This is evidently the deed or treaty of cession which is 
quoted by Ashub (Vol.II, foil.513(b) to 314(b)), and which, 
as Ashub remarks, Nadir compelled the Emperor to write.
(c.f. Sir J. Malcolm^s statement in his ^History of Persia*, 
Vol.II, page 79 that this document was *no doubt dictated 
by the conqueror.* There is some doubt as to the actual 
date of this treaty; Ashub gives the'29th Safar II52 which 
is evidently too late; in the translations‘given by Fraser 
(pages 223-226) and others, the date 4th Muharram is given, 
which seems to be too early, unless, of course, the instru­
ment was drawn up and signed long before the investiture 
ceremony took place (Nadir may4 well have deferred this cere­
mony until the collection of the indemnity had been complete:
3 T.N., page 208, Mirza Zaman (Fraser, page 208), Otter, Vol.II,
page 90* Grant Duff, in his *History of the Mahrattas* 
(Bombay 1878) Vol.I, page 468, states that Nadir wrote to, 
inter alios. Baji Rao, stating that although he had not 
assisted the Emperor, he must now attend to his commands.
4 Fraser, pages 206 and 207*
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The Emperor !s name was now substituted for that of 
Nadir in the Khutba, as well as on the coinage. Muhammad 
Shah was thus once more a sovereign, but his kingdom had 
shrunk, and his commander-in-chief and many thousands of his 
soldiers and subjects had been slain. Also, his jewels were 
gone, his treasuries were empty, and his prestige, which his 
own indolence and pusillanimity had done so much to injure, 
had been still further impaired.
Having accomplished all that he had set out to do, 
Nadir decided to depart from Delhi; in fact, the advent of 
summer rendered imperative an early start on the homeward march, 
and NSdir had, moreover, other aims in view.
Before leaving Delhi, Nadir despatched a number of 
Indian boat-builders and carpenters to the river Oxus, via 
Kabul and Balkh, in order to build boats for the transport of 
his army in the campaign which he had in contemplation for the 
reduction of the-rulers of Bukhara and Khwarazm to obedience.^ 
In addition, he engaged numbers of other carpenters, as well 
as Stone-cutters, masons, goldsmiths and other craftsmen, his 
intention being to erect in Iran a city on the model of Delhi.^ 
Some Indians of higher rank and attainments were also enrolled
^ It has not, apparently, been recorded when Nadir first con­
ceived the idea of^invading Bukhara and KhwarazffiJ he may 
have done so when listening, in November 1758, to Rida Qul! 
MIrzaTs account of his campaign (see pages 19/* 198 and 206 
above), or possibly even earlier.
2 T.N., page 208.
Hanway, Vol.IV, page 197* See also Otter, Vol.I, page 402, 
who says that Nadir intended to erect this city near 
Hamadan, and that it was to be called NSdirabad.
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in the Sh&h’s service; the most important of these was
cAlavi KhAn, the HaKIm-Bashl or Chief Physician, whom Nadir
engaged to cure him of an intestinal complaint which he had
contracted before his conquest of India.-** Another Indian
of some note, Khwaja tfAbdu!l-KarTm ibn AqTbat Mahmud, of
Kashmir, who subsequently wrote the Bayan-i-Waqf, entered
Nadir!s service at this time.
An immense baggage train consisting ofJmules and
camels was prepared for the transport of all the treasures,
and several hundred elephants and a large number of horses
2were included in the spoils. All at length being ready, 
N£dir left Delhi on the 7th Safar (16th May) for the Shalimar 
gardens, where he halted until the following day. The long 
homeward march then began in earnest.
Bayan, fol.66(b).
Bayan, fol.30(b). MTrtfa Zaman (Fraser, page 221) puts the 
number of elephants at 1,000, while cAbdufl-KarTm gives 
500; Hanway is probably right in saying that there were 
not more than 300 (which is the figure given by Rustam *All, 
fol.29l(a)).
CHAPTER XVIII
The Invasion of India. IV. Delhi to Qandah^r.
From the Shalimlr gardens Nadir proceeded as far as 
Sirhind by the route which he had followed on his outward 
march. The long and richly laden baggage train proved an 
irresistible bait to the more daring of the peasants, who on 
several occasions attacked and looted the rear end of the 
train; it is said that NSdir lost 1,000 baggage animals and 
thdrloads in this way before he reached Thanesar.^ Enraged 
by these exploits of the peasants, NSdir ordered massacres 
wherever they had occurred, and thus added to the devastation 
and havoc wrought by his men when on the way to Delhi.
The heat on the plains was already so considerable
as to cause much suffering amongst the soldiers and camp- 
followers. In order to reach the foothills more rapidly and 
so escape to some extent from the heat, Nadir turnecl to the 
north at Sirhind, and marched via Sialkot to* Akhnur on the 
ChenSb river. An additional reason for this change of route 
was that the countryside between Sirhind and Lahore had been 
so ravaged on the outward march that sufficient provisions for
the troops and fodder for the animals would not have been
available.^
^ Hanway, Vol.IV, page 199*
2
T.N., page 208, Bayan, fol.27(b), Anand Ham, fol* 179(a)*
3 BaySn, foil.27(a) and 27(b).
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Just after his departure from Delhi Nadir had des­
patched Hayatufllah Khan, the eldest son of Zakariya Khan, to 
Lahore, in company with cAbduT 1-BaqI Khan, with orders to 
collect a crore of rupees from that city. As soon as 
Zakariyfi Khan was informed of this order, he raised more than 
the sum demanded, and took it in person to Nadir, whom he met 
somewhere to the N.E. of Lahore. Zakariya Khan accompanied 
Nadir as far as the Chenab.^
Akhnur was reached on the 27th Safar (5th June), 
and the cold waters of the ChehSh did much to refresh the 
soldiers, whose sufferings from the great heat had been much
2aggravated by their heavy clothing; every day, many had died.
Copious rains in the mountainous country to the 
north had caused the river to rise considerably, and the 
current was very strong. The troops began to Gross by the 
bridge of boats at Akhnur, but this bridge proved unequal to 
the strain imposed upon it by the great strength of the 
current and by the unusually heavy load. When only a portion 
of the army had reached the further bank, the bridge broke 
asunder, and 2,(TOO men were drowned in the swirling waters.
^ Anand Ram, fol.178(b).
2 Bayan, fol.27(b), T.N., page 208. Irakli II also speaks of
the terrible heat and of the numbers of men who succumbed 
to it. (H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 362.)
5 Anand R£m, fol.l79(a)« cAbduf 1-Karlm (BaySn, fol.27(b)) states 
that the inhabitants of those parts, having been warned of 
Nadir1 s approach, had retired to the hills. They then cut 
down as many big trees in the vicinity of the river as they 
could, and cast them into the CheriAb. Borne swiftly down­
stream, these tree trunks were dashed against the floating 
bridge at Akhnur with such force that the chains connecting 
the boats snapped in two.
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It proving impossible either to repair this bridge or to 
build another one nearby, NSdir gave orders for the remainder 
of the troops and the baggage and artillery to be ferried 
across at Kullowal, JO miles downstream from Akhnur; this 
passage by ferry proved a lengthy process, and it was not 
until the *Jth RablcII (14th July) that it was completed.
Knowing that his men had amassed much plunder at
Delhi, Nadir, before the crossing was begun, issued an order
that every man was to surrender all his loot. Many men
obeyed and were rewarded, but, as Nadir knew that many others
had disregarded his order, he posted some trustworthy men at
the crossing place who searched every man as he passed. Some
men buried their valuables, in the hope that they would be
able to return later and recover them, but in this they were .
disappointed; others are said to have been so enraged that
2they threw their jewels and money into the river.
Before leaving the further (western) bank of the 
Chenab, Nadir set free his Indian prisoners and ordered
^ T.N., page 208.
 ^Bayan, fol.2 8(a). In February 1740 some merchants arrived at 
Gombroon from Nadir1 s camp who said that it was nexcessively 
rich in Money and Jewells. But the latter he (NSdir) en­
grosses to himself, having forbid the soldiers retaining
Diamonds or other Stones  On their coming to any Pass,
He had their Baggage brought before him and examined to 
prevent their concealing such....” (Gombroon Diary, 22nd 
February, 1740). In his ^History of Persia® (Vol.II, page 
86), Sir J. Malcolm, after mentioning this order of Nadirs, 
says:- ®I have heard many Persian noblemen, when speaking 
on this subject, refer the conduct of Nadir more to policy 
than avarice. He feared, they affirmed, his soldiers would 
be spoiled by wealth.®
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ZakariyTi Khan to assist them to return to their homes; he 
then gave the Khan leave to go back to Lahore
It was, apparently, at this time that Nadir, doubt­
less as a result of his difficulties over1the Chenab crossing, 
sent orders to Muhammad Taqi Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, to
bring reinforcements by sea to Sind. These orders reached
- 2 Muhammad TaqT Khan at the end of October or early in November;
the manner in which he carried them out, or rather in which
he attempted to do so, will be described in the next chapter.
In heavy rain the army advanced from the CheriSb to
the Jhelum; having crossed the latter river by a bridge,^
the army continued its march via RUwal Pindi to Hasan Abdal.^
Whilst at Hasan Abdal, Nadir despatched impressive embassies
to Constantinople and St. Petersburg in order to announce his
conquest of India. Each of the Ambassadors, who started on
their lengthy journeys on the 20th Rajab (23rd October), took
gifts of great value, as well as a number of elephants, to
present to the ruler to whom he was accredited.^
^ Bayan, fol.28(b), T.N., page 209*
2 It appears from the T.N. (page 211)'* that Nadir only issued 
these orders when at Kabul in December 1739, tut this is 
impossible; it is clear from the Gombroon records that 
they reached the Beglarbeg* late in October or early in 
November, so they must have been despatched several months 
before. See Gombroon Diary, 5th November, 1739*
5 See Irakli*s letter, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 363*
4 T.N., page 209, Bayan, fol.29(b).
5
T.N., page 209* Further details of these embassies will 
be given subsequently.
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At the end of Rajab Nadir received word from Rida
Qull Mirza that IlbSrs, the Khan of Khwarazm had taken
advantage of his (Nadir’s) absence in India to raid the
Ablvard and Nasa districts of KhurAsSn.^ *
On leaving Hasan Abdal, Nadir bore westwards to- 
2
wards the Indus. He was now In the country of the warlike 
Yusufza’is, who offered much resistance. After some heavy 
fighting had taken place, N2dir came to terms with these 
resolute tribesmen, and enlisted a large number of them in his 
army; had he not reached this understanding with them, much 
delay would have resulted, and he would have been unable to 
reach the high country round Kabul before the advent of the 
winter snow rendered the roads impassable.
After crossing the Indus, NSdir went to Peshawar and 
on through the Khaibar Pass and JalalAbad to Kabul, where he 
arrived on the 1st Ramadan (2nd December) .4 AJ.1 the Afghan 
leaders and notables of the province came to pay homage to 
N2dir at Kabul. No less than 40,000 Afghans of Peshawar,
Kabul, the HazarajSt andother districts enrolled In his army 
and were sent to Herat where they were to await Nadir’s arrival
^ T.N., page 210.
2
The route which Nadir followed is probably the same as that 
briefly described by Muhammad Ja*far Shamlu in his 
Manazilu’l-Futuh, foil.7(a) and 7(b).
 ^T.N., paga 210, Bayan, foll.29(a) and 29(b).
4 T.N., page 210.
5 T.N., page 211.
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Some time previously, Nadir had summoned Miyan Nur
Muhammad Khudayar Kh&n, the powerful Governor of Sind, to 
*
meet him at Kabul and to do.homage to him there, but the 
Kalhora chief disregarded this order.^ Being at such a dis­
tance and feeling that Nadir would not march his tired troops 
so far to the south, Khudayar Khan had no misgivings* It is 
characteristic of Nadir that he refused to brook this flouting 
of his authority. Though it was nearly mid-winter and the 
cold was intense, he started southwards from Kabul on the 8th 
Ramadan (9th December) in order to punish KhudAyar KKan.^ The 
elephants did not accompany NSdir on this southward march, 
because it would have been impracticable to take them. They 
were, instead, sent to Iran via Ghazna, Qandahar and Herat.
Details are lacking in regard to the route followed 
by Nadir betv/een Kabul and the iKurram valley* He doubtless 
marched south for 15 miles to Zahidabad; here he may have 
branched off to the south-east and crossed into the upper
 ^Bayan, fol*5l(b)* According to Leech!s nBrief History of 
Kalat1* (J.R.A.S., Vol*XII, page 484), Muhabbat Khan, the 
eldest son of ‘Abdullah Khan Brahoi, mindful of a promise 
which Nadir had made, during the siege of Qandahar, to 
assist him against Khudayar Khan, the slayer of his father, 
reminded NAdir of this promise when the army reached the 
Indus. For the feud between Khudayar Khan and cAbdufllah 
Khan, see page 93 above.
^ According to Otter, (Vol.II, pages 97 and <?8), Nadir, after
leaving Kabul for QandahAr, despatched Abdufl-Baql Khan,
with 5>000 men, to receive the submission of Khudayar Khan.
On receiving word from ^ bdufl-BaqT Khan of Khudayar Kh'Ants
refusal to submit and of his preparations for resistance,
Nadir,.who was then Jvery close to Qandahar1, ^retraced his 
steps in order to bring KhiidayAr Khan to, reason*1 This
Hanway’ *ol'u > page 4o2* is 
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Kurram valley via ^ .11 Khel and Ahmad Khel. Alternatively, 
he may have marehed on southwards from Zahidabad to KliSk 
Hazara, three stages from Kabul; from Khak Hazara the route 
runs almost due east to Hazar Darakht, near the headwaters of 
the Kurram* Of the two routes, this latter is the more prac­
ticable in winter, and is therefore the * one which he probably 
took. There is a tradition to the effect that Nadir marched 
still further south before turning east, and entered the Bannu 
country via the Daur valley.*** It is said that Nadir so 
thoroughly subdued the Daur tribe that they paid an annual
tribute of Rs.12,000 to the Kabul authorities until the time 
^ 2
of Zaman Shah Durrani. References in other authorities to 
the traversing of the Bangashlt^ and the length of time spent 
in the Kurram yalley seem to prove, however, that Nadir and 
the bulk of his army went that way and not by the Daur valley, 
but it is nevertheless possible that Nadir sent some of his 
troops by the latter route*
The march in these parts was trying in the extreme, 
and many of those who had survived the stifling summer heat of 
the plains now succumbed to the cold of the high country in
1 Hayat-i-Afghahl, page 628, and S. S. Thorburn, wBannu; or Our 
Afghan Frontier1*, London, 1876, page 24. Sir E. D.
Maclagan has very kindly Informed me of -a local tradition 
In support of this statement; this is that the fountain of 
Zwoh, between the Tochi and the Bar an passes at the mouth of 
the Daur valley was polluted by the numbers of Nadirfs 
soldiers and camels that fell into it.
2
Hayat-i-Afgharil, page 418.
^ See the Bayan, foil.31(b) and 32(a), T.N., page 211.
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mid-winter. The army and the long baggage train had to cross 
the swift Kurram river no less than 22 times; so many baggage 
animals were carried away and drowned during these crossings 
that one quarter of the spoils of India was lost.**'
At last, on the 1st ShawwSl (1st January, 1740) the 
army emerged from the grim anc^ forbidding defiles of the Kurram, 
called by the men the Walley of the demon1; on entering the 
lower country, they rejoiced to see green fields and to breathe
o
the warmer air.
Although the soldiers rejoiced when they left the
Kurram valley behind, their troubles were by no means at an end.
The local zamindars retired to their strongholds and offered
resistance^, and certain of the Bannuchi tribesmen attacked the
4Iranian columns. It is said, however, that some of the 
Bannuchis were terrified at the sight of the Iranians, who were 
all clad in red and had tents of the same colour. Nadir dealt 
ruthlessly with the tribesmen who attacked him; the Garri clan 
is said to have been 1,000 strong when Nadir came; only two 
remained after he had gone.-*
 ^Bayan, fol*32(a).
2 " n n and 32(b).
5 " » 32(b).
Sir E. D. Maclagan informs me that, according to local tradi-
tion, the townspeople of Kaki and Bharth mistookithe Iranian
advance guard foria company of merchants travelling in the
manner of the Powindahs, and delivered an attack. They paid
dearly for their mistake, for Nadir had them all put to the
sword. As the Powindahs always travelled fully armed and in 
large bodies when in dangerous country, it is not altogether 
strange that the Bannuchis should have mistaken the Iranian 
advance guard for a company of them.
5 Hayat-i-Afgharil, page 628.
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Large numbers of baggage animals had, as stated above, 
been drowned in the Kurram; many more died through lack of 
fodder, and transport became very scarce. Further to the 
south, it was found that the tribespeople had, at the orders 
of Khudayar Khan, taken away and hidden as much of the grain 
as they could carry and had burnt the rest; consequently, 
parties of troops had to be sent far afield to obtain sufficient 
supplies .*•
It seems that Nadir struck southwards from the Kurram 
river near Bazar Ahmad Khan to the Tochi river, and that he 
passed through or close to the towns of Bharth and Kaki, 
traversed the district of Nar^ and the Marwat desert.-^  He 
must have gone over the Pezu pass, between the Bhittani and 
Marwat ranges, and then marched southwards to Dera IsmacTl Khan,
 ^Bayan, fol.33(a)«
2 Sir E. D. Maclagan states: wThe natives have a strange story
about a poor Bannuchi in Nar who, on Nadir1 s approach, fled 
up a very large tree; the place beneath this tree was selected 
by Nadir fs Khalasis as the spot on which the tents of the 
harem should be pitched; the ladies espied the poor man 
in the tree, andwhen the Shah himself came out, the poor 
wretch fell down! in abject terror, but Nadir, instead of 
punishing him, said with a sort of princely contempt that, 
as the harem was now of no value, he might take it all, 
and the Bannuchi ploughman found himself saddled with an 
emperorfs harem and all its servants and accoutrements. He 
was only too pleased to accept a few rupees from the ladies 
and to let them return to Khuras’Sn.” These local traditions 
are of interest, but implicit reliance must not be placed 
on them. For example, Sir H. B. Edwards (op.cit.. Vol.II, 
page 20) relates that the people of Multan believed that 
the fine groves of date-palms surrounding the city owed 
their origin to date stones left on the ground by Nadirfs 
soldiers, ”a legacy of wealth and beauty such as conquest 
seldom leaves behind.” It is, however, known for certain 
that Nadir did not march through Multan.
3 Thorburn, op.cit.. page 24. states that Nadir completely cowed 
the Marwats as well as, the Bannuchis, and that he levied 
heavy tribute from both
where he arrived on the 5 ^  Shawwal (5th January 1740).^ At 
Dera IsmacIl Khan, Sadiq Khan, the Chief of the Daudputra
j
9 !tribe , came to pay homage to Nadir and promised to assist 1
him against Khudayar Khan.3 i
■!
At Dera IsmacIl Khan Nadir embarked the greater part
i
of his army in boats and proceeded by river to Dera GhazI Khan, ;
Yrhich he reached on the 15th Shawwal (15th January) * 4 From 
this town Nadir sent a further summons to Khudayar Khan, but 
the Khan again returned no answer*
Having reduced to obedience all the tribes in the 
neighbourhood, Nadir set out southward again, and reached 
Larkana on the 14th Dhufl-Qacda (12th February); here he re­
ceived word that Khudayar KKan had fled in the direction of 
Gujerat. Leaving his baggage at Larkana, Nadir hastened in
R _
pursuit.^ On arriving at Shahdadpur he found awaiting him
1 T.N., page 212.
2 - -  -For an account of the origin and history of the Daudputras
see Plr Ibrahim KhanTs ^History of Bahawalporeff, London,
1848, page 24 and Mohun LalTs WA Brief Account of the Origin 
of the Daudputras and of the power and birth of Bahawal Khan, 
their Chief*1, in J*R*A.S*B*, Vol.VII.
3
 ^Not long before, Khudhyar Khan, jealous of the increasing
power .andaffluence of the Daudputras, had attacked them and 
so incurred their enmity. See Plr Ibrahim Khan, op.cit.. 
page 18.
4 T.N., page 212. 
ibidem.
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some presents and a petition from the Khan;-^  the latter, how­
ever, had fled across the desert to his fortress of cUmarkot^ 
where hejbnsconced himself in fancied security.
On the 28th Dhu’l-Qada (26th February) Nadir left 
Shahdadpur and made a forced march for 30 farsakhs across the 
desert to^markot where he arrived on the following day.
Burying his treasures, the Kh&n prepared for a further flight, 
but it was too late.^ Khudayar Khan offered to submit, on 
condition that the lives of himself and his family were spared;
Nadir readily consented, for he could not afford to delay,
4
since his troops were without water or supplies.
Various stories are told of the interview between 
Nadir and Khudayar Khan and of the manner in which the latter 
was made to disgorge his treasures. According to *Abdufl-Karlm, 
a number of objects of value that had formerly belonged to the 
Safavl monarchs were discovered amongst them; on enquiries 
being made, it was found that the Ghilza!i Afghans of Qandahar, 
on being subdued by Nadir, had scattered their Iranian spoils 
in all directions; some of these spoils had been purchased by 
Khudayar Khan.5 The value of all the gold, jewels and
^ T.N., page 212.
2 cThe Emperor Akbar was born atcUmarkot in October 1542; in 
159i Akbar marched through the place when on his successful 
Expedition against Sind.
*  _
T.N., page 212, Anand Ram, fol.183(a), Bayan, fol.34(a).
4 Bay&n, fol.34(a).
fol.54(b). See also the somewhat different accounts
pearls which the Khan Y;as forced to hand over amounted to over
a crore of rupees
After spending a few days at^Umarkot, Nadir returned
to Larkana, taking Khudayar Khan with him in chains. Five
days after reaching Larkana, Nau Ruz was celebrated there with
great pomp and magnificence.^ It was at this time, apparently,
that Zakariya Khan, in response to a summons from Nadir, arrived
at Larkana, where the ShAh treated him with even more courtesy
and consideration than before*5
Since Nadir was pleased with Khudayar Khanfs bearing
and behaviour after his submission, he forgave him, and made him
Khan of Thatta and part of Sind, which formed approximately one-
third of his former dominions; Nadir also conferred on him the
title of Shah QulT (f Slave of the Shah1) Khan. In return,
Khudayar Khan had to undertake to pay an annual tribute of 10
lakhs of rupees and to furnish a contingent of 2,000 cavalry
4 —under the command of one of his sons. Nadir, then divided up 
the remainder of Khudayar Khanfs territories; he gave Kaehhi, 
the portion of Sinead joining Baluchistan, to Muhabbat Khan, the 
Governor of that province, and rewarded SSLdiq Khan, the chief of 
the Daudputras, by granting him the district of Shikarpur and the 
high plateau of Sind.
T.N., page 215, Postans, op.cit.. page 169*
2
Bayan, fol.54(b).
 ^Anand Ram, fol.185(b).
4 T.N., page 214. See also Leech, in J.R.A.S.B., Vol.XVII,page4§>
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Whilst Nadir was at Larkana an ambassador arrived 
1
from Muhammad SHSLh bearing a letter and costly gifts. Nadir
returned a suitable reply, and sent the Emperor a present of
some fine horses and 200 camel-loads of Balkh melons - a
trivial return for the peacock throne and the other treasures
2of India which he had been ^given”!
After enjoining upon Zakariya Khan and his son 
Hayatu!llah the need for serving the Emperor faithfully, Nadir 
gave them both leave to depart.5
Having despatched instructions to Rida Qull Mirza 
(who was then at Tehran) to proceed to Herat,^ Nadir left 
Larkana for Nadirabad on the 13 th Muharram, 1153> (10th April), 
taking two of Khudayar KhanTs sons with him as hostages.5 The 
route taken was via Gandava and Sibi, then over the 54-mile 
Bolan Pass, the dreaded Dasht-i-Bi-Daulat desert, Shal (Quetta) 
and Fushanj (Pishin); Nadir and his army arrived at Nadirabad 
on the 7th Safar (4th May)^ , just over two (lunar) years from 
the time when he had set out from there for the conquest of India
T.N., page 215> Bayan, 55 (a) • Muhammad_Sliah is said to have 
become alarmed on receiving news of Nadirfs campaign in Sind 
and of his summons to Zakariya Khan, fearing lest a second 
invasion of India might be impending.
^ Mirza Mahdi may have been conscious of the relatively insignifi­
cant value of Nadirfs presents to Muhammad Shah, for he de­
votes some space to describing how NSTdir delighted above all 
in, first, the water melons of Balkh and Herat, and secondly, 
in a beautiful horse (T.N., page 215) the moral drawn being, 
of course, that Nadir sent to the Emperor the two things in 
which he himself took most delight.
3 T.N., page 214.
4 n ■ 215•
5 ibidem, Bayan, fol.35 (a2*
6 T.N., page 215. The Bayan gives this date as the 3rd Safar
(50tb April). 264.
CHAPTER XIX.
The FirstcOman Campaign and Operations in the Persian Gulf,
1737 - 1740.
Some time in 1736 the Imam Saif ibn Sultan of ‘Oman 
appealed to Nadir for aid against his rebellious subjects.^
It seems that Latlf Khan, the Admiral of the Gulf, whose expedi­
tion to Bahrain had been so successful, persuaded Nadir to take 
advantage of the situation incOman to send an expeditionary 
force to conquer the coutry.^  Nadir could have needed but 
little inducement to agree; with Muscat and thecOman coast in 
his hands, the establishment of Iranian naval supremacy in the 
Gulf would be an easy matter.
On the 14th March 1737 the Iranian fleet, consisting 
of four ships (two of which had been purchased from the English), 
two ’grabs’ and some smaller vessels,reached Gombroon from 
Bushire under the command of Latlf Khan ’’who hoists his Flag, 
being a white ground with a red Persian sword in the middle•1f5 
After 5*000 men, and 1500 horses had embarked, the fleet sailed 
on the 12th April for Khor Fakkan (74 miles^outh of Ras Musandam) 
where it arrived four days later. 4 Latlf Khan, after landing
 ^Salll ibn Razlq’s flHistory of the Imams and Seyyids of^Oman’’ 
(Badger’s translation), London, 1873-, PaS® 13*
2
Gombroon Diary, 2nd/13th February, 1738*
5
Letter from Gombroon to London of 6th/l7th May, 1737*
4 See C. Guillain’s ^Documents sur l’Eistoire, la Geographic et
le Commerce de l’Afrique Orientale11, (Paris, 1856), Vol.I,
page 529.
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some of the troops at Khor Fakk&n, sailed back northwards, 
rounded Ras Musandam and landed the remainder at JulfSr (Rasu’l- 
Khaima), where he met the Imkm. In company with Saif ibn 
Sultan, Latlf Khan marched inland and at Falju’s-Saminl defeated 
Bal<arab ibn Himyar al-Yacriba, who, although a relative of 
Saif, was the leader of the rebels.^ The Iranians and Saif’s 
adherents then occupied the towns of al-Jauf andcIbra. At 
'Ibra dissension broke out between Said and Latlf KKan because 
the latter had begun to act as if the Iranians were already 
masters of the whole country. The alliance between the Imam 
and the Iranians was therefore broken off and the latter re­
turned to Julfar.^
No further steps to establish control over cOman were 
made during the summer and autumn of 1737* but in November 
Taqi Khan, the Beglarbegi of Fars, received peremptory orders 
from Nadir to prosecute the campaign.
In January 1738 Taqi Khan and Latlf Khan, after com­
mandeering all the English and Dutch trankeys at Gombroon, 
sailed for JulfSr with 6,000 men. Taqi Khan went with con­
siderable misgivings, and quarrelled with Latlf Khan because 
the latter had persuaded Nadir to undertake the venture. The 
Beglarbegi and the Admiral smoothed over their differences, and 
joined forces with Saif ibn Sultan, whose lack of success.
See C. Guillain’s ^Documents sur l’Histoire, la Geographie et 
le Commerce de 1’Afrique Orientale”, (Paris, 1856), Vol.I, 
page 529*
^ Gombroon Diary, 21st July/Ist August, 1737»
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against his rebellious subjects had forced him once more to 
seek Iranian aid. The combined armies again defeated Balcarab 
ibn Himyar, and occupied the towns of Bahia and Nizwa;^ they 
then advanced to Muscat. The Iranians occupied the town with­
out difficulty, but could not secure possession of the eastern 
and iwestexnforts, although they besieged them for five weeks. 
Taqi KhUn quarrelled with the Imam at Muscat, doubtless because 
of the Iranian attempt to seize these forts. Saif ibn Sultan 
withdrew with his fleet and troops and made terms with Balcarab, 
who promised to assist him against the Iranians.
Taqr Khan, being unable to take the Muscat forts,
likewise
left for Barka at the end of May, but was/unable to obtain pos­
session of the Barka forts. At Barka dissensions once more 
broke out between Taqi Khan and Latlf Khan, with the result that
the former poisoned the Admiral.5 Taqi Khan and his men were,
4it appears, reduced to great straits. After a vain attempt 
to seize Sohar, the Iranians had to retire to Julfar. Mean­
while, disaster had befallen the Iranian garrison which had 
been left at Bahia.
The failure of Taqi Khan to pay and adequately feed 
the Arab seamen (most of whom were Huwalas) led to a serious
^ Salil ibn Razlq, op.cit.. page 142, Guillain, Vol.I, page 529> 
Gombroon Diary, oth/l9th April, 1738.
2
- These forts were known respectively as al-JalaH and MaranI; 
they had been built by the Portuguese.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 26th June/7th July, 1738.
4 ibidem, 13th/24th July, 1738.
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mutiny in the Iranian fleet, and the Iranians, lost for a time 
the command of the Gulf to the mutineers and their allies, the 
Huwala and Omani Arabs. Basidu was raided and the Iranians 
in Bahrain were besieged in a castle, and it became necessary 
for provisions to be sent in English vessels to the troops at 
Julfar.^ *
By the end of 1758 dissensions had broken out amongst 
the Arabs, and in January 1759 the Iranian's, having recovered 
some vessels, defeated the mutineer and rebel fleet, the Arab 
admiral being blown up. In March the Beglarbegi arrived at 
Gombroon with ^positive orders to level Muscatt to the ground.^ 
However, no progress could be made with the conquest of 'Oman 
because Taqi Khan was called away almost immediately in order
4  _  _
to quell a revolt in the Kuhgilu province. After TaqT.Khan
had subdued the rebels in that province, he received, in October
or early November 1759 > the orders to proceed to Sind which
— SNadir had sent to him when delayed at the Chenab.
Having obtained the loan of a large Dutch vessel and 
purchased stores from the English, Taqi Khan left Gombroon on 
the 3rd December for Sind by land via Makran, at the head of
2,000 cavalry. The fleet, which had^aken on board several
^ Gombroon Diary, 26th July/6th August. 1758.
^ Letter from Gombroon to London, 3^st March/11th April, 1759*
5 ibidem. * " * » n
^ ibidem 15th/26th May.
' T.N., page 211. See also page 255 above.
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thousand Iranian troops, sailed the same day.**- A rendez-vous
was made at Gwadar, whence Taqi Elian marched inland to Kesh
where, some time in February, he was heavily defeated by the
2
Baluch tribes, led by Malik Dinar, of Makran• Provisions ran 
short both on shore and in the fleet, with the resiilt that many 
died of starvation. On the 5th/16th April Taqi Khan returned 
to Gombroon from his disastrous expedition "wherein the 
greatest want of Conduct imaginable has appeared".5 ^wo days 
later, the Admiral, Mir ‘All Khan, arrived, looking "greatly 
dejected"; he reported many deaths owing to lack of water and 
food. Towards the end of April Taqi Khan received a curt 
summons from NSTdir to proceed to Nadirabad, where the Shah was 
shortly to arrive. By the lst/12th May the whole fleet had 
assembled again at Gombroon, but it was reported to be "unfit 
for any Enterprise", and fears were even entertained of an 
attack by the Arabs.^
As for Taqi Khan, he was, on arrival at the court, 
severely reprimanded and deprived of his post*
The history of the second faman campaign and subse­
quent operations in the Persian Gulf will be given in Chapter 
XXIII.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th November. See also Otter, Vol.II, 
pages 87 and 88.
T.N., page 214.
* Gombroon Diary, 5th/16th April 1739•
4 " " lst/12th May *
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CHAPTER XX.
The Viceroyalty of Rida Qull Mirza#
The viceroyalty of Rida Qull Mirza is a subject 
that has been much neglected by Iranian iistorians, and some 
of the European writers who have touched upon it and have 
passed judgment upon the Prince1s conduct seem to have done 
so without sufficiently examining the facts.
Rida Qull had undoubtedly inherited many of his 
fatherfs qualities and defects# He was brave and ambitious, 
and he could, at times, be both avaricious and cruel, but the 
blemishes in his character have been exaggerated by such 
writers as Bratishchev and Hanway# The former relates that 
when Nadir made Rida Qull Viceroy of Iran, he arranged that 
no one save Ibrahim Khan should have the right to interfere 
with him in the exercise of his powers; Mirza Mahdi, however, 
makes no mention of Ibrahim Khan being invested by Nadir with 
any overriding authority on this occasion (though Nadir had 
done so in 1736, when Rida Qull was made Governor of Khurasan). 
This point may, perhaps, be regarded as academic, because 
Ibrahim Khan was already dead when Nadir appointed his son 
Viceroy; but Nadir at that juncture was not aware of this 
fact, and Mirza Mahdl’s act of omission might be taken to
 ^See G. F. Muller’s German translation of V# Bratishchev’s 
account, in the former’s nSammlung Russischer Geschiehte®, 
St# Petersburg, 17&3> Vol.VIII, page 465*
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mean that the ShSh conferred unfettered power upon his son.
If this is so, and if one takes into account the fact that 
Rida Qull was N5dir*s favourite son, the young Prince»s 
quasi-regal behaviour as Viceroy does not seem so surprising.
Hanway, in writing of this period, states that Rida 
Qull, "by practising all the acts of cruelty and extortion, 
soon incurred the hatred of the people. In order to cover
1
his rapacious avarice, he took the specious name of a merchant." 
Hanway then mentions Rida Qullfs monopoly of the silk trade.
It is true that Elton and Graeme (who, as will be related 
subsequently, arrived in Gilan in June 1739 with a cargo of 
goods belonging to certain merchants who were members of the 
Russia Company) say that Rida Qull had by his
"Kupeeheens^ become, in a manner, the sole Merchant 
or Trader in all Persia, as none—but the Schah1 s 
Kupecheens could buy any Goods imported. And as 
to Raw Silk, not only the Product of the Province 
of Gilan, but of all the other Provinces that pro­
duce Silk, was wholly engrossed by the Schah.
Hence we, amongst the rest, were obliged to tender 
our Goods to the Schah1 s Kupecheen."
Elton and Graeme, however, later go on to.say that it was
not Rida Qull, but a merchant of Isfahan (whom the Prince had
made his Treasurer) who •engrossed1 to himself all the
 ^Hanway, Vol.IV, page 180. It is to be noted that Hanway 
did not visit,Persia until 1743*
2
See Appendix III. "Kupecheen" is a corruption of the 
Russian word Kytt^ vihA m^anfng Tmerchant1.
3 See Elton and Graemefs "A Journey through Russia into Persia 
by Two English Gentlemen who went in the year 1739 from 
Petersburg, in order to make a Discovery how the Trade 
from Great Britain might be carried on from Astracan over 
the Caspian", London, 1742, pages 26 and 27*
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European imports.^ *
Notwithstanding these restrictions on trade, Rida 
Qull, in response to a petition from Elton and Graeme, gave 
them considerable trading privileges in August 1759* Elton 
and Graeme expressly state:
"that he (RidS Qull) is ready to redress Grievances, 
and encourage..trade, we could produce several Instances; 
witness the Decree ... he so readily granted us, and 
that, it is said, he lately granted to the Armenians, 
which impowers them to carry their Goods to any Market 
in Persia, without regard to the Schah’s Kupeeheens, 
that it is to be hoped the Treasurers Projects are 
near to an end."5
Further, it is important to note that no trading 
monopoly existed in the south of Iran; there is, moreover, 
definite evidence to prove that Rida~QuIi had the interests 
of the people there at heart. When, sometime in 1759* 
Muhammad Taql Khan ordered the Kalantar of Kirman to collect 
and forward to him 1500 tomans in respect of taxes,4 the 
official made representations to Rida Quli, with the result 
that the Prince gave instructions for the order to be can­
celled. Meanwhile, however, the Beglarbegi had forced the 
Kalantar to raise the money; the luckless official, being 
unable to obtain more than a fraction of the amount from the
 ^Elton and Graeme, op.cit*. page 29*
 ^ ibidem, page 45*
5 ibidem, page 52*
4
Volume X of the Bombay Government Public Consultations quotes 
a letter from Gombroon of the 20th March 1739 which states 
that the Beglarbegi had just informed the Agent of his in­
tention to raise 20,000 Tomans, to reimburse himself for 
the expenses to which he had been put in connection with 
the Muscat expedition. ^
2 / 2  • j
populace, had to borrow the balance from the representatives 
of the English and Dutch Companies at Kirman. The Kalantar 
thereupon made further representations to Rida Qull, who 
immediately ordered the Beglarbegi to refund the money, out 
of which the Europeans were to be repaid all that they had 
advanced.'*’
This was not the only occasion on which Rida Qull 
intervened to annul some high-handed action by Taql Khan. In 
the autumn of 1738 the Beglarbegi performed some unspecified 
action that was detrimental to the East India Company. The 
Gombroon Agent referred the matter to Bombay, and the President 
there wrote a letter to NSdir complaining of the Beglarbegi*s 
conduct. This letter reached Iran during Nadir*s absence, 
and was dealt with by Rida Qull. The Prince
nin answer thereto wrote the Agent that He had signified 
our Complaint to the Beglerbeggy who would do Us 
justice: they (i.e. the Agent and Council at Gombroon)
are well informed the Beglerbeggy Is much exasperated 
at this Letter.
In October 1739 Taql Khanfs son was at Isfahan, on 
his way to Rida Qulltg court. It is said that Rida Qull, at 
the instigation of some of the Beglarbegifs enemies, had the
The particulars given above are taken from the Bombay Govern­
ment TPublic Consultations1, Vol.XI, 1740, the entry in 
which is based on a letter from Gombroon of the 28th 
February, 1740. The Gombroon Diary gives no details of 
this incident, but makes (on the 23rd February, 1740) the 
following comment upon Ri<ja Qullfs action: nIt is no un­
pleasant Prospect of what his future Reign may be, to find 
this Prince interest himself so much In favour of his 
Subjects.1
o
Bombay Government ’Public Consultations®, Vol.X, 1739*
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son stripped of his equipage, horses and arms. There can be
no doubt that Rida Qull and Taql Khan disliked each other;
and it is by no means impossible that Taql Khan’s hostility to
Rida. Qull may have been instrumental to some extent in bringing
about the terrible punishment which Nadir inflicted upon him
in 1 *7£2$ this is a point which will be dealt with more fully
in due course.
The outstanding event during Rida Qull’s tenure of
the office of Viceroy was the execution of the luckless ex-Shah
Tahmasp and his family. This cruel act, for which the Prince
was directly responsible, is undoubtedly a great stain upon
his character.
As early as the spring of 1739 it was reported in
Iran that disaster had befSLlen Nadir’s army in India and that
the ShSth himself had perished,^ and other rumours to the same
effect were afterwards repeatedly in circulation; in the
absence, often for long periods, of reliable news, these reports
were widely believed.5 A particularly persistent report of
Nadir’s death reached Iran late in 1739 > and it is said that
Rida Qull feared that the people might rise in favour of Tahmasp
•?
or his son Abbas and restore one or other of them to the throne.
^ Gombroon Diary, 6th November, 1739*
2 -When this rumour reached Isfahan, Otter’s Iranian friends,
fearing the outbreak of disturbances, advised him to leave 
the country. Otter acted on their advice, and left Isfahan 
for Baghdad on the 12th/23rd April 1739 (Vol.II, page 2). 
Bratishchev states (op.cit.. page 470) that the Indians in 
Iran deliberately disseminated false news.
5
Bratishchev, op.cit.. page 470.
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In order to obviate this risk, and to secure the succession 
for himself in the event of the report of NadirTs death prov­
ing to be correct, Ridh Qull gave orders for Tahmasp, his two 
young sons cAbbas and Sulaiirfan, and even, it is said, the ex- 
Shah^ wives, to be strangled.1 All that can be urged in 
extenuation for this terrible act is that Rida Qull realised 
that he would, in all probability, lose not only his right to 
the succession, but also his life, if any Safavl restoration 
took place.
The exact date of this tragic event is not, apparent­
ly, recorded, but it is probable that Rida Qull gave the order 
for the executions before he left Mashhad for the purpose of 
holding his Nau Ruz assembly at Tehran; it may therefore have 
been towards the end of February, 1740.
In the spring of 1740 it was believed in Basra that 
Ahmad Pasha had hopes of securing the throne of Iran for him­
self, should the reports of N£dir!s death prove to be well-
Hazin, pages J02 and 305, rAbdu11-Kar 1m Bukharl, page 46. It 
is probable that Rida Qull believed this report of Nadir1 s 
death to be true; Hanway (Vol.IV, page 208) says that the 
Prince ^received this account with a seeming satisfaction11, . 
but (as usual) he gives no authority for this statement. 
Bratishchev (op.cit.. page 467) states that Rida Qull found 
in Tahmasp the greatest obstacle to the realisation of his 
great* ambition to secure the throne, and that the means by 
which he thought to gain his ends showed his criminal dispo­
sition. Later (page 468) Bratishchev records what purport 
to be the ipsissima verba of Fatima Begum, Rida Qulifs wife 
and sister of the slaughtered ex-Shah, when she reproached 
her husband for his deed. (One cannot help doubting the
accuracy of such citations, because Bratishchev himself
could, obviously, not have been present, and he makes no
attempt, to explain how, he obtainecLhis information). Acco: 
to Bratishchev upage 469J Rida Qull was stung to the ouick 
by his wifejs reproaches ang'.ncut short the stream of her m w^ords ana of .her, life witn^is^sword.11 _ ., . , .
fn  ar £ e t? f r  to ^ o & d o n d a f ic r t f ie
founded.*** It is not known whether there was, in fact, any 
real basis for this belief: as Ahmad PashS. was a very 
ambitious man and had conquered much of Western Iran in the 
troubled period following the Afghan invasion, he may perhaps 
have thought of repeating his exploits, in the event of Nadir’s 
death, and of exercising dominion over the Iranian provinces of 
KirmanshSLh, Ardalan and Hamadan, as well as over the Turkish 
Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra.
Most exaggerated reports were spread at Isfahan and 
elsewhere of the Prince’s object in holding the assembly at 
Tehran, it being said that
”he had summoned all the Cauns and Governors of Persia 
to attend him (at Tehran) as Nadir at Chulamagon (Chul- 
i-Mughan) and was then by order of his Father to take 
upon himself the Absolute Sovereignty as Monarch of 
Persia .....”2
It was later ascertained, however, that RidS Qull’s reason for 
holding this assembly was merely to receive the annual accounts.
Previous to the holding of this assembly, Rida Quit, 
doubtless on receipt of instructions from Nadir, issued a 
proclamation at Isfahan
’’whereby Every body is required to bring Into the King’s 
Mints all Silver Coins that were formerly Current, such 
as abassees, mamoodies and nadirrees and to receive in 
lieu of them rupees being of the same value with those 
he (Nadir) Stamped in India and which are to pass for 
ten shahees Silver each”.3
1 Dorrill’s letter to London, dated the 5th/16th March 1740.
Gombroon Diary, lst/12th April 1740 (on the authority of a 
letter from Joseph Hermet, the Company’s ’’Linguist” at 
Isfahan)•
3 ibidem. 276.
The Gombroon Agent expressed the view that this change would 
have a good effect upon trade, if the exchange continued to 
fall there.^ He went on to say that he had not yet heard of 
any alteration in the gold coin, "nor do we find any of the 
other become so plenty as to be in every Body's hands."
On the 12th/2Jrd March the Gombroon Diary referred
to the "Ease enjoyed by the People from the Suspension of
Taxes by Shaw Nadir and the Flattering Expectations 
they are in of the Young King's Government from 
several Acts of Justice he has shewn."
The people were soon, alas I to be disappointed in so far as
the taxes were concerned; as to Rida Qull, his period of
authority was nearing its end.
Of the lot of the common people and peasantry during
this period there is not a great deal on record, but what there
is makes pathetic reading. In the south the exactions of
Taql KliSn occasioned much misery, and many of the young
recruits enrolled or rather impressed for the c0man expedition
never saw their homes again. As regards the centre and west,
there is Otter's interesting account of his journey from
Isfahan to Baghdad via Kangavar and Kirmanshah. Otter draws
a gloomy picture of the condition of the peasantry; their
state was by no means enviable when he had travelled to
Isfahan with ^ Abdu' 1-BaqI Khan in 1737* but, when returning to
Baghdad two years later, he found that it had deteriorated a 
_  _ _
Gombroon Diary, Stly^ebruary 1740. (on the authority of a 




Although Nadir ordered RidS Qull more than once to 
attend his Court at Herat, the Prince deferred obeying the 
summons for some time, on the grounds that affairs of state 
at Tehran still necessitated his presence there. It is diffi­
cult to say whether this was a genuine excusd or whether it 
was, as has been suggestedmerely a pretext of Rida Qulifs 
to delay meeting his redoubtable parent, because he feared 
that the latter had received unsatisfactory reports of his con­
duct. Rida Qull at length set out from Tehran, at the head of
12,000 picked horsemen and met Nadir at Qara Tappa, In Badgtils, 
on the 26th June.^ Nadir proceeded to review Rida Qullfs 
force and then incorporated it in his own army, leaving the 
Prince without any command. It is said that the reason for 
this action was that Nadir’s suspicions of his son had been 
aroused by the latterfs unauthorised putting to death of the 
ex-Shah Tahmasp.^
At or about the same time Nadir made Nasru’llah Viceroy 
of Iran in place of Rida Qull, and ordered the last-named to 
accompany him on the Turkistan expedition.5 Reports of the
* Otter, Vol.II, pages 13 and 14.
Bratishchev, op.cit.. page 478.
3
T.N., page 217* MIrza Mahdi gives no indication of the 
manner in which Nadir received his son. Bratishchev (page 
478) states that Nadir received the Prince *More with the 
severity (Ernsthaftigkeit) of a powerful sovereign than with 
the friendliness of a father.”
4 cAbduf 1-Earlm Bukharl, page 46.
5 BaySn, fol.38(b). 9t7Q
PrinceTs disgrace were soon in circulation, and reached
1 9Gombroon and St. Petersburg** in August and December respec­
tively.
In the Gombroon Diary, on the 6th/l7th\ August, 1740, it is 
said that a report of the Princefs disgrace had reached the 
town, "which is somewhat surprising, considering the General 
Reports of the Prince*s Conduct seemed to be favourable, but 
it may be to divert the Odium occasioned by the Death of 
Shaw Thomas, the deposed King....."
2 Edward Finch (who was Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
at St. Petersburg from 1740 to 1742) reported, in December 
1740, that Rida Qull had been disgraced, because of his 
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the construction of the Oxus flotilla, he sent a humble 
message to Nadir in India, saying that he was of an ancient 
line of kings (i.e. of ChingTz KKan and his descendants), 
that he was unable to oppose Nadir and that he hoped that 
the Shah would honour him by being his guest. Nadir, in 
reply, thanked him for his invitation to Bukhara, and said 
that, after reaching Herat and Balkh, he would go on to 
Bukhara. In conclusion, he assured Abufl-Faid that he 
had no designs upon his kingdom; he would, however, have 
to punish Ilbars.
Having met Rida Qull MIrza at Qara Tappa, as 
related in the previous chapter, Nadir marched in company 
with him to Balkh via Maruchaq, Chachaktu and Andhkud.
In crossing the desert country many men and baggage animals
"if.
perished through lack of water.^
In accordance with the orders which Nadir had
2
sent from India, the Commander of Balkh had had 1,100 boats 
built by the Indian carpenters and shipwrights. When Nadir 
reached the banks of the Oxus at a point opposite the small 
town of Killf, he found this flotilla in readiness; he then 
gave instructions for corn and stores, as well as cannon, to 
be placed on board. Part of the army was ferried across to
Bayan, fol. 40(a).
T.N., page 217« MTrzE. Mahdl describes these boats as being 
from two to three thousand maunds burden, i.e. from, 
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KilTf, and, when the main body begqn to march downstream 
on the left bank, this detachment kept pace with it on 
the other side of the river.'1' Kirki was reached on the 
27th Jumadl I (20th August); here Muhammad Rahim Bl, the
o
principal minister of Abu’l-Faidf the Governors of Qarshi 
and other towns and the majority of the chiefs of 
Transoxiana came to do homage to Nadir. Nadir, however, 
was not satisfied with this show of submission, and 
determined to continue his advance. He sent Rida Qull 
with 8,000 men on in advance as far as Charjui, and ordered 
his nephew CA1I Qull Khan to patrol the east side of the 
river and to keep parallel with Rida Qull.^
Nadir himself arrived at Charjui on the 8th 
Jumadi II (31st August), and ordered a bridge of boats 
to be made; when this bridge was completed, the army 
crossed over to the right bank of the river.^
The principal nobles of Bukhara again came to 
render homage to Nadir, but the Shah insisted that Abufl-Faid 
must come in person; otherwise the advance on Bukhara would 
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offering resistance, but wiser counsels prevailed; he 
accordingly left his capital and humbly made his submission 
to the conqueror at Qarakul, one stage from Bukhara. On 
the 20th Jumadl II (12th September) Nadir accepted Abu!l~ 
Faidfs submission.1 Nadir, in company with Abufl-Faid, 
went on to Charbakr, a suburb of Bukhara, whence, at the
suggestion of Abufl-Faid, he sent an envoy, in company with
_ 2
two Khwajas of Juibar, to Ilblrs, with a letter summoning
him to come and seek pardon for his wrong doing. When 
Ilb§rs read Nadir1s letter, he was so enraged that he put 
the envoy and the two KhWSjas to death.^
It Is said that Nadir, after having become 
possessed of the wealth of India, looked with contempt upon
4
the paltry possessions of the Bukh&rans. The nasaqchls 
maintained strict order amongst the Iranian troops in the 
city, and the troops were made to pay full value for all 
that they required. The surrounding country was, however, 
ravaged by Qizilbash patrols.^
T.N., page 219, Bayan, fol. 45(b).
2
See Khanikofffs ”Boukhara, its Emir and its People”, London, 
1845, page 254, for a description of the Khwajas of 
Juibar, who formed one of the two religious classes of 
Bukhara.















Whilst at Bukhara Nadir sent to Samarqand for
the tomb-stone of Timur and the bronze gates of the Madrasaj
these were, by his orders, despatched to Mashhad.^
No less than 20,000 Ozbegs and other tribesmen 
of Bukhara, Samarqand and elsewhere in Turkistan were 
enrolled in Nadir1 s army and sent to Khurasan.
On the 15th Rajab (6th October) Nadir presented 
AbuTl-Faid with a magnificent robe and invested him with 
the title of Shah. At the same time, hov/ever, he declared
that Charjui, Balkh and all Bukharan territory south of the
Oxus were annexed to Iran. Having espoused one of Abu1! 
Faidfs sisters and arranged for his nephew cAli Qull Kh&n to 
wed the new Shahfs daughter, Nadir, on the 7th October, left 
Bukhara for Khwarazm. Just previous to his departure,
Nadir sent Tahmasp Khan Jalayir to quell some disturbances 
which, he heard, had broken out in his Indian possessions. 
Tahmasp Khan was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief 
of all the provinces which had been taken from the Mughal 
Emperor.^
I
Bayan, fol. 4 5(a). Gombroon Diary, 27th January/7th February 
1741. This tomb-stone, which was dark green in colour and 
well polished (see Khanikoff, op.cit., page 1J2), was split 
in two in the process of removal (Bayan, fol.45b.)• Nadir 
subsequently sent the tomb-stone and gates back to 
Samarqand. See Barthold, in Zapiski, XXV, pages 85-88, 
on the authority of Muhammad Kazim).
%ayan, fol. 45(a).
T^.N., page 219. According to Fir Ibr&hlm Khan (o p. cit.« 
pp. 27-30)> Tahmasp Khan, when endeavouring to stamp out 
a rising of the Daudputras, was defeated by them and lost 
the bulk of his forces.
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Whilst en route for Charjui, Nadir received 
word that the Turcomans of Khwarazm, who were in great 
force, had joined with a large body of Ozbegs and were 
marching on Charjui in order to destroy the bridge and 
cut his lines of communication.1 Leaving his baggage 
train to follow, Nadir hastened to the river at the head 
of a picked body of troops. Having reached Charjui before 
the enemy could come up, Nadir crossed to the other side of 
the Oxus and prepared for battle. On the following day 
the Turcomans and Ozbegs appeared, but Nadir speedily put 
than to flight.^
Nadir halted for several days at Charjui after 
this battle, in order to enable the rest of the army and 
the baggage train to arrive and to cross the river. Having 
laden the boats with stores and cannon, and sent these on 
downstream, Nadir, on the 28th Rajab (19th October) set out 
for the Deve Boyun ("Camel1s Neck") gorge, where the width 
of the Oxus is reduced by two-thirds.
On reaching Deve Boyun Nadir learnt that Ilbars 
with a strong force was at the strong fortress of Hazarasp, 
10^ miles to the west. On the 16th Shac ban (6th November)
T.N., page 220, Bayan, fol. 47(a).
?ibidem, page 221. cAbduf1-Karim (fol.47b.) states that the 
Qizilbash troops suffered very severely from thirst on 
this occasion, and that, when Nadir was informed of this, 
he had the noses of the two chief water-carriers cut off 













Nadir left his baggage at Deve Boyun, and marched towards 
Hazarasp. He found, however, that Ilbars had filled the 
moat surrounding the fortress with water from one of the 
canals from the Oxus, and that he could not bring his 
artillery within effective range.-1- It being impracticable 
to deliver a frontal assault under such conditions or to 
blockade the fortress, Nadir marched on towards Khiva, 
hoping that the threat to Ilbars1 capital might cause him 
to emerge from Hazarasp. When the Iranian army had marched 
one stage, Ilbars left Hazarasp, as Nadir had hoped, but 
kept close to the Oxus, not daring to give battle.2 A number 
of Yomut and Tekk6 Turcomans, however, advanced to the attack. 
A sharp engagement ensued, which resulted in the rout of the 
Turcomans; those who survived fled to Ilbars, who fell back 
with them towards Khanaqa, another of the fortresses of 
Khwarazm, lying between Khiva and Hazarasp.^ On the following 
day Nadir advanced on Khiuiaqa and defeated Ilbars1 men;
Ilbars himself and the survivors took refuge in Khanaqa, where 
they were soon rigorously besieged. The fortress was heavily
T *  " I I - - I. 1- n-
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bombarded for three days and mines were also employed to 
destroy the walls. When, on the 24th Shac ban (14th 
November) the Iranians were preparing to deliver a general 
assault, the garrison, together with many of the Ozbeg 
chiefs, offered to surrender. Ilbars himself, however, 
remained obdurate, and stayed within the fortress until he 
was, at Nadir* s orders, seized and forcibly removed.
In consequence of Ilbars* contumacy, NSdir had him strangled 
a few days after the fall of KHanaqa, together with a score 
of his chiefs.  ^ Nadir then installed Tahir Khan, a descendant 
of Chingiz Khan, as Vail of Khwarazm and appointed a number 
of suitable persons as his principal officials.^
When Ilbars had realised that he was in real 
danger from Nadir, he had sent to Abu*l-Khair Khan, the 
chief of the Little Horde of the Qazaq, for assistance.^
In response to Ilbars* appeal, Abu*l-Khair, with a mixed 
force of Qazaqs and of Ozbegs from the neighbourhood of the 
sea of Aral, advanced to his aid, and occupied Khiva.
T^.N., page 222. According to cAbdu* 1-KarTm BukHarl (page 49) > 
Ilb&rs himself asked for, and was granted, quarter. When, 
however, the relatives of the murdered Khwajas demanded 
retribution for the blood of the latter, Nadir gave orders 
for Ilbars and 21 of his principal officers to be put to 
death.
2





lends a From there Abu*l-Khair sent as his envoy to NSdir a
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he trusted more than his own chiefs.-^  Muravin, on being
brought before Nadir, informed the Shah that Abu*l-Khair
offered to submit, and that he wished to be allowed to
become Khan of Khiva. Nadir treated Muravin graciously
and charged him to request Abu*l-Xhair to come in person
to his court where he would be received and rewarded as a
subject of the Empress of Russia, with whom he (the Shlh)
2
wished to remain on peaceful and friendly terms. Muravin 
returned with this message to Abu*l-Khair, but the Qazaq 
chief, either because he feared to trust to Nadir*s word 
or because of a plot hatched by the people of KhTva, fled 
back to his horde on the Qaz*aq steppes.5
After the flight of Abu*l-Khair, the people of 
Khiva decided to resist Nadir, and refused to yield when
e resist- he summoned them to surrender. Khiva, like Hazarasp, was 
| of Khiva.
a fortress well-known for its strength and was surrounded
See the "Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz 
Kazaks", (Ferry de Pigny*s French translation of 
A. Levshin* s OtineAme. kwprio'b-
KAvtcA1 v< opAl> M cTeiretf page 194. Muravin and two
other Russian engineer officers named Gladishev and 
Nazimov had been sent by the Russian Government, at the 
request of Abu*l-Khair, to examine the site for a 
fortress at the mouth of the Sir Daria (see Howorth*s 
"History of the Mongols", Vol. II, pp. 913 & 914)*
’Levshin, pp. 194-195* 
L^evshin, page 195*
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by a deep moat. The Iranian troops drained away the 
water from this moat by means of ditches, and bombarded 
the fortress from all sides, 
of their obduracy and surrendered.
In Khiva and elsewhere in Khwarazm Nadir discovered 
no less than 12,000 Khuras'ahls imprisoned or enslaved. He 
ordered all these people to be provided with horses, baggage 
animals, food and money, and assigned to them as their place
_ o
of residence a town at Chashma-yi-Khalanj an which he had 
ordered his Indian builders and craftsmen to erect on the 
model of Delhi.5 This town was afterwards re-named 
Khlvaqabad. 4
Amongst the slaves in the hands of the Khlvans 
were ten Russians; Nadir liberated these men and gave
T.N._, page 223. Levshin (page 195) states that the Russian 
Tatar Zhanaiev, who was in Khiva during the siege, wrote a 
report thereon which is (or was) to be found in the 
archives of the Orenburg Frontier Commission.
2
The correct reading of this name is difficult to establish; 
it is given as above in my MS., as TTKhilIjanT in the Bombay 
edition of the T.N.(page 223), and as "Gelenjiah" by Jones 
(Vol.XII, page 28).
^Bayan, fol.57(b). cAbdu! l-Xarlm Kashmiri states here that 
Nadir first called this place Mauludgah, but the real 
Mauludgah (i.e. Nadir1s birth-place) was just outside 
Dastgird, in Darragaz. %bdufl-Karlm is doubtless correct 
in saying that Nadir sent many of the people of Khiva as 
slaves to Khlvaqabad, so that they might experience the 
treatment which they had meted out to their Iranian captives
4The name is sometimes written as Khlva-abad (it is from a 
misreading of the form Khlvaqabad that Gladwin gets his 
"Jieyookabad”. E. 0TDonovan, who visited the ruins of 
Khlvaqabad in 1880, gives a description of them in his 
book TTThe Merv Oasis1’, Vol.II, pages 78 and 80.
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them 50 roubles and a horse apiece to enable them to reach 
their own country; they ultimately reached Samara in safety, 
under the leadership ofthe Russian Tatar named Zhanaiev. 1
Nadir detached a force of only moderate strength 
to support Tahir Khan; in order to strengthen the latter^ 
position, he compelled the local chiefs to swear allegiance 
to the new Vail. 2
Having spent several days in settling the affairs 
of KhwHrazm in this fashion, Nadir left KHIva on the 17th 
Ramadan (6th December) for Charjui.^ From the latter place, 
the army marched across the desert to Merv; as water was 
extremely scarce on this route, Nadir had previously made 
elaborate arrangements for sufficient supplies to be available*4 
From Merv NTadir proceeded via Kalat, Mayab, his own 
village of Kubkan, Khabushan and Radkan to Mashhad; he arrived 





T.N., page 224. The reason why Nadir did not leave a larger
force is, according to MIrza MahdT, that he felt that the
people of Khiva would be unable to bear the burden of
maintaining it.
^T.N., page 224.
‘S’or details of these arrangements, see Bayan, fol. 48(a).
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The Daghistan Campaign and Relations with Russia
(1741-1745)
Nadir remained for nearly two months at Mashhad. 
Before leaving that city for Daghistan, he entrusted the 
affairs of Khurasan to Nasrurllah Mfrza* Since there was 
a dearth of supplies on the NIshapur-Sabzavar route, Nadir 
decided to march westwards via Khabushan, Astarabad and 
Ashraf. Accompanied by Rida Qull MTrza^ Nadir left Mashhad 
on the 26th Dhu!l-Hijja (14th March 1741), and a week later 
spent the Nau Ruz atcAliabad, in the Khabushan district.
From there he marched via Simalqan through the Giraili 
country and then, in pouring rain, down the Gurgan valley.
In this valley the conditions were very similar to those 
experienced in that of the Kurram; the river had to be 
crossed no less than 25 times; as before, many of the baggag 
animals perished from drowning and others from lack of fodder 
In time, however, Astarabad and then Ashraf were reached, and 
the march was continued through Sari,''Aliabad and Zlrab 
towards the Gaduk pass.
^It is known that Rida Qull accompanied his father on this 
journey; this disproves the truth of AbduTl-Karlm1s 
assertion that the Prince was disgraced at Mashhad for 
some unknown reason and exiled to Tehran.
2
T.N., pp. 226 and 227* See also Bayan, fol. 61(b).
On the 28th Safar 1154 (15th May 1741), Nadir, 
after crossing the Talar river by the Pul-i-SafTd, some 20 
miles north of the Gaduk pass, in the thickly-wooded Savad 
KQh district, was proceeding along a narrow road, accompanied 
by his haram and the quruqchls (ijarailL guards) ; the troops, as
tempt on was usual, were some distance away. Suddenly, a marksman
idir's life
sar Pul-i- hidden behind a tree some twenty paces from the road fired
id. 15 th
y, 1/41. at Nadir as the latter passed; the bullet, after grazing
Nadir’s hand and wounding him in the thumb, embedded itself
in his horse’s neck. The animal fell to the ground, bringing
the Shah down with it; it is said that Nadir, with great
presence of mind, lay still on the ground, feigning death,
and so escaped a second shot. For a moment, all was confusion,
but, when it was seen that Nadir was not seriously hurt, the
eunuchs and quruqchls, headed by Rida Qull Mlrz"a (who had
hastened up with the rearguard), made a prolonged search in
ilure of the adjacent forests. No trace of the would-be assassin
forts to .
ick down could, however, be found, and the march was resumed after a
would-
f assassin, brief delay.
1
T.N., page 228. According to cAbduf 1-Karim Kashmiri, there 
were two men waiting in ambush; when Nadir approached, they 
rushed out, one of them firing at him. NSdir, who was 
slightly wounded, at once flung himself off his horse, 
feigning death, and the two men, thinking that they had 
killed him, ran away. (Baygn, fol. 64aJ. In this 
connection, see also Bratishchev, Sammlung, Vol.VIII, 
pp. 485 and 484, but his account is too fantastic to be 
taken seriously. As will be seen below, the culprit was 
eventually found to be a man named Nik Qadam, one of the 
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Well would it have been for Iran and also for 
Nadir’s reputation had that bullet found its intended mark. 
Nadir was then at the culminating point of his career.
Besides delivering his country from the yoke of the Afghans, 
he had humbled the Turks, caused the Russians to give up 
all the Iranian territory remaining In their power after 
their voluntary evacuation of GTlSn, and had subdued the 
Bakhtiarls, AbdalTs and Ghilz^is; also, he had despoiled 
India, and conquered Turkistan, while his troops had seized 
part of Arabia. All that remained to be done to satisfy 
his ambition was, first, to avenge the death of his brother 
by the reduction of the LazgTs, and secondly, to achieve the 
complete humiliation of Turkey. As will be seen, his 
attempts to realise these remaining aims were not only 
unsuccessful, but they caused untold suffering and loss, 
particularly to Nadir’s own subjects.
Prom the Gaduk pass Nadir proceeded to Tehran, 
where he gave audience to Kalushkin, the Russian Resident; 
the latter had just received orders from St. Petersburg, 
to assure the Shah of Russia’s friendly intentions. This 
action was necessary, because Khulafa, the Iranian Ambassador 
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false reports that were very unfavourable to Russia.
Kalushkin was also instructed to ascertain and report 
upon Nadir’s real intentions.
Kalushkin reported to St. Petersburg that the 
Shah was very independent and that it was much more difficult 
to speak to him than it had formerly been. "The new 
Nebuchadnezzar has been rendered quite mad by his triumphs.
He says: TIt was not difficult for me to conquer all India
If I move with only one leg I take India; if I move 
with both legs, I shall conquer the whole worldl1" Although 
Kalushkin found that NSdir was hostile to Turkey, he could 
not be sure that he would always remain friendly to Russia?
After a brief halt in Tehran, Nadir proceeded to 
QazvTn, where he arrived on the Jlst May. It is noteworthy 
that Rida QulT was left behind at Tehran; it does not appear 
to be known whether the Shah already suspected him of having 
instigated the attempt upon his life or whether the Prince 
was still in disgrace because of his behaviour when Viceroy.^
"^ Soloviev, Vol.XXI, pp. 84 and 85.
^Soloviev, Vol.XXI, pp. 84-86.
^Mlrza Mahdl merely says (page 229) that Rida QulT was ordered 
to remain in Tehran, "of which province the revenues were to 
be his." Bratishchev (op.cit.« page 487) relates that Nadir 
treated the Prince kindly at Tehran, and that he gave him no 
post and left him behind, as he wished to free him from the 
toils of the forthcoming campaign. Nadir, however, ordered 
two of his trustiest eunuchs to remain with the Prince, 
ostensibly to look after his health and safety, but really 
to spy upon him.
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Giv Amilakhor and another Georgian chief came to 
Nadir at QazvTn and informed him of the situation in Kartli. 
When he heard of the ravages of the LazgTs in that country, 
Nadir was furious and swore that he would punish the people
I of Daghistan. Nadir made Giv Amilakhor Eristav of Ksan,
and sent a force of Afghans and other troops to that district,
where much fighting took place.^
adir pro- Having spent fifteen days in QazvTn, Nadir set out
eeds to _ _
aghistan. in person for Daghistan via Qaraja Dagh, Bardac a and the
district of Qabala.
It will be recalled that when Nadir was at
Nadirabad in May 1740 he ordered the Abdali chief cAbdu» 1-
Ghahi Khan and his brother-in-law Fath CA11 Khan to go to
Shir van and to cooperate with the army commanders in Georgia
and Adharbaijan in suppressing the Lazgls of Jar and Tala
9during the autumn and winter. For some unrecorded reason, 
cAbdu!l-Ghanl Khan and the other commanders did not launch 
their attack on the Lazgls until March 1741. After severe 
fighting, the LazgTs were defeated and many were forced to 
submit.
Details of this minor campaign are given by Papouna Orbelian 
in H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 58-6I.
2
See page 280 above.
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When Nadir reached Sttlrvan, large numbers of 
Lazgis came to offer their submission. The salutary 
lesson just given to the tribesmen of Jar and Tala, followed 
by the advent of the Shah at the head of his army of some 
150,000 men^ - doubtless induced these LazgTs to take this 
course.
Nadir marched on northwards, and by the 1st Jumadl I 
(14th August) he had penetrated to the town or village of 
Ghazi Qumuq, in the heart of Daghistan.
It was at Ghazi Qumuq that the unwelcome news 
reached him that a mixed force of Ozbegs, Aral Tatars and
Qazaqs had invaded Khwarazm, captured KhTva and put to
Khan o
death Tahir Seg and his supporters.
At the beginning of Rajab (12th September), Nadir 
left Ghazi Qumuq with the intention of reconnoitring the 
borders of Avaria. In view of the lateness of the season, 
it seems doubtful whether Nadir seriously contemplated forcing
1 ~  ' ’
Bazin, who was at Darband in October 1741 when Nadir arrived 
there, gives the strength of his army then as 150,000.
He states that it was composed mainly of Indians, Qzbeg 
Tatars and Afghans and that there were but few Iranians. 
Bazin thus comments on the small number of Iranians: t!il
(i.e. Nadir) sgavoit que les peuples naturellement attaches 
It leurs Souverains, ne suivent quflt regret un Usurpateur, 
et quTils ont pour le trahir l’exemple que lui-meme leur 
a donn£.n (See Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 288).
^T.N., page 229-
his way through the mountains at that time and occupying
the whole country. However that may he, the severity of
is com- the weather, together with the obstinate resistance of the 
i lied to
sndon his mountaineers, forced Nadir to give up all idea of advancing 
tempt.
further northwards and compelled him to turn eastwards and 
make for the Caspian coasti Had Nadir begun his march on 
Avaria a month or so earlier, it is possible that he might 
have forced his way through the formidable mountain barrier 
to Khunzakh, the Nutzalfs capital; by so doing, he would 
have had the key of Daghistan in his hands. With the 
Shamkhal Khass Fulad, Surkhai, and the Usmi and other chiefs 
all in chastened mood, and the strength of his army still 
unimpaired by the hardships and losses of a protracted campaign 
in exceedingly difficult country, Nadir would have stood a 
much better chance of success than he did in the following 
year. The consequences of an early settlement of the 
Daghistan problem might well have been most important. With 
his military reputation unblemished and his array intact and 
flushed with successes in India, Turkistan and Daghistan,
Nadir would have proved an even more formidable opponent to 
the Turks than he did in 1743. It is not unlikely that N&dir,
I ~ “
T.N., page 230, Bratishchev, page 489* Butkov does not 




Instead of attacking Turkey, might have made a determined
attempt to wrest Kizliar and Astrakhan from Russia;"* that
power, being taken by surprise, with many of her troops
withdrawn from the southern frontiers in order to strengthen
her forces then engaged in the war with Sweden, might have
had serious difficulty in parrying a sudden thrust by Nadir.
Nadir, as will be seen below, afterwards seriously contemplated
an attack on his northern neighbour, but the opportunity of
doing so with a reasonable chance of success had passed.
iraqaitaq When Nadir was at Chiragh, on his way back to the
jibesmen
'.tack Caspian coast, he heard that the QarSqaitaq tribesmen had
ldirf s
•oops. attacked some of his troops in the thick forest country,
killing many of them and capturing part of their baggage.^
The bold Tatars also hovered around his own force, skirmishing
and attacking the convoys; one night they even raided NUdir’s 
jjdir' s rage, own quarters. NSdirfs rage at this incident was such that he
had a number of his own officers and men put to death; 3 he
then swore that he would not quit Eaghistan until all the
rebels had been forced to submit.^
Kalushkin had already made some disquieting reports to St. 
Petersburg regarding Nadir1s attitude towards Russia; in 
this connection, see page 295 above.
T^.N., page 2J0. Bazin (page 290) states that the Lazgls had 
at first only thought of submission; when, however, they 
saw that, after submitting, their folk were exiled to 
KhurUsan and were stripped of all their possessions, and 
that their families were ruthlessly slaughtered by N&dir If 









NSdir reached Darband on the 5th ShacbHn (l6 fch 
October); leaving his baggage in the tom, he hastened 
off to attack the Qaraqaitaq tribesmen. In order to 
counteract the LazgT raids, Nadir had forts built through­
out the Shamkha^s territory, stationed from 2 to 5 
farsakhs apart.^
On the 10th Ramadan (19th November) Nadir 
returned from his expedition, having apparently failed to 
achieve his object. 2 As there was plenty of water and 
forage available at Dasht-i-Kafari, 3 farsakhs north-v/est 
of Darband, the Shah established his winter quarters there.- 
The provisioning of so large an army in a country 
that consisted, for the most part, of forests and mountain 
crags presented serious difficulties. Little food was 
procurable in the neighbouring province of Shlrvan, because 
of the repeated ravaging to which it had been subjected, 
and Kartli4and Kakheti were in a similar state. The only
T.N., page 230.
>
As Mlrza Mahdi is silent as to the result, one is justified 
in inferring that it was unfavourable.
T.N., page 230, Butkov, Vol.I, page 212.
Papouna Orbelian states that so heavy a tax was levied on 
Kartli in 1741 that many persons fled to Turkey, while 
others wilfully devastated their own lands.
(H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages 57 and 58.)
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solution was to procure supplies by sea. Having already
a fleet on the Persian Gulf, Nadir determined to have one
on the Caspian as well; the great difficulty, of course,
was to obtain the vessels. There were already some Iranian
vessels in service, but these were small and of primitive
design and build; 1 further, the Iranians were almost
entirely unskilled in navigation. Nadir is said to have
sent to Surat for ship-builders and sailors, in order to
2remedy this deficiency.
Until he could get ships of his own, Nadir had, 
therefore, to depend almost entirely on Russian traders 
for his sea-borne supplies; many of these traders made 
vast profits.^ When Kalushkin informed Nadir of the 
accession of Elizabeth Petrovna, after the coup d*4tat of 
the 6th December, 1741, the Shah replied that he was very 
glad to hear the news, since the throne of Russia belonged
■ J
Captain Woodroofe’s Journal, in Hanway, Vol.I, page 149- 
Such vessels as the Iranians possessed had been built, for 
the most part, by Russian deserters or renegades.
See Hanway1 s hitherto unpublished letter from Astrakhan to 
his principals, dated the 7th/l8th November 1744, and the 
Memorial from the Russia Company to Lord Carteret, dated 
the 13th/24th January 1744 (S.P.91* Vol.XXXVI.) In the 
Memorial It is stated that Nadir took this action "long 
before Mr. Elton ever was in Persia", (i.e. before, 
presumably, Elton arrived in Iran for the second time, in 
June 1742). Nothing seems to have been done in Surat to 
comply with this request of Nadir1 s.
"'Hanway appears to be in error in asserting (Vol.IV, page 225) 
that these Russian merchants were not allowed by law to sell 
supplies to the Shah, as Butkov (Vol.I, pages 2l2 & 510) 
says that the Russian Government only permitted merchants 
of Russian nationality to despatch food supplies to the 
Iranian ports on the Caspian.
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to her by right, as the daughter of Peter the Great.
Nadir then gave Kalushkin a coat of honour and a thousand
(asks Russia roubles, and requested him to arrange for the loan of ten lend himvessels. Russian vessels, some of which would be used in his
operations against the DaghistSn rebels and some for the
transport of supplies from Astrakhan. Kalushkin, in
transmitting this request, warned his Government that, if
Nadir were lent these vessels, he would never return them,
as he was most anxious to have a fleet of his own. In
ssia refuses consequence of Kalushkin* s warning, the Government refused 
i accede to ,
Mir1 s to accede to Nadir*s demand. Nadir, however, as will be
I pest.
seen below, was able later to obtain the nucleus of his
Caspian fleet from an unexpected quarter.
The festival of Nau Riiz was celebrated at the
camp in the customary fashion.
lir»s According to MIrzS Mahdl, Nadir, at this time,
iention to fully intended to abdicate in favour of one of his sons and 
licate.
to retire to Kalat, as soon as he had come to a final settle­
ment with Turkey.^
Before opening his campaign in the spring, Nadir 
sent his agents northward to Enderi and Kostek, in the 
country of the Qumiqs, to purchase supplies and horses, but








these tribespeople angered the Shah by charging exorbitant 
prices, and by taking part in robberies, besides helping the 
Lazgis. 1
At the end of May 1742 Nadir marched against the 
rebels of Tabarsaran. It is said that he made three attacks 
on these tribesmen in considerable force, but in each case he
was unsuccessful, and on the last occasion he barely escaped
9__________________________________with his life. Surkhai and the Shamkhal Khass Fulad were
with Nadir most of the time, and tfin the performance of their
3
service made no fault”; the Usmi, on the other hand, renounced 
his allegiance, and retreated to his strong castle of Quraish.
It was in July 1742 that the connection began 
between Captain Elton and the Iranian Government which was 
destined to have such unfortunate consequences for the Russia 
Company and to end in disaster and death for Elton himself.
At the end of June in that year the vessel which 
Elton had just built at Kazari^ for the conveyance of the British 
merchantsT goods between Astrakhan and the Iranian ports on 
the Caspian arrived at Enzeli on her maiden voyage. She
I ~ ~ “  ~ ’ ~
Butkov, Vol.I, page 212.
^ibidem, page 213* See also Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 200.
^T.N., page 235*
4The circumstances under which the trade connection between 
Great Britain and Iran via Russia was established afe 
described in Appendix III.
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carried a composite crew of Russian and British seamen and 
was commanded by Captain Woodroofe; Captain Elton was also 
on board. When her cargo of English goods had been discharged 
at Enzeli, for disposal in Iran, the vessel was taken into 
the service of the Iranian Government, and was used on two 
occasions in 1742 for the conveyance of rice to Darband; 
the troubles that arose with the Russians in consequence of 
these voyages and of other actions of Elton1s will be described 
in Appendix III. By utilising this British vessel for the 
transport of rice from Iran, Nadir was able, to some extent, 
to break through the monopolistic "ring" formed by the Russian 
traders for the conveyance of foodstuffs by sea to his forces 
in DlTghistSn; this was undoubtedly the initial reason for 
the development of the crisis between the Russian Government 
and the Russia Company, and was the cause of Elton and Woodroofe 
meeting with such hostility from Russian officials at Resht and 
Darband in 1742.
In consequence of repeated attacks by the D&ghistanls,
s camp Nadir, in July 1742, made an entrenched camp in the north of
an
Tabarsaran, near Gubden, where, it is said, he intended to 
found a town. 1 It was only with the greatest difficulty that
I
Butkov, Vol.I, page 21J.
504.

















provisions could be brought to this camp; besides being 
short of food, the Iranian troops and convoys were subjected 
to frequent attacks by the LazgTs, Qaraqaitaqs and other 
hostile tribesmen* In consequence of the sufferings of 
his men and their heavy losses through casualties and wastage, 
Nadir cynically called his new camp "Iran Kharab" or "ruined 
Iran".! h^e great heat and the badness of the water ther^ 
caused some form of plague to break out, which particularxy 
affected the Afghan troops. So serious did this outbreak 
become that Nadir transferred the sufferers to another camp 
some thirty miles to the north, near Buinaq, and forbade 
anyone to mention the epidemic.^
Kalushkin had repeatedly endeavoured to convince 
the Shah that the Daghist^n campaign would have evil 
consequences for Iran, but NSdir paid no heed to his words. 
Being apprehensive lest Nadir should violate Russian territory, 
Kalushkin urged his Government to reinforce its troops on the 
frontier; the Russian Government did as he recommended, 
thereby, as will be seen below, causing Nadir to modify his 
aims. Soon after making this recommendation, Kalushkin;died; 
he was succeeded as Resident by his interpreter Vasili 
Bratishchev.^
T
Butkov, Vol.I, page 21J, Lerch, in Blischingfs "Magazin",
Vol.X, page 399•
2
Butkov, pages 21J and 214.
S^oloviev, Vol.XXI, page 201.
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By degrees the Iranian troops obtained the ascendancy
over the tribesmen in Tabarsaran, and Nadir therefore decided
to make another attempt to conquer Avaria and also to punish
the Qumiqs, although the latter step would involve crossing
the Russian frontier. Hearing that a strong force of Russians
had reached Kizliar, Nadir abandoned his idea of attacking the
Qumiqs, but he persisted in his design against the Avar s. ^
After an initial defeat, the Iranians captured Aq
Qusha in August 1742, and advanced on Avaria and Kafir Qumuq
via GKazanish.2 An advance-guard 6,000 strong was ambushed
by the Lazgls in a defile, and was compelled to retreat after
sustaining heavy loss. The SKS.h, in a paroxysm of rage, gave
orders for several of the officers of the defeated force to be
put to death. In September, Nadir himself led the advance,
and employed no less than 5,000 men with axes to clear a track
through the jungle^ At one village, which was, apparently,
near the Avar-Qoisu, the Iranians met with a severe check, and
were compelled to retreat.4 Avaria continued unconquered, and,
1
Butkov, Vol.I, page 220. Bratishchev reported that Nadir was 
less truculent after he had heard of the arrival of Russian 
reinforcements on the frontier (see Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 201).
2 —Butkov, Vol. I, page 215. For an explanation of how Kafir
Qumuq received its opprobrious name, see Barthold1s article
on D^ ghistltn in E.l, Vol.I, page 890.
^ibidem.
Shis may possibly have been the village of Arakani where,
Mr. J.F.Baddeley has informed me, there is a local tradition 
that Nadir was never able to advance beyond that point, owing 
to the brave resistance of the inhabitants.
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consequently, the key to Daghistan remained heyond NSdir’s 
reach. It was, apparently, at this juncture that another 
Iranian force climbed the mountain on which the Usmifs 
stronghold of QUraish was situated, and in three days carried 
the fortress by assault. Ahmad Khan, however, succeeded in 
making his escape before his stronghold fell, and fled to 
Avaria. The Qaraqaitaq tribe, having lost their main fortress 
and being deprived of their leader, submitted to the Iranians.
In October, Nadir retreated from the borders of 
Avaria, and marched via TarkhH and Bashli to Iran Kharab, where 
he made his winter quarters.
It was at Iran Kharab that the terrible incident of 
the blinding of Rida Q u H  Mfrza took place.5 Many versions 
of the events leading up to the tragic finale exist, and the 
actual facts are difficult to ascertain. It appears that 
Nadir’s would-be murderer was tracked down near Ob^and taken 
into custody some months after the perpetration of the outrage. 
The man, Nik Qadam by name, was in due course brought to the 









man stated that he alone was responsible for the attempt.
MIrzS Mahdl states that the instigator of the 
crime was Aql MIrz3, the son of DilSvar KKSn of the Taymaril, 
and that Nik Qadam was one of Dilavar Khan's guards.^ A 
number of writers have asserted that the person really res- 
ponsible was Rida Quir MTrza, but it has never been proved 
conclusively that the Prince was guilty. Bazin firmly asserts 
that he was innocent, and adds "mais au Tribunal d'un Usurpateur 
le soupgon vaut la preuve."^ Further, in the concluding portion 
of the TS’rtkh-i-Nadirl, which MIrza Mahdl wrote when he no 
longer had any reason to withhold or distort the truth, It is 




Hanway, Vol.IV, page 210; Bayan-i-Waqic, foil.64(b) and 65(a), 
Bratishchev, pages 477 and 478 (for the plot which, this 
writer alleges, Rida Qull MIrzS, his maternal uncle Lutf 
*A1I Khan and a certain Muhammad Beg Afshar hatched, see 
page 477). fAbdufl-KarIm’BukKarl, who also believed in the 
Prince's guilt, states (page 49) that Nadir's suspicions of 
his son were first aroused when, after discovering that Nik 
Qadam was the culprit, he recollected that Ri£S Qull had been 
riding with Hazara Muhammad Khan TayimanI at the time of the 
outrage.
3
Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 292. Lerch also believed 
in the Prince's innocence (see Biisching's T,Magazin'T, Vol.X, 
page 400.)
4
T.N., pages 262 and 263.
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evil whisperings and imputations”^ of malicious persons* In 
this connection, it should be borne in mind that Rida Qull 
had made a deadly enemy of TaqI Khan ShlrazI;^ it is therefore 
possible, and even highly probable, that Tacff KK§n, who 
possessed great influence with the Shah, may, through his 
friends at court, have calumniated the Prince when he knew 
that he had already incurred his fatherfs displeasure and 
aroused his suspicions by his conduct as Viceroy*
The terrible remorse which Nadir afterwards 
undoubtedly felt may have been due to a belated realisation 
of the innocence of his son.
Bazin relates that the blinding was carried out in 
the presence of a number of nobles. Afterwards Nadir held 
that they had committed a crime by not offering themselves 
in place of his son, and caused fifty of them to be strangled
1
”Wasawis va tawahhumat”. Malcolm (Vol.II, page 97) remarks
that Nadir ”is believed to have had no evidence of his sonfs 
guilt but his own suspicions?. Lower down on the same page 
Malcolm adds that Nadir1s lack of success against the LazgTs 
”had increased the natural ferocity of his temper; and, 
listening to the enemies of Reza Kooli, he, in a moment of 
rage, ordered him to be blinded.” In a footnote relating 
to this passage, Malcolm says: ”1 have conversed with the
descendants of several of Nadir*s chief omrahs, who all 
concurred in the truth of Meerza Mehdi*s statement of this 
fact.”
2
See pages 2Kf'3 and above.
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in his presenceNadir is said to have been so overcome
with grief after the terrible scene that he retired to his
tent and remained there for three days.^
Malcolm, quoting from some unspecified Iranian MS.,
states that after Rida Qull had been blinded, Nadir said that
his crimes had forced him (Nadir) to take this dreadful
measure. The Prince replied: f,It is not my eyes you have
put out, but those of Persia.”5
In November 1742, Nadir set out again northwards.
He had, it appears, the intention of crossing the Terek
when it was frozen and of marching on Kizliar, to which place
he laid claim, on the grounds that it had formerly belonged 
to Iran. In taking this decision, NSdir was influenced by
Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, page 292. Bratishchev (pages 495- 
502) gives a detailed account of RidH QulITs attitude when 
urged to confess and of the meting but of the punishment; 
this authority states (page 498) that Nndir at first ordered 
the Prince to be beaten, and that he only gave the order for 
him to be blinded after an assembly of nobles and mullas had. 
by a majority vote, recommended the infliction of this penalty; 
a minority urged that Rida QuIT should be put to death. Both 
Bratishchev (page 501) and Papouna Orbelian (H. de la G., Vol. 
II, Part II, page 70) state that Nadir caused his brother-in-law, 
Lutf CA H  Khan, to be blinded as well as Rida QuIT Mlrza.9 *
^Bratishchev, page 505.
M^alcolm, Vol.II, page 97* and Matlacu* sh-Shams, Vol.II, page 17« 
See also Hanway, Vol.IV, page 211.
^Butkov, Vol.I. page 220. According to a letter from St. Peters­
burg, dated the end February 1745* which was published in the 
London paper nThe Daily Post” on the 21st of that month, news 
had been received at the former capital that Colonel Selenski, 
the Commandant of the fortress of Kizliar, had been brought in 
irons to Moscow because he had "given assistance to the Rebels 
of Daghestan against Schach Nadir, which was the Occasion of 
that Monarch1 s advancing towards our Frontiers and was given 
him on that Head.”
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messages which he had just received from the ruler of the 
Chechens, stating that he wished to become an Iranian subject 
and offering to show him routes by which he could invade 
Russia. Nadir also, it appears, had the design of forcing 
his way through to the Crimea?-vl§. Kabarda and Kuban.
It seemed for a time as if war between Iran and 
Russia was inevitable.2 Bratishchev, in reporting to St. 
Petersburg the warlike intentions of the Shah, said that 
Elton had offered to lend his vessel to Nadir in the event of 
war breaking out between Iran and Russia.5
Russia, having for some time past been apprehensive 
of a-ihostile move by Nadir, had considerably strengthened her 
troops on the southern frontier. Furthermore, since Turkey 
and Iran wished to attack each other by marching through the
1
Butkov, Vol.I, page 220, says that Nadir ordered the route from 
Enderi to the Cherkass country and the Crimea to be surveyed.
2
In Lord Carteret*s despatch of the 15th/26th February 1743 to 
Sir Cyril WIch, It is stated inter alia:- "The French flatter 
themselves there must be a war with Persia (I.e. between 
Persia and Russia), and rejoice much in it. They have a 
notion that the present Sophy has long had an Eye to the 
Russian Dominions and did formerly demand the present Empress, 
when Princess, in Marriage, for himself or Son, but being 
refused and so disappointed of coming to the Succession that way, 
He will try to obtain his end by conquest." (S.P.91> Vol.XXXIV).
^Soloviev, Vol.XXI, page 202. Neither Woodroofe nor Hanway 
mentions this offer of Elton*s, but it is possible that it 
may have been made. Elton at that time (December 1742/
January 1743) had certainly reason to complain of the treat­
ment to which Woodroofe and he had been subjected by the 
Russian officials in Iran.
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northern Caucasus, Russia took special measures to ensure 
the friendship of the people of Kabarda.^ However, the 
menacing attitude of Turkey towards Nldir prevented hostilities 
from breaking out between Iran and Russia. The Shah had 
received several reports of the movement of large Turkish 
forces towards the Iranian frontier; the arrival of a Turkish 
embassy at the Iranian camp early in 1743, with a message from 
the Sultan in which he categorically refused to recognise the 
JacfarT sect or to agree to the erection of the additional 
column or pillar in the Kacba, caused Nadir to renounce his 
idea of Invading Russia and to decide on war with Turkey 
Instead. 2 On the 15th Dhufl-Hijja 1155 (10th February 1743), 
Nadir set out on his southward march.5 He left the Abdall 
chief cAbduf 1-GhanT in command of the Darband garrison. 4
The mountaineers of Daghistah had proved more than 
a match for the conqueror and his veterans. All that Nadir
1
For particulars of these measures, see Butkov, Vol.I, page 224.
2
T.N., page 236. The Shah*s decision naturally came as a great 
relief to the Russian Court. On the 12th/23rd March 1743 
Sir C. WIch reported to Whitehall: "Proof of the Russian
Court1 s being not apprehensive is that the nine regiments sent 





had been able to do was to subdue the lowlands of DSghisfSn 
and capture a few isolated fortresses such as Quraish. The 
cost to Nadir in terms of man-power, as well as in material 
resources, was very heavy, and his prestige naturally 
suffered greatly.
In blizzards and extreme cold, the Iranian host 
dragged its way southwards towards the Mughan steppes. The 
troops suffered terribly from hunger as well as from cold, 
and were even reduced to the extremity of eating pies made of 
human flesh.1 So many men and animals died on the road from 
the Samur to Shabran that it was strewn with bodies and 
carcasses.2 The difficulties encountered and the hardships 
suffered on this terrible march are evidenced by the fact 
that it took no less than forty days for the army to go from 
Darband to the Kura.^
1





Iranian Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1740-1744, 
and the secondcOman Expedition#
In Chapter XIX the history of the Iranian operations 
in the Persian Gulf andc0man was taken down to May, 1740, when 
the Iranian fleet had reassembled off Gombroon after the 
abortive expedition to Makran.
The Arab crews of the vessels were in a very discon­
tented state, as their pay was again greatly in arrears and 
they were receiving insufficient rations. Matters came to a 
head early in September, when a general mutiny broke out at 
Laft, where the fleet then was; the mutineers killed the 
Admiral, Mir eAll Khan and all the Iranians that offered resist- 
ance, and then removed the entire fleet to Khor Fakkan; some, 
of the vessels were afterwards taken to the island of Qais.
The Gombroon Agent thus comments on this mutiny: . .
n...unless the Arabs are brought back to Obedience We 
believe it has entirely Frustrated his Majestie(s 
great Scheme of a Fleet, since these are the People 
who could only have been brought to accomplish his 
purpose, the Persians being entirely Averse to, as 
well as Ignorant of, Sea Affairs which indeed the 
Scituation and Nature of their Country, not productive 
of any one Requisite for the Purpose, seems to dis­
allow....^
A few days later the new Admiral, Mahmud TaqT Khan 
by name, arrived at Gombroon, After requesting the Agent to
 ^Gombroon Diary, 26th August/6th September, 1740; Otter, 
Vol.II, page 130.
2
Gombroon Diary, 26th August/6th September. 1740.
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arrange for the sale of a large ship, the Admiral wrote to 
the ringleader of the mutineers urging him and his associates 
to submit to the East India Company; the Agent also wrote to 
the same effect, and the trankey conveying these letters 
sailed under English colours.^ *
Without waiting for a reply, the Admiral forced the 
Dutch to lend him two of their ships which were then anchored 
off Gombroon. The Admiral boarded one of these ships and 
sailed off, in company with the other, as well as some smaller 
vessels, to attack the Arabs. An engagement took place with 
the Arabs early in October in which neither the Dutch nor the 
Admiral distinguished themselves.^ Later in the month the 
Admiral quarrelled with the Dutch, and placed armed guards on 
their vessels. Meanwhile, the mutineers and the Huwala Arabs 
roved where they pleased in the Gulf; they appeared off Cong in 
November, and in the following month they made a further 
attempt to conquer Bahrain.
When Nadir heard of the mutiny and the Huwala revolt, 
he sent orders for 6,000 men to be collected and 15,000 tomans 
to be raised, and endeavoured to purchase more vessels at Surat;
he is said to have ordered no less than 11 ships from there in
1741.5
^ Gombroon Diary, 14th/25th September, 1740.
2 For particulars of this action, see the Gombroon Diary, 12th/
23rd October, 1740, and Saldanhafs Selections from State
Papers11, page 55* An English gunnei; who was on board one of
the small vessels, made a full report to Gombroon.
5 See H. Dodwell’s reference, in nA Calendar of the Madras
Records 1740-1744W (Madras 1917)# page 235# to a letter from 
Stephen Law, etc. at Bombay to Fort St. George, dated 9th 
December, 1741.
By March 1741 the Arabs had, as usual, fallen, out 
amongst themselves, and some of them opened negotiations with 
the Government* In May a newly-purchased vessel arrived 
from Surat
Early in September it was reported that Nadir, in 
his determination to have a fleet, had ordered carts to be made 
for transporting timber from MSzandaran to the Gulf.^ Later 
in the year a large consignment of this timber reached Isfahan
en route for the coast; it was said that the Shall had given
/
orders for some ships to be built at Bushire nof One hundred 
Guz Shaw or upwards of Three hundred English feet length by the 
Keel and proportionate Dimensions; one particularly is to have 
500 (sic) guns and to bear his (NadirTs) Name, and they are to 
be supplied with Workmen and Stores from the Europeans•
Shortly after, the Agents of the East India Co. and 
the Dutch Company each received a raqam from Nadir ordering him 
to send
wthree knowing Men, Carpenters to Effect a purpose he has 
of building Ships at Boucheir, and That we also supply 
the People with what Stores they may want on a receipt 
given us for which We are to be paid their Value by the
Beglerbeggy  But if We fail in this Service, He
shall let us feel his Displeasure.n
The Agent thus comments on Nadirfs shipbuilding project:
nBut what probability there is of such mighty Affairs 
being accomplished may in part be guessed at by the
* Gombroon Diary, l7th/28th May, 1741.
2 n 11 25th August/5th September, Bazin, page Jl8.
 ^ n * 27th November/8th December.
means they are obliged to use for procuring Timber 
Bringing it near Sixty Days on Men’s Shoulders from 
Mazanderoon, and They must come at every other 
Material with equal difficulty.”
Time was to prove the wisdom of these words* Nadir had a
cannon foundry erected at Bandar cAbbas, where two copper
cannon were cast in September 1741; iljwas intended to cast
2
no less than 300 for the fleet.
In October the Iranian/ SardSr seized tv/o Dutch 
ships at Gombroon, and went to attack the Arab mutineers and 
rebels on the island of Qais. After some 500 Iranians had 
been landed, the Arab fleet appeared. In the ensuing engage­
ment the Arabs were getting the worst of it when the Sardar 
was killed through the bursting of a gun on his vessel* The 
Iranians, in dismay, then broke off the battle, and left the 
unfortunate landing party to its fate.
At the beginning of January 1742 tv/o ships arrived 
at Gombroon from Sind which the East India Co. had procured 
for NITdir, and another vessel was acquired at Bushire by an 
’unauthorised1 purchase.^
Events: in^Oman were now once more to lead to Iranian 
Intervention in that country. After the Iranians had, as 
related in Chapter XIX, been forced to retire to Julfar in 
1738, the Imam Saif ibn Sultan was for some time supreme.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 13th/24th September.
2 ” ” 19th/30th October. Otter’s version of this
engagement is inaccurate.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 27th January/7th February 1742.
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His licentious ways, however, estranged many of his subjects,
•»
and, in February 1742 they again broke into open revolt, 
deposed Saif, and conferred the Imamate on his cousin Sultan 
ibn Murshid. Saif, as before, appealed to the Iranians for 
aid, and Taql Khan sent a favourable reply. The opposition, 
however, seemed likely to be strong, because the Huwala Arabs 
had Joined the supporters of Sultan ibn Murshid.
As the Huwala Arabs had seized Khasab, near Ras 
Musandam, the Iranian garrison at Julfar marched on the 
Huwalas there in April 1742 and inflicted a crushing defeat 
on them. Shaikh Rama, one of the principal Huwala leaders, 
was killed in the battle, and over 500 Arabs were captured.^ 
On the 10th/21st June the Iranian fleet sailed for Julfar
4
carrying reinforcements and stores; but it was not until the 
following November that Kalb CA1T KhAn, the Sardar of the Hot 
countries, crossed over to the Arabian shore. He was follow­
ed 5 weeks later by Taqi Khan himself. By this time the 
Iranian fleet had been further strengthened by the arrival of 
four new ships from Surat.
According to Shaikh Abu Sulaiman (see Guillain, Vol.I, page 
555), the date of Sultan ibn Murshid fs elevation to the 
Imamate was the 10th Dhu’l-HiJ Ja, 1154 (16th February, 1742) 
Salll ibn Razlq is obviously wrong in saying (page 145) 
that SultAn ibn Murshid became ImAm in 1151 (1/58/9) I It
is clear'from the Gombroon Diary that the revolution took 
place earlyin 1742., because the Agent or the J3.1.Co. re­ceived a letter at the beginning or April or that year from 
the Beglarbegi asking for ships to take troops across to 
the assistance of S&If ibn Sultan. See also Otter, Vol.II 
page 165•
2 Sultan ibn Murshid fs mother was a daughter of Saif Ibn 
Sultan I. (Guillain, Vol.I, page 555)*
5 Gombroon Diary, 19th/50th April, 1742, Otter, Vol.II,page I69.
4 n 10th June, 1742s Otter, Vol.II,page 168,,says
that Taql Khan, on this occasion,* sent 6.Q00 men to Julfar 
In response to the deposecLJkQamis appeal for assistance.
TaqT KhSn, on meeting Saif ibn Sultan at JulfTr, 
concluded a treaty whereby he undertook to restore him to 
the ImSmate if he would, in return, recognise the suzerainty 
of Iran. The allies then proceeded to attack Sultan ibn 
Murshid and his adherents.^ * While a portion of the Iranian 
army, under Kalb CA1T KhSh, laid siege to Sohar, the Beglarbegi 
and Saif ibn Sultan proceeded by sea to Muscat, which was 
still held by partisans of the ex-imam.^ The Iranian troops 
were able to go where they wished in the town, but Saif ibn 
Sultan refused them access to the forts of Al-JalalT and 
Marani. Taql Khan resolved to get possession of these forts
by foul means if he could not&o so by fair. Knowing the
/
weakness of Saif ibn Sultan for drink, the Beglarbegi had 
brought a cask of ShTr5z wine from Iran. When invited, with 
some of his officers, to a banquet in Marani fort, TaqT Khan 
brought this cask of wine with him, and succeeded in making 
Saif and his officers completely drunk; this, it appears, was 
no difficult proceeding in so far as Saif was concerned.
Whilst Saif and his officers were lying insensible, TaqT Khan 
and the Iranians with him secured possession of the fort with­
out difficulty or bloodshed. The Beglarbegi then stole Saif»s 
seal and affixed it to an order which he had had written in 
Saif*s name, to the commander of the fort of al-JalalT, 
charging him to admit the Iranian troops. The Arab commander,
1
Guillain, Vol.I, page 536, Otter, Vol.II, page 16J.
2 » " page 537*
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suspecting nothing, obeyed, the order. When Saif recovered 
his senses, he found, to his dismay, that both forts were in
T
the possession of the Iranians.
It being useless to attempt to regain the forts,
Saif decided to continue the war against Sultan ibn Murshid.
Sohar was very ably defended by the Governor, Ahmad 
ibn Sa^Id who, as will be seen below, later founded the Al-Bu 
Sacld dynasty of Muscat# Taql Khln and Saif ibn Sultan ad­
vanced against Sultan ibn Murshid, who, finding his forces 
out-numbered, retired towards Sohar, where he hoped to be able 
to break through the Iranian lines and join Ahmad ibn SacId. 
Sultan ibn Murshid succeeded, apparently, in entering Sohar,
o
but he was killed soon after, when leading a sortie# Ahmad,
however, continued bravely to resist the Iranians until July,
when, having begun to run short of food and munitions, he
deemed it expedient to come to terms#5 The siege had lasted
for seven or eight months, and had cost the Iranians over 5000 
men.4 _______________________ _ __________________
This is the story as given by Niebuhr, in his Beschreibung 
von Arabien, (page 5°0); Guillain gives a slightly differ­
ent version. The Agent of the E.I.Co. at Gombroon received 
a letter from the Iranian Government on the l8th February 
1745 stating that the Beglarbegi had captured Muscat# 
Reports of Taql Khan’s subterfuge must have been spread 
abroad, for the Agent added that it was supposed that the 
place had been taken nby dealing underhand with the Imam’s 
slaves to deliver him the forts#1
^ Guillain, Vol. I,;b page 558* Some uncertainty exists as to
whether Sultan/Murshid was killed in this way or whether he 
perished when attempting to force his way through the 
Iranian lines#
5 Gombroon Diary, 21st July, 1745- The news of the capitula­
tion was received in Gombroon by trankey from Sohar on that 
day# See also Niebuhr’s Beschreibung von Arabien page 501.
4 Gombroon Diary, 21st July# SalTl ibn RazTq’s account of the
siege (page 140) is grossly exaggerated, and Otter’s state­
ments (vol.II, page lol) are incorrect.
Shortly after the death of Sultan ibn Murshid.0 *
Saif ibn Sultan, being overcome with grief at witnessing the 
state to which his own behaviour and acts had reduced his 
country, left the Iranians and retired to Rastaq, where he 
died a few days later. Thus ended ingloriously the Yatriba 
dynasty of^Oman.^
It is to be noted that, if Saif Ibn Sultan had 
succeeded, with the help of the Iranians, in getting himself 
reinstated as Imam and if he had then accepted, as he had
agreed to do, the suzerainty of Iran, Zanzibar and the
—  2 dependencies of^Oman on the African mainland would ipso
facto have likewise formed, in theory at least, part of 
Nadir*s empire.
Ahmad ibn SacId managed to ingratiate himself with 
Taql Khan to such an extent that he not only managed to obtain 
confirmation of the position as Governor of Sohar, but also 
had Barka added to;his domains.^
It is stated in the Gombroon Diary that 3,500 re­
cruits were to be sent over to Arabia, to replace those who
had lost their lives at Sohar and elsewhere,
1 the King having ordered that when they were Masters of
the Sea-Shore to march inland and it is supposed his
 ^Guillain, Vol.I, page 538.
2 —The internal troubles in6Oman had, however, led to a weaken­
ing of thec0maril authority in East Africa, which resulted 
in the loss of Mombasa (which the Portuguese temporarily re 
gained) in 1733 - see 0. Kersten*s **Tabellarische Uebersicht 
der Geschichte Ostafrikas1*, pages 17 and 18, in Vol.Ill of
Baron von der Deckenfs ^Reisen in Ost-Afrika®, Leipzic,l879
5 Guillain, Vol.I, page 538, Niebuhr, page 301, Salll ibn 
Razlq, pages 149 and 150. 32I.
Designs are to conquer the whole Country, but while 
he is doing this he is destroying his Own, and Nothing 
but Misery, Tyranny and Oppression are to be seen or 
heard in these Parts, the People being daily tax’d 
(so) that before Time is given for collecting one 
Another is laid on.11^*
Meanwhile, the war between Iran and Turkey, which 
had been threatening for so long, at last broke out* Never­
theless, NSdir did not order the withdrawal of his forces 
from^Oman, with the exception of some vessels which were at 
Sohar; it appears that he intended to use these vessels in
9
the combined land and river operations against Basra*
For some time past there had been serious friction
incOman between Taql. Khan and KalbCA1I, and each sent to Nadir
accusations against the other. Nadir was greatly displeased,
and ordered the recall of his brother-in-law; he appointed
Muhammad Husain Khan Qirqlu, who had just returned from a
mission to Russia, to succeed him as Sardalr of the GarmsTrat.^
Nadir was also displeased with Taq^ I Khan, whose recall he
ordered almost immediately afterwards;^ according to MIrza
Mahdl, Kalb ‘All/and Tacfl Khan were recalled simultaneously.5
Early in October Muhammad Husain Khan Qirqlu, the new Sardar
of the Hot Countries, parsed through Gombroon on his way to
Sohar•*> *
T
Gombroon Diary, 21st July/lst August, 1743*
2 w n 24th August/4th September. These vessels
must have arrived too late to participate in the initial 
operations (for particulars of the siege of Basra, see the 
ensuing Chapter^.




TaqT Khan, with part of the fleet, arrived at 
Gombroon on the 20th November/Ist December, and was followed 
a few days later by Kalb‘All Khan; the latter secretly in­
formed the Company1 s ’linguist1 that Taql Khan had actually 
revolted and that he had spent several days trying to persuade 
him (Kalb^ AlI) to join in the revolt* Ta<fl Khan had the ex- 
Sardar strangled a few days later and caused his body to be 
thrown down a well;*** he then publicly raised the standard of 
revolt and marched off to Shiraz* The measures which Nadir 
took to quell this revolt will be given in the following Chapter; 
all that is necessary to say here is that Nadir was so occupied 
in suppressing Taql Kh&n that he was unable to pay any attention 
to c0man* When the Shah had overcome Taql" Kh&n, he became so 
taken up with the prosecution of the Turkish war that he was 
likewise unable to concern himself with affairs in^man. In 
consequence, the Iranian garrison there received no reinforce­
ments* The able Ahmad ibn SacId took advantage of this 
situation. One of the conditions of Ahmad’s settlement with 
the Iranians at Sohar had been that he was to pay them tribute 
regularly. After the departure of Taql Khan, Alunad, however, 
failed to make his payments on the appointed dates, alleging 
that he had no means of sending the money to Muscat. As a 
result, the commanders at that place became short of money and
were unable to pay their troops, many of whom consequently 
2
deserted. Having invited these commanders to Barka, on the
^ Gombroon Diary, 30th December, 1743 / 10th January, 1744.
2 Ni^ bijihj’s ”Bes^^eibung von Arabien”, page 302, Guillain,
pretext of arranging for the payment of the tribute due, he
seized them and the soldiers who had accompanied them. Ahmad
then proceeded to Muscat and summoned the Iranians there to
surrender, offering them money if they yielded of their own
accord, with the alternative of imprisonment if they did not.
Being deprived of their leaders and short of provisions, and
having no hope of being able to resist Ahmad, the majority
surrendered. It is said that Ahmad put some of the Iranians
to death, but allowed the others to return to Iran."** In this
way, Ahmad became master of the coast from Muscat to Sohar;
later he extended his sway over the whole country, with the
exception of Julfar and a small strip of adjacent territory
2which the Iranians managed to retain for some years. Having 
expelled the invaders and restored order in rOman, Ahmad had 
no difficulty in inducing the chief Qadi to arrange for his 
election as Imam, thus founding the Al-Bu-SacId dynasty, which 
rules in Muscat to this day. The election of Ahmad to the 
Imamate is said to have taken place in the latter part of 1744
In so far as Iran was concerned, thecOman campaigns 
had proved a costly failure. At least 20,000 men had perished
** Niebuhrfs nBeschreibungn, page 5^ 5* Salll ibn Razlq’s 
account (pages 155 and 154; of Ahmad’s treachery to the 
Iranians and his subsequent massacre of them seems much 
exaggerated.
^ Entries in the Gombroon Diary show that, as late as 1748,
ships carrying men and provisions were being sent over from 
time to time to Julfar.
5 Guillain, Vol.I, page 542, and Kersten’s nTabellarische
Uebersicht11, page 18. Salll ibn RazTq states (page 152) 
that Ahmad ibn SacId became Imam in 1154 A.H. (1/41/1742; 
but this is clearly impossible. ^ 4
either in battle or from the ravages of disease,^ but this 
heavy sacrifice brought no commensurate advantage. Like 
the Daghistan campaigns, but on a lesser scale, thecOman 
operations imposed a prolonged and useless drain upon Nadir1s 
resources, and the efforts to provide men and material to 
carry them on caused much privation and suffering in Southern 
Iran.
Nevertheless, success would certainly have been 
attained had Nadir, instead of entrusting the supreme command 
to the corrupt and inefficient TaqI Khan, given it to some 
honest and capable military leader like Tahmasp Khan Jalayir.
For 'Oman the results were vastly different. Although 
the Iranian invasions entailed for a time much loss and hard­
ship to the inhabitants, they brought about the union of the 
conflicting interests and led directly to the supersession of 
the decadent Yacriba dynasty by that of the Al-Bu SacTds.^
Nadirfs bid for sea-power, like his attempts to con­
quer 'Oman, ended in nothing. Nevertheless, the great and 
persistent efforts which Nadir made to acquire and maintain a 
fleet are most remarkable, particularly as he himself had no 
personal experience or knowledge of the sea and as the vast
^ There are several references in the Gombroon Diary to heavy 
wastage from disease in the Iranian armies inc0man.
2 R. Said Ruete, in his lecture to the Central Asia Society in 
19299 pointed out that the Al-Bu SacXd dynasty achieved 
power by driving out the Iranians just as the Yacriba 
dynasty had previously done so by expelling the Portuguese. 
See the Journal of the C.A.S., Vol.XVI, Part IV, page 419*
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majority of his subjects were ill-fitted, by inclination, 
upbringing and environment, to become seamen. By means of 
purchase, Nadir built up a fleet of JO vessels in the Gulf, 
but it seems to have achieved but little after 1743, and its 
condition progressively deteriorated. The fantastic attempt 
to build ships at Bushire with timber from Mazandetran ended 
in August 1743, when orders came from Nadir for work on the 
large vessel to be stopped, owing, it appears, to peculation 
on the part of those in charge of the construction?*
Gombroon Diary, 24th August/4th September 1743* Sir W.
Ouseley saw the remains of this vessel when he arrived at 
Bushire in March l8ll. (See his "Travels in Various 
Countries of the East, more particularly Persia," London, 
1819# Vol. I, page 180.) The construction of this large 
vessel involved the death of a Fleming named La Potterie. 
This man was resident at Isfahan and Nadir insisted on 
him going to Bushire to supervise the construction of 
the vessel. La Potterie protested that he knew nothing 
of ship-building, but his objections were disregarded.
The poor man was so troubled by his new duties that his 
health became 'undermined. He at length got leave to return 
to Isfahan, but died en route, in August 1742 (see A.
Martineau, "Le premier Consulat de France h Bassora (1739- 
1745), in the Revue de lfHistoire des Colonies Franpaises, 
Paris 1917* pages 411 and 412.
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CHAPTER XXIV,
The Turkish War. I. The Mesopotamian Campaign.
Turkey like Russia - and indeed Iran itself - re­
ceived but little authentic news of Nadir during the 
conqueror*s absence in India. The relations between Turkey 
and Iran remained in the same anomalous state as they had 
done since 1756* There was no real peace, for the treaty 
had not been ratified; there was merely a prolonged cessa­
tion of hostilities. It was natural that the Sultan and 
his advisers should feel some anxiety lest Nadir, if he 
returned victorious from India, should renew the war; they 
were well aware that NsTdir would not scruple, if occasion 
arose, to use as a pretext for reopening hostilities the 
failure to reach agreement on the religious questions. How­
ever, whilst the SttAh was so far away, ahd particularly when 
persistent rumours arrived of his defeat, the Porte felt 
that the danger, if not entirely removed, had become remote. 
The relief felt by the Porte in this respect was reflected 
in its relations with Russia and Austria. The Treaty of 
Belgrade had been signed on the l8th September 1759> but when 
difficulties arose in connection with the fulfilment of 
certain of the terms of settlement, the behaviour of the Porte 
was anything but conciliatory. However, a sudden change in 
the attitude of the Porte towards Russia and Austria was
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noticeable when it became known in Constantinople that Nadir 
was at length on his way back from India, and the difficulties 
with the two Christian Powers were smoothed over.^
In January 1741 the Iranian Ambassador, Hajji Khan 
Chamishgazak, with an enormous retinue, made a most imposing 
entry into Aleppo.  ^ Three months later he reached Constantin­
ople, where he was received by the Grand Vizier. Hajji Khan!s
fhaughty and contemptuous carriage1 on this occasion and his 
obstinate refusal to discuss with anyone but the Sultan the 
objects of his mission gave great offence.^
After being given an audience by the Sultan, the 
Ambassador discussed the religious questions with the Turkish 
ministers and ulama. The views of the Porte remained un­
changed in this respect, but it was not deemed prudent, at 
that juncture, to refuse outright to accede to Nadir*s demands. 
The Porte therefore replied evasively that action would be 
taken in accordance with the precepts of the true law.^
Since the Ambassador had not been given full powers
to conclude peace and since it was not altogether clear from
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 36 •
2
See ^A Relation of what passed at Aleppo on the occasion of 
the Arrival of Hadjy Khan, the Persian Ambassador to the 
Ottoman Porte1*, in S.P.97* Vol.XXXI.
3
For details, see Sir E. Fawkenerfs despatch of the 23rd MarclV 
3rd April 1741, and **The Daily Post** of the 26th May.
A ,
Von Hammer, Vol. XV, page 41.
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the messages which he brought whether Nadir desired peace or 
war, it was decided to arrive at no settlement with Hajji 
Khan, but to send an embassy to Iran* The ambassadors 
selected were Munif Efendi, a high official of the Treasury, 
and NazTf Mustafa Efendi, the director of the Constantinople 
Customs.^ * This embassy reached Nadir’s camp (some 11 miles 
north of Darband) in January 1742.^ The Turkish envoys 
delivered a message from the Sultan in which the latter made 
excuses for his inability to accede to the Iranian religious 
demands. Nadir replied that he wished that the Sultan would 
recognise the Jacfari sect, since his (Nadir’s) fundamental 
object was to tighten the cords of friendship. As the matter 
of this fifth sect contained the elements for the pacification 
of the Muslim state, and as the Sultan was Caliph of Islam, 
Nadir would, he said, go in person to Turkey in order to 
achieve finality regarding the question. ®I am hoping that 
if Allah wills, the matter may be arranged there on my arrivals 
With this threat Nadir concluded his reply.
religious policy the semblance, at any rate, of hieratic appro­
bation, Nadir convened an assembly of the gulama, under the 
presidency of the Mulla-Bashi, gAlI Akbar. The ^ulama knew 
what was expected of them, and obediently confirmed the fatwa
Feeling that it would not be amiss to give his
2
T.N., page 2^1* Nazlf’s name is wrongly given as Latlf in the 
Bombay edition. 1
Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page^42, where Munif Efendi is stated 
to have been
of 1736 regarding the establishment of the Jacfar"l sect, the 
erection of the fifth pillar in the Kacba and the abjuration
c 1of the Shi a heresy.
Nadir, although he had thus flung down the gauntlet 
to Turkey, was unable, for some thirteen months, to put his 
threats into execution, owing to his being kept fully occupied 
by the Lazgis .and their allies in Dlghistan.
Notwithstanding the repeated reports of Nadirfs 
reverses in Daghist&n, the Porte was alarmed when, early in 
April 1742, Munif Efendi and Nazlf Efendi returned to 
Constantinople with Nadir !s reply and their information as to 
his threatening attitude.
Reports from the Turkish commanders on the frontier 
confirmed the information brought back by the Ambassadors, and 
active preparations for war were made.
When informing Whitehall of the above developments, 
Sir E. Fawkener added that there was a great lack of provisions 
near the frontiers.
”This war,” he said, is on all accounts very unseasonable 
for it finds the Turks still panting under the fatigues 
of the last with the Christians, and with the remem­
brances still fresh of the difficulties and hazards of 
the past Persian Campaigns, the Country yet feels the 
heavy effects of them, and is so exhausted as to be 
very ill-provided for the subsistence of Armys. There 
is also such an indisposition in all sorts of People to 
go that way, that it will be no easy matter to draw 
together an Army of any consequence......*2
^ T.N., pages 232 and 233*
Sir E. Fawkener's despatch of the 8th/19th April.
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As the year wore on, additional news was received 
of Na&ir’s difficulties in Daghistan; consequently the 
Porte became rather less apprehensive.
A curious incident is recorded in the Gombroon 
Diary. On the 24th May/4th June 1742 it was stated that
®Shaw Nadir would send an Embassadour to the King of 
England in order to engage a firm alliance with him, 
that He, the King, was informed Our King (whom it seems 
he mistook for the Emperor) had had some Part of his 
Territories wrested from him by the Turks, Wherefore 
he would join with us against them and wanted to know 
whether we thought our King would be induced to 
hearken to his Propositions.1
The Agent replied that this matter was nan Affair of
Kingdoms and foreign to our Purpose11 and that it concerned
another ruler. Moreover, the Turks were the friends of the
British. The Agent concluded nWe find they (i.e. the
Iranians) are entirely strangers to what lyes without them.*1^
The Porte held grave doubts as to the loyalty of
Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, and it is said thatcA!T Pasha did his
9
best to blacken his enemy’s character. The truth of the 
matter was that N£dir certainly had a great regard for Ahmad 
PasKA? which the latter reciprocated, but there is no proof
Nevertheless, Nadir, by means of his numerous embassies, was 
very well informed of the situation in both Constantinople 
and St. Petersburg.
2 Otter, Vol.II, page 359*
Otter, (Vol.II, page 184) states that he was informed by an 
Iranian that Nadir once asked some of his courtiers who, in 
their opinion, was greater than he was. The courtiers re­
plied that they knew of no one who was even his equal.
Nadir then said ’’You are wrong. Ahmad Khan, the Governor 
of Baghdad, is assuredly greater than I, since he has main­
tained himself for so long between tiro enemies as strong as 
myself and Sultan Mahmud, and he does what he wishes with
that Ahmad would really have betrayed his country and become
as Fasha of Baghdad, where he ruled almost as a sovereign, 
many days* journey from Constantinople; under Nadir, the 
authority of the Crown would have been a reality, instead of 
a mere shadow.
horses, mules and camels, although they must have realised 
that these animals would be of great use to the Iranians when
Early in 174J, just before Nadirfs departure from 
Daghistan, a further Turkish embassy arrived at his camp, and 
delivered a letter from the Sultan, in which the last-named 
excused himself once more for his inability to agree to 
recognise the Jacfarl sect and to authorise the erection of 
the fifth pillar in the Kacba. In reply, Nadir informed 
the Sultan of the impending advance of his nworId-conquering
army.^
Longrigg, in his ®Four Centuries of. Modern Iraq11, (page 161) 
states that there is, in recorded facts, ®no justification 
for the odious nickname of fNidhamuf1-Mulk$f bestowed by 
his detractors®. (Otter, on page 565 of his second volume, 
says that the Kahya of Mosul, when in conversation with him 
in June 17^ 3, referred to Ahmad Pasha as Ba second Nizamu’l' 
Mulk ,^ and alleged that the* Pasha was the true author of 
all the troubles that were then about to afflict the countryl
 ^Otter states (Vol.II, pages 247 and 248) that all the time 
that he was at Isfahan and Ba§ra, that is for some 6 years, 
this traffic had been in progress.
^ T.N., page 237*
a henchman of the Shahfs;^ he was too fond of his position
Many Turks and Arabs in Mesopotamia did not scruple 
.rgefsums of money by supplying N^dirfs agents with
o
at length hostilities with Turkey began again.
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Then followed the terrible inarch to the Mughan plain,^  
where a halt -for 20 days was made to enable the men and 
baggage animals to recover. After this respite, the march 
was resumed via Hashtarud and Qara Chaman; passing within 
four farsakhs of Tabriz, the army continued southwards to 
Marivan, where the Princes Nasrufllah, Imam QulX and Shahrukh 
joined it from Mashhad on the 24th Raba? II (l8th May) • An 
ambassador from Muhammad SKah arrived in company with the 
Princes, and brought with him a number of costly gifts. Nadir 
then resumed his march to Sinandij.
The renewed threat of war with Iran made Turkey 
more inclined to be friendly with, or at any rate, not hostile 
to, Russia. The news of the sending ofthe Russian reinforce­
ments to Astrakhan and Kizliar had, for a time, alarmed Turkey, 
as it feared at first that these forces were to be used against 
her, in conjunction with Nadirfs hosts. This fear proved
groundless, but Turkey continued to act with circumspection
2in so far as Russia was concerned.
Nadir, before leaving Daghistan, had sent envoys 
to Ahmad Pasha demanding the surrender of Baghdad. The
Pasha, on receiving this message* sought to gain time by send-
 ^See page 313 above.
 ^Stanhope Aspinwall (who became Charg^ d!Affaires on Sir E. 
Fawkenerfs departure on leave from Constantinople in 
November 1742/* reported on the 8th/19th July 1/43 that the
Turks dare not alarm Russia, Bmuch less hold a stiff or
threatening style with, lest She might be provoked to re­
taliate It upon them, in the end, by joining the Persians, 
an Apprehension which has been long thought here more than 
chimerical.” (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII).
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ing word to Nadir, through his Kahya, Muhammad Agha, that he 
wished to maintain friendly relations with him, but that he 
could not surrender Baghdad until the end of his term of 
office; the Sultan had appointed him, and he had to do his 
duty. Ahmad concluded by asking for a respite.^ *
Muhammad Agha delivered this message to Nadir at
Sinandij; the Shah received it in good part, but despatched
several bodies of troops to seize Samarra, Hilla, Najaf,
Karbala, and otto places in Mesopotamia. Nadir, at the
same time, appointed Qoja Khan Shaikhanlu, of the Chamishgazak
tribe to command the forces that were to besiege Basra; the
Shah ordered the Governors of Sbarvan, Huwaiza, Shushtar and
Dizful and the Arabs in those parts to cooperate with Qoja 
2Khan. The siege of Basra by these forces will be described 
later in this chapter.
On the 1st July NSdir sent Nasru’llah and the other 
Princes to Hamad an. He then gave the Mughal Ambassador leave 
to return, and handed to him many gifts for the Emperor.^
T.N., page 239* Sulaiman Sa’igh states, in his HTa’rlkhu’1- 
Mausil (Cairq, 1923), page 278, that Ahmad Pasha resolved to 
adopt a cunning policy, and sent word’to Nadir that he 
should in the first place conquer Mosul and that he would, 
on his return, find the gates of Baghdad open. According 
to Von Hammer (Vol. XV, page 57) 9 Ahmad Pasha wrote to one 
of Nadir’s advisers that he had proposed to the Porte that 
two eminent lawyers should be appointed to find a solution 
of the difficult question of the Jacfarl sect; if Ahmad 
Pasha actually made any such proposal, he doubtless did so 
with the knowledge that it would be rejected; all that he 
wished to do for,the moment was to gain time, in order to 
gather in the harvest and accumulate stocks of provisions.
2 T.N., page 239*
3 ibidem.
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Since Nadir contemplated going into winter quarters 
in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, he gave instructions for 
quantities of corn to be collected in the Shahrizur district
for despatch later to his camp.*** ^
Nadir marched■: through the Shahrizfir with Kirkuk as 
his immediate objective. Khalid PS'sha, a member of the well- 
known Baban family, who was Governor of the ShahrizSr district,
fled before him; Nadir paused to appoint as Governor Khalid’s
2 —  —  cousin Salim. Previous to Khalid Pasha’s flight, Ahmad
Khan, the (Iranian) Governor of Ardalan, had fled with some
500 followers to Join the Turks.5 It is said that his failure
to pay a large sum to Nadir was the reason for his defection.4
Muhammad 'Agha was then sent to Constantinople with
Ahmad Pasha’s report on the situation.
On the 14th JumadT II ,(5th August) , Nadir and his
army appeared before Kirkuk.5 The garrison retired to the
citadel and refused to submit. When, a week later, Nadir’s
artillery arrived, he bombarded the citadel from all sides and
forced the defenders to yield after the siege had lasted for
9 days.^
^ T.N., page 239* Von Hammer (Vol.XV, pages 69 and 70) says 
that Nadir’s seizure of corn while oiuhis march to Kirkuk 
caused a severe famine at Baghdad.
2 T.N., page 240.
^ Muhammad SharTf’s ’’Zubdatu’t-Tawarikh-i-Sinandiji”, fol.210(a)
4 Otter, Vol.II, page 280.
^ T.N., page 240.
6 See M.H.Pdgndm’s French translation, entitled ’’Chronique 
Syriaque-Relative au Sikge de Mossoul par les Persans en
According to MTrzI Mahdl, NSdir had resolved not 
to advance beyond KirkPk, because he hoped that the messages 
which had been sent to the Porte through the intermediary of 
Ahmad Pasha and his Kahya Muhammad Agha would elicit a 
favourable response. A letter from the Sultan reached Nadir 
whilst he was at Kirkuk, and its terms proved to be anything 
but favourable. The Sultan informed Nadir that the Shaikhu’l- 
Islam had issued a fatwa which declared lawful the killing or 
capturing of Iranians, whose religion was contrary to Isl^m.^ 
The Porte had, simultaneously, sent orders to Hajji Husain 
Pasha,^ of Mosul, to take all necessary measures to put the 
city into a state of defence.
The provocative terms of the Sultan’s letter made 
Nadir decide to advance on Mosul, and on the 3rd September 
he left Kirkuk. ArbTl offered resistance, but was speedily 
taken. On the march to Mosul, the Iranian troops plundered 
and destroyed the villages and devastated the countryside.
No distinction was made between Muslim and Christian, and in 
some villages, churches and monasteries were destroyed and 
the monks made prisoners.5
Husain PasKS, in the meantime, was busily preparing 
for the impending siege. His small garrison was augmented 
by the arrival of his namesake, the Governor of Aleppo, with
1 T.N., page 240.
O ^
Husain Pasha’s grandfather, Abdu’l-Jalll by name, and a 
Nestorian Christian by faith, had been for long in the 
service of the Pash& of Mosul. For details of this inter­
esting family, see Niebuhr’s ’’Reisebeschreibung”, Vol.II, 
pages 3^2 and 363* an<* Longrigg, op. cit.. page? 158 and 347« 
3 Habeche, page 499> and Sulaiman SA’igh, page 278.#.
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his troops; the combined forces numbered some 3Q>000 men.
On Nadir summoning Husain PashS to yield, he met 
with a firm refusal.
^bduil-Fattah Beg, a brother of Husain Faslia, 
thereupon advanced with a portion of the garrison to oppose 
N5dir, and a battle was fought on the east side of the Tigris. 
cAbdu!l-Fattah Beg and his men were defeated, but managed to 
recross the river and reach Mosul, despite efforts of the 
Iranians to cut them o f f *
On the 25th Rajab (14th September) the Iranian 
army camped at Yarimja, close to the tomb of the Prophet 
Jonah.^ The Tigris was bridged both above and below Mosul, 
and numbers of men crossed over to complete the encirclement 
of the town.
News of the threat to Baghdad and the fall of 
Kirkuk produced consternation in Constantinople. Fears of 
an uprising caused the Qizlar-Agha to bring about the dis­
missal of the Grand Vizier, CA1I Pasha, and the appointment 
of Hasan Pasha, an ex-Janissary, to the post. There seems 
to be no doubt that cAli Pasha was made a scapegoat, and that
^ Sulaiman {3a!igh, page 281**.
o
Sulaiman Safigh, page 283. According to MTrza Mahdl, (T.N., 
page 240) it was the Governor of the Koi San jap who thus 
endeavoured to oppose Nadir. *
^ This is the .date given in the Ta * rlkh-i-Nadirl (page 240) 
and in the Turkish official account of the siege of Mosul, 
an Italian translation of which was sent to the foreign 
diplomatic representatives at Constantinople (see Stanhope 
Aspinwallfs despatch of 20th November/lst December 17^3,
S.P. 9 7 , Vol.XXXII)• Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 70) gives 
the date as the 13th.
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Hasan Pash'S was chosen not only because he was a capable 
man, but also because his appointment would be popular in 
the army.^
When news of the siege of Mosul arrived, there was
further alarm, and it is said that Bonnevalfs advice was 
2
sought.
Having entirely surrounded the city, Nadir construct­
ed redoubts, and erected fourteen batteries; in these batter­
ies 160 cannon and 230 mortars were mounted.^ By the 8th 
Sha<ban (27th September), all preparations for the siege were 
completed, and the batteries opened fire. For eight days
4
and nights a continuous cannonade was maintained, and many 
thousands of cannon balls and bombs rained upon the defenders.5 
Breaches were made in the walls, but these were always repaired 
Much mining and counter-mining^ went on, and no 
fewer than seven general assaults and five subsidiary attacks
^ Stanhope Aspinwall to Whitehall, 5th/l6th October, 1743 
(S.P.97, Vol.XXXIl) and Von Hammer, Vol.XV* page 69.
2
"The Daily Post®, 30th November, 1743* The correspondent of 
the paper stated that Bonneval planned to finish the war 
in one campaign, but that his plan was not adopted.
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 70 and 71*
4 See the official Turkish account of the siege. Habeche
(page 500) states that the bombardment lasted for 9 days 
and nights.
5 Niebuhr (Reisebeschreibung, Vol.II, page 3^ 7) puts the
number at 40,000, the official Turkish account at 60,000, 
while Sulaiman §a!igh (page 284) raises it to no less than 
100,000 - doubtless a gross exaggeration.
6 The Iranian mines did, on the whole, considerably more harm
to the besiegers than to the besieged, as the majority ex­
ploded backwards. The Turks are said to have had the ser­
vices of a capable engineer from Constantinople (see C. J. 
Rich’s "Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan and of the 
Site of Ancient Nineveh". London, 1836, Vol.II, page 46).
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were delivered. Once, after the walls had been breached
by a mine, the Iranians rushed forward impetuously to the
attack; 1700 scaling ladders were planted against the
walls, but the assailants were beaten off with heavy loss by
the defenders, who showed desperate courage.**" The Christian
element of the population played a most important part in the
defence of the city, and were afterwards given special
2
privileges in reward for their services. A legend was 
afterwards current that the Iranian forces were dispersed by 
the miraculous interposition of St. George, St. Matthew and 
the Prophet Jonah, "who suddenly appeared among them armed 
and mounted.
On the 22nd Shacbah (11th October) Nadir received 
serious news from Shfrvan, where the pretender Sam Mlrza and 
Muhammad, the son of Surkhai, with a force of Lazgls, had 
captured and afterwards put to death the Governor of Sftlrvan, 
between Shamakhl and Shabran.^
Soon after Nadir heard of this uprising, he received 
further disquieting news: namely, that the pretender "Safi
Mirza" (alias Muhammad CA1I Raf sinjanl), whose cause the Turks 




Niebuhr, op.cit.« Vol.II, page 361, Sulaiman Sa’igh, page 289*
^ Rich, op.cit.. Vol.II, page 46.
4 For details of this revolt, see the ensuing chapter.
*5
J Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page
339.
These reports, together with the knowledge that 
his troops were becoming disheartened by their repeated 
failures and heavy losses, caused Nadir to make overtures 
to Husain PashS for a cessation of hostilities. Nadir!s 
proposals were at first rejected, but, on fresh overtures 
being made by him, negotiations were opened. Nadir and 
Husain Pasha exchanged costly gifts, and it was arranged 
that the siege would be raised if Husain Pasha forwarded the 
ShahTs peace proposals to Constantinople.^* At this juncture 
Muhammad Agha arrived from Constantinople, bearing a message 
from the Sultan in which the latter said that he placed no 
reliance upon Nadirfs friendship and brotherly feeling, 
because he had violated the frontier. If, however, Nadir 
would retire to the borders of Iran, he could there discuss 
with Ahmad Pasha the questions at issue.
NSdir agreed to this proposal, and, on the 2nd 
Ramadan (20th October) he and his army left Mosul for Kirkuk 
and Qara Tappa. Leaving the bulk of his army and all his 
baggage at Qara Tappa, Nadir set out to visit the holy 
shrines of Mesopotamia.5 Thus began another phase of the 
extraordinary relations between Iran and Turkey during this 
period (all this while the siege of Basra was in progress, as 
will be seen below)•
^ T.N., page 241.
ibidem. See. i. ov. b.^HrV*
3 ibidem.
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At Shahraban Nadir was met by Muhammad Agha and
other notables, who brought him presents from Ahmad P'asha.
From Shahraban, Nadir proceeded to Kazimain, where
he visited the shrines of the Imams Musa al-Kazim and Muhammad• *
Taql^ *, so venerated by the Shica. Nadir then re-crossed the 
Tigris, in a barge of state furnished by Ahmad Pasha, and
9
went to the tomb of Abu Hariifa, at Mucazzam.
* /  • •
On the 1st Shawwal (l8th November) Nadir proceeded 
to Karbala, where he performed the circumambulation (tawaf) 
of the shrine. Radiyya Begum, who was a daughter of Shah 
Spltan Husain and who had married Nadir in 1730, gave 20,000 
nadiris for the repairing of the sacred building.^
Later in the month Nadir journeyed to Najaf via Hilla, where 
he had convened a great assembly of the \ilama of Iran, 
Afghanistan, Balkh and Bukhara on the one hand, and of the 
Holy Cities of Mesopotamia on the other, in order to discuss 
and settle the religious question.4
|=>avl7 M e d  2.
-I The seventh and ninth, respectively, of the Shi a Imams.
/ ivNvf=psrge=M*4i» 'Abdullah ibn Husain as-Suwaidl of Baghdad
(who was a contemporary of NSdir*s) wbetfaem in his ^Kitab 
al-Hujjaj al-Qatciyya Lifttifaq al-Firaq al-Islamiyya1* 
(which was published in Cairo in 1906) mentions this message
^  />°3L \ an(i a^ s that the Sultan said that the claim for the
liKX ] Jacfarl sect must be dropped. See Professor A. E. SchmidUs
Hi wctoPwk cyhhmtcKo —HXnm*t‘c.fcvix °T-HoHTenntf in V. V.
Bartholdfs ^Festschrift11, entitled “‘iqdu11-Juman11,Tashkentj 
1927. page 85.______________________________________
 ^T.N., page 241.
 ^According to MIrza Mahdl, Nadir visited Karbala on the 1st 
Shawwal, after having been at Najaf (T.N., page 246), but 
we know from As-Suwaidl (Schmidt, op.cit.. page 95) that 
the meeting of culama at Najaf took place on the 24th 
Shawwal, so the visit to Karbala must have preceded the 
meeting.
4 T.H., page 241. 341<
In order, no doubt, to predispose the local
divines in his favour, Nadir gave orders for the dome of the
shrine of cAll at Najaf to be gilded*
By far the fullest and most interesting account of 
these religious.discussions is that given by the Turkish 
Arabian divine cAbduLlah ibn Husain as-Suwaidl* Ahmad Pasha 
sent ^ Abdullah to Nadir in order to assist in the task of re­
conciling the conflicting religious elements in Iran.^ Nadir, 
aooogdingte fAbduLlahjhad- arranged the wholo—affoir boforo- 
hand with Akbar-j -tho- Mulia Bashir* cAbduLlah, on being 
received by Nadir, conversed with the Shah in the Turcoman 
dialect. Nadir requested ‘Abdullah to render assistance 
in removing wdisloyalty,f(i.e. non-conformity with the Sunni 
code), but, instead of asking him to take part as a disput­
ant, he requested him to act as umpire, to take note of 
everything and to report fully thereon to Ahmad Pasha* On 
the conclusion of the audience ^ Abdullah met cAIi Akbar the 
Iranian Mulla-Bashi, with whom he had a long informal dis­
cussion on the text of the Qu*ran and the traditions*
rAbduLlah, who was a staunch Sunni, found ‘All Akbar irrecon­
cilable on certain doctrinal points. On the following day 
(24th Shawwal = 12th December 17^ 3) the culama assembled; 
there were *JQ Iranian clergy and two groups of Afghans and 
Bukharans. cAbdullah as-Suwaidl as arranged, was umpire,
 ^Professor Schmidt, op.cit.* pages 83-100*
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and ^ .ll Akbar and a Bukharan Mulla were the chief spokesmen* 
It soon became clear that NSdir had carefully arranged 
matters beforehand withCA11 Akbar and the other Iranians, 
for he, when cross-questioned on the alleged fdisloyalty1 
of the latter, was most deferential and correct in his views* 
Finally, agreement was reached between the Iranians and the 
two groups of BukhAran and Afghan divines. On the next day 
all the culam% * togetherVith those of Najaf, signed a document 
setting forth the terms of the Iranians1 undertaking, and 
‘Abdullah as-Suwaidl then signed and sealed it in his capacity 
as umpire. In this document the religious policy of Shah 
Isma!Il and his successors -was deplored, the legitimacy of 
the first three Caliphs was recognised, as was also the true 
descent of Jacfarufs-Sadiq from the Prophet. Lastly, the 
right of the Iranians to recognition as belonging to the 
Jacfarl sect was affirmed.
After the culama had completed their deliberations 
and issued their manifesto, Nadir?s wife Gauhar Shad, the 
mother of the Princes Nasrufllah and Im&m Qull, gave the sum 
of 100,000 hadiris for the repairing of the walls and tile- 
work of the shrine, and presented a jewelled censer and 
another of gold for use therein.^
In the meanwhile, Nadir and Ahmad Pasha had been 
discussing the terms of peace, and had reached agreement on





its terms at the end of November or beginning of December*
Nadir thereupon issued orders for the raising of the siege
of Basra; a description of this siege must now be given*
The operations in the south of Mesopotamia had not
been conducted with anything like the same vigour as those in
the north. When Nadir had started on his advance to Kirkuk
and Mosul, he had, as already stated, appointed Qoja Khan
Shaikhanlu, of the Chamishgazak tribe, to the command of
2 —the force which was to advance on Basra. Qoja Khan, the
Governor of Huwaiza and Salman (who was also known as
Sulaiman), the well-known chief of the Ka* ab Arabs^ (who had
recently moved into Iranian territory round Duraq, and had
become Iranian subjects) prepared to make a joint advance on
Basra from Huwaiza.% *
Muhammad Agha was evidently sent to Constantinople about 
this time, with the terms of the proposed arrangement or 
treaty, because Stanhope Aspinwall reported his arrival 
at the capital in the middle of February 1744 with the 
treaty for-tratification. The full terms of the draft 
treaty are not disclosed, but they evidently showed no 
abatement of Nadir*s religious demands. Aspinwall said 
that the- Porte desired peace, but that it could not with 
honour comply with the Iranian demands regarding Mecca; 
the draft treaty was therefore rejected. (S.P.97* Vol. 
XXXII) • MTrza Mahdl" states (page 247) that this treaty 
provided for the return to Turkey of the fortresses of 
Kirkuk, ArbTl, Qurna and others that had been captured.
2 T.N., page 239,
* See Sayyid Ahmad Kasrawi1s "Ta'rlkh-i-Panj Sad Sala-yi-
Khuzistann(Tehran, 1931/1932), page 119* ’In 1740 the 
Ka^ab tribe had migrated into purely Iranian territory, in 
the neighbourhood of Duraq and the Jarrahi river, where 
they occupied lands which had, up till then, been in the 
hands of the KhuzistSh branch of the Afshar tribe.
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On the 16th July two envoys from the Governor of 
Huwaiza reached Basra and stated that unless the town♦ I
surrendered a general massacre of the garrison and 
inhabitants would result.^ Some of the neighbouring Arab 
tribes, which had for years past been in intermittent revolt 
against the Turks, joined the Iranians. The Turkish com­
mander in Basra sent a galley and some trankeys to prevent 
the Iranians and their Arab allies from crossing to the west
side of the Shatt^l-ixab. The Iranians, nevertheless,% ► *  *
succeeded in crossing over, by means of boats which had been 
built at Huwaiza.^
As soon as Thomas Dorrill, the Resident of the East 
India Company at Basra, heard of the threatened Iranian 
attack, he ordered a small brigantine belonging to the 
Company, that was then anchored off the town, to slip away 
quietly by night and go to Qatlf.^ He feared that, if the 
vessel remained, the Turks would seize her and employ her 
against the Iranians, as they had done in the case of the
two Company ships at Basra in 1735* When the Mutasallim
discovered that the brigantine had gone, he accused Dorrill 
of being in league with the Iranians. Unluckily, the crew 
(who v/ere mostly Basra lascars) of the vessel mutined before
 ^Dorrill to London, 20th/31st August, 1743 (Vol.XV of the
India Office Records, Persia and the Persian Gulf series).
2 T.N., page 239.
See the very interesting letter from Dorrill to London, 
dated the 7th/l8th April, 1744, describing the siege and 
the incident of the brigantine.
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she had proceeded far, and forced the master to bring her 
back. The Mutasallim was as delighted at this, turn of 
events as Dorrill was the reverse, and demanded the handing 
over of the vessel. On Dorrill refusing, the Mutasallim 
had him seized and placed for 48 hours in a tent situated on 
the walls of the town, under a guard of Janissaries. The 
Mutasallim then spread stories of Dorrill1s sympathy with the 
Iranians, with the result that the lives of Dorrill and his 
assistant, Danvers Graves, were in great danger from the 
exasperated soldiery. Dorrill, feeling that death would 
assuredly be his portion unless he agreed to surrender the 
vessel, at last gave his consent, but he managed to convey 
a message to the master urging him to destroy her at all 
hazards. The master accordingly bored holes in the bottom 
of the brigantine, and pretended that she had sprung a leak. 
When the Turks perceived that the vessel was in a sinking 
condition, they consented to her being run ashore. Dorrill 
was then released, but his troubles were by no means over. 
All the Europeans in Basra were made to furnish arms, levy 
soldiery and provide horses at their own expense:
nall this when money (was) so scarce we could hardly 
raise enough to buy ourselves bread; thus we were
^ Dorrill and Graves said, in a letter to Gombroon dated _ 
the 7th/l8th December 1743) that when the Iranian Sardar 
and the Beglarbegi heard of the ill-treatment to which 
they were being subjected, they ordered their soldiers 
to call out to the Mutasallim 55if he was not ashamed to 
treat strangers in such a manner who came into their 
country as Merchants and not to fight.11 (Gombroon 
Diary, I7th/28th January, 1744).
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harassed during the whole siege which lasted from 
the 28th August to the 27th November1, and during 
the last eleven days the place was continually 
Bombarded night and day from 21 mortars placed at 
different quarters."2
On the evening of the 27th November/8th December
messengers arrived from Nadir and Ahmad Pasha ordering the
fighting to cease, as a treaty had been signed. The gates
of Basra were then flung open, and compliments and presents
passed between the Turkish commanders and officials on the
one hand, and the Sardar (Qoja Khan) and the Governor of
Huwaiza on the other. The Governor of Huwaiza sent a» 1
"Complaisant Message" to Dorrill "for his suffering so much 
on their Account", and asked him and Graves to visit the 
Iranian camp, but Dorrill thought it politic to offer excuses 
and to send a present instead.5 On the 5tk/l6th December 
the Iranian army marched away to Huwaiza, while the command­
ing officers went to Najaf, to report to Nadir.^
On concluding the treaty with Ahmad Pasha, Nadir 
proceeded to Shahraban where he remained for some weeks;
 ^These dates are Old Style.
2 Dorrill and Graves, in their letter to Gombroon, referred 
to above, said that the Iranians, at thebeginning of the 
siege, had but little artillery. They applied to Nadir 
for some cannon of heavier calibre, "upon which he sent 
them great Guns, Powder, Ball and 21 Mortars with 6000 
Shells, which arrived in their Camp the 16th plto. (i.e. 
the I6th/27th November)". See the Gombroon Diary, 17th/ 
28th January, 1744.
Dorrillfs letter to London on the 7th/l8th April.
4 Gombroon Diary, l7th/28th January, 1744.
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whetker he intended to remain there until he knew whether 
or not the Porte had ratified the treaty is not, apparently, 
known. In January 1744 alarming news of revolts and dis­
turbances in various parts of Iran caused Nadir to decide to 
return to that country, and on the 30th January he and his 
army left Shahraban for Mahidasht and Kurdistan.'*’
T.N., page 249* Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 71) > on the 
authority of two French accounts which Penkler, the 
Austrian Resident at Constantinople, sent to his court, 
states that two Turkish armies, each 100,000 strong, the 
one commanded by the Sarcaskar of Baghdad (Ahmad Pasha) 
and the other by the Sarcaskar of Mosul (Husain Pasha) 
attacked the Iranians near Sinna, and inflicted a heavy 
defeat on them; these accounts put the Iranian losses 
at between 40,000 and 50,000. I have had no opportunity 
of seeing these French accounts, but it would seem that 
they are grossly exaggerated. Ahmad Pasha would surely 
not have attacked Nadir at that time, and Husain Pasha 
and his army would hardly have ventured to*do so alone. 
There is no mention of this alleged battle in the Ta^rikh- 
i-Nadirl, and Muhammad SharTf, the author of the Zubdatult- 
Tawarikh-i-Sinandiji, likewise ignores it.
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CHAPTER XXV,
Revolts in Iran 1743-1744*
The constant need of men, money and supplies for
the prosecution of the Turkish war led to much suffering
and discontent throughout Iran in 1743* In the north-west
provinces the muhassils had been particularly active, with
*
theresult that an individual of obscure origin, who called
himself Sam Mlrza and gave himself out to be a son of Shah
Sultan Husain, and therefore laid claim to the throne, had % % * *
no difficulty in collecting a number of supporters from
— 1 -among the malcontents of Darband and Tabarsaran. Sam was 
soon joined by Muhammad, the son of Surkhai, who had been 
hiding in Avaria since Nadirfs Daghistan campaign. The 
rebels were able to gain many adherents in the province of 
ShTrvah.
Haidar Beg Afshar, the Governor of ShTrvan, set 
out to crush the rebels, but was completely defeated between 
ShairicikhT and Shabran. Sam and Muhammad captured Haidar Beg 
and put him to death, and then seized Aq Su, his place of
Some years before, this individual, whom Mlrza Mahdl des­
cribes as_being of nunknown lineagen, had^appeared in 
Adharbaijan. Nadirfs nephew, Ibrahim Khan (formerly
known as Muhammad CA1T Beg), had captured Sam, cut his nose 
off and then freed him. (See T.N., page 247, Papouna 
Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, page 77* and Hanwaj 
Vol.IV, page 241). (Hanway. however, mistakes the younger 
Ibrahim Ehan for his father)._ No son of Shah Suit In 
Husain bearing the name of Sam MTrza is mentioned by 
Muhammad Muhsin, in his Zubdatu*t-Tawarlkh.
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residence.^ As was natural, this success led to an
o
extension of the revolt. Some Mughanli soldiers, who 
formed part of the garrison of the fortress of Qubba, 
murdered their fellow troops (who were Afshars), and deliv- 
ered the fortress to Sam and Muhammad. In Darband itself 
there was great danger of a rising.
Simultaneously, but quite independently of Sam and 
Muhammad, Giv Amilakhor, the Eristav of Ksan, had rebelled 
against Nadir’s authority, and was joined by bands of 
Cherkass and Ossetine tribesmen from the northern Caucasus.^ 
For a time Tiflis was threatened.
Nadir, on hearing of the serious outbreak in 
Shirvan and Daghistan, sent emphatic orders for it to be 
stamped out. Muhammad *A1T Khan, the Governor of Darband, 
seized and put to death many rebels in that neighbourhood.
He then defeated the Mughanlis, many of whom he had blinded 
and then sent them to their homes.  ^ cAshur Khan Babalu, the
 ^T.N., page 247*
2 The Mughanlis were a tribe inhabiting the Qanlq district, 
in close proximity to the Lazgis of Jai^ /and Tala.
 ^T.N., page 247*
4
Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G*, Vol.II, Part II, page 78.
This writer gives a detailed description of the troubled 
state of Georgia at this time. He relates (page *J2) how 
Nadir, when he heard that Giv Amilakhor had given hostages 
for his good behaviour, made a superb gesture. The Shah 
ordered the hostages to be sent back, exiaiming in anger: 
wIn the whole extent of my domains from whom have I taken 
hostages, to ensure hisnloyalty? If he (Giv) submits, let 
him come to me and so carry out my orders; if he will not, 
let him be exterminated 15
5 T.N., page 248.
commander-in-chief of Adharbaijan, marched from Erivan to 
the scene of revolt, and was joined by Fath *A1I Khan AfsHar, 
the Charkhchi-Bashl and many other commanders* Nadir 
despatched his son, Nasru’llah Mlrza, with 15,000 men; on 
reaching Tabriz, Nasru’llah took command of the royal forces. 
The Prince’s troops encountered the rebels near the Bagh-i- 
Shah, close to Shamakhl, and routed them, taking more than a 
thausahd prisoners. Muhammad was wounded, but escaped, 
while Sam fled to Georgia.
Even more serious was the revolt of TaqI Khan 
Shlr&zT. Taqr Khan’s rebellion was due to several causes.
He is said to have become puffed up with conceit after his 
capture of Muscat;^ he knew that Nadir was displeased with 
him and suspected him, and when he receivedlfche order for his 
recall, he decided openly to revolt. He believed that, 
with the influence which he imagined that he possessed in 
Fars, together with the control of the land forces there and 
on the Gulf coast and the support of the fleet, he could 
successfully resist Nadir.
It has already been stated how Taqr Khan, on 
reaching Gombroon from Muscat early in December 1743> after 
trying in vain to persuade Kalb CA1T Khan to join him in his
_  n
revolts, had the unfortunate Sardar put to death. TaqI
^ Niebuhr’s ”Beschreibung von Arabien”, page 301.
2
See page 3^3 above.
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Khan likewise tried to win over the commander of the 
Iranian fleet (which had just heen augmented by the arrival 
of eight new vessels from Surat), but the commander refused 
to join him, and sailed away from Gombroon.^ *
On the 16th January TaqI Khan, having openly re­
volted, set out from his camp near Gombroon for Shiraz, at 
the head of 2,500 men.^
When Nadir received word of this rebellion, he re­
called Husain Khan Qiriqlulf rom e0man. Husain Khan collected
* %
such troops as he could in the GarmsTrat and marched after 
TaqI Khan. At Fasa Husain Khan came up with Taqr Khan, but, 
his heart failing him, he retired to Kazarun; thereupon
3
TaqI Khan entered Shiraz, and prepared the city for defence. 
Meanwhile, troops whbmi Nadir had sent southwards reinforced
Husain Khan, and others soon joined him from Khuzistan,
— - - 4Kirman and Khurasan. Some jazayarchis, artillery and




^ Gombroon Diary, 20th/31st December, 1743.
2 w n JQth December/lOth January, 1744.
5 Autobiography of Mlrza Muhammad Shlrazi, page 18. News of 
TaqI KhanTs initial success reached Gombroon in April.
^ Mlrza Muhammad ShlrazI, page 18 (Fasa’i, in the nFarsnaman,
page 194, quotes from this authority). Henry Savage, who
was the East India Company!s representative at Kirman,
wrote from there to Gombroon on the 25th March that 0^00
men from "Corasoon11 (Khurasan) had passed through the
town on their way to join the forces operating against
the rebels. Savage stated that the country was thrown
into great confusion by the revolt, and that the roads ^
were so infested with robbers that his messengers.feared
^eVMyi§thUiprii%^ ly? entry ±n tfie SomEr°Sn 6iary °n
5 Mlrza Muhammad Shirazi states (page 18) that Husain Khan 
had between 40,000 and 50±QQ0 men.
It is related that Nadir, despite his anger at
the murder of his "brother-in-law, sent Mlrza Muhammad CAH,
the Sadru’l-Mamalik, to conciliate TaqI Khan, whom he had
sworn not to harm.^ The efforts of the Sadr to conciliate
Taqi Khan were, however, of no avail. Husain Khan then
besieged Shiraz closely. At length, with his immense
superiority of force, Husain Khan captured the city, after
"besieging it for four and a half months; two days later,
2Taqi Khan fell into hi§ hands.
Nadir issued orders for all Taqi Khan’s titles
to be taken away from him. Taqi Khan was then sent under
close guard to Nadir. But for his vow, Nadir Y/ould doubt­
less have put Taqi Khan to death at once; as it was, his 
treatment of the rebel was infinitely more cruel. Three
of the Khan’s sons and one of his brothers were put to death,
and the members of their families were sold a§slaves.3 Taqi
/
Khan then had one of his eyes put out and was made a eunuch; 
on his reaching the Shah’s camp, Nadir had Taqi’s favourite 
wife given over to the soldiery in his presence; he had 
doubtless been left the use of one eye so that he might
*■ Mlrza Muhammad ShTrazT, page 19*
 ^ ” ” ” n This writer (who was an
eye-witness of these events) states that Shiraz suffered 
terribly as a result of this siege. All the lovely gar­
dens around were destroyed; when the royal troops enter­
ed the city, they pillaged every house and put to death 
many persons. Two towers containing humane heads were 
erected. After the siege, plague broke oilt and carried 
off no less than 14,000 people.
 ^Mirza Muhammad Shiraz"!, page 20.
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witness this culminating point of his humiliation and dis­
graced
Nadir subsequently repented of his cruel treatment,
and restored Taqi Khan to favour; a year later he made Taqi
2KhSn Governor of the province of Kabul*
As Husain Khanfs troops had not been paid for 
several months, money had to be raised to pay them* Messengers 
reached Gombroon from Shiraz v/ith orders to collect 4,000 
tomans within three days* These messengers ^immediately went 
to drubbing the Banians and Merchants that refused the Tax laid 
upon them11, and many persons, to escape this persecution, left 
the town.  ^ At Isfahan there were similar exactions, and the 
1linguist1 and broker of the East India Company were imprison-* 
ed; the broker was compelled to give a bond for 2,000 tomans. 
The muhassils then demanded 3,000 tomans from
«  ^i
Peirson, the Resident of the East India Company at Isfahan,^ 
and threaimed him with imprisonment if he refused to pay; in 
the end, he managed to avoid seizure by paying 460 tomans.
The Armenians were forced to pay 1,000 tomans, and pressure 
was also put on the Dutch.5 Peirson, later in the year, 
wrote that it was difficult to collect money due to the
 ^Hanway, Vol.IV, page 243*
Farsnama, page 195* Bazin (Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV,page
297) •
 ^Gombroon Diary, lst/12th July 1744.
 ^Owing to troubles with the Government, the European staff had 
been withdrawn from Isfahan in April 1755 a d^ no Europeans 
were stationed there again until the 17th June 1743*
5 Gombroon Diary, 6th/17th July, 1744 (quoting from a letter 
from Isfahan dated theJlth/l8th June) .
Company, because of the Shah’s exactions; the Company’s
merchants, he said, had to pay up 4,500 tomans.^
Practically at the same time as Taqi Khan rebelled, . 
Muhammad Hasan Khan, one of the sons of the late Fath 'All 
Khan Qajar, headed a revolt in the province of Astarabad.
As Hanway, who was at Astarabad at the time and fell into the 
hands of the rebels, has given a full account of this upris­
ing,^  it is unnecessary to go into any detail here. Suffice 
it to say that the revolt was soon suppressed and that many 
persons were executed. As at Shiraz, two towers of human 
heads were erected. Muhammad Hasan Khan succeeded in escap­
ing to the Turcomans, with whom he stayed until after Nadir’s 
death.5
News of yet further disturbances reached Nadir early 
in 1744, this time in the far north-east, where some of the 
people of Khwarazm, having joined with the Yomut Turcomans, 
killed Ertaq Ainaq, the Governor whom Nasru’llah had installed
as ruler of Khwarazm in 1742. Nadir instructed his nephew,
'All Quli Khan, to proceed to Khurasan, in order to prepare 
for a punitive expedition. According to Mlrza Mahdx, Nadir 
intended to go to Khwarazm himself in the following year
(1745)-4
Gombroon Diary, 5th/l6th October (quoting from an Isfahan 
letter of the 24th August).
2 See Volume I, Chapters XXX and XXXI, and Vol.IV, page 245.
' For particulars of Muhammad Hasan Khan's wanderings in the 
desert and Nadir’s efforts to effect his capture, see pages 
9 and 10 of the Ta’rlkh-i-Qajariyya, by Mlrza Taqi Sipihrl 
(Lisanu’l-Mulk).
^ T.N., page 250.
Although the country was seething with discontent, 
Nadir was still strong enough to stamp out rebellion; he was 
able, moreover, to galvanise the exhausted nation once more 
into action against Turkey*
CHAPTER XXVI.
Conclusion of the Turkish War.
Having marched from Shahraban to Mahidasht, Nadir 
went on to Kirm^nshah and Qalamrau; he celebrated the Nau 
Ruz festival at the last-mentioned place.^ The armistice 
with Turkey still continued, but Nadir, not having abated 
his demand^ , could hardly have expected a favourable reply 
from the Porte. Muhammad Agha, Ahmad Pasha’s Kahya, after 
being kept waiting for some time in Constantinople, was back 
towards the end of February with a message that the proposed
o
treaty was rejected and that Nadir’s sincerity was doubted. 
Once more, Ahmad Pasha’s loyalty was questioned;^ neverthe­
less, in March 1744 he was appointed Sarcaskar of the 
southern forces. The Pasha of Qars, who had orders from the 
Porte to support Safl-Mlrza, sent numbers of letters in favour 
of the pretender across the frontier, in the hope of gaining 
adherents for him.^ On Nadir reaching Abhar (whither he 
had proceeded from Qalamrau) he received word of this action,
Hanway reached Nadir’s camp at this place on the 31st March, 
1744, his object being to obtain redress for his losses in ‘ 
the Astarabad rebellion. His account of his visit to the 
camp is most interesting; it is given in Vol.,I, pages 240-
259.
 ^Stanhope Aspinwall to Whitehall, 10th/21st February, 1744,
S.P.97, Vol.XXXII.
 ^ibidem. Raghib, the Rais-Efendi, was made Governor of Egypt, 
in April 1744; Von Hammer (Vol.XV, page 76) says that the 
reason why he was sent away to Egypt was that he was a 
friend of Ahmad Pasha, who was suspected of having an 
understanding with Nadir.
4 T.N., page 250. 357. J
and ordered the Governor of Erivan to ascertain from the
Pasha the reason why he was conducting such propaganda whilst
the peace negotiations were in progress* The Plfsha replied
that he had had no news of such negotiations and that his
orders were to support Safi Mlrza* Nadir, in anger, sent
word to the Pasha that he would soon set out to meet him and
Safi Mlrza.*
Soon after, Nadir duly began his march north-west­
wards; whilst en route, the welcome news was brought that
f
Taimuraz and Irakli had captured SSm Mlrza in the district of 
Ksan. Nadir sent orders for one of Sam Mirzafs eyes to be 
put out and for him then to be sent, with some Turkish 
prisoners, to Qars, 11 so that he and Safi Mlrza could look 
upon one another.
When at Gori, Nadir heard the further agreeable 
news that Taimuraz and Irakli had inflicted a serious defeat 
upon the Turks. Nadir was very pleased at this news, and 
rewarded the Georgian princes by giving Kartli to Taimuraz 
and Kakheti to Irakli.3
1 T.N., page 250.
2 ibidem, page 251; Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II,
Part II, pages 80 and 8l. Vakhusht,' in his Histoire du
Karthli, tH.de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page 197)> states
that when Sam was endeavouring to join the Turks, his
guide betrayed him and took him and 60 followers to
Taimuraz; Taimuraz arrested Sam and sent him to Nadir in 
Iraklifs custody.
 ^T.N., page 251; Vakhusht, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part I, page
190, Papouna Orbelian, H. de la G., Vol.II, Part II, pages
84 and 85*
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From Gori, Nadir marched to, Qars, just to the south 
of which he camped at the end of May* The Turkish garrison, 
which consisted of picked troops, strove to dislodge him, 
hut he repulsed them after five hours of severe fighting. 1 
NSdir then moved nearer to the fortress round which he began 
to construct fortifications;^ he endeavoured to divert the 
stream from which Qars drew its water supply, but the 
garrison frustrated this design. Almost continual skirmish­
ing went on for a long-:time until, on the 24th August, an 
indecisive battle v/as fought.
Nadir had for some time been making proposals of 
peace to the Sar^askar; after the above-mentioned engagement 
the Pasha, although not authorised by the Porte, entered into 
negotiations. Ahmad Efendi Kesrieli, one of the Turkish 
envoys, persuaded the Shah to treat direct with the Sultan, 
and set out with the. Turkish envoys for Constantinople.^
Nadir, however, continued the siege with vigour; although he 
is said to have suffered a severe reverse on the 19th
1 Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 82. It is impossible to reconcile 
completely the version given in the Tafrlkh-i-Nadirl 
(page 252).
Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86. Papouna Orbelian states that 
Nadir had 4,000 workmen brought from Tiflis, who were 
engaged on this work for a month. (H. de la G., Vol.II, 
Part II, page 89)*
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 85 (on the authority of cIzzi); 
this battle is not mentioned by Mlrza Mahdl.
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 83 and 84. This authority states 
that the murmurings of the garrison and the tricks of 
Kisrieli induced the Pasha to negotiate.
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Septemberhe went on with his operations until the cold 
forced him to raise the siege on the 9th October.^
Whilst the siege of Qars was in progress, an 
Ambassador from Muhammad Shah reached Constantinople, bringing 
a letter for the Sultan. The Emperor and his ministers 
wished to form an alliance with Turkey against Nadir Shah, 
but the Porte, in reply, merely gave vague assurances of 
friendship.
Nadir retired from Qars to the Arpa Chai and thence 
went to Akhalkalaki,^  where he camped for a time, whilst 
winter quarters for the army were being prepared at Barda€a; 
on the 6th December he reached Bardaca. Instead of remain­
ing there for the winter, Nadir left for Daghistan three weeks 
later^ in order to punish the Lazgis. Having crossed the 
Kura at Javad, he divided his forces into four divisions, and 
marched rapidly northward despite the severity of the weather. 
The Lazgis were taken by surprise, andsubmitted, after the
Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86. The Turks, according to this 
authority, forestalled an attack by Nadir, and captured 9 
of his zanburaks and much baggage. See also Stanhope 
Aspinwall*s despatch of the 13th/24th October, (S.P.97*
Vol.XXXII).
2 T.N., page 252; Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 86.
Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 87 • Von Hammer considers that this 
mission may have been the result of Bonneval!s intrigues, 
as he had, some three years before, suggested to the French 
Ambassador the advisability of an alliance between India 
and Turkey against Iran.
4 T.N., page 252; Papouna Orbelian states (H. de la G., Vol.II, 
Part II, page 9^ ) that Nadir sent raiding partieSrfrom here 
to the Turkish district of Akhaltzikhe.
 ^T.N., page 252.
^ ibidem.
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/Iranians had captured large numbers of their cattle and 
sheep. On the day of the Adha festival (10th Dhu’l-Hijja 
1157 = 14th January, 1745), Nadir went to Darband, whence 
he returned to Bardaca.
Nadir only remained for three weeks at Barda'a; 
hearing that water and fodder were more abundant north of 
the Kura, he marched via Aresh to Shakki; Nadir stayed at 
Shakki from March until June, after which he proceeded via
_ o
Miyankuh to Gokcha, in the yailaq of Erivan. Whilst on 
the way there, Nadir was taken seriously ill,^ and had to 
be conveyed for several stages in a litter. Nadir, however, 
was skilfully tended by his physicians and soon recovered.
On the 5th Hajab U 58 (3rd August 1745) Nadir set 
out from Gokcha in the direction of Qars. It so happened 
that Yegen Muhammad Pasha, with 100,000 men^ had already left 
Qars and was marching towards Erivan. Nadir placed his army 
in position at Murad Tappa, near Baghavard, on the spot where
1
T.N., page 252.
2 ibidem, " 255.
3 -^ ibidem. Peirson wrote from Isfahan to Gombroon on the
5th/l6th October 1745 that NSdir was then being tended by 
a Jesuit. This may have been Pere Damien, of Lyons, who, 
according to Pere Desvignes (Lettres Edifiantes, Vol.IV, 
page 401; had previously treated Nadir for some form of 
liver disease.
4 Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 96* Stanhope Aspinwall reported, 
on the 19th/30th June 1745 * that Yegen Muhammad had advanc­
ed in defiance of his instructions, because he feared that 
there would be a famine and possibly a mutiny as well, if 
he remained inactive. Mlrza Mahdl gives the strength of 
the Turkish army as 140,000 men, of whom 100,000 were 
cavalry and the remainder Janissaries.
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he had so decisively defeated ‘Abdullah Koprulu’ s army ten
r
years before.^ *
The Turkish army continued its advance until, on
the 10th Rajab (8th August), it halted a couple of farsakhs
oaway from the Iranian camp. On the following day, the 
Turks launched a strong attack, but were repulsed with heavy 
loss. For four days the battle continued; the Turks 
suffered so severely in this fighting that Yegen Muhammad 
Pasha was obliged to retire.
A few days after this battle, couriers arrived 
from Nasru’llah Mlrza, who had been operating against the 
Turks in Kurdistan and the north of Mesopotamia; the Prince 
reported that he had defeated the Turks near Mosul.^ Nadir 
sent a messenger to Yegen Muhammad with a copy of this letter, 
but just as the man Y/as nearing the Turkish camp, a great 
tumult arose in it. Many of the Turkish soldiers had 
mutinied, and in the disturbance that ensued the unfortunate
A
Yegen Pasha was killed. The Turks were by now very demoral­
ised, and fled in confusion, leaving all their artillery and
^ See pages 151-153 above. Von Hammer makes two errors here; 
he states, first, that the battle took place 12 years 
before, and secondly, that the defeated general was Topal :
*0sman; he evidently__confused the first battle of Baghavaid 
with that fought at Aq Darband in 1733*
2’ T.N., page 254.
5 T.N., page 255.
 ^ " n it yon Hammer (Vol.XV, pages 96 and 97) says
that Yegen Muhammad died either at the hands of a rebel 
or of chagrin at his defeat*
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baggage in N2dirfs hands; it is said that they lost over 
20,000 men in all.**-
Nadir showed surprising moderation after this great 
victory. It is probable that he realised that, victorious 
though he was, his country was too exhausted to enable him 
to carry the war into Turkey with any hope of success. The 
success which he had just obtained would, on the other hand, 
enable him to secure an honourable peace.
Nadir gave orders for those of the Turkish prison­
ers who were wounded and helpless to be set free and to be 
conveyed to Qars.^ At the same time, he despatched 
messengers to the Turkish Sarcaskar, Hajji Ahmad Pasha, with 
peace proposals in which, for the first time, there was no 
insistence on the recognition of the Jacfari sect or on the 
setting up of the fifth column in the Kalba. Nadir still
1 Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 97; MTrzS Mahdl (T.N., page 255) 
claims that the Iranians, who pursued the fugitives as 
far as the Arpa Chai, killed from 10,000 to 12,000 Turks, 
and that they captured over 5 >000 &en, including several 
Pashas and other officers of lower rank. In an account 
(doubtless from Turkish sources) which Stanhope Aspinwall 
forwarded to Whitehall on the JOth August/10th September, : 
it was said that Yegen Muhammad had 1^0,000 men in all.
On advancing from Qars towards the frontier, he defeated 
some small bodies of iranians. Flushed with these success 
es, the Pasha marched on towards Erivan, near which town 
Nadir was encamped with 40,000 men; in an adjacent vallej 
were another 40,000 Iranians. Some detachments of 
Iranians, as at Karnal, lured on their opponents by feign­
ing flight, and so brought Yegen Muhammad fs army into 
collision with the Sh5h»s main forces. Immediately after-* 
wards the other Iranian army attacked the Turkish flank. 
The Turks, according to this account, lost 28,000 men, 
including 5 PashSs. (S.P.97, Vol.XXXII).
T.N., page 256.
5 6 5.
claimed, however, the cession of Van, Turkish Kurdistan, 
Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala and Basra •***
The Porte found these proposals unacceptable, and 
began actively to prepare for a fresh campaign. CA11 Pasha 
Hakim Oghlu was appointed Sarcaskar of Qars in place of 
Hajji Ahmad Pasha, and efforts were made to secure the active 
cooperation of Surkhai and the Usmi Ahmad Khan,, in 
Daghistan.^
In the midst of all these preparations, an.Iranian 
Ambassador named Fath CA1I Khan arrived unexpectedly^ at 
Constantinople, attended by only a few persons; he had 
travelled via Baghdad (where he had been detained for some 
time)• The Sultan issued an order (khatt-i-sharif) for the
• * i
proposals brought by the Ambassador to be discussed in a 
full Council; this was accordingly done on the 1st February 
1/46.^ It was found that, although Nadir was no longer 
adamantine on the religious issues, his territorial demands 
were still exorbitant.5 The Council nevertheless declared 
that from the moment when Nadir abandoned his religious 
claims, peace between the two Empires was re-established, at
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV* page 9 8*
 ^ n 11 page 99*
3
Stanhope Aspinwallfs despatch of the 9th/20th January 1746. 
(S.P.97, Vol.XXXII)•
 ^Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 101 and 102.
 ^ibidem, page 102.
any rate as regards its essential conditions* They stated, 
however, that no Turkish territory could be ceded. It was 
at length agreed that Nazif Efendi, who had previously been 
on a mission to Iran (with Munif Efendi), should be sent to 
Iran to discuss the terms of peace.^
Meanwhile, Nadir had left Adharbaijan and proceeded, 
by easy stages, via Hamadan and Farahan, to Isfahan which he 
reached on the 4th Dhu’l-HiJJa (28th December 1745)* En 
route Nadir had received envoys from the ruler of Khotan^
(in Chinese Turkistan) .
The Shah1s sojourn in Isfahan was a period of 
trials and tribulations for the inhabitants, especially for 
those that were wealthy. It was said that Nadir had lists 
prepared of all the people of any wealth at Isfahan and else­
where*^ Nadir demanded 10,000 tomans from the Governor of 
the city, and had him bastinadoed* ”The King11 it is related 
f,0rdered him to Cry out, when under Punishment, that such and 
such Armenians were indebted to him, who were immediately sent
for and Mossels (muhassils) set on them to take the money
• * %
without any examining into the Matter.” There was no redress
^ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, page 102. Nazif Efendi bore a letter 
from the Sultan to the Shah and‘another from the Mufti 
(the celebrated PIrizada) to the Iranian Mulla-BashI. The 
Porte insisted upon renunciation of the claims respecting 
the Jaefari sect and the fifth pillar in the Ka'ba, but 
offered to restore the frontiers as fixed by the Treaty
of 1659*
 ^T.N., page 256. Professor Minorsky, in his nEsquisse11,
page 55* suggests that this should, perhaps, read nKhoqar(dJ 
5 Gombroon Diary, 28th January/8th February, 1746.
^  tt t» n n n
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whatever. A little later, the Shah decreed that goats should
be taxed, with the result that many of these animals were
destroyed by their owners, to avoid payment of the tax.^ *
«
As was natural, trade suffered severely by reason
of the merciless exactions on the merchants.
On the 2nd February 1746 Nadir left Isfahan and went
to Mashhad via Ardkan and Tabas; Mashhad was reached on the• *
17th March, and the Nau Ruz was celebrated there. After a 
short stay at Kalat, Nadir returned to Mashhad, and later 
marched westwards and* camped at Kurdan, in the Sauj Bulagh dis­
trict, 57 miles W.N.W. of Tehran.
Nazif Efendi, the Turkish Ambassador, arrived at the
royal camp at Kurdan, and was received by Nadir with impressive
o
ceremonial and pomp. Discussions afterwards ensued between
the Turkish Ambassador and Nadir’s ministers, and agreement was
reached after five conferences had been held. On the 17th
Shacban 1159 (4th September 1746) the Treaty was signed at
*
Kurdan, and so brought to a close the long period of strife 
between Iran and Turkey.
3
Mlrza MahdX, before quoting the Treaty in full, 
gives the text of the letter accompanying it which Nadir
 ^Gombroon Diary, 8th/19th March (on the authority of a letter 
from Peirson, the Isfahan Resident, dated the Jlst January/ 
11th February).
^ Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 117 and 118. Nadir was seated on 
the Peacock Throne when he received Nazif Efendi; Von 
Hammer gives a description (page 117) of the Jewels which 
the ShSh wore on this occasion.
5 T.N., pages 260 and 261. A French translation (from the
Turkish text) is given by Gabriel Eftodi Noradoungian in his 
^Recueil diActes Internationaux de 1’Empire Ottoman” (Paris , 
1897;, Vol.I, pages 506/308. J66# * ______
addressed to the Sultan.^ This letter, which begins with a 
doxology and praise of Muhammad and the Orthodox Caliphs, refers 
to the heresies of Shah Ismael, the evils which they brought 
upon Iran and the troubles which they stirred up between 
Iranians and Turks. Nadir, after repeating that he had accepted 
the crown of Iran on condition that the Iranians abjured the 
Shi*a faith, expressly gives up his claim for recognition of the 
Jacfari sect, and concludes by renouncing all claim to one of 
two portions of territory in Iranian‘Traq and Adharbaijan which, 
in the time of Shlth Isma'll had been transferred to Turkey.^
The Treaty itself consisted of a preamble, three 
articles and a supplement.
It was declared, in the preamble, that the peace made
i
in the time of Sultan Murad IV was to be observed and that the 
frontier between the two States should be as laid down in that 
instrument. It was further agreed that the two States should 
abstain ”from those matters which excite any resentment (kadurat) 
and are detrimental to the conclusion of peace.*3
The first article provided that the Turkish authorities 
would allow Iranian pilgrims to go via Baghdad or Syria to Mecca 
and that they would be protected en route.
It was laid down in the second article that each State 
should send an Ambassador to the Court of the other every three 
years.
 ^T.N., pages 259 a^ d 260.
2 It is not specified in the letter to which of these two areas 
this renunciation applied.
5 T.N., page 260. 367.
In the third article it was agreed that the prisoners 
of both the parties should be set free and allowed to .return to 
their homes, and that the buying or selling of them (as slaves) 
should be unlawful*
The Supplement stated that the Governors of the 
frontier places were to abstain from acts detrimental to friend­
ship, that the Iranian peoples, having abandoned t! those unseemly 
opinions which were created in the times of the Safavis, and 
having in their fundamental beliefs followed the path of the 
people of the Sunnatn, should treat the Orthodox Caliphs with 
respect. Thenceforward these peoples should go, via Turkey, 
to and from Mecca, Madina and the countries of Islam in the 
manner of the Turkish pilgrims and of the peoples of the other 
Islamic-countries; they were likewise to visit the Holy Cities I 
in Mesopotamia. So long as they carried no merchandise, the 
Governors and officials of Baghdad should levy no tax. Similar ) 
privileges were to be accorded to Turkish subjects in Iran. I
I
The Supplement concluded with an undertaking that the treaty 
should always remain in force between the two States.
The Porte, on Nazif’s return to Constantinople with j
the Treaty, decided to send an embassy of unexampled magnifi- 1
cence to Nadir’s court. Ahmad Efendi Kisrieli was appointed 
as Ambassador; his suite consisted of 1,000 persons and he 




those which the Porte had hitherto sent to any Asiatic or 
European sovereign.^ However, this mission never accomplished 
its task, because Nadir was assassinated while it was still on 
its way to him.
Nadir, for his part, sent as Ambassadors to the 
Porte Mustafa KhSn ShSmlu and Mlrza Mahdi; they took with them 
a golden throne set with jewels (doubtless one of the spoils of
t 2Delhi), pearls from ‘Oman, two dancing elephants (fll-i-raqqasi), 
a letter in friendly terms, and the text of the treaty.^
Von Hammer, Vol.XV, pages 119 and 120. The value of these 
presents is given as 700 purses.





Nadir: The Concluding Phase.
After the successful conclusion of the peace 
negotiations at Kurdan, Nadir proceeded to Isfahan, where 
he arrived early in December 1746. Nadir remained at 
Isfahan until the 23rd January 1747; during his stay there 
he practised the most terrible cruelties, and there can be 
no doubt that his mind was completely unhinged at times.
Pfere Bazin, who at that time was made Nadir1 s 
principal physician, describes Isfahan as resembling a city 
which, having been taken by assault, had been given up to the 
fury of a conquering army.**- Whenever Bazin emerged from the 
palace, he would see the corpses of 25 to 3° wen who had been 
strangled at Nadir1s orders or murdered by the soldiery.2 Bazin 
relates that, one day, an inventory of the palace furniture, etc., 
was made, and a small carpet was found to be missing; the keeper 
of the royal jewels was accused of having stolen this carpet and 
was promptly bastinadoed. Whilst being beaten, the man cried 
out that his predecessor had sold the carpet to eight merchants, 
four of whom were Jews and the others Armenians and Indians.^
^Bazin, page 299*
2ibidem, page JOQ.
^Accusations were frequently made in this way, sometimes by 
previous arrangement with the man who was being beaten; those 
accused were immediately punished without examination or trial.
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These unfortunate men were seized forthwith and each one,
without even the semblance of a trial, suffered the loss of
an eye; they were then cast in chains into a fire. Bazin
states that all those who witnessed this execution, including
those who carried it out, were aghast.*’
On the 10th Muharram 1160 (2Jrd January 1747) Nadir
left Isfahan for Yazd and Kirman. Wherever Nadir halted, he
had people tortured and put to death, and caused towers of their
heads (kalla-yi-minari) to be erected.^ At Kirman, Nadir imposed
terrible punishments upon the populace, in retribution for a
revolt which had broken out there in June 1746.5 The toll of
victims was consequently heavy; and Captain Possiet, a member
4of Prince Golitzin1s mission to Nadir, who had gone on in advance
and was at Kirman at this time, saw two high towers of heads there.^
Bazin, page 300. Lutf CA1£ Beg, Atash-Kada. Mfrzh Mahdi states, 
probably in reference to this incident, that Nadir carried 
injustice to such a pitch during his stay in Isfahan that he 
caused several Indians, Armenians and Muslims to be burnt in 
the Maidan (T.N. page 264).
2T.N., page 265.
*The Governor, Muhammad Amrn. Beg, had headed this revolt, which 
was due to the usual cause , namely, excessive taxation. The 
loyal members of the garrison, after expelling the local Afshars 
(who were disaffected and who proceeded to join the rebels), 
took refuge in the citadel. Savage and Graves, the representa­
tives of the East India Co. at Kirman, hid their cash and books 
and sought shelter in a fort at some distance from the town 
until reinforcements arrived and restored order. See the 
Gombroon Diary, 10th/21st July 1746.
^For particulars of this mission, see Lerch (Buschingfs "Magazin", 
Vol.X, page 567 et seqq.), Dr. J. Cook!s "Voyages and Travels 
through the Russian Empire, Tartary and part of the Kingdom of 
Persia" (Vol.II, pages 242-2o0), and Hanway, Vol.I, Chapters 
LIV to LvTII. Golitzin and the other members of the mission 
arrived at Resht in April 1747* and were on their way to Nadir1 s
y«e§«5o?y^recel7ed ??ws^ o:f^ the Shah1 s assassination;Captain Possiet was Lerch1 s brother-in-law.
5 Lerch, op.cit., page 421, Cook, Vol.II, page 499. 9%1
As will be seen in Appendix III, the East India Company 
suffered severely from an act of extortion by Nadir, when the 
Shah was at Kirman early in 1747*
At the Shah’s orders, enormous contributions were 
levied upon the inhabitants of Isfahan and, indeed, throughout 
the empire, "whereby (in the words of Peirson and Blandy), and
through the scarcity of Money, No bounds is had to Usury and
many Places have revolted hereupon, for nobody is exempt and 
the King has likewise imposed large sums upon his Sons and 
Nephews which with his intolerable cruelties in killing to the 
amount of forty to fifty People every Day and other outrages 
gives every Reason to fear he is out of his senses".**’
In Georgia, King Taimuraz was ordered to pay a very 
large sum* The King and his son Irakli were quite unable to 
pay this amount, and prepared for armed resistance; Taimuraz 
later decided to go in person to Nadir in order to plead for a 
reduction. He left Tiflis with this object in view in May 1747 >
2and was on his way to the Shah when he heard of his assassination.
In Adharbaijan the excessive taxation demands occasioned
an open revolt; the pretender, Sam Mlrza, reappeared and was
proclaimed Shah by the people of Tabriz.^
1
Letter from Peirson and his assistant Blandy to London, dated the
16th/27th May 1747, In Vol.XV of the Persia and Persian Gulf records.
2
Papouna Orbelian, in H. de la A., Vol.II, Part II, pages 114-117 
and 119-125.
i^bidem. page 119* See also page 10 of Das Mujmil Et-Tarikh-i 
Bacdnadirije by Abu’l-Hasan Ibn Amin Gulistana (Leiden edition, 
1891, edited by Oskar Mann).
372
SXstan had for nearly a year been in rebellion; 
the outbreak had begun in March 1746, when the Khan of that 
province headed the malcontents, and carried out a raid on Bam. 
The SXstanl rebels were subsequently strengthened by a number 
of Baluch tribesmen. ■*
The Nau Ruz festival was held outside Kirman, but it 
must, under the circumstances, have been an occasion of horror 
rather than of rejoicing. At the end of March Nadir decided 
to go to Mashhad and marched across the terrible Dasht-i-Lut, 
where many men perished of hunger and thirst, while others were
o
swallowed up by the treacherous ground.
At Tabas, the first town reached on the further side 
of the desert, N5dir was met by his sons, sixteen in number, whom 
he had summoned to his presence. After looking at them for some 
time, Nadir offered his crown to each of the three eldest in turn, 
but they, fearing a trap, refused, pleading their incapacity, 
extreme youth and lack of experience.^
1 !
Gombroon Diary, April and May 1746. (There were several entries 
in the Diary during this period in regard to the Slstan revolt; 
these were based on reports received from Graves at Kirman).
2Bazin, pages 307 - 308.
3
Bazin, page 308. These three elder sons are noi^  mentioned by 
name; it is to be presumed that they were Nasrullah, Im5m Qull 
and the eldest of the other sons, and that the blind Rida QulT 
was not of their number.
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Mashhad was reached at the end of April. There Nadir 
renewed the cruelties which he had practised at Isfahan and 
KirmSn. The consequence was that no one felt secure; all 
feared, not only for their fortunes, but also for their lives.
Urged by the instinct of self-preservation, everybody, not 
excluding Nadir1 s own relations, entered into plots and sought 
to join in the revolts which were in progress or on the point 
of breaking out in practically every part of Irani
NUdir had sent his nephew CA1I Quli Khan, together 
with’Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, to subdue the formidable rebellion 
in STstan? Word being brought to these two leaders that the 
Shah had ordered them to pay, respectively, 100,000 and 50,000 
tomans into the royal treasury, CA1I Quli KhSn joined the rebel 
Sistanls? Even Tahmasp Khan, who had throughout been most 
loyal to Nadir, became alarmed and joined jkir QulX KhSn. Never­
theless, when Tahmasp Khan discovered that *A1I Quli Khan was 
aiming at supplanting his uncle, he ceased to rebel and- endeavoured 
to dissuade CATI Quli KhSn from aspiring to the throne. CA1T QulT 
Khan refused to listen to Tahmasp Khan, whom he' poisoned; he




T.N., page 265. Bazin (page 5O9) says that Nadir sent a force 




then "raised the standard of absolute authority and spread 
his claims (to the throne) throughout the kingdom".1 Many 
tribes and persons were constrained by fear to join^AlI Quli 
Khah; amongst his adherents were the Kurds of Khabushan, who
signalised their revolt by raiding the royal stud farm at
^  —  2Radkan.
Nadir, who had been greatly afflicted by the defection 
of his nephew,5 was enraged by this Kurdish raidf1 and set out 
from Mashhad, at the head of some 16,000 men, to punish the 
perpetrators. It was evident that Nadir was aware of the 
rapidly growing danger, for, before he left, he took the 
precaution of sending his family to Kalat for security.
On NSdir’s approach, the Kurds retreated into the 
mountains. Advancing on Khabushan, the Shah halted at Fathabad,
two farsakhs5from that town, on the evening of the 19th June.
-  ABazin, who was in attendance upon Nadir at this time, relates0
that the Shah "seemed to have some presentiment of the evil 
which was awaiting him at this spot. For some days he had 
kept in his haram a horse saddled and bridled. He attempted 
to escape to'KalSt. His guards surprised him, pointed out 
the evils which his flight would entail, proclaimed that they 




"uulistana, op. cit., page 12.
4T.N., page 265? Matlacu"sh-Shams, Vol.I, page 164.
T^.N., page 265*£
Bazin, page Jll.
all his enemies and that not one of them would abandon him.
He then allowed himself to be persuaded, and returned. He 
clearly perceived that for some time a number of plots against 
his life were being, woven* Of all the nobles_at his court, 
Muhammad Quli Khan, his relation, and Salih Khan werex the most 
discontented and the most active. The first was in command of 
the guards2and the second the superintendent of his household. 
The latter caused him less fear because his post gave him no 
authority over the troops; but he dreaded the former, (who was) 
a man of swift action (expedition) * esteemed for his bravery, 
and (who was) on good terms with his officers. It was on him 
that suspicion fell. He (Nadir) resolved to forestall him.
He had in his camp a corps of 4,000 Afghans; these 
foreign troops were entirely devoted to him and hostile to the 
Persians. On the night of the 19th/20th June he summoned all 
their chiefs. "I am not satisfied with my guards", he said 
to them, "your loyalty and your courage are known to me. I 
order you to arrest all their officers to-morrow morning and 
to place them in irons. Do not spare any of them if they 
dare to resist you. It is a question of my personal security, 
and I entrust the preservation of my life to you alone.""
The Afghans, after promising to carry out these
orders, retired, and began to get their men in readiness for
action.
The secret, however, was divulged to the Iranians. 
Muhammad Quli Khan, after being informed by one of his spies, 
passed on the news to Salih Khan. An agreement was then 
entered into between these two, whereby "they undertook not to 
abandon each other and to put to death that very night the 
common enemy who had resolved to put them to death on the 
following day". This covenant or agreement was only shown
1
Muhammad Quir Khan was one of the Afshars of Urumiyya; it 
was apparently because he was an Afshar that Bazin termed 




to those of their fellow-officers whom they trusted the most.
It was finally agreed that Muhammad Khan Qajar, of 
Erivan, Musa Beg, of the Eyerlu Afshars, Qoja Beg Gunduzlu,^ 
of the Afshars of Urumiyya, and some seventy others were, with 
the help of Salih Khan and Muhammad Quli Khan, to carry out 
the murder of the Shah.
It is related that most of the conspirators, on 
reaching the entrance to the tent where Nadir was sleeping, 
became powerless to proceed owing to their fear of him, and 
that only three of them actually entered.2 The eunuch or 
guard at the entrance was seized and strangled and the three 
resolute men pressed on.
ChukI, the daughter of Muhammad Husain Khan, in whose 
tent Nadir was passing the night, was aroused and noticed the 
dim fora?of one of the assassins. With trembling hand, she 
awoke the Shah, who sprang up from his bed in surprise. Seeing 
Salih Khan advancing, Nadir heaped abuse on him. "Drawing his 
sword, he (Nadir) rose from his place and ran towards Fate (AJal). 
His foot (however) caught in one of the tent ropes and caused iiim 
to fall." Before Nadir could recover himself, Salih Khan
1
Gulistana, op. cit., page 14 (this name is wrongly given as Foja
in Oskar Mannfs edition). MlrzH Mahdl says (page 265) that the
plot was hatched at the instigation of *A1I Quir Khan, but this 
statement does not accord with the accounts given by Bazin and 
Gulistana. It is far more probable that self-preservation was 
the main motive, and that this induced the conspirators to further
the aims of XLT Quir KhSn by murdering the ShSh.
2Gulistana, page 14.
^ " page 19* Literally "blackness" (siShl)
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struck at him, cutting off one of his hands. After striking 
this blow, Salih Khan became, it is said, powerless to do more 
and stood as if rooted to the ground from fear of Nadir; it 
was Muhammad Khan QSjar who followed up the attack, and cut off 
the Shah1 s head»
Having accomplished their principal object, the 
assassins and their accomplices seized whatever thqy could 
of Nadir’s possessions, and put to death all whom they knew 
had stood well with him. They forced their way into the 
women’s quarters and seized the women’s valuables, but did not 
otherwise molest them. The assassins then hastened to the
tents of the three ministers who had enjoyed Nadir’s particular
\
favour, killing two of them, but sparing the third.
These deeds were followed by a scene of terrible 
confusion and horror in the camp. The 4,000 Afghans whom 
Nadir had ordered, the evening before, to arrest the officers 
of his guards, could not be induced at first to believe that the 
Shah was really dead.2 Hastening to the royal tent in order, as 
they thought, to protect Nadir, the Afghans found their way 
barred by 6,000 Qizilbash guards who were joined by another 
body 4,000 strong. Notwithstanding these odds, the Afghans, 1
1 “
Bazin, page 323. Bazin omits to mention the names of the two 
ministers who were killed but says that the third was ’’Mayar 
Kan”; by this he may possibly have meant Husain Quli Khan 
Mu ^ ayy iru ’ 1-Mamalik.
2Bazin, page 322, Gulistana, page 20.
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under the leadership of Ahmad Khan Abdall, broke through their 
opponents1 ranks and entered the royal tent. Vi/hen they beheld 
the headless trunk of the Shah lying in a pool of blopid, they 
were horror-struck. After giving expression to their grief, 
the Afghans retired; although attacked and pursued by the 
QizilbSsh, they beat off their adversaries and reached Qandahar 
in safetyi
The story of ill Quli Khhnfs elevation to the throne 
and of his brief reign does not fall within the scope of this 
narrative, but mention must be made of the manner in which he 
disposed of Rida Quli Mlrza, Nasru’llah Mlrza, Imam Quli Mlrza 
and their younger brothers.
Feeling that he would not be secure upon his throne 
so long as Nadir*s sons remained alive, CA11 Quli Khan despatched
a body of Bakhtxhrls, under a Georgian named Suhrab Khan, against
—  2 —  the fortress of Kalat, to which, as stated above, Nadir had sent
the Princes for safety. Although excessively strong, the fortress
was captured after a siege of sixteen days, treachery or
negligence on the part of the defenders having enabled the
besiegers to make an entry^
1
Bazin, page 324; Gulistana, pages 20 and 21; T.N. page 265*
2
See page 575 above.
3
Mlrza Mahdl (T.N., page 266) says that some of the garrison, 
after fetching water from outside the fortress, negligently 
left standing against the cliff or wall the ladder which they 
had used. The besiegers were able to ascend the wall by 
means of this ladder. See also Gulistana, page 23* Bazin, 
page 528, suggests treachery.
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Nasrullah, Imam Quli, Shahrukh and the other 
princes fled in the direction of Merv, but they were over­
taken and forced to return to Kalat. Nasrullah put up a 
strenuous resistance, but was overpowered. The unfortunate 
Rida Quli and fifteen of his relatives were put to death at 
Kalat, while Nasrullah and Imam Quli were slaughtered after 
being taken to Mashhad.^ Nadir1 s grandson, Shahrukh, alone 
was spared. Mlrza MahdT relates that *A1I Quli Khan (or 
cAdil Shah as he styled himself on his accession) spared the 
young prince so that, if the people of Iran wished to have one 
of the sons (sic) of the late ruler (Khaqan) as Shah in place 
of himself, Shahrukh would be available.2 Gulistana seems more 
likely to be correct in stating that *Adil Shah did not put 
Shahrukh to death because the people might wish to have as
3
their monarch one who belonged to the ancient Safavl line. 
cAdil Shah poisoned the remaining brothers of Nasrullah and 
Imam Quli, and put to death all those of Nadir's widows and 









*. Nadir’s head and body were eventually brought 
to Mashhad and interred in the tomb which he had had built 
there, almost opposite the mosque of Shah *Abbas, a number 
of years before; the body of Rida Quli was later placed in 
the same tomb. Agha Muhammad Shah, on ascending the throne, 
had the remains of Nadir (and of Karim Khan as well) exhumed 
and brought to Tehran, where they were laid under the 
threshold of his palace, so that "whenever he went abroad 
he might trample upon the dust of the great persecutor of 
himself and his family.
1
Curzon, Vol.I, page I65. (Curzon is wrong in stating, on 
the same page, that Agha Muhammad, "mindful of the source 
to which he owed his calamity, rased Nadir’s tomb to the 
ground." In the first place, it was Adil Shah, and not 
Nadir, who was responsible for Agha Muhammad’s misfortune. 
Secondly, Nadir’s tomb was demolished by the mu.itahids of 
Mashhad in 1802, after the execution of NSdir MTrza, who 
was one of the sons of Shahrukh and therefore a great- 
grandson of Nadir. (Nadir Mirza, together with his brother 
Nasrullah, had aroused the animosity of the mu.itahids by 
despoiling the shrine of Imam Rida, and he had later incurred 
their mortal enmity by murdering‘one of the principal priests.) 
Curzon, in this second instance, has made the same mistake 
as de Khanikoff (from whose work - page 107 - he presumably 
obtained his information.)
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CHAPTER XXVIII.
Nadirfs Character and Attainments.
The object of this final chapter is to give, as 
briefly as possible, particulars of NSdir’s character, appear­
ance and health, together with a survey of his attainments and 
defects.
I. Personal Characteristics.
Mlrza Mahdl gives but little information respecting 
NadirTs character, appearance and personal tastes, the explana­
tion probably being that he regarded such details as unnecessary 
and possibly even out-of-place in his official record. It is, 
however, obvious from a perusal of the Ta1rTkh-i-Nadirl that 
Nadir was a man of very strong personality and that (although 
almost illiterate) he was possessed of very considerable
intellectual power. Notwithstanding his humble origin Nadir
1
seemed, in the words of Bazin, ”born for the throne.” In the
vivid account of Nadir’s character and appearance which Cockell
9 -gave to Fraser, it is stated that Nadir was tall, robust and 
very good-looking. In his earlier days, his bodily strength 
and powers of endurance were very great.
^ Bazin, page 216.
2
Fraser, page 227. For Nadir’s appearance in later years, see ! 
Bazin, pages 315 and 316, an(i &s-Suwaidi, (Schmidt), page 90.;
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According to Mlrza Mahdl, Nadir1s principal delights
in life were, first, a melon of Her,at and, secondly, a good
horse.^ In the matter of attire, Nadir’s tastes were simple,
except, of course, on state occasions; he had, however, a love 
2of jewels which he was able fully to satisfy after despoiling 
India. As to his attitude towards women, Hanway is probably 
right in rejecting the exaggerated stories that were told about 
him; in his later days, NSdir had, according to the same 
authority, thirty-three women in his haram, exclusive of their 
attendants.^
Nadir showed, at times, that he had a sense of humour.'
*
'Abdu’l-KarTm Kashmiri relates that Tahmasp Khan Jalayir, who
was short, stout and very swarthy, was once charged and nearly
killed by a wild boar. When Nadir heard of this incident, he
was greatly amused, and remarked: ^Little Brother was playful
with Big Brother, nay rather, he was rude to him!”^  When Nadir
was at Delhi, he ordered 150 women to be added to the 850 who
were already in Qamaru’d-DTn Khan’s haram. in order that that
♦
Minister might qualify for the military rank of Mim-Bashi or 
chiliarch.^
 ^T.N., page 215. See also page 264 above.
2 See, for example, as-Suwaidi’s description of the jewellery and 
ornaments which Nadir was wearing when.the Shah received him 
at Najaf. (Schmidt, op.cit.. page 89)* See also, Hanway, 
Vol.IV-, page 268.
3 Hanway, Vol*IV, pages 268 and 269* See also Malcolm, page 85 
(footnote)•
^ Bayan, foil.59(b) and 40(a).
 ^Malcolm, Vol.II, pages 85 and 86.
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II. Nadir*s Health
During his youth and middle age Nadir enjoyed excellm t 
health, but from his fiftieth year and onwards he had recurrent 
physical troubles which had, as will be seen below, a most 
unfortunate effect upon his character. rAbdu*l-Kaflm relates that 
Nadir had, before his invasion of India, contracted an intestinal 
complaint and, apparently, dropsy, which were accompanied by
I
severe melancholia. It is possible that the disease may have
been occasioned or, at any rate, aggravated by the fact that
Nadir had lost all his molar teeth^  further, the hardships which
he had undergone during his many campaigns must have had some
deleterious effect upon his constitution, robust though it was
at the outset of his active career.
As Nadir could get no relief from the incompetent
Iranian physicians, he engaged, when at Delhi, the capable 
1
BayBn. fol. 66 (b) ♦ .The text, which is somewhat corrupt, reads:
| • oVf11 ojfc
. v makes nonsense, and it
seems possible that this may be a mistake for 
("seeking to do evil"), but it appears more likely that it
may be intended for ("dropsy"). If one adopts the j
latter meaning and adds a tashdid to the Oty- > the I
sentence may be translated as follows: "Since Nadir Shah, I
before his conquest of India, had become afflicted with an 
abdominal illness, dropsy and excessive hypochondria ..."
The word without the tashdid of the <3 9 comes from
the root , and means, according to Lane, the
oesophagus; * this does not make good sense, and the modern
Iranian meaning of \j* as ,hiccoughsl is likewise
unsuitable. It seems probable thgj; the reading should be 
<3^ , the plural form of (from ) which
Lane defines as "the thin and soft tender part of the belly". , 
2 _
Bayan, fol. 99 (b) . Further, when Abdu!llah as-Suwaidi was 
received by Nadir at Najaf in December 174p, he noticed that
the Shah had lost several of his front teeth and that his
eyes were jaundiced. See Schmidt, op~- cit., page 90.
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Indian doctor 'Alavl Khan as his chief physician, cAlavI Khan 
did not limit his treatment to mere drugs, but also employed 
"words that were more bitter than the remedy1*;^* in other 
words, he ventured to admonish Nadir for his outbursts of 
temper.
Nadir, being pleased at ^ llavl Khanfs frankness, 
followed his treatment and acted upon his advice, with the re­
sult that his state of mind as well as of body greatly improved 
in fact "for fifteen to twenty days (at a time) he would not 
order anyone to be beaten to death.^Abdu*1-Karlm states 
that, even after the attempt on Nadir1s. life in Mazandaran, he 
did not punish anyone until he had calmly investigated the 
matter.5
*Alavr Khan left Nadir*s service in July 1741. When 
deprived of the Indian doctorTs treatment and influence, Nadir 
soon reverted to his former state and by the autumn and winter 
of that year he was performing the most atrociously cruel 
actions.4 In the autumn of 1742 there occurred the tragic 
blinding of Rida Quli MTrzS:; had Nadir been in a normal state 
during the preceding few months, he would probably never have 




4 Bazin, page 290.
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whole nature was changed by this terrible event, and that his 
health suffered much as a result;^ * it was indeed a vicious 
circle.
In June or July 1745 Nadir was taken seriously ill
when near Miyanduab and had to be carried in a litter for
2several stages. He recovered from this attack, but in 
December 1746 his condition was such that he feared that some 
serious illness was imminent. Being profoundly dissatisfied 
with his own physicians and having heard much of the'skill of 
European practitioners, he requested Peirson, the representa­
tive of the East India Company at Isfahan, to procure a 
European doctor for him. Peirson was much perplexed^  as he 
did not know where he could find such a doctor, but, on his 
attention being drawn to Pere Bazin, he introduced him to the 
Shah, Nadir was pleased with Bazin and made him his chief 
physician.^ Bazin states^ that Nadir was then suffering from
 ^T.N., page 265*
5 Vibidem, page 253♦ Pere Desvignes (see page 361 above) states 
that Nadir had been treated by Pere Damien of Lyons for some
disease of the liver. It is not known whether this illness
was a recurrence of this liver trouble and whether P^re 
Damien was still in attendance upon him.
5 Bazin, pages 3 3^ and 304.
 ^ibidem, page 304. It was probably on the strength of Bazin1 s
diagnosis that Byron wrote as follows in nDon Juan", Canto 
IX, No.XXXIIIs-
Oh! ye who build up monuments defiled,
With gore, like Nadir Shah, that costive sophy,
Who, after leaving Hindostan a wild,
And scarce to the Mogul a cup of coffee,
To soothe his woes withal, was slain, the sinner I 
Because he could no more digest his dinner!
(The edition published in London in 1833 has, in Vol.XVI, 
page 289, the following footnote appended to the above 
lines: "He was slain in a conspiracy, after his temper had 
lnlanity^f6ra^e 6 5§§6 CQS^lv^ y to a degree of
dropsy-*- in an early stage (une hydropisie commencee) and had 
frequent attacks of vomiting as well as severe constipation 
and liver trouble.
On comparing the scanty data furnished by^bdu1!- 
Karlm with the fuller particulars which Bazin gives, one is, it 
seems, Justified in assuming that Nadii*!s intestinal trouble 
and the accompanying lack of mental equilibrium had continued 
and had, in fact, grown progressively worse, during the five 
and a half years that elapsed between the departure of *AlavT 
Khan and the advent of Bazin.
It would not be correct to assert that Nadirfs fren­
zied outbursts were always due entirely to physical causes; it 
seems rather that, in general, his physical state rendered him 
liable to become unduly affected by happenings of an unpleasant 
nature, besides occasionally making him act cruelly for no 
apparent motive.
BazinT s medical treatment began when Nadir was at 
Kirman, at the beginning of 1747# Bazin relates that he
succeeded in almost curing NSdir, but that, on the latter
2reaching Mashhad,, he recommenced his cruelties 1 It is not 
clear from Bazin1s account whether N5dirTs relapse was due to 
his discontinuing the medical treatment or whether the cumula-
 ^It is possible that the dropsy might have been aggravated by 
Nadir having contracted malaria (wrhich he very probably did 





tive effect of the news of the various revolts, together with 
the fatigue occasioned by the trying march across the desert 
to Mashhad, proved too much for his already unstable mental 
condition. There appears to be no doubt that Nadir’s mind 
was definitely deranged during the last month or so of his life.
III. Nadir as a Military Leader.
It is abundantly clear from the various accounts 
that have come, down to us that Nadir was nothing short of a 
military genius. Curzon is not guilty of exaggeration when 
he says: "Less than 20 years after this disaster (i.e. the
overthrow of the Safavi monarchy by Mahmud the Ghilza’i in 
1722) we are confronted with the spectacle of a Persian con­
queror overrunning Central Asia, upsetting kingdoms and 
empires, and in the eighteenth century presenting the
1
phenomenon in Asia that Europe owed to Napoleon in the nineteenths
It is inevitable that Nadir should have been likened
to Alexander; such a comparison was not due entirely to the
2love of his admirers for hyperbole.
The kind of tactics in which NSdir excelled was the 
swift cavalry raid, delivered, generally with crushing effect, 
from some totally unexpected quarter. In open warfare, too,
^ "Persia", Vol.I, page 575*
2 s
See J. P. de Bougainville’s "Parallele de 1’Expedition 
d’Alexandre dans les Indes, avec la Conquete des memes 
Contrees par Tahmas-Kouli-Khan", Paris, 1752. (Bougainville’s 
work, being based mainly on Otter’s imperfect account of 
Nadir, does not do sufficient Justice to him).
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Nadir was most successful.
The true greatness of Nadir’s military achievements 
can only be fully appreciated when one compares the deplorable 
state of the Iranian armies in the time of Shah Sultan Husain 
with the wonderful efficiency of Nadir’s hosts only a few years 
later. Nadir was much more than a mere commander of men; he 
was a splendid organiser and v*as able, by the sheer force of 
his personality, to impose his will upon and completely meta­
morphose the seemingly unv/arlike man-power at his disposal.
Little by little, Nadir instilled new life into the 
Iranian soldiery and, by his cautious methods, restored the 
confidence in themselves which they had lost under a series 
of incompetent commanders. By his infusion of large numbers 
of Afghans and Ozbegs into his ranks, Nadir raised still higher 
the fighting value of his army, and by his rigid enforcement 
of discipline and his insistence upon drill, he welded the 
whole into a most formidable fighting machine. The remarkable 
extent to which Nadir could control his heterogeneous forces 
is graphically illustrated by their instant obedience when they 
received his order to cease from massacring and plundering the 
people of Delhi and, later, by his troops allowing him td dis­
possess them of their Indian spoils.
Sir F. Goldsmid’s "Persia, and its Military Resources", Journal 
of the Royal United Service Institution, 7th!March 1879*
Vol.XXIII, page 155♦ See also Colonel G. Drouville’s 
"Voyage en Perse", Paris, 1828, Vol.I, page 85#
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Nadir possessed the inestimable gift of being able
to inspire in others the supreme confidence in his leadership
which he himself possessed.
One- of Nadir’s most remarkable gifts was his amazing
memory; this was of particular service to him as a commander,
Coclcell said that he could
”readily call all the principal officers in his numerous 
Army by their Names. He knows most of the private 
Men who have served under him any Time, and can re­
collect when and for what he punished and rewarded 
any of them.”!
A number of contemporaries of Nadir refer to his re­
markably loud voice which enabled him to make his commands 
easily heard above the din of battle and which on several 
occasions struck terror into the enemy.
Nadir was least successful in his conduct of sieges, 
mainly because his heavy artillery was deficient both in 
quality and quantity. Nevertheless, when compared with the 
standards of his predecessors, Nadir’s artillery, generally 
speaking, was really extremely good. It was due very largely 
to the assistance and advice of some French officers that
Nadir was enabled to make the Iranian artillery more formid-
2able than it had ever been before; in fact, it has been
stated by a competent authority that Iran did not possess any 
real artillery until the time of Nadir.5
 ^Fraser, page 233*
2 Drouville, on.cit.. Vol.II, page 142.
 ^ibidem.
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In general, Nadir thought out his important cam- 
paigns beforehand to the last detail , but on a few occasions 
he showed himself lacking in foresight. Nadirfs conduct of 
the first operations against Topal^sman Pasha, vrtiich ended
in his complete defeat, was not well thought out, possibly,
2 *as has already been suggested, because he was over-confident.
Secondly, he showed lack of judgment in his later Lazgl !
campaigns; although he seemed to grasp the fact that, unless I 
he could conquer Avaria, Daghistan would never be utterly at 
his mercy, he always deferred until too late in the season his 
endeavours to force his way through to Khunzakh. |
|
IV. Nadir as a Statesman and Ruler. |
Nadir was essentially a warrior. He was at his 
best when leading his army; when called upon to control the 
destinies of his country in peace time, he was less successful, 
the reason being that he was always preparing for the next war. 
Peace was to him nothing but an irksome, but sometimes necessary 
interlude.
In his foreign policy Nadir displayed undoubted 
skill, but in formulating this he always had an eye to forth­
coming campaigns.
As monarch of Iran, Nadir ruled by force alone, 




See pages 122 and 123 above.
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could employ. His- supersession of the SafavT line, his 
suppression
gKffgKXSESxtHH of the Shic a religion and his crushing taxation,
tendered him hateful*to the majority of his subjects, despite
the lustre which his military exploits gave to Iran. Nadir,
like the earlier Safavls, endeavoured to secure -his north-east
frontier against Turcoman and Oabeg raiders by moving Afshars,
Bakhtiarl, Kurdish and other warlike tribesmen to the border
(
districts; this policy had the additional advantage of splitt­
ing up and so weakening the Bakhtiarls and other turbulent 
tribes; further, it increased the population and importance 
of Khurasan.
Nadir seems to have had no regard whatsoever for the 
welfare of his subjects or to have made any seriouseffort to 
build up the material resources of his empire; he looked upon 
his people merely as tax-payers and as furnishers of man-power 
and supplies for his enormous army. The long wars with the 
AbdalTs and the Turks, following upon the period of Afghan 
domination, had, by the time Nadir ascended the throne, terribly 
impoverished and exhausted the country. When Nadir returned 
from India with spoils worth many ; millions of pounds, he had 
an excellent opportunity of remitting taxation for a number of 
years and so letting the Iranians recover from the terrible 
drain upon their physical and financial resources. Nadir, 
however, hoarded his spoils, and resumed his exactions in a
manner even harsher and more thorough than before. Merchants 
were taxed almost out of existence, while agriculturalists 
fared even worse; besides being heavily taxed, the latter 
frequently had their man-power and their crops requisitioned. 
Nadir did not seem to realise the fact that, by pursuing this 
policy so ruthlessly, he was killing the goose that laid the 
golden eggs.
In some respects, Nadir endeavoured to break away 
as far as possible from the ways and customs of his Safavl 
predecessors. The most important of these changes was, of 
course, the substitution of the Sunni for the Shica religion, 
the reasons for which have already been given. Secondly,
Nadir made Mashhad the capital of his kingdom in place of 
Isfahan, but this step was taken largely because of his pre­
ference for his own province of Khurasan. Thirdly, Nadir 
abandoned the pernicious Safavi practice of keeping the royal 
princes in the haram until the time came fo,r them to rule; 
the lamentable results of this policy were clearly shown on 
the accession of Shah Sultan Husain and of his son Tahmasp II. 
Nadiy on the other hand, gave his sons military and other 
appointments at an early age.^
^ The Gombroon Agent thus commented upon Nadir!s policy: 11 It
is no small Proof of his (Nadirfs) Superior Sense and Judge­
ment that can depart from a bad Custom so long and cruelly 
maintain*d by his Predecessors and all other Eastern Princes 
of immuring their Children with Eunuchs and Women in a 
Seraglio till by their FatherTs Deaths they were called in
to the World, Monsters to Govern 11 (Gombroon Diary,
6th/l7th November, 1739)*
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In the autumn of 1740, while Nadir was in Turkistan,
-  1it was reported in Isfahan that the Shah
"intends to change the Persian habit, his Subjects to 
shave their Beards^ and to put on Turkish Dress as 
also to destroy all Places that were built (by) or 
bear the Name of Shaw Abas and erect others in their 
stead, likewise to bring a River some days distant 
from Isfahan to water the City.”3
This report proved to be nothing more than a rumour, but it is 
notev/orthy that Nadir had already changed the headdress of 
his subjects, having (as we learn from Otter), invented and 
forced them to wear a hat "with four corners round which they 
place a shawl .... oif/wool.”^
Although Nadir did not succeed in founding an endur­
ing dynasty, he, like Henry VIII, added very considerably to 
the property of the crown by his wholesale confiscation of 
religious lands and endowments.
By his efficient system of spies, Nadir received 
secret reports on the behaviour of the governors of provinces 
and towns; retribution was, in general, promptly exacted for 
peculation and disloyalty.
Gombroon Diary, 19th/30th November, 1740,
In imitation of Peter the Great?
3 -Nadir was by no means the initiator of this scheme (known as 
the Karkunan), which was to divert the head waters of the 
Karun into the Zayanda Rud by means of a tunnel. The work 
was begun by Shah TahmSsp I, and was continued, on a 
different basis, by eAbbas the Great and, later, by'&bbas II, 
(See Herbert’s "Travels’T, page 1J5 and Sir W. Foster’s note 
thereon; also, Curzon’s "Persia”, Vol.II, page 316).
4
Otter, Vol.I, pages 3 9  and 40. An interesting modern parallel 
is the creation of the Pahlavl hat by H.I.M. Shah Rida 
Pahlavi.
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V. Nadir's Attitude towards Religion*
It seems probable that Nadir, although born a Sunni,
had little or no religious conviction or feeling. Bazin says:
"It would be difficult to decide as to what religion he 
belonged. Many of those who think that they had known 
him best, claim that he had no religion. He used to 
say, sometimes, fairly openly that he thought as highly 
of himself as of Muhammad andcAlI; that they were so 
great because they were good fighters, and that, after 
all, he believed that he had attained the same degree 
of glory as they had by (force of) arms.n^
Religious fanaticism was not one of Nadir’s faults;
his persecution of the Shi*a was conducted for purely secular
reasons. NSdir was tolerant towards his Christian subjects,
with whose freedom of worship he never interfered. The
Armenian Catholicos Abraham speaks in the highest terms of his
good treatment at the hands of Nadir, who even attended
2service in the cathedral at Echmiadzin. The Catholicos sub­
sequently received a special invitation to the assembly on the 
MughSn plain, where, on arrival, he "was the object of parti­
cular attention” and Nadir personally assigned to him a daily 
subsistence allowance.^
Nadir raised no objection to the presence of foreign 
missionaries in Iran; a number of these were in Isfahan, while 
others were in Gilaii. As has been stated above, Nadir, during 
the last few months of his life, employed the Jesuit missionary,
 ^Bazin, page 318.
2
Catholicos Abraham,page 270.
 ^ibidem, pages 280 and 285*
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Pere Bazin, as his chief physician*
According to the Jesuit, Pere Desvignes, there 
were no less than 22 Orthodox Armenian churches in Julfa, as 
well as four Catholic places of worship* The population 
of the suburb was 10,000 at that time.^ *
It was, apparently, during Nadir’s Indian expedi­
tion that his interest was aroused by Sura XLVIII (Suratu’l- 
Fath) of the Qu’ran, where, in verse 29 reference is made to 
the Pentateuch (Taurat) and the Gospels (lnjil) Nadir 
asked the Mulla-BashT (“All Akbar) if the Pentateuch and 
Gospels were extant; on receiving an affirmative reply,
Nadir ordered Mlrza Mahdi to arrange for an Iranian transla­
tion of both to be made. The preliminary steps must have 
been made by letter from India, because the Gombroon Agent 
received a letter from the Isfahan ’linguist’, early in June 
1740 to the effect that:
nShaYir Nadir.... has appointed Moolahs to make a Transla­
tion of the Bible, Jewish Talmud and Mahumetan Alkaran, 
who were for coming to be in our house (at Isfahan) 
but he (the ’linguist1) prevented them”.3
See Pere Desvignes’ f,Lettreecrite de Julfa...” in ”Lettres 
Edifiantes”, Vol.IV, page 564.
4 For an English translation of this verse, see Rodwell’s 
nThe Koran”, London, 19U* page 465.
 ^Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th June, 1740. cAbdu11-KarTm (Bayan,
foil.65(b) and 66(a)) says that Nadir first became inter­
ested in the matter during the Turkistan expedition, but 
this is impossible; it is clear from the Gombroon Diary 
(and, as will be seen, from Pere Desvignes’ account) that 
the instructions for the translations to be made were re­
ceived in IsfahSn before the start of the expedition to 
Bukhara and'Khiva.
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The Jesuit Pere Desvignes, writing in May 1744, 
states that NSdir sent a mulla to Isfahan with orders to 
collect such Jews, Armenians and ’Francs1 as were considered 
necessary forthe work of translation.According to the same 
authority, the work began in May 1740 and lasted for 6 months. 
Two Roman Catholic missionaries and two Armenian Catholics, 
two Orthodox Armenian monks and two priests undertook the 
translation of the New Testament, while Jewish rabbis translat­
ed the Old Testament. Some disagreement arose between the 
Catholic and Orthodox collaborators; as to this, Pere 
Desvignes wrote
"we had the consolation of seeing that in almost all 
these disputes the Muhammadan : (i.e. the mulla in 
charge of the work) guided solely by reason, decided 
in favour of the Catholic statements.....11
The Qu’ran was also translated into Iranian.
When at length the work was completed, the trans­
lators were summoned to appear before Nadir at Qazvin. The 
Roman Catholic Bishop of Isfahan, two Catholic missionaries 
and four Armenian bishops, together with the mulla in charge, 
proceeded to Qazvin where Nadir received them graciously and 
paid them for their expenses en route. The Shah, however, 
stated that he had no time to examine their work and that, as
1 vPere Desvignes, op.cit.. pages 402-404.
o
A copy of the Iranian translation of the Gospels, made under 
the supervision of Pere Lagarde in Gllan in 1746, is in 
the Biblioth&que Nationale, in Paris. See Blochet’s 
"Catalogue des Manuscrits Persans.. . . Vol.I, page 6,
No.7.
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there was only one God, there could be only one Prophet* 
These words greatly disappointed the pious translators who 
had hoped that much good would accrue to the Christian faith 
in Iran by reason of their work.^
VI. Nadir and the Arts*
The arts, save for that of war, did not flourish in
Nadir?s time* It was a period when the sword was mightier
than the pen. The two chief literary figures of NadirTs
day were Mlrza MahdT and Shaikh HazTn, of whom it is unneces-
2 *
sary to say more here. Nadir himself seems to have had but 
little liking for literature and poetry. The only poet for 
whom he appeared to have any regard was Hafiz (his interest 
in the poet!s works may, however, have been confined to the 
drawing of fals or auguries). It is strange that, unlettered 
though he was, Nadir was one of the two most generous donors 
to the library of the §ahn of Imam Rida at Mashhad, to which
See the somewhat different and apparently less well-informed 
account by the Carmelite friar Leandro di Santa Cecilia, 
in his "Persia- Ovvero Secondo Viaggio... .DelliOriente", 
Rome, 1757, Vol.II, page .222. According to other 
authorities, Nadir, on receiving the translators, ridiculed 
alike the Christian, Jewish and Muhammadan faiths and 
declared that, if God vouchsafed him life, he v/ould give 
mankind a much better religion that all those which had 
been known up till that time (see, in this connection* 
Hanway, Vol.IV, pages 216-219 and Otter, Vol.II, page 155)*
2
See the bibliographical introduction.
he presented 400 manuscripts.^ Further, it must not be over­
looked that it was at Nadir’s orders that the T2?rTkh-i-Nadirl 
was written*
In the construction of towns and buildings Nadir was
more active. Mention has been made already of his building
of New Shamakhl, Nadirabad and KhTvaqabad, of his additions
to the shrine of Imam Rida at Mashhad, and of the-erection of
his Mauludgah outside Dastgird, in Darragaz. At* Kalat he
caused a number of buildings to be erected, one of which was
his treasure-house, known as the Maqbara-yi-Nadira^. Shiraz
benefited for a time at the behest of Nadir, and it was not
his fault that most of the improvements which were carried out
were undone during the revolt of TaqT Khan.5 Nadir did
practically nothing for Isfahan, but at Qazvln he erected a
4new palace, of which Hanway has given a description. At 
the town of Ashraf, in Mazandaran, he built the Chihil Sutun, 
which Sir W. Ouseley has described and depicted in his "Travels
 ^De Khanikoff, pages 100 and 101.
2 Several persons have described this building, which is nov/ 
probably in the last stages of decay* In Sykes’ “History 
of Persia11, Vol.II, page 264, there is a photograph of it 
by Major Watson. See also Macgregor’s “Narrative of a 
Journey through the Province of Khorassan and on the N.W. 
Frontier of Afghanistan", London, 1879# Vol.II, pages 51 
and 52.
 ^Autobiography of MIrza Muhammad SlilrazI, page 19*
4 Vol.I, pages 251 and 2J2.
* Vol.Ill, page 270 and plate No.LXXI.
During his stay at Delhi Nadir had several 
portraits of himself p a i n t e d O n  Nadirfs return to Iran, 
he engaged, for a time, (through Elton) a young painter 
named Cassel or Cassels, who painted eight battle-pictures 
for him.^
See Dodwell*s f,A Calendar of the Madras Records , 1740-1744*, 
page 30* One of these portraits was presented to 
Richard Benyon, the Governor of Madras.
2
In a memorandum, dated the 13th/24th January 1744, by the 
Russia Company on the subject of the Russian charges 
against Elton, it was stated that ttNone of the people who 
were with Mr. Elton are entered into the service of the 
Shah, excepting one Cassel a German Painter to whom he 
gives a salary of 1000 Roubles per annum to paint his 
Battles.* (S.P.91, Vo1.XXXVI). The picture in the Chihil 
Sutun of one of Nadir!s battles is probably one of Cassel*s. 
For details of the manner in which Cassel (or Cassels, who 
was half-English and ha If-Prussian) is alleged to have be­
haved tOxJElton, see Cook, Vol.II, page 514. Cook states 




It Is impossible here to attempt to solve, the
problem whether the Afshars are of Turkish or Mongol origin.
All that can be said is that RashIdu!d-DIn, in his JamiSi1!-
TawarTkh} described them as Turks and that they have generally,
2but not, it is true, invariably, been regarded as such.
The Afshars are believed to have been driven 
westward from Central Asia by the advancing Mongols in the 
XIII century A.D., and to have settled first in Adharbaijan; 
afterwards they became widely disseminated in Iran.5 Shah 
IsmacXl I recruited his formidable army mainly from the 
Afshars and from six other Turkish (or Turco-Mongol) tribes, 
namely, the Shamlu, Rumlu, Ustajlu, Takallu, DhuTl-Qadar and 
Qajar.
1
See the edition, nSbornik Lyetopisei”, edited by N. Berezin, 
St. Petersburg, 1861, Vol. VII. According to Abu*l-Ghazl, 
”Awshar” (or * Afshar”) means ”one who promptly finishes an 
affair”: see the Turkish text of the ”Shajarat-i-Turk”,
edited by Desmaisons, St. Petersburg, 1874, Vol.II, page 28.
2
As to the alleged Mongol origin of the Afshars, see ”Les 
Afsars d!Urumiyeh” by B. Nikitine, in the ”Journal Asiatique”, 
January-March 1929*
In this connection, see the interesting articles by Sayyid 
Ahmad Aqa TabrTzi, in the Tehran periodical Ayanda, No.IV,
1304 (1926), No. IX, 1305 (1927), and Part II, No. VIII,
1306 (1928). Dr. M. Afshar was kind enough to send me 
copies of these articles.
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Mfrza MahdT states that the Qiriqlu (or Qirikhlu) 
branch of the tribe, to which Nadir belonged, went to 
Khurasan in the time of Sh~h IsmacIl I (1502 - 1524 A.D.), 
and that they made their yailaq or summer camping ground 
by some springs known as Hayab Kubkan, just south of the 
Allahu Akbar ranged Sayyid Ahmad Aqa Tabrlzl says, 
however, that Shah'Abbas I moved the Qiriqlu Afshars and 
the Chamishgazak Kurds to that district, in order to oust 
the Ozbegs therefrom? However that may be, It seems that 
there were Afshars in Khurasan from, at any rate, the 
beginning of the XVI century A.D., for Khwandamlr, in his 
Habxbu* s-Siyarp speaks of a certain Shahrukh Beg Afshar 
YajujI being sent from Herat in 920 A.H. (1514/15 A.D.) to 
the province of Qandahar, in order to subdue a rebel named 
Shuja* Beg there. I am quite unable to say whether there
was any close connection between the Yajujf and Qiriqlu 
Afshars (the epithet ”Yajujf”, i.e. Tlof Gog”, may only have 
been applicable to Shahrukh Beg himself).
1
T.N., page 17 •
2
See the Ayanda, Part II, No. VIII, page 601.
Habibu1s-Siyar, Vol.Ill, Part IV, page 75-
Nadirfs relations with the various branches of 
the Afshars were by no means invariably friendly. He was, 
according to MTrzS Mahdi, deserted by certain of the Afshars 
during his first attempt to overcome Malik Mahmud SistanI;'L 
later on, certain clans revolted against him (e.g. at 
Kirman in 1746) and several Afshars, including one belonging 




T.N., page 19; see also page 50 above.
2
See pages 374 and 377 above.
APPENDIX II.
NadirTs Original Name.
There is some doubt as to the correct form of 
Nadir1s original name. In the first place, MXrza MahdT, 
Muhammad Muhsin and others write Nadr Qull Beg, while some, 
such as Shaikh HazXn, give the form Nadhr Quli Beg. The 
fact that Nadir, on becoming Shah, unquestionably took the name 
Nadir and not NacLhir, seems to show that Nadr and not Nadhr 
was the original form. Also, if any significance is to be 
attached to the meaning of the name, Nadr Qull ("the slave of 
the wonderful11) makes much better sense than Nadhr Qull (TTthe 
slave of the votive offering”). Secondly, there is the view 
held by Professor Naficy of Tehran, that ”^ 11” should be 
substituted for ”QulT”. He bases his argument on the fact 
that Nadir ^ 11 Is the name shown not only in the Waqf-Nama 
or deed of bequest relating to Nadirfs tomb at Mashhad, but 
also on the gilt portico of the shrine of the Imam Rida at 
Mashhad (see the Matla*uTsh-Shams, Vol.II, page 20); he also 
states that Qull (Turkish for ”slave”) is only used after the 
name of a divinity, sdint or protector.
On the other hand, the MSS. of the Tafrlkh-i-Nadirl, 
Zubdatu1 t-Tawarlkh, Bayan-i-WaqX', etc., all give ”QulI” and 
not also, Nadr Qull Is not an impossible combination,
as Nadr is an alternative form of Nadir (meaning the "rare”, 
"unique* or "wonderful*), and so could he taken as referring 
to Allah.
As to the name Nadir *All which is said to be on
the gilt portico of the shrine at Mashhad, it is known that
Nadir, on three occasions, gave orders for the shrine to be 
repaired and embellished. After capturing the city in 
December 1726 Nadir had some repairs carried out and ordered
the dome to be gilt and a second minaret built. It seems
probable that the portico was constructed later, either
after his coronation in 1736 or In 1740 or 1741 after his
\
return from India. This would, if correct, account for 
the form "Nadir* instead of "Nadr": as to the name "ill",
this may have been added in order to please the Mu.1 tahids.
The Waqf-Nama, being of later date, does not 
furnish conclusive evidence.
APPENDIX III.
The British in Iran.
During Nadirfs period of power, Great Britain 
had not, despite her fairly considerable commercial interests 
in Iran, any diplomatic or consular representatives in the 
country.^ - While the Dutch were also, strangely: enough, 
unrepresented in this way, tlje Russians maintained, for the 
greater part of the time, a Resident at the Court, as well 
as a Consul in Gllan. France, whose stake in the country 
was smaller than those of the three powers mentioned above, 
had a Consul at IsfahSn until May, 1730.
Nadir1s first contact with the British was, as will 
be seen below, in November 1729- Hanway relates that Nadir 
more than once remarked of the English that "they are bold, 
and appear like men of business
Save for Dr. Cook at the end of Nadir1s reign and 
for sundry officers and men of the Mercantile Marine who 
belonged to independently owned vessels, no persons of British 
nationality other than those in the service of, or connected 
with, the East India and Russia Companies visited Iran during 
the period under review.
■^Captain Elton recommended, probably in 17^ 3, that one of the 
British subjects in GTlan should be appointed British Consul 
there. (See Hanway, Vol.II, page 28).
2Vol. I, page 258. •*'
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Since the Russia Company did not actively concern 
itself with Iran until 1739# the affairs of the East India 
Company will be dealt with first.
I. The East India Company.
It would be easy to fill at least one volume with 
the record of the Company* s affairs in Iran between 1729 
1747« Space, however, only permits of a brief summary being 
given.
The East India Company, during the period under
review, maintained establishments at Gombroon, Isfahan (for
part of the time on a greatly reduced scale), Kirman and
Shiraz. It was, on the whole, a most unfavourable time for
trading in Iran. The invasions by the Afghans, Turks and
Russians and the state of insecurity prevailing in many parts
had brought about severe economic depression. When, through
Nadirfs military exploits, Tahmasp was established on his
throne in Isfahan, the hopes of the Company, as of the *
community at large, for the coming of a more settled and 
prosperous era were aroused. Unfortunately, such hopes were 
vain, for Nadir was no economist, and soon showed that he had 
no regard at all for the encouragement of trade, whether Iranian 
or foreign. All that he wanted was the provision of men, money
and supplies, in order that he might carry out his martial aims.
407
As has already pointed out, Nadir seemed to have no conception 
that his extortionate ways were rapidly ruining the country.
Although Nadir was, at the outset, friendly to the 
Isfahan representatives of the Company, it was not long 
before his attitude completely changed! In general, the 
English and Dutch Companies were on bad terms with each other, 
and it was therefore easy for Nadir to play off one concern 
against the other.
It was customary, and in fact necessary, in those 
times for the companies to make periodical gifts to influential 
ministers, Governors and lesser officials. In this respect, 
the Dutch Company had a considerable advantage over its rival, 
because, owing to its being almost a national enterprise, it 
had more funds at its disposal. Consequently, the Dutch 
Company nearly always led the way with presents and, by their more 
lavish scale, it was sometimes able to secure concessions that 
were denied to its poorer rival. Moreover, the English Agent 
frequently got reprimanded by Bombay and London for making 
presents at all, although, under the then existing conditions, 
little or nothing could be accomplished without
I ~ _ _ _ _ _
In December 1729 Nadir, by threatening to use violence, 
extorted 300 tomans from Cock ell at Isfahan. According 
to the Gombroon Diary (of the 14th/25th February) the 
Dutch had bribed NSdirfs officers and had alleged that 
the East India Company had been assisting the ^Ophgoons” 
Afghans).
this means of securing the good will of influential persons.
It was the misfortune of the Company that, for nearly ten 
years, it had to conduct most of its business with the 
Government through the medium of Muhammad TaqT Khan ShTrazl, 
the corrupt and disloyal Beglarbegi of Fars.3*
The Company was extremely anxious to secure from 
the Government the renewal of certain privileges which it had 
lost; the most important of these were the right of being 
customs-free at Gombroon and, secondly, the grant of one half 
of the customs receipts at that part. Further, there was its 
claim for the repayment of a loan of 3,000 tomans to Sh"Sh ' 
Sultan Husain, as well as for compensation for sundry losses.
Sh5h Tahmpsp showed himself very favourably inclined 
towards the Company, and promised to make amends for its losses, 
but it soon became evident that the Shah was in no position to 
carry out his undertakings.
It was in the matter of shipping that Nadir sought 
to make most use of the Dutch and English Companies; he made 
it clear to them both that they could expect no redress of their 
grievances unless and until they met his wishes in this respect. 
The English Company, like the Dutch, often found it most 
inconvenient, for purely commercial reasons, to lend its ships
I
Otter well describes TaqT KhSh as !Tun homme de mauvaise foi 
et avide de pr^sens." (Vol.II, page 86).
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to the Iranian Government. Moreover, it had the fear that 
its vessels might be used against the Turks. As it had a 
factory at Basra, it was apprehensive lest the Turks should 
seize its effects and maltreat its representatives there, in 
retaliation for such use. For similar reasons, it was averse 
to its shipping being employed against the Arabs of Muscat and 
elsewhere.
The Company adopted, as an alternative, the sale of 
ships to Nadir. Then followed a:;long contest between the 
Company and the Sh5h; the former promising ships in return 
for the grant of its former privileges and the latter stating 
that he would do nothing in this respect unless and until 
his naval requirements were met. Needless to say, Nadir 
always found some excuse to defer granting all that the Company 
wanted. In return for Its services for procuring ships, the 
Company recovered certain of its privileges, but It never 
obtained its chief desideratum, namely, that of being customs 
free at Gombroon. It nevertheless secured payment for a time 
of 1,000 tomans a year out of the customs receipts there, and 
was later granted in lieu thereof one-third of the customs on 
freight borne by its own vessels.**' It was not, however, deemed 
to be in the Company1 s interests that Nadir should have a strong
I — —  —
Gombroon Diary, 12th/23rd March, 1757-
fleet In the Gulf ^ and measures were taken to prevent
o
"unauthorised" sales of vessels to the Iranians.
The unfortunate naval affair during the siege 
of Basra in May 1735 seemed at first certain to precipitate 
a crisis between Naidir and the Company, but, as stated in 
Chapter XI , the pressing needs of Nadir for additions to 
his fleet caused him to show no resentment.5
Meanwhile, in March 1735* the Companyfs factory 
at Isfahan had been practically closed down. Geekie, the 
Resident there, was withdrawn, and the establishment was 
left in charge of Hermet, the "linguist".4 The main reason
1 ~  "
See the summary of a letter from the Bombay Presidency 
dated the 21st November 1741, in H. Dodwell's rA Calendar
2 of the Madras Records, 1740-1744, page 230*.
Such sales naturally adversely affected the Company1s 
bargaining powers. In order to prevent these sales, as 
well as to keep the Iranian navy from becoming too strong, 
the Bombay Presidency, in 1741, decided to permit no vessel 
to proceed to an Iranian port until the owner had given a 
bond not to sell her to the Iranians without permission, undo? 
a penalty of 40,000 Rs. (See Dodwell, op.cit., Page 230;. 
Despite these measures, a vessel named the "Robert" was 
disposed of at Bushire in January 1742 without authorisation 
by the Company. The Agent remarked (Gombroon Diary, 27th 
January/7th February 1742) that this sale was "Contrary to 
orders and transacted unluckily at a Juncture when We are 
endeavouring to raise the greatest Merit possible by a 
compliance of this kind." (The owner sold the vessel for 
1,000 tomans, but Taqr Kh5n deducted 150 tomans as his 
commission.)
3
See page 156 above. The Company was, of course, entirely 
blameless in the matter, but TaqI Khan threatened the Agent 
that NSdir would, if the reports of the incident proved 
correct, "put a Ring in our Ears which We shall remember 
to the Day of Judgement". (Gombroon Diary, 16th/27th July, 1735 )
4Gombroon Diary, 28th March/8th April and 2nd/13th April 1735*
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for this step was the decline in trade and the growing 
difficulty in recovering debts owing to the Company, due 
to the increasing impoverishment of the inhabitants (at a 
later date, Nadir’s choise of Mashhad as his capital caused 
the star of Isfahan to wane still further). Further, the 
troubles with the Goverment, which were largely occasioned 
by its exactions, were an additional reason for the withdrawal.
The provisioning of the Qandahar expeditionary force, 
as already related,'*'interfered seriously with the Company’s 
transport arrangements. Consignments of wool from KIrmah 
to Gombroon were greatly delayed owing to the lack of camels 
and mules.
In February 1742 TaqI Khan gave fresh proofs of 
his dishonesty. The Company had, shortly before, delivered 
two vessels to the Government, for which It had received 8,000 
tomans on account; another 1300 tomans remained to be paid.
TaqI Khan privately requested the Company not only to forego 
any further payment, but to give him a receipt (to be forwarded 
to Nadir) for 10,000 tomans. As the Agent considered that 
a complaint to Nadir would not only be useless,^but would result 
^See pages 187 and 188 above.
^Nadir’s toleration of TaqI Khan’s misdemeanours was remarkable. 
It is stated in the Gombroon Diary (l3th/24th March 1742) that 
it was discovered, after TaqI Khan’s dismissal from his post 
in 1740, that he had embezzled 1500 tomans. On this matter 
being reported to Nadir, he merely ordered TaqI KhSn to pay up 
the sum in question. Consequently, the Agent deemed It use­
less to report TaqI Kh^n’s conduct to Nadir: to do so would
merely incur the Beglarbegi’s resentment and would achieve no 
useful purpose at the court.
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in arousing the Beglarbegi’s enmity, he compromised by 
agreeing to receive another 800 tomans and to waive all 
claim to the remaining 5 0 0 .1
The attempt by certain members of the Russia 
Company (see part II of this Appendix) to establish them­
selves in Northern Iran and to secure a share of the trade 
in woollen goods, led to the East India Company sending two 
European factors to Isfahan in the early summer of 1742, to 
reopen the factory there on the former basis.2 It was also 
proposed to open a factory at Mashhad, but this project was 
not approved by the London management.^
Peirson, the new Resident at Isfahan, sent Hermet 
to the Shah1 s camp in July 1745 In order to make a further 
attempt to secure the renewal of the Company’s privileges; 
this step was taken partly because of the endeavours of the 
Russia Company merchants to secure privileges from the Shah. 
When Hermet reached the camp, he was interviewed by MTrza 
Mahdl, who said that it would not only be useless, but also
“^Gombroon Diary 20th February/3rd March 1742. See also Otter, 
Vol.II, pages 162-3* Otter, however, gives an incomplete 
account of this incident, as he was hot in possession of all 
the facts.
2
See the reference, in the Gombroon Diary of the 6/l7th 
August 1743> to Peirson1s letter from Isfahan of the 16th/ 
27th July.
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most Injudicious for him to appear before Nadir unless he 
could make the Shah a suitable present. When he found that 
Hermet was not in a position to make any present to the Shah, 
MIrzS Mahdl advised him to return to Isfahan; although Hermet 
offered MTrza Mahdl 100 tomans, the latter refused to take any 
action.'*'
The*0man campaign, by reason of the requisitioning 
of supplies and heavy taxation which it occasioned, had a bad 
effect upon trade in southern Iran. The revolt of TaqT Khan 
in 1744 caused a further set-back to trade. It is stated in 
the Gombroon Diary^that the Dutch, in concert with the Shah- 
bandar of Gombroon, drew up and sent to Nadir a document charging 
the East India Company with complicity in TaqT Kha^s revolt.
The Agent, on the old "tu quoque" principle, retaliated by 
sending the Shah a counter-charge against the Dutch.
Trading conditions during the concluding years of 
Nadir fs reign were most unfavour able. 5 The Shah fs extortionate 
ways became more burdensome than ever. When Nadir was at 
Kirman in the early part of 17479 he forced Graves, the Companyfs 
representative there, to give him a draft on the Isfahan office 
for 1100 tomans, which he sent to the Isfahan authorities, for
^Gombroon Diary, 20th/31st December 1745*
2
" " 10th/21st April 1744.
3
Dorrill informed London on the 5^ **/ 16th December 1745 that 
"the Name of Trade is forgot..... . .in Persia", owing to the 
continued revolts and disturbances.
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collection. When the draft was presented for payment,
Peirson had insufficient funds in hand to meet it, and was 
forced to borrow in order to make up the required total. In 
reporting the matter to Gombroon, Peirson stated that he had 
had very great difficulty In arranging this loan. It is a 
proof of the insecurity of those times that the minimum rate 
at which money was then available on loan at Isfahan was 
15$ per mensem.^
The Shahf s conduct was so unreasonable and trading 
conditions were g o bad that the Company more than once 
contemplated the complete abandonment of its Iranian business. 
It nevertheless persevered and, in due course, it weathered the 
storm.
As for the Dutch, they fared no better than their 
British rivals during these troubled times. The French 
Compagnie des Indes, in pursuance of Dupleixfs policy of 
expansion,2 made a most ill-timed endeavour to re-establish 
its trade at Gombroon in 1740.3 After suffering severely at 
the hands of TaqT Khan (who on one occasion confiscated a
1
Letter from Peirson and Blandy to London, dated the 16th/27th 
May 1747 .
2
H. Castonnet des Fosses "Les Relations de la France avec 
la Perse", Angers, 1889, page 30.
3
Otter strongly advised the Company1s representative not to 
proceed with this project (see his Vol.II, pages 86 and 87)*
French vessel and held the captain to ransom)} and losing its 
Agent and his assistant through illness} the Company appointed 
a new Agent, Duplessis by name, who endeavoured, but without 
success, to secure a share in the Kirmah wool trade. Realising 
the futility of continuing the factory under the then existing 
conditions^ the Company recalled Duplessis, who left Gombroon 
in July 1745* Although the factory there was closed, French 
vessels continued to call at irregular intervals and to carry 
on some trade with the local merchants.
Otter, Vol. II, page 156.
A. Martineau, fLe premier Consulat de France b. Bassora . . 
page 69. Gombroon Diary, 19th/J0th October, 1740.
ibidem. In Martineau1 s words, the French "etaient obliges 
de subir tons les caprices des autoritSs locales. Ces 
caprices Itaient souvent deraisonnables, pourtant ils 
allaient rarement jusqufh la persecution". See also R. 
Vadala, "Le Golfe Persique", Paris, 1920, page 110.
II. THE RUSSIA COMPANY.
After Peter the Great had conquered the littoral 
of Daghistan and Shlrvan and had occupied Gllan, he endeavoured 
to stimulate trade and industry in his new dominions by inviting 
the English to revive their former trade with Iran through 
Russia.^ " Although nothing came of this project during Peter’s 
lifetime, a most important step towards its realisation was 
taken in 1754, when the commercial treaty between Great Britain 
and Russia was concluded♦ In clause VIII of this treaty 
provision was made for British merchants to send their goods 
in transit through Russia to Iran or vice versa on payment of 
a of 3$ ad valorem.^
It was not until that nenterprising but indiscreet 
Englishman”^  Captain John Elton, paid his first visit to Iran 
in 1759t that actual advantage was taken of the above privilege. 
Elton, whilst employed by the Russian Government on the Orenburg 
expedition, made several vain attempts to travel from the Yaik 
river to the Sea of Aral and thence on to KhTva and Bukhara.
The primary object of his journey to Iran in 1759* with the 
young Scotsman Mungo Graeme, was to open up trade with ”the
1
Hanway, Vol.I, page 1J. See also W. Tooke’s "View of the 
Russian Empire under Catherine II” (London, 1800), Vol.Ill, 
page 446.
o
The text of this clause is giver* by Hanway, Vol.I, pages 47 
and 48.
^Malcolm, Vol.II, page 102.
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Bucharies” (as he termed Bukhara and Khiva) via Astarabad. 
Reference has been made in Chapter XX to the trading 
privileges which Rida Qull MTrza accorded to Elton and 
Graeme in August 1759* and to the journey of Thompson and 
Hogg to Khiva and Bukhara in 1740-41. Leaving Graeme 
behind in Iran, Elton returned to St. Petersburg, where he 
arrived at the end of January 1740. Elton gave glowing 
accounts to the British merchants at St. Petersburg of the 
prospects of the trade with Iran; in July 1740 he wrote 
a long memorandum in which he set forth the privileges 
which, he considered, should be secured from the Russian 
Government in order that the transit trade might be carried 
on. Elton wrote another memorandum for the information of 
Edward Finch, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, in 
which he gave particulars of his scheme and drew attention 
to the advantages which the British traders would enjoy.^ 
Elton pointed out the importance of Mashhad, which Nadir had 
made his capital, but stated that the Mashhad trade was of 
less Importance than that with nthe Bucharies”, Kabul, 
Qandahar, India and even Tibet, which could be carried on 
through Mashhad. It was essential for the success of the 
project that the British merchants should have their own
1
For the text see ”The Gentleman’s Magazine”, Vol.XII (1742), 
pages 21-25. (This memorandum is the ”pompous memorial” 
which Hanway quotes in his Vol.I, pages 35*42.)
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vessels on the Volga and Caspian* The costs involved in 
sending British woollen goods by the Russian route would, 
Elton continued, be certainly far less than the freight on 
such goods when sent via India or Turkey* In Iran itself 
the posit'ion was eminently favourable; Rida Qull had 
thoroughly subdued the troublesome Turcoman and Ozbeg tribes­
men on the north-east frontier: as to trade rivals, the
East India Company had had to withdraw from Isfahan some 
years before, and the Dutch, although they remained there, 
were doing but little business. Lastly, much profit could 
be made out of Gllah silk.
Finch forwarded copies of these memoranda to
London, together with a translation of Rida Qull MIrza’s
"5.decree in favour of the British merchants, 1 u-mJl on
the 29th July/9th August 1 7 4 0 in his covering despatch 
Finch stated that the Russian Government nenter tains a good 
Opinion of the Undertaking and seems likely to encourage it”.
The Russia Company in London was favourably 
impressed with Elton’s arguments* Since the establishment 
of trade on the lines proposed by Elton would involve an 
infringement of the rights of the Levant Company, the Russia
1 '
A translation of this decree is given in "The Gentleman’s 





Company entered into negotiations with the Board of Trade, ■*- 
with the result that, in 1741, an Act of Parliament was passed 
which removed this disability, despite the opposition of the 
Levant Company.
In the meantime two British factors, Thompson and 
Hogg by name, left St. Petersburg for KhTva and Bukhara.
They reached KhTva safely, but were detained there during 
Nadir’s siege of the town in November 1740. Thompson went 
on to Bukhara in the following year. He stated that in both 
KhTva and Bukhara "no foreign commodity bears a price 
proportionate to the risque of bringing it to market".^
Particulars have already been given of how Elton 
and Woodroofe, after being entrusted with a cargo of goods 
by certain of the British merchants at St. Petersburg (it Is 
important to note that the Russia Company did not trade with 
Iran in its corporate capacity), reached Iran in June 1742 
and of how Russian animosity was aroused by their carrying 
cargoes of rice from Enzeli to Darband for the Iranian troops 
in Daghistan.^ The Russian authorities were alarmed when
1
For details of the conferences held at the Board of Trade, see 
the Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 
January 1734/5 to December, 1741, Vol.XLVIII, pages 346-356 
and 376 and 377 (London, 193o) •
2
See the Journal of Thompson & Hogg in Hanway, Vol.I, pages 
351 and 354.
''See page 3°4 above.
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Elton made a survey for the Shah of the south-east coast 
of the Caspian.^ * Then came reports of Elton having entered 
the Shah’s service - of his ship-building activities on 
Nadir’s behalf.
The Russian Government protested against Elton’s 
conduct, but the Russia Company believed at first that the
charges against Elton were based upon false and malicious
*
reports by Armenian and Russian merchants. On further 
protests being made, some of the British merchants in 
St. Petersburg who were interested in the Iranian trade
2sent Jonas Hanway to Iran on a mission of investigation.
Others of the merchants remained, however, firm believers in, 
and supporters of, Elton. ^ Hanway has described in great 
detail his experiences in Iran and his discussions with Elton 
and others. It seems clear from a hitherto unpublished letter4 
which Hanway wrote to London from Astrakhan when on his way 
back from Iran that he then (November 1744) entertained a more 
favourable idea of Elton and his activities than he afterwards 
allowed to appear in his published record.
^See Woodroofe’s Journal (in Hanway, Vol.I, Chapter XX).
2
In February 1743 Hanway had accepted a partnership in the 
St. Petersburg firm of Dingley and Klencke. (See S.P.91* 
Vol.XLIII and Hanway, Vol.I, page 83.
3
Cook, Vol.II, page $10.
^This letter was dated the 7th/l8th November 1744; a copy is 
to be found in S.P.91, Vol. XXXVI.
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Notwithstanding Russian opposition, some progress 
was made with the Iranian trade venture. A factory was 
established at Mashhad, and the woollen goods imported through 
Russia and Gllan began competing in central Iran with those 
of the East India Company, with the result that that company 
reopened its Isfahan factory?'
Difficulties in Iran itself, as well as in Russia, 
were not slow in arising. Early in 1743 goods to the value 
of some 3*500 tomans were seized by the Government in Gilan?
In November of the same year Mungo Graeme was murdered by 
robbers when returning from Mashhad to Resht? Further, the 
climate, particularly in GTlah, caused much illness and some 
mortality amongst the British factors; Hanway states that
4
five (out of a total of sixteen) died between 1740 and 1744.
1
See page 413 above.
2
Gombroon Diary, 4th/15th January 1743* The Agent remarked, 
with a certain satisfaction, that "paying Customs (in Iran) 
proves no Exemption from Impositions, and it is not Our 
Masters that suffer only in such Calamitous Times".
5
Hanway, Vol. II, page 24. See also the letter from Gombroon 
to London (apparently written early in 1744), in Vol. XV 
of the Persia and Persian Gulf Records.
4
Hanway, Vol. I, page 221.
Moreover, the manner in which the transit duty 
was calculated in Russia amounted to 7$ in the current 
Russian money, instead of the 3% stipulated.1
As time went on, the complaints of the Russian 
Government grew more and more vehement, particularly after 
Elton had completed his first vessel for Nadir.2 Although 
Hanway had failed to persuade Elton to sever his connection 
with the Iranian court, further efforts were made through 
Lord Tyrawley to induce him to do so.5 He was even offered 
a pension of £400 a year (to he levied on the Iranian trade), 
with the alternative of a commission in the British Navy.4 
Elton, when pressed once more to return to England, produced 
a decree from Nadir, dated the 21st November 1745* stating 
that "the properest of the Christians" (i.e. Elton) was not 
permitted to leave Iran as it was necessary for him to attend
1
This duty was payable in rixr-dollars (reichsthalers). See 
the Petition from the Russia Company to the King in Council, 
a copy of which was sent by Whitehall to St. Petersburg on 
the 30th July 1742 (S.P.91, Vol.XXXI.)
2
Lerch, when at Darband, saw an 18-gun frigate which Elton had 
built. Elton was then (1745)> Lerch said, an Admiral, but 
he was, nominally at any rate, under the "Over-Admiral", 
MTrzaT Muhammad Khan, who was also Governor of Baku. At that 
time, two frigates and four smaller vessels were said to be 
finished, while other ships were under construction. 
(Biisching’s "Magazin", Vol.X, page 404).
^James O’Hara, Baron Tyrawley, was Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary from 1743 to 1745-
4
Hanway, Vol.II, page 34.
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the court at the next Nau Ruz and "to settle our naval 
affairs on a right foundation".'*'
Bakunin, who had succeeded Arapov as Consul at 
Resht, sent to St. Petersburg in 1745 and 1746, two long 
reports containing accusations against Elton. Copies of 
these reports, couched in very Russified German, were 
communicated by the Russian Government to Lord Tyrawley and 
his successor, the Earl of Hyndford.  ^ Lord Hyndford formed 
the opinion that the agitation against Elton was engineered 
largely by the enemies of Bestuzhev (who had been responsible, 
on the Russian side, fbr the conclusion of the 1734 treatj).? 
However that may have been, the situation went from bad to 
worse.
At the request of the Russian Government, the two 
British ships on the Caspian were sold to Russian merchants 
and sailed thereafter under the Russian flag. The next step 
was far more drastic; by a decree issued in November 1746 the 
Empress withdrew the transit privileges accorded by the treaty
Lord Hyndford, in his despatch of the 22nd November/Jrd 
December 1745* forwarded these reports to London, where 
they were examined by the Russia Company.
2
See Lord Hyndford1s despatch referred to in the preceding note.
3
Hanway, Vol.II, page 47-
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of 1734 and requested the British Ambassador to inform the 
British merchants concerned that no more goods should be 
consigned to Iran and that they should immediately liquidate 
their affairs there and withdraw their servants and effects
The British Government protested at this decree, and 
pointed out that it was most unfair to penalise those British 
merchants engaged in the Iranian trade who were not associated 
with Elton; the Russian Government, however, remained adamant. 
Notwithstanding this ban on their trade, some merchants and 
factors remained on in Iran, in the hope that the decree might 
be rescinded. However, in the disturbances that broke out 
in Iran after Nadir1 s death, everything was lost, goods to the 
value of £80,000 being seized.^ By 1751 ali the British, save 
Elton, had left northern Iran, As for Elton, he was murdered 
in Gilan in April 1751*^ Although the Russian charges against 
him were, in mapy respects, grossly exaggerated, and in some 
cases actually false, the basic fact remains that it was his
Hanway, Vol.II, pages 74-78. The extent to which Elton's 
actions were resented in Russia may be gauged from the fact 
that, as long afterwards as December 1762, when the Earl of 
Buckingham was endeavouring to negotiate another commercial 
treaty in Moscow, he reported that, on touching upon the 
question of British trade with Iran, he found: f,Mr. Elton1 s
misconduct has made an impression which it will be very
difficult to get the better of." See "The Despatches and 
Correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buckingham, Ambassador 
to the Court of Catherine II, 1762-1765*" (London, 1900), 
page llj.
H^anway, Vol.II, page 90*
H^anway, Vol.II, page 120. According to Lerch (Buschingfs
"Magazin", Vol.X, page 460), Elton was murdered in 1750*
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injudicious conduct in entering Nadir's service and in 
assisting him to found a navy on the Caspian which, by 
arousing the fears of Russia, brought about the collapse 
of the enterprise. As Hanway very truly remarked:...."unless 
we could convey our merchandize through the Russian empire 
with the good will of that nation, there could be no conveyance 
at all".^ It was unfortunate that Elton did not use his 
undoubted talents in such a manner as not to prejudice the 
Interests of the Russia Company merchants. If, for example, 
he could have persuaded Nadir to place him in charge of the 
Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf, he would have had ample 
scope for his abilities, without giving Russia any grounds for 
offence. It is probable, however, that the East India Company 
would not have relished anyone like Elton being appointed to a
high position in the Iranian fleet, it being to that Company1s 
advantage for Iran to have an ineffective fleet.
When all is said and done, however, it is clear that, 
even if Elton had done nothing to alienate the good will of 
Russia, the Iranian venture would have ended in failure, owing 
to the course of events in Iran.
1
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ABSTRACT OF A THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.
NADIR SHAH 
By Laurence Lockhart, B.A., (1955)
This thesis is historical rather than biographical. 
The story of Nadir’s life, after his rise to power, is to so 
large an extent that of Iran as well that it has been necessary 
to relate the history of that country during the period of 
Nadir’s prominence; further, I have had to give, in outline, 
the course of events in adjacent countries, in so far as this 
was affected by Nadir’s policy and acts. Ranging as he did 
from beyond Qars in the west to Delhi in the east, threatening 
Russia for a time from Daghistah, and seeking dominion in 
Turkistan and in Arabia, Nadir was undeniably a figure of great 
international importance for several years.
In compiling the thesis, I have utilised, as far as 
possible, purely contemporary authorities. When describing 
important events, I have endeavoured to draw my facts from 
more than one source; in fact, I have, throughout, sought to 
coordinate the Iranian and other authorities available. I 
have tried to be strictly impartial,rneither\seekingyto gloss 
over Nadir’s illdeed^bor to magnify his good actions.
In the course of my investigations, I was fortunate 
enough to come upon a fairly considerable amount of hitherto
unutilised material) notably*' at the India Office and the 
Public Record Office*
Events have been recorded chronologically* except 
in the last chapter where* in the appraisement of Nadir1 s 
qualities* I found that some recapitulation was necessary.
I have devoted some space to the activities and 
tribulations of the East India Company and of the Russia 
Company but* in order not to cumber the main narrative unduly* 
I have included in an appendix the bulk of the information 
respecting these two Companies.
Besides giving a bibliographical introduction* I 
have compiled a bibliography of the sources consulted* and I 
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